START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-III): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JULY 22,
2009, AFTERNOON SESSION

REF: GENEVA 616 (SFO-GVA-III-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-III-002.


2. (U) Meeting Date: July 22, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Russian Delegation continued its presentation of
papers and proposals initiated during the morning session
(REFTEL),focusing on basing of strategic offensive arms
(SOAs) outside the national territory of the Parties, and
proposed language for the START Follow-on Treaty's preamble
and final provisions. On basing SOAs outside of national
territory, the Russian Delegation sought information on why
the United States objected to the concept of limiting SOAs
within the continental portion of each Side's national
territory, and asked whether the United States had plans for
such basing. The Russian Delegation also proposed a set of
notifications concerning the temporary deployment of heavy
bombers, as well as notification of large-scale exercises
involving heavy bombers.


4. (S) Regarding the Treaty's preamble, the Russians
explained that their proposal was consistent with ideas
discussed during previous sessions, and included a
formulation on the "unbreakable link" between SOA reductions
and missile defense deployment, as well as a statement that
the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration impacted strategic stability. Regarding
concluding provisions, the Russians explained that their
proposal was generally consistent with language from the
START Treaty, although it included a statement that
"qualitative and quantitative" increases in missile defense
capabilities could provide justification for treaty
withdrawal under the supreme national interest clause.


5. (S) The Russian Delegation also outlined a proposal for a
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that would
be based on UNGA Resolution 59/94 dated December 17, 2004,
entitled "Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions and the
New Strategic Framework," that had been jointly proposed by
Russia and the United States. The Russian Delegation noted
that the 2004 resolution had been very useful, and a similar
resolution prior to the 2010 Review Conference for the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would likewise be
useful.

--------------
BASING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS OUTSIDE OF THE PARTIES'
NATIONAL TERRITORIES
--------------



6. (S) Antonov presented the following paper, which included
an attachment with specific treaty text proposals, regarding
the basing and temporary deployment of strategic offensive
arms beyond the national territory of each Side.

Begin text:

Official Translation

To be Turned over to the
U.S. Side

Paper of the Russian Side
July 23, 2009

On Basing and Temporary Stationing of
Strategic Offensive Arms Outside the
National Territory of Each Party

In accordance with the Joint Understanding of the
Russian and U.S. Presidents on strategic offensive arms
issues, of July 6, 2009, which instructs the negotiators to
include in the text of the new treaty a provision on basing
strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national
territory of each Party, the Russian side would like to
outline in more specific terms its approaches to this issue,
which we regard as one of the key elements of the future
agreement.

The Russian side notes that in its June 16, 2009
"Comments" on the Russian side's views regarding the new
treaty the U.S. "does not object to the concept of locational
restrictions for SOAs," including a restriction on basing
SOAs outside the national territory of each Party.

At the same time, the U.S. side particularly stipulates
in the above-mentioned paper that it rejects the narrowing of
this restriction to the "continental portion" of the national
territory of the Parties, as we initially proposed at these
negotiations. In this connection, we cannot but have certain
concerns as to what is behind this U.S. approach.

As you know, one of the significant differences between
SOAs and other types of weapons is their range, which, from a
military standpoint, makes it easier to solve the problem of
selecting a basing location for such weapons. During the
term of the START Treaty there have been no precedents for
basing either Russian (Soviet) or U.S. SOAs outside the
continental portion of national territory.

In this context we would like to ask the U.S. side the
following: does the U.S. plan to establish SOA facilities or
base SOAs outside the continental portion of its national
territory? What is the reason for its apprehensions
concerning such a restriction?

We also have a number of questions for the U.S. side in
connection with information that is becoming available, to
the effect that the U.S. is carrying out measures in
preparation for launching the LV-2 launch vehicle from Meck
Island (the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean),which is



declared as a "space launch facility" under the START Treaty.
We would remind the U.S. side that at the JCIC session in
June of this year the Parties agreed to consider the LV-2
launch vehicle being assembled on the basis of the first
stage of the Trident I SLBM as a START accountable Trident I
SLBM. Furthermore, the Marshall Islands, including Meck
Island, are not U.S. territory since they have the status of
a state "freely associated with the U.S." and, from a legal
standpoint, they are an independent country. Could the U.S.
side comment on this situation, given both Parties' intention
to retain in the new treaty the START provision on not
stationing SOAs outside national territory?

The Russian side reaffirms that our approach does not
envisage a ban on temporary stationing of heavy bombers
outside national territory.

We note that such an approach is consistent with the
U.S. side's views on this issue, expressed in the
aforementioned U.S. paper, where the U.S. "does not object to
inclusion of provisions similar to those in the START Treaty
that would address the temporary stationing of heavy bombers
outside national territory." In this context, we take into
consideration the fact that the U.S. side is proposing to
work out less stringent notification requirements in this
regard.

At the same time, we propose that a special regime be
established for heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs
or other nuclear armaments directly on them. Specifically,
there would be a ban on stationing heavy bombers with
long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments outside
the continental portion of national territory.

The Russian side is prepared to provide the U.S. with
its proposals on specific wording for the provisions on
basing and temporary stationing of SOAs outside the national
territory of each Party for inclusion in the text of the new
treaty on strategic offensive arms (attached).

Attachment

Proposals of the Russian Side
for the Wording of the Provisions on
Basing and Temporary Stationing of SOAs Outside
the National Territory of Each Party
to be Included in the Text of the New Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Arms

In the body of the text:

Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall
not be based outside the national territory of each Party.

In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber
outside national territory, a notification concerning
movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in
this Treaty shall be provided.

Each Party undertakes not to station heavy bombers with
long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments outside


the continental portion of national territory.

In an annex to the Treaty:

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, inter alia,
the following notifications concerning movement of items
subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty:

(a) Notification, no later than 24 hours after a visit
of a heavy bomber has exceeded 24 hours in duration, of the
visit of such an airplane to the location visited. Such
notification shall include, for each location visited: the
number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of
the heavy bombers that are visiting; the air base, heavy
bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy
bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which
such airplanes are based; the location such airplanes are
visiting; and the date and time of arrival.

(b) Notification, no later than 48 hours after
departure, of the conclusion of the visit of a heavy bomber,
notification of which has been provided in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this Section. Such notification shall
include, for each location visited by such airplanes: the
number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of
the heavy bombers that have concluded the visit; the location
visited by such airplanes; the air base, heavy bomber flight
test center, production facility for heavy bombers, or
training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes
are based; and the date and time of departure.

(c) Notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of
the beginning of a major strategic exercise involving heavy
bombers, of the beginning of such an exercise. Such
notification shall include: the air bases for heavy bombers
that are involved in the exercise; and the date and time of
the beginning of the exercise.

(d) Notification, no later than 24 hours after the
completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy
bombers, about which a notification has been provided in
accordance with paragraph (c) of this Section, of the
completion of that exercise. Such notification shall include
the date and time of the completion of the exercise.

End text.


7. (S) Following Antonov's presentation of the Russian paper
and proposed treaty text, Elliott asked whether Russia sought
to prohibit the deployment of heavy bombers capable of
carrying LRNA and other nuclear armaments, or whether Russia
sought to prohibit the deployment of heavy bombers actually
carrying such weapons. Antonov clarified that Russia's
proposal was to prohibit deployments beyond the continental
portion of each party's national territory of heavy bombers
actually carrying nuclear weapons.


8. (S) Warner commented that he looked forward to seeing the
Russian Federation's written paper. He stated that the U.S.
Delegation would further investigate the question regarding
possible plans to deploy strategic offensive arms beyond the


continental United States. The initial U.S. reaction to the
idea of further limiting the deployment of heavy bombers to
the continental portion of national territory was that this
proposal had not been useful, but the United States would
consider it further.


9. (S) Regarding exercise notifications, Warner asked
whether such notices were proposed only for exercises that
went beyond the continental portion of a country's national
territory, or if the proposal was for any large-scale
exercise. Antonov responded that the delegations could
discuss the issue further after the United States had time to
review Russia's written proposals.

--------------
CLARIFICATION ON THE LV-2
FROM THE JCIC PERSPECTIVE
--------------


10. (S) Regarding Russian questions raised on the LV-2 in
the Russian paper on basing of SOAs outside of national
territory, Taylor responded that he looked forward to
studying Russia's written proposals and specific questions.
As he understood the Russian Delegation's presentation,
Russia was concerned about the deployment of LV-2 on Meck
Island. This was an issue discussed within the JCIC, and
included issues associated with both space launch facilities
and space launch vehicles. The issue of identifying a space
launch facility outside of a Party's national territory was
discussed extensively in the JCIC, and restrictions and
limitations were put in place for the utilization of such
facilities. One restriction was to prohibit the basing of
strategic offensive arms at such a facility. A space launch
vehicle taken to such a facility would remain under the
control of the owning Party, and any items remaining after
the launch would be returned. This would not prohibit the
movement of a space launch vehicle outside national territory
as long as proper notification was provided. Under START,
Meck Island was a declared space launch facility outside the
national territory of the United States. The LV-2 was a
ballistic missile that incorporated the first stage of a
Trident I. Per Joint Statement 21, a ballistic missile that
incorporated the first stage of a ballistic missile of a
specific type was accountable as a ballistic missile of that
type. The United States, therefore, considered the LV-2
accountable as a Trident I. All necessary data had been
provided to Russia. Any movement of the LV-2 to Meck Island
would be done with notification provided in accordance with
START and, therefore, would not be in violation of the Treaty.


11. (S) Antonov replied that this issue would likely be
discussed further in the JCIC.

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR
THE TREATY'S PREAMBLE
--------------


12. (S) Antonov previewed specific Russian proposals for the
treaty's preamble by noting that there were two schools of
thought for approaching the START Follow-on Treaty. One was


to focus on the most difficult issues first. The other was
to focus on the areas where there existed some agreement.
Russia had adopted a hybrid approach and, with regard to the
preamble, Russia had developed its proposal drawing from both
U.S. and Russian concepts, and placing these in a logical
construction. He read the following Russian-proposed
preamble.

Begin text:

Official Translation

To be Turned over to the
U.S. Side

Paper of the Russian Side
July 23, 2009

Draft Preamble to the New Treaty
on Strategic Offensive Arms
(Proposals of the Russian Side)

The Russian Federation and the United States of America,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Committed to the historic goal of freeing humanity from
the nuclear threat and consistently implementing the
obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968;

Endeavoring to help reduce the role and importance of
nuclear arms in ensuring international security and
expressing support for global efforts in the field of
non-proliferation;

Continuing along the path of strengthening strategic
stability and forging a new strategic relationship based on
mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation;

Considering it necessary to bring the nuclear postures
of the Russian Federation and the United States of America
into alignment with our countries' post-Cold War relationship
- no longer enemies, no prospect of war between us, and
cooperating where mutually advantageous;

Considering the stabilizing influence on the global
situation brought about by the radical and variable reduction
of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century;

Noting that there is an indissoluble interrelationship
between the reduction of strategic offensive arms and the
deployment of missile defense systems;

Agreeing that ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration have an impact on strategic stability;

Taking into account the fact that the Treaty Between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty) has been
implemented in full;



Noting that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have completely fulfilled the
obligations assumed in accordance with the Protocol to the
Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 23, 1992;

Fully appreciating the contribution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the cause
of general and complete nuclear disarmament and strengthening
international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states;

Seeking to maintain continuity and provide new impetus
to the process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while
maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear
arsenals, and with a view to multilateralization of this
process in the future;

Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance
with the obligations under this Treaty, based on the
procedures that were perfected in the START Treaty, and
supplemented by transparency and confidence-building measures;

Guided by the principle of equal security and believing
that global challenges and threats require continued use of
qualitatively new approaches to interaction on the whole
spectrum of strategic relations,

Have agreed as follows...

End text.


13. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov and asked about the
statement that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had fully
fulfilled their obligations under START. Specifically, for
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, there were START-accountable items
that had yet to be eliminated.


14. (S) Antonov replied that it was a good question but
that, from his perspective, it was important to be clear
that the other START Treaty Parties had fulfilled their
obligations; otherwise it would lend credence to their
arguments that they be part of the START Follow-on
negotiations. Instead, he suggested that the work on
eliminations under the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program continue and, for the purposes of recognizing their
contributions, the United States and Russia note that the
other START Parties have complied with their obligations.


15. (S) Gottemoeller elaborated that her point was that the
single statement in the Russian-proposed preamble recognizing
the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may
be sufficient without commenting on the legal status of START
implementation, where there could be some questions.

--------------
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR
THE TREATY'S CONCLUDING
PROVISIONS
--------------




16. (S) After recognizing the hard work of the Russian
Delegation's legal advisor prior to the negotiating session,
Antonov read the following Russian proposal for the Treaty's
concluding provisions.

Begin text:

Official Translation

To be Turned over to the
U.S. Side

Paper of the Russian Side
July 23, 2009

Draft Concluding Provisions of the New Treaty
on Strategic Offensive Arms
(Proposals of the Russian Side)


1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification.


2. This Treaty shall be concluded for 10 years.


3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty.
Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with
the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.


4. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to
make changes in the provisions of the Annex to this Treaty
that do not effect substantive rights and obligations under
the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Consultative
Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without
resorting to the procedure of making amendments, set forth in
paragraph 3 of this Article.


5. Each Party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to terminate this Treaty if, in
its view, further compliance with the Treaty will jeopardize
the Party's supreme interests, inter alia in the event of a
quantitative and qualitative buildup in the capabilities of
missile defense systems.


6. A Party that has decided to terminate this Treaty
shall inform the other Party of its decision through
diplomatic channels at least three months prior to
termination of this Treaty, specifying the extraordinary
events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme
interests.


7. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty
shall supersede the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and
the United States of America on Strategic Offensive
Reductions of May 24 2002, which shall terminate as of that
date.

This Treaty will be registered pursuant to Article 102
of the Charter of the United Nations.


End text.


17. (S) Gottemoeller asked Brown for his initial reaction,
to which he replied that the text was well done.
Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. Delegation would have
additional comments during the next day's meetings, including
regarding the Russian formulation for the supreme national
interest withdrawal clause.

--------------
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED UNGA RESOLUTION
--------------


18. (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to consider a
Russian proposal for a bilateral resolution for presentation
to the U.N. General Assembly regarding U.S.-Russian bilateral
strategic offensive arms reductions and the new framework for
bilateral relations. He stated Russia had reviewed UNGA
resolution 59/64 from December 17, 2004, on this subject, and
believed that it was very useful, noting its inclusion of
several figures regarding reductions in the area of strategic
offensive arms. Russia believed an updated resolution would
be useful ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. He then
read the following Russian-proposed UNGA resolution:

Begin text:

Official Translation

To be Turned over to the
U.S. Side

Paper of the Russian Side
July 23, 2009

On a Draft Resolution
"Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms
and the New Framework for Strategic Relations"

In order to ensure broad international support for the
efforts being undertaken by our countries in the field of
disarmament and non-proliferation, we propose to the U.S.
side jointly submitting a draft resolution entitled
"Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms and the New
Framework for Strategic Relations" to the First Committee of
the UNGA during the upcoming session of the General Assembly.
We already submitted such a draft in 2004 at the 59th
Session of the UNGA.

The Russian side considers it appropriate to use as a
basis the text of Resolution 59/94 of December 3, 2004, and
reflect in it the following additional points:

-- the nature of the strategic relations between Russia
and the U.S. (equal security, trust, openness, cooperation,
and predictability);

-- the upcoming completion of the operation of the
Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and the
implementation of its provision on reduction of the sides'
strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200;



-- fulfillment of the START Treaty obligations by all
the Parties, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;

-- the beginning of the negotiations between Russia and
the U.S. to work out a new treaty on strategic offensive arms;

-- the obligations under Article VI of the NPT;

-- the need for early entry into force of the CTBT;

-- support for the FMCT negotiations;

-- a call to other states to join in the nuclear
disarmament efforts of Russia and the U.S. and to do their
utmost to support the development of the disarmament process.

We would ask the U.S. side to present its views in this
regard. If there are no objections in principle, we would be
willing to prepare the draft of such a resolution for
consideration at the next round of negotiations.

End text.


19. (S) Antonov proposed that if the United States agreed, a
more complete resolution could be developed by August, but
reiterated the basis would be the 2004 UNGA resolution.


20. (S) Gottemoeller replied that this idea had been
considered in Washington and that, in general, the Russian
proposal was a good idea. She asked how the Russian proposal
would relate to a possible resolution initiated by the P-5.


21. (S) Antonov replied that the resolution on bilateral
reductions and relations would shed more light on common
U.S.-Russian objectives. It would provide a broader context
for U.S.-Russian leadership, and demonstrate U.S.-Russian
resolve specifically in the area of nuclear disarmament. He
did not believe the P-5 document would be submitted to the
General Assembly. However, the Russian-proposed document
could assist in the development of the P-5 document.


22. (S) Gottemoeller again commented that it was a good idea
that was also being considered in Washington, but that so far
Washington had not focused on any potential details. It
would be important, however, to continue to shed light on
U.S.-Russian disarmament efforts.

--------------
INITIAL DISCUSSION OF
WORK PLAN FOR START
FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


23. (S) In reviewing the next day's agenda, Gottemoeller
noted that an important agenda item would be to agree on a
work plan and timeline for negotiating text for the Treaty
and its protocols. Antonov replied that the Presidents had
provided clear instructions. He was prepared to meet daily
if there was substance to discuss. However, he believed the
United States would need time to develop its response to the


Russian papers. Russia would provide additional papers, but
time was needed for each Side to do its homework. Not all of
the experts were at the negotiating sessions, nor was the
leadership that would ultimately need to approve proposals.
The key issue was not the frequency of the meetings but the
substance of them. He commented that Ambassador Beyrle had
scared the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff when he
asked whether Antonov would be up to the task of leading the
START Follow-on negotiations for Russia. The MFA leadership
wanted to know if the United States wanted Antonov replaced.


24. (S) Gottemoeller replied that if such a query were made
by Ambassador Beyrle, its intent would certainly not have
been to suggest that the United States sought to replace
Antonov. She made the point that organizational issues were
boring but necessary, and she wanted to ensure that the
Russian Delegation understood U.S. thinking with regard to
the work in Geneva over the coming months.


25. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian Paper On Strategic Missile Systems in a
Non-nuclear Configuration, dated July 22, 2009; and

-- Russian Paper On the Interrelationship between
Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms, dated July
22, 2009.


26. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Reis
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connors
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin



Col Novikov
MGen Orlov
Mr. Pischulov
Mr. Rudenko
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Vasiliev
Ms. Vodopolov
Col Zaitsev
Mr. Gayduk (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS