START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000733

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO U.S.
DRAFT TREATY AND RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TREATY ELEMENTS

REF: A. STATE 88259

B. STATE 88260

C. STATE 88262

D. STATE 88263

E. GENEVA 0616 (SFO-GVA-III-001)

F. GENEVA 0617 (SFO-GVA-III-002)

G. STATE 04678

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-002.


2. (U) Meeting Date: August 31, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:15 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

Meeting Date: September 1, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) During meetings on August 31 and September 1, the
Russian Delegation provided initial comments on the
U.S.-proposed draft Treaty (REFS A-D),and presented Russian
proposals on several elements of the Treaty. The Russian
Delegation also raised the issue of Votkinsk closure under
START, delivering points raised previously, and emphasizing
that Russia expected all U.S. monitors and equipment to be
gone from Russian territory by midnight on December 4.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation stated that the U.S. draft
treaty had been prepared professionally, and complimented the
United States in this regard. However, Russia was concerned
that key issues Russia had raised before were not adequately
reflected, noting that Russia had presented specific proposed
text for the new treaty that had not been included. Russia
perceived an imbalance regarding the treatment of road-mobile
missile systems in the U.S. draft as compared to other
systems of concern from their perspective, particularly,
ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and heavy
bombers. Russia also asked why the United States retained
START's telemetry provisions when the START limitations that
telemetry was meant to verify were not retained. Finally,
Russia raised certain elements of the draft treaty's
preamble, and questioned specifically why the United States
objected to the idea of basing the treaty on the concept of
"equal security," and why the United States did not accept
Russian-proposed text concerning Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine fulfilling their obligations under START.


5. (S) Russia presented its proposal for the new treaty's
structure and key elements of certain treaty articles.
Russia proposed the new treaty contain fifteen (15) articles,
several of which were consistent with the U.S. draft treaty,
at least in terms of subject area. Important differences
included proposed articles for: deployments and
confidence-building measures. Russia did not, however,
provide details for each of these elements, noting Russia's
complete draft treaty was awaiting approval at the


President's office, and would be provided to the United
States at a later date. Russia proposed a single annex to
the treaty that would combine elements of the various START
Protocols and Annexes, and would include specifically
sections on: terms and definitions; treaty database;
procedures for conversion or elimination; notifications;
inspections, visits and exhibitions; and the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC). Russia's presentation made
clear that the Russian approach was to carry forward text
from START, but to limit it significantly. Their draft would
be much shorter than the U.S.-proposed draft.

--------------
INITIAL RUSSIAN COMMENTS
ON U.S. DRAFT TREATY
--------------


6. (S) Antonov noted that the U.S. draft START Follow-on
treaty had not been distributed to the Russian interagency
for review because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not
completed the official translation of the document. He
provided the following comments, which he characterized as
his personal comments, and explained that he only had time to
read in detail the treaty's preamble and final provisions:

- The U.S. draft treaty text was prepared very
professionally, and it was important that future work be
continued in this manner.

- Most importantly, the U.S. draft was clearly derived from
START, and the U.S. and Russian positions coincided on
several issues. These included: the prohibition on the
transfer of strategic offensive arms to third parties;
maintenance of existing patterns of cooperation with other
states; provisions for the BCC; the preamble; and the
treaty's final provisions.

- On the preamble, in comparing the U.S. and Russian texts,
there was much in common, and the U.S. approach was
"creative" in several places in its attempts to improve the
style and to outline some new ideas.

- The U.S. draft, however, did not reflect Russian concerns
addressed in previous sessions. This was puzzling as the
U.S. Delegation had said that Russia's positions were clear
and noted, although the United States did try to integrate
text from the Russian preamble and the final provisions into
U.S.-proposed joint draft texts. Without addressing Russia's
main concerns, stated in papers given to the U.S. Delegation,
it would be impossible to conclude a new treaty. This
position was presented several times before, and was not just
the position of the Russian Delegation; it was also mentioned
by President Medvedev in his speech in Helsinki.

- It was unclear whether the United States sought to
compensate its nuclear weapon reductions with increases in
conventional strategic strike and missile defense
capabilities. Russia could not ignore this possibility.
Consideration of the potential impact of the new treaty on
Russian national security was especially important before the
Russian interagency could submit a proposed document to its
leadership. Russia could never accept a treaty that
permitted the United States to compensate for reductions with


build-ups of U.S. military potential in other areas.

- Russia would complete its review of the U.S. draft treaty
quickly, and would not delay the negotiations. The Russian
Delegation proceeded from the timetable established by
Presidents Medvedev and Obama; the outcome of the
negotiations should be a completed document by late November.


7. (S) Buzhinskiy provided additional comments, as follows.

- The imbalanced nature of the U.S. draft treaty was
puzzling, particularly with regard to limits and verification
measures for mobile launchers and the inclusion of telemetry
provisions. The July 6 Joint Understanding stated that the
new treaty would allow each Party to determine for itself the
structure and composition of its strategic offensive arms.
Further, inspections and verification would be made less
costly compared to START. However, one-sixth of the document
was devoted to mobile ICBMs, particularly with respect to
inspection and verification; or "two out of seventeen
articles, 14 of 138 paragraphs, and 23 out of 135
definitions," while only the Russian Side had mobile ICBMs.
Therefore, much of the treaty applied only to Russian systems.

- From the military perspective, mobile missiles were not
distinguishable from other mobile strategic offensive arms,
such as submarines, and were sometimes less effective. In
terms of the potential of mobile missiles versus submarines,
the greater threat came from submarines, with multiple
warhead SLBMs. Mobile missile patrols were limited to the re
stricted areas and national territory of a Party, which could
be sufficiently verified by national technical means (NTM),
while the movement of submarines beyond national territory
was not re stricted, and the secrecy of their movement
greatly exceeded that of mobile ICBM systems. However, the
United States had not included any limits on the movement of
submarines, or any special provisions for NTM of verification
or other monitoring provisions.

- The situation was similar for heavy bombers. Their ability
to deploy at great distances from their bases, the lack of
effective verification for their movement, and their ability
to carry a significant number of armaments made them more
threatening than mobile missile systems, yet there were no
comparable provisions for heavy bombers.

- The U.S.-proposed numerical limits on non-deployed mobile
missile launchers were not understandable, particularly since
there were no comparable limits for non-deployed SLBM
launchers.

- Regarding telemetry, START provided for telemetry exchanges
to support provisions concerning throw-weight, heavy ICBMs,
and numbers of reentry vehicles that could be flight-tested
on new systems. None of these provisions, however, were
included in the draft treaty, and the U.S. reference to
transparency was not clear. The separate reference within
the Definitions Annex to the SS-25 within the definition of
"new type" was also puzzling.

- Based on an initial review, the conclusion drawn was that
the U.S. draft treaty did not reflect the April 1 Joint
Statement of the Presidents. In his view the mechanical


inclusion of START treaty text in the new treaty would not
result in a good treaty.

--------------
U.S. RESPONSE TO ISSUES
RAISED BY RUSSIA
--------------


8. (S) Gottemoeller replied to the Russian points with the
following comments.

- The United States had listened intently and read with
interest the papers provided by Russia concerning their key
issues (REFS E and F),and the U.S. Delegation would provide
additional responses later in the session. However, the
United States continued to wait for specific Russian-proposed
language to insert into the draft treaty.

- Regarding the limitations and provisions for mobile
missiles, the United States had worked hard to remove
provisions from START that constrained mobile missile
operations. The measures that remained served to verify
limits rather than restrict operations.

- Regarding heavy bombers, the U.S. approach was to provide a
more accurate account of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers
based on the concept of actual deployments.


9. (S) Siemon commented on the telemetry provisions
contained in the U.S. draft treaty. While there were no
limits in the draft treaty on missile throw-weight or heavy
ICBMs, telemetry was important in that it provided
understanding regarding the capabilities of new types of
missiles. Further, the record of START's Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission (JCIC) indicated that Russia had
telemetry-related questions in the past concerning the
functioning of reentry vehicles. While many of Russia's
questions were answered, the United States was prepared to
continue to exchange telemetry data as a means to enhance
transparency.


10. (S) Warner added the following points regarding the
comparison between mobile missile systems and submarines.

- To inhibit the underwater activities of submarines would
risk their survivability, and Russia's recognition that the
draft treaty did not include provisions to limit underwater
activities was accurate.

- However, the number of submarines and SLBM launchers, and
the number of warheads for these systems, were limited by the
two primary ceilings contained in the draft treaty, and these
limits were verifiable. Detailed information concerning
numbers of submarines, launchers, and warheads would be
included in the treaty's Memorandum of Understanding, in some
cases by location. Further, the combination of data update
inspections and the nuclear warhead inspections, drawn from
reentry vehicle inspections under START, would provide a very
detailed examination of the submarine-based capabilities of
each side.

- By contrast, the provisions on mobile missiles guarded
against the deployment of these systems beyond their bases,


which was important, as these systems were much smaller than
an SSBN, which was easily observed by NTM while in port. As
Russia MIRVed more of its mobile systems, the percentage of
these systems relative to strategic offensive arms would
grow. Importantly, however, the United States did not seek
restrictions on mobile missiles that would reduce their
survivability. In peacetime, Russia could spread its mobile
forces across very large areas. In a crisis it could field a
greater percentage of mobile systems. Both of these facts
made these systems impossible to target effectively.


11. (S) Elliott added that the draft treaty's provisions
applied equally to both Sides, as did the provisions for
silo-based ICBMs. But, because the United States did not
deploy mobile missiles, there existed a potentially
destabilizing situation. The United States had proposed
transparency measures for mobile missile systems as a
stabilizing factor, not a limiting factor. This was not
unlike provisions concerning heavy bombers.


12. (S) Antonov replied that the discussions on these issues
were useful to better understand each other's positions, and
such discussions would be continued in the working groups.

--------------
REVISITING RUSSIA'S KEY CONCERNS
--------------


13. (S) Antonov noted Gottemoeller's earlier comment that
the United States was waiting for specific Russian-proposed
text on its key issues. Russia's proposed text for these
issues was included in the papers it had provided at the last
session (REFS E and F),and Russia had no additional text.
Each of those papers discussed concepts associated with
Russia's concerns, and provided specific text for the new
treaty. While the text would be included in the draft treaty
that Russia was preparing, there would be no new language,
and it was surprising that the U.S. Delegation expected
additional text, since Russian text had already been provided
(in the paper).


14. (S) Buzhinskiy added that Russia was not against
providing additional details, but the key regarding
verification was that it be symmetrical. Mobile missiles
comprised the majority of Russia's strategic forces. While
the United States might consider them potentially
destabilizing, Russia considered non-nuclear missiles to be
far more destabilizing. The United States had noted that it
has no mobile ICBMs, but it should be noted that Russia has
no non-nuclear missiles, and he called for the Sides to make
symmetrical reductions. With regard to survivability and
what Russia could do in a crisis, that was irrelevant; in a
crisis Russia would not be concerned with treaty compliance.
Mobile missiles were a major part of Russia's strategic
potential, and SSBN forces were a major part of the U.S.
potential. To be symmetrical, the United States should
consider limiting the range of patrols and exchange of
information and NTM measures for its submarines. Otherwise
the U.S. proposals limited a significant portion of Russia's
potential, while leaving a significant portion of the U.S.
potential intact.


15. (S) Buzhinskiy continued that heavy bombers provided an


analogous situation. They could be located at great
distances from their bases and there was no effective
verification of their movement. This, combined with their
ability to carry multiple armaments at a time, made them no
less dangerous than mobile ICBMs. Yet, the U.S. draft treaty
contained no special limits or provisions for heavy bombers,
though Russia was prepared to accept the U.S. approach to
movements of heavy bombers outside national territory.
Turning to telemetry, he asked whether the U.S. interest was
primarily directed at new types, to which Siemon responded it
was.

--------------
RUSSIAN QUESTIONS ON
U.S. DRAFT PREAMBLE
--------------


16. (S) Antonov raised several questions associated with the
U.S. draft preamble. Specifically, why did the United States
not agree with the concept of "equal security" presented
previously by Russia? What about this concept, was it
unacceptable or threatening from the perspective of U.S.
national security? How could the Sides build a treaty that
was not based on this concept? Would that mean that one Side
would have more advantages or disadvantages than the other?
This idea was a basic principle of Russian foreign policy.
Was it not also a basic principle in U.S. relations with
other countries, or did the United States want more security
than others? What was wrong with this concept in a treaty in
the area of reductions of strategic offensive arms?


17. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. draft contained a
range of language covering similar ideas, but at this point
in the session it would be more productive to hear other
questions than try to discuss the advantages or disadvantages
of specific U.S. and Russian formulations.


18. (S) Antonov responded that, for Russia, it was not a
matter of a better formulation of language, but a basic
principle upon which the treaty and negotiations therefore
must be based. If the concept were agreeable, then the Sides
could accept a simple statement that they were "guided by the
principle of equal security." This would clarify the
approach to other issues, including mobile missiles,
submarines, and others. Both Sides should operate at the
same level of rights and obligations.


19. (S) Antonov turned to the preambular language on
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, stating that the U.S. draft
preamble significantly paired down Russian ideas concerning
the contributions of these countries. Gottemoeller replied
that the U.S. reasoning was simple; from a legal perspective
it was not accurate to state that these countries had
completely fulfilled their obligations under START, as there
were still some outstanding implementation issues. Antonov
replied that he was most interested in expressing support for
the contributions made by these countries in terms of
disarmament and strengthening peace and security.
Gottemoeller said that the U.S. Delegation had prepared a
U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for the treaty's preamble and
a separate U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text on the treaty's
final articles. She provided copies of the drafts to the
Russian Delegation, noting that the United States had



prepared the text and included specific language that the
Russian Delegation had provided. (Begin comment: Separate
reporting cables will be sent containing that text. End
comment.)

--------------
ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN CONCERNS:
LARGE VOLUME OF U.S. TEXT
--------------


20. (S) Antonov stated that, with regard to volume, the U.S.
draft Treaty and START were comparable, particularly in the
area of verification. This suggested the United States had
departed from the principle of making the new Treaty simpler
and less costly compared to START. Gottemoeller replied that
Antonov could not be sure of this until the United States
presented its proposed Inspection Protocol.


21. (S) Warner commented that the United States had
eliminated five types of inspections from START, but did keep
important elements of the inspection regime, and did so in
detail, to support verification. For example, while the
United States had dropped close-out inspections, it had
retained formerly declared facility (FDF) inspections so that
the Sides could verify activities at an FDF should any
concerns arise. Similarly, while baseline inspections were
dropped, data update inspections were retained and would be
used to update any new items. In addition, verification
associated with bomber armaments was a new area that required
a new approach, which would be made clear when the United
States presented its draft Inspection Protocol.


22. (S) Gottemoeller emphasized that the United States had
removed a number of verification measures, including some
measures associated with mobile missiles and, in this regard,
was not proposing any additional measures. Antonov again
concluded that these issues could be sorted out in the
working groups.

--------------
Russian Proposals for New Treaty
--------------


23. (S) Antonov previewed specific Russian proposals for the
new treaty by noting the high level of interest that existed
within Russia regarding the new treaty, and the common
objective of the United States and Russia to complete a new
treaty before START expires. Based on the political
relationship that existed between Russia and the United
States, and the fact that the sides were utilizing START as
the basis for work, completing the treaty by the end of
November was possible. He noted there was agreement that the
START Treaty would not be extended or repeated in full.
However, some negative issues remained. The new treaty was
being developed in the absence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, which was a very important factor that needed to be
taken into account. Other issues included ICBMs and SLBMs in
a non-nuclear configuration, which would hamper strategic
stability, and basing of strategic offensive arms outside of
the continental portion of national territory. These issues
could be overcome based on the will of the Presidents to use
the new treaty as the basis for enhancing overall
U.S.-Russian relations, and the interest that existed in both


capitals for improving relations. Antonov presented the
following summary of the Russian view of the overall
structure of the new treaty:

- The new treaty will have an updated preamble and fifteen
articles that focus on positive aspects of U.S.-Russian
relations in a manner that supports a simpler and less costly
treaty in terms of implementation. The fifteen articles will
be:

-- General provisions
-- Central limits
-- Counting rules
-- Establishment of the database
-- Deployment
-- Prohibitions and restrictions
-- Conversion or elimination
-- Notifications
-- Confidence-building measures
-- Use of national technical means of verification
-- Inspections, visits and exhibitions
-- Bilateral Consultative Commission
-- Cooperation with third states
-- Entry into force and termination
-- Registration

- The new treaty will have a single annex that would include
individual sections on terms and definitions, as well as
procedures regarding the database of information, conversion
or elimination, notifications, inspections, visits and
exhibitions, and the BCC.


24. (S) Following presentation of the Russian paper, Antonov
summarized Russia's approach, stating Russia intended to
streamline the treaty significantly as compared with START,
making implementation of the procedures for the treaty much
simpler. Russia believed this would make the ratification
process easier as well.


25. (S) Before turning to members of the Russian Delegation
to provide additional details on elements of the treaty from
the Russian perspective, Antonov reminded the U.S. Delegation
that Russia had presented some specific language for the
treaty during the last session. The information to be
presented was in addition to the proposals presented
previously. Russia hoped to transmit the rest of its
formulations for the draft treaty during the next round of
negotiations.

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL
FOR TREATY DATABASE
--------------


26. (S) Orlov presented the following summary of Russia's
proposals for the Treaty's database of information.

- The treaty's database of information will serve as the
basis for resolving every issue. It is an essential element
of the new treaty from the Russian perspective. The accuracy
and amount of data must be considered very carefully, as it
would serve as the basis for success of the treaty.


- The database should list types and number of strategic
offensive arms as of treaty signature, including ICBMs, SLBMs
and heavy bombers.

- Notifications should be provided to indicate when
newly-constructed strategic offensive arms become subject to
the treaty, similar to START:

-- For ICBMs and SLBMs, when they first leave a production
facility;

-- For heavy bombers, when their air frame is first removed
from the shop, plant or building where components are
assembled into an air frame;

-- For silo launchers, when a protective cover is first
installed and "locked;"

-- For mobile launchers, when the launcher first leaves the
production facility;

-- For SLBM launchers, when the submarine associated with the
launchers is first launched; and

-- For types of arms not included in the treaty, upon
agreement within the BCC.

- The role of the BCC will be significant, and difficult to
overestimate.

- Missiles developed solely to intercept or counter objects
not located on the surface of the earth would not be
ballistic missiles to which Treaty limitations would apply.
At the same time, such missiles must not have the capability
of an ICBM or SLBM, and their associated launchers must have
essential differences from launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs.
Procedures to confirm differences would be subject to
agreement within the BCC, and Russia would be prepared to
provide specific proposals.


27. (S) In response to a question from Gottemoeller, Orlov
stated that the Russian approach would allow for conversion
of launchers to a new type. He also stated that Russia did
not envision including data associated with warheads in the
database. (Begin comment: During the U.S.-hosted reception
on September 1, Orlov clarified, during a conversation with
Trout, that Russia did not include warhead data in its
version of the database because the issue of counting
warheads had not been resolved. Once resolved appropriate
information would be included. End comment.)

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
--------------


28. (S) Buzhinskiy presented the following summary of
Russia's proposals for confidence-building measures in the
treaty.

- In addition to mandatory verification, Russia proposed the
provision of information on a voluntary basis regarding
strategic offensive arms that could generate ambiguous


situations. This information could be exchanged not only
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) of each
country, but through diplomatic channels. Such information
would help prevent misinterpretation of each other's
activities.

- This article would also include provisions for discussing
within the BCC problems regarding new kinds of armaments that
could be considered strategic offensive arms in order to
agree on provisions that would apply to these systems.


29. (S) In response to questions posed by Warner, Buzhinskiy
further explained that this was Russia's proposal for the
entire treaty article concerning confidence-building
measures; these were not additions to the existing treaty.
He noted that, while the United States sometimes tried to
specify all contingencies in treaty language, Russia did not
attempt to do so. He concurred with Warner that some types
of confidence-building work had been done within START's
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),but Russia
envisioned that other measures could be pursued also.

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON PROHIBITIONS
--------------


30. (S) Pischulov presented the following summary of
Russia's proposals for Treaty prohibitions:

- In addition to previous Russian proposals on prohibitions
against the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration, prohibitions on the conversion of ICBM and
SLBM launchers into launchers for ballistic missile
interceptors and the reverse, and prohibitions on the basing
of heavy bombers outside of a Party's national territory,
Russia also proposed the following:

-- Prohibition against converting heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments to heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments;

-- Prohibition against storing nuclear armaments at bases
where heavy bombers converted to heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments are based; and

-- Prohibition against training air crews that are
assigned to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments
to be able to support nuclear missions.


31. (S) In response to the U.S. Delegation's questions
regarding the scope of Russia's proposed article on
prohibitions, the Russian Delegation confirmed that what they
had presented reflected the entire scope of prohibitions
envisioned by Russia. Russia sought a very concise set of
prohibitions, and many from START were not retained. Antonov
explained that Russia had focused on positive relations with
the United States, and had concluded that several
prohibitions contained in START were excessive.

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON NTM
--------------



32. (S) Ilin presented the following summary of Russia's
proposals for the use of NTM under the treaty, noting that
the substance of Russia's proposal did not fully correspond
to START.

- Experience with NTM as an element of verification under the
INF Treaty and START reinforced the importance of this type
of verification measure. NTM contributed to mutual
confidence in treaty compliance.

- Russia proposed to retain NTM as an efficient tool of
verification, which had been well tested under START.

- Russia proposed a separate article for NTM use that would
include:

-- Agreement to use NTM for Treaty compliance;

-- An obligation to use NTM in accordance with principles
of international law;

-- An obligation not to interfere with the use of NTM by
the other Party; and

-- An obligation not to use concealment measures that
would impede verification, including when missiles are
tested, though this would not apply to the use of covers or
environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

- There would be no specific provisions associated with
mobile missile systems, as there were under START.


33. (S) In response to a question posed by Gottemoeller,
Ilin confirmed that Russia did not intend to supplement NTM
with any other form of remote monitoring.

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR BCC
--------------


34. (S) Kotkova presented the following summary of Russia's
proposal for BCC under the Treaty.

- The efficiency of START's JCIC, created under Article XV of
the START Treaty, was tested over time and its efficiency
demonstrated. Russia therefore proposed including START''
Article XV in the new treaty with two changes:

-- The JCIC would be renamed the BCC; and

-- There would be a direct reference to the section of the
Russian-proposed new treaty annex that pertained to the
functioning of the BCC.

- As compared to the provisions contained in START's JCIC
Protocol:

-- The new treaty would be a bilateral treaty, and
references to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which were
added by JCIC Agreement 1, would be removed;

-- There would be no provisions authorizing one Party to
represent the other, which had been included in the JCIC


agreement;

-- There would be no detailed set of procedures for
signing documents; and

-- There would be no provisions on the order for special
sessions, as the use of diplomatic channels for arranging
meetings would be sufficient to resolve urgent problems.


35. (S) Following her presentation, Kotkova noted that
Russia had not seen specific U.S. proposals regarding the
BCC, but expressed hope that the U.S. and Russian positions
on the BCC were close.


36. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether Russia proposed utilizing
diplomatic channels instead of communications through the
NRRC of each country as a means of coordinating meetings.
Kotkova replied that diplomatic channels would be used to
augment communications through the NRRC, not replace them.
Gottemoeller supported the comment made about the successful
work of the JCIC and expressed her thanks to JCIC Heads
Taylor and Koshelev.

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSALS REGARDING
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
--------------


37. (S) Ilin presented the following summary of Russia's
proposals for treaty terms and definitions.

- Russia based its proposal for the treaty's terms and
definitions on those developed for START, while working to
reduce and simplify terms.

- Russia added terms relating to ballistic missile defenses,
including, for example, the terms "interceptor missile,"
"launcher of interceptor missiles," and "ballistic missile
defense system," which were all relevant to provisions in the
article on prohibitions.

--------------
VOTKINSK
--------------


38. (S) Regarding Votkinsk, Antonov noted that the U.S.
Delegation already knew everything he was going to say and
that he would present it "in a friendly way." His main point
was that, under START, all equipment must be dismantled and
the U.S. monitoring team must leave Russia before December 5.
He pointed to the positive experience of cooperation under
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: both
sides started their preparatory work a half year before
expiration to ensure an orderly departure. An important
point was that there were no difficulties of an
organizational nature or equipment. Continuing, Antonov said
he did not want any surprises -- he wanted to avoid any
"force majeure" situations with respect to people or
equipment.


39. (S) Antonov noted the U.S. position had changed in
recent months. The U.S. Representative in the JCIC had
stated as much. Russia was told that, due to the change in


Administration, the United States wanted the START
negotiations to get started first before proceeding on
Votkinsk. Antonov recalled that on June 16 Russia had sent a
note regarding the steps needed to complete the work on
Votkinsk. Since the U.S. response was received on August 14
(REF G),he had not slept well. He claimed that the U.S.
approach differed from what was discussed previously. Russia
felt it could not consider the August 14 communication to be
an official answer to its June 16 note; discussion at a
higher level was needed. At that point, Ambassador Kislyak
had been instructed to meet Under Secretary of State
Tauscher. There was surprise in Moscow when Tauscher said
the United States "wanted to study the issue." It had been
Russian thinking that the Russian position on this issue had
already been explained very clearly, and that the U.S.
Representatives in the JCIC had understood the Russian
position clearly prior to JCIC-XXXIV. He acknowledged that
each Party intended to comply with its obligations under
START, but their understandings of compliance, once the same,
were now different. He noted that he had been instructed by
his Minister to present an aide-memoire to the U.S. Side at
this meeting.


40. (S) Buzhinskiy took the floor to make similar points,
though more bluntly, and noted that he was also speaking
under instructions of his Minister. He pointed to the change
in production at Votkinsk since the 1980s from Treaty-limited
missiles only to a wider range of missiles now after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. He asserted that Russia had to
"tolerate" the U.S. presence due to START, but that "he could
not imagine that any Russian authority would accept such an
asymmetrical situation in the future." There were 94 days
left during which U.S. inspectors would be allowed to remain;
after the Treaty's expiration their privileges and immunities
and their official status in Russia would expire. He did not
want to "have a situation where the inspectors had problems
with the local authorities."


41. (S) Gottemoeller responded that the presentation had
been clear and 94 days was an accurate number. She recalled
that the INF Treaty monitoring at Votkinsk had been concluded
in a positive atmosphere and that was the U.S. objective for
START. She reminded the Russian Delegation that the United
States fully intended to exercise its Treaty rights at
Votkinsk until midnight on December 4 and that, if there were
no superseding arrangements to START by that time, the U.S.
personnel would be gone. She added that the United States
continued to believe that there was a role for continuous
monitoring in the new treaty, though she acknowledged that
the Russian Side was not yet convinced. Therefore, any
discussions regarding the conclusion of the START Treaty
activities were without prejudice to the new treaty.


42. (S) Antonov said the U.S. position was clear and that he
was open to discussing any subject related to the reduction
of strategic offensive arms at the negotiating table.
Technical issues would be discussed at the working group
level. Both Sides agreed that the START Treaty was not going
to be extended. That said, he viewed the discussion of how
to complete activities under START as being on a separate
track from the negotiations for the START Follow-on treaty.
He did not want to make negotiation of this treaty harder.
He understood that the United States wanted to exercise its


full Treaty rights through December 4, but if no decision
were taken to extend the monitoring provisions then U.S.
personnel would leave on that day. On the other hand, Russia
insisted that there not be any equipment left either. He
mentioned again avoiding "force majeure." Switching to
English, Antonov said "as the Negotiator, I am not really
responsible for what happens on this but I am very
concerned." He noted that there was very little time left,
and that the JCIC had still not signed the relevant
agreement, and he personally hated "unfinished business."


43. (S) Gottemoeller said she thought both Sides understood
the other's position and recalled the importance of
completing Treaty implementation fully and constructively.
She noted that the use of threatening language did not help
the situation and she hoped it could be resolved in a
positive manner. (Begin comment: During a lunch hosted by
Antonov on September 2, that included A/S Gottemoeller and
Ambassador Ries, Buzhinskiy commented that the current
Russian position on Votkinsk originated with Prime Minister
Putin, who had received a briefing on the PPCM Site and
reacted strongly to the notion of Americans being present
there. End comment.).


44. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for the Preamble,
August 31, 2009; and

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for Final Provisions,
August 31, 2009

- Russia:

-- Russian Proposals for New Treaty;

-- Russian Proposal for Treaty Database;

-- Russian Proposal for Confidence-Building Measures;

-- Russian Proposal on Prohibitions;

-- Russian Proposal on NTM;

-- Russian Proposal for the BCC; and

-- Russian Proposals Regarding Terms and Definitions.


45. (U) Participants.

U.S.:

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Reis
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Dunn
Ms. Eccles
Mr. Elliott
Ms. Friedt


Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA:

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Gen Buzhinskiy
Col Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Adm(Ret) Kuznetsov
Ms. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin
MGen Orlov
Col Pischulov
Mr. Rudenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Tarasov
Mr. Vasiliev
Gen Venetsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Mr. Gayduk (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


46. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS