Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA592
2009-07-16 16:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

GEORGIA TALKS ROUND 6: MORE CIVIL; MINOR PROGRESS;

Tags:  GG PGOV PHUM PREF PREL RS 
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DE RUEHGV #0592/01 1971600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161600Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8866
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5997
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0691
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3078
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000592 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: GG PGOV PHUM PREF PREL RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA TALKS ROUND 6: MORE CIVIL; MINOR PROGRESS;
SOUTH OSSETIANS STILL MAJOR OBSTACLE

REF: A. A) GENEVA 409

B. B) GENEVA 494

Classified By: Peter Mulrean, RMA Counselor, Reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000592

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: GG PGOV PHUM PREF PREL RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA TALKS ROUND 6: MORE CIVIL; MINOR PROGRESS;
SOUTH OSSETIANS STILL MAJOR OBSTACLE

REF: A. A) GENEVA 409

B. B) GENEVA 494

Classified By: Peter Mulrean, RMA Counselor, Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary and Comment: The tone in the sixth round of
the Geneva Talks on Georgia was a distinct improvement over
round five (reftels),with all participants (except the South
Ossetians) being civil and many being constructive. The
South Ossetians were the clear exception, sticking to
unacceptable demands and insulting Georgia (as well as the
U.S.). The Russians were selectively constructive, adopting
a strategy of appearing conciliatory without really ceding
ground. The Abkhaz were genuinely constructive throughout,
as were the Georgians, who made consistent efforts to be
respectful and accommodating to other speakers. In the end,
both Working Groups had something to show for the session.
In Working Group 1 (security),the Abkhaz de facto
representatives agreed to an initial meeting of the Joint
Incident and Response Mechanism for Abkhazia on July 14 in
the sensitive Abkhaz town of Gali, (home to a large ethnic
Georgian community). Working Group 2 (refugees and IDPs)
announced agreement - very reluctant on South Ossetia,s part
- to begin a joint assessment of water rehabilitation needs.
There was considerable discussion of non-use of force (NUF)
agreements, with the South Ossetians tabling a direct NUF
agreement with Georgia and Georgia countering with a proposal
for a new bilateral NUF with Russia. In the end, the
co-chairs issued an upbeat press release about the overall
session, noting the constructive tone, areas of agreement and
plans to hold round seven on September 17. In adopting its
generally more constructive approach, the Russian delegation
appeared to want to avoid both the isolation it felt in the
Security Council on the UNOMIG resolution and any blame for
further undermining international community engagement on
Georgia. End Summary and Comment.

--------------
Working Group 1 - Security
--------------


2. (SBU) All sides, including the South Ossetians, agreed
that the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs)

are useful and important and should continue to function.
The Abkhaz de facto rep expressed a readiness for the IPRM in
Abkhazia to begin operations in Gali, a sensitive town in
southern Abkhazia that is home to Abkhazia,s Georgian
minority, and to convene the first meeting on July 14. The
Abkhaz rep also confirmed a willingness, despite the loss of
UNOMIG, to allow both the EUMM and UN to participate in the
IPRM, thereby clearing the way for the IPRM to emerge as a
vehicle to secure the UN,s return to Abkhazia, without a
UNSC mandate.


3. (SBU) In contrast, South Ossetian de facto "Foreign
Minister" Chochiyev set conditions for convening the IPRM to
deal with South Ossetia: chairmanship should include Georgia
and South Ossetia (to secure implicit recognition of South
Ossetia,s independence); the fate of three South Ossetians
who disappeared in October 2008 must be clarified; and
Georgia must provide a written guarantee that it will not use
force against South Ossetia. (Comment: this was a new
condition. End comment.) On the chairmanship, South Ossetia
suggested it rotate between Georgia and South Ossetia.
Georgia rejected this, calling for continuation of the
current arrangement of EUMM and OSCE jointly facilitating
(not chairing) the sessions. South Ossetia rejected this.
On the disappearances, Georgia repeated an offer to allow
South Ossetians to visit sites in Georgian-controlled
territory to investigate, with the proviso that Georgia be
allowed to do the same in South Ossetia. South Ossetia
rejected this proposal. Georgia expressed a willingness to
hold the next JIPRMs for South Ossetia in Ergneti and Dvani
(a concession) and even Russia intervened and tried to walk
South Ossetia back a bit from its conditions, but to no
avail. In a later discussion of the press release with
co-chairs, South Ossetia insisted that there was no agreement
on when the South Ossetian IPRM might meet again. South
Ossetian representatives also refuse to allow the IPRM to
convene on South Ossetian territory.


4. (SBU) There was much discussion about non-use of force
(NUF) agreements. South Ossetia tabled a draft text for
bilateral NUF agreements between Georgia on the one side and
South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, which would secure
implicit recognition of the independence of both separatist
regions. Russia supported this, having made a similar
proposal during round five of the Geneva talks. Georgia

GENEVA 00000592 002 OF 003


countered that it had already made a binding commitment to
the NUF in the September 12 ceasefire agreement and quoted a
Russian statement acknowledging that Georgia had made such a
commitment. Georgia pointed out that Russian President
Medvedev had included the "presidents" of Abkhazia and south
Ossetia as signatories at the September 12 signing ceremony.
While Georgia did not recognize them as included in the
agreement, it appeared that Russia did and should therefore
consider them covered by the NUF element of the September 12
agreement. Finally, Georgia expressed a willingness to make
another written commitment to Russia on NUF, if that would
reassure all sides, and distributed a draft text.


5. (SBU) EUR DAS Bryza expressed support for NUF agreements
in general, but agreed that Georgian had already made such a
commitment in the September 12 agreement. He stressed that
the US would hold Georgia to that commitment. When South
Ossetia responded that Georgian assurances were worthless,
since there had been an NUF agreement in force before the
conflict last year, Bryza noted that it had been South
Ossetia and Russia who had refused to increase transparency
in the conflict zone in the years leading up to last summer,
when the U.S. and our Euro-Atlantic partners repeatedly
pressed for more OSCE military observers. He stressed that
Georgia had legitimate security concerns, citing the ongoing
large-scale Kavkaz-2009 Russian exercise and aggressive
Russian military deployments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
(including artillery at Akhalgori within firing range of
Tbilisi). This would seem to support the need for a
reaffirmation of the Russia-Georgia NUF agreement. Russia
responded that Kavkaz-2009 was indeed large, as it was
necessary to make a show of force as a deterrent to any
further Georgian aggression. In the end, there was general
agreement that the NUG topic deserved further attention in
future rounds.

--------------
Working Group 2 - Refugees and IDPs
--------------


6. (SBU) The co-chairs of Working Group 2 had planned to
focus discussions on the five concept papers on
displacement-related themes (e.g. housing, legal status,
water) distributed by the co-chairs following round 5, hoping
to review only the practical recommendations to avoid
polemics. Instead, the South Ossetians presented a
three-page paper focusing exclusively on "unacceptable"
language (references to the status of territory, the use of
Georgian geographic names, etc.) used throughout the concept
papers. South Ossetia concluded that the papers were
otherwise not worthy of comment. The Russian rep was more
circuitous in his undermining of the concept papers. He
began by saying that one could not delve into the details of
practical problems on the ground without first addressing the
primordial issues of security and trust and called for a
"comprehensive approach" to humanitarian issues. He went on,
however, to present a lengthy Russian alternative paper (text
only in Russian) on displacement-related issues that, at
least according to his oral presentation, had considerable
overlap with the issues in the co-chairs, concept papers.


7. (SBU) Given this overlap, the co-chairs attempted to steer
the discussion back to the recommendations from the concept
papers. The Russians and South Ossetians consistently
countered that the concept papers were an unacceptable basis
for discussion, with the Russians continuing to push for a
discussion of fundamental security issues and the South
Ossetians raising the case of the three missing South
Ossetians (para 3). (Comment: While unhelpful, the
interventions by the Russians and South Ossetians remained
civil in tone. End comment.) The Chairs and the U.S.
countered that those were matters for Working Group 1 and
that the remit of Working Group 2 was to address practical
humanitarian issues in an un-politicized way.


8. (SBU) With the clock ticking down, the co-chairs moved
quickly through the topics discussed in concept papers,
without reference to specific recommendations. The OSCE rep
briefed on progress made in on water issues, since Georgia,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia had named technical experts for
discussions since round 5. The OSCE called for agreement to
move forward with a needs assessment for the rehabilitation
of both drinking and agricultural water infrastructure, which
will for the baseline for expert-level discussions. To
proceed, all parties must send a letter to the OSCE Chair
(Greece) stating their support for the needs assessment.
South Ossetia initially balked at sending such a letter, but
after much prodding gave in. This, in the end, was the only

GENEVA 00000592 003 OF 003


deliverable for Working Group 2. The co-chairs promised to
take a look at the new Russian issues paper and see what they
could salvage from the concept papers. They will circulate
some form of new issues paper in the coming weeks.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) While Geneva VI lacked dramatic breakthroughs, the
agreement of de-facto Abkhaz authorities to convene the IPRM
on Abkhaz territory (and particularly, in Gali, where ethnic
Georgians complain of human rights abuses),marked an
important step forward. This step clears the way for an
informal agreement reached by UNSYG Special Rep Verbeke,
Russian Deputy Minister Karasin, Abkhaz de-facto authorities,
and DAS Bryza, to use the IPRM as a platform allowing the UN
to return to Abkhazia in a quiet, status-neutral way. The
general tone of the discussions was improved compared to the
vitriol and theatrics of round five; except for early salvos
by Russia and South Ossetia in WG1 questioning the continued
utility of the Geneva talks - easily beaten back by the US
and others - it appeared that all parties are willing to
stick with the forum for now. EU Special Rep Morel and UN
Special Rep Verbeke believed the non-confrontational, more
constructive approach of both Russian and Abkhaz participants
reflected their surprise at being isolated by Msocow,s
decision to veto UNOMIG,s technical rollover in the UNSC.
The Russian delegation in Geneva appeared to want to avoid a
repeat performance and/or being perceived as further
undermining international community engagement on Georgia.
GRIFFITHS