Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA738
2009-09-04 10:51:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0738/01 2471051
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041051Z SEP 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9221
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4706
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1891
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0885
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6081
S E C R E T GENEVA 000738 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIR ON CESSATION OF CONTINUOUS
MONITORING AT VOTKINSK

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000738

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIR ON CESSATION OF CONTINUOUS
MONITORING AT VOTKINSK

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-012.


2. (U) At paragraph 3 below is the text of the official
translation of the Russian Aide-Memoir on cessation of
continuous monitoring at Votkinsk that was provided to the
U.S. Delegation on August 31, 2009.


3. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation
CONFIDENTIAL
To be Turned over to the
U.S. Side
Paper of the Russian Side
August 31, 2009

On the Issue of Completion of U.S. Inspection
Activities at the Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs
at Votkinsk
(Aide-Memoire)

The U.S. side's latest official papers on the issue of
completion of U.S. inspection activities at the production
facility at Votkinsk and the U.S. Department of State's
reaction to the relevant demarche from the Ambassador of the
Russian Federation in Washington show that our U.S. partners
refuse to understand the logic of the Russian side's actions,
which is in strict accord with the provisions of the START
Treaty.

We are perplexed and seriously concerned by the
substance of the non-paper of August 14, 2009, entitled "U.S.
Views Regarding the Expiration of the START Treaty and
Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring at the Production
Facility (sic) at Votkinsk." Above all, we cannot regard it
as an official response to our Note No. 5405 of June 16,
2009, either in form or in content.

The Russian side has not questioned and is not
questioning the U.S. side's right "to carry out its full
START Treaty rights with respect to PPCM at Votkinsk until
the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009." At
the same time, the U.S. side has also never denied that after
2400 hours on December 4 of this year there will be no legal
grounds for the presence of the U.S. verification mission on
the territory of the Russian Federation. Therefore, in
accordance with the existing practice of completing
continuous (monitoring) inspection activities under the INF
Treaty, preparation of the relevant package of documents
governing the procedure for completion of U.S. verification
activities in Russia was initiated as far back as a year ago.
In this connection, in a spirit of good will the Russian
side expressed its willingness to provide the United States
of America with the necessary assistance in ensuring the
calm, orderly, and respectful withdrawal of its personnel and
property from Votkinsk. However, it would seem that the U.S.
side is not interested in this.

The Russian Federation's position on the U.S.
verification mission at Votkinsk is utterly transparent and


consistent. The issue of the U.S. continuous inspection
presence at the Votkinsk plant is not and will not be a
subject of negotiations in the context of working out the new
treaty on strategic offensive arms. This principled decision
by the Russian side is not subject to discussion and, thus,
there are no grounds for raising the question of
"preservation in a caretaker status" of the U.S. continuous
monitoring facility at Votkinsk "until such time as
inspection activity (sic) is reestablished."

We believe that at present the discussion can involve
only the time frame for signing the drafts, which were agreed
upon earlier, of the Agreement on Principles and Procedures
for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the
Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and the letters of exchange on
the use of ground transportation and settlement of accounts.
In this connection, we reaffirm our proposal, which was
transmitted to the U.S. State Department through Russian
Ambassador S.I. Kislyak, to complete this process during the
upcoming round of the negotiations on strategic offensive
arms in Geneva on August 31-September 3, 2009.

We would again urge the U.S. side to comply with its
obligations under the START Treaty and begin as soon as
possible taking practical steps to complete its continuous
presence at Votkinsk so as to ensure that both equipment
belonging to the U.S. and U.S. personnel are removed from the
territory of the Russian Federation by December 5.

We look forward to an early response from the U.S.

End text.


4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS