|09GENEVA521||2009-06-25 14:50:00||SECRET||Mission Geneva|
VZCZCXYZ0006 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0521/01 1761450 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 251450Z JUN 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8735 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4637 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1808 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0816 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5988
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-004.
2. (U) Meeting Date: June 23, 2009
Time: 3:45 - 4:45 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
3. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations resumed work on the
draft Joint Understanding. The meeting focused on the U.S.
response to the draft text tabled by Russia on Monday, June
22, 2009, (REF A). A/S Gottemoeller introduced the proposed
draft by saying that the U.S. Delegation had listened very
intently and studied very carefully the answers the Russian
Delegation had provided during the morning session (REF B).
As a result, the U.S. Delegation was tabling a U.S. non-paper
(see paragraph 22) that was a combination of the Joint
Understanding the United States had tabled in Moscow on June
15, the Russian response provided the day prior, and some
revisions by U.S. lawyers that would make the text more
consistent with accepted legal style. Gottemoeller explained
that the text was not a bracketed text, but rather a working
document and proceeded to review the text paragraph-
by-paragraph. Antonov thanked the U.S. Delegation, saying it
was clear that the U.S. Delegation had worked very hard and
he could see that the United States was trying to find
compromise and eliminate the difficult points. This was a
step in the right direction but in some areas was not
sufficient. Two areas that were especially bothersome for
the Russian Delegation were the issues involving the
"commitment" to continue to pursue new and verifiable
reductions and the fact that the United States had not
included Russia's proposal on radical reductions.
Gottemoeller countered that it was clear that both Presidents
Obama and Medvedev had already made the decision to proceed
with additional reductions beyond the replacement of the
START Treaty, given their statements in London, Prague and
Helsinki. In addition, the U.S. Delegation was not rejecting
Russia's proposal on radical reductions, rather the U.S.
formulation stipulated a "to not exceed" level leaving the
determination of the final numbers for negotiation at a later
U.S. TABLES COMPROMISE TEXT
4. (S) Antonov welcomed the U.S. Delegation back to the
Russian Mission and turned the floor over to Gottemoeller.
Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. Delegation had been
listening very intently to the Russian Delegation's response
to U.S. questions during the morning meeting. In addition,
the United States had carefully read the Russian proposal and
was prepared to provide a compromise text. The non-paper the
United States was presenting was a combination of our joint
language based on the document the United States had provided
in Moscow on June 15, the Russian-proposed text and some
stylistic changes by our lawyer.
5. (S) Beginning with the preamble, Gottemoeller proceeded
to review the document paragraph-by-paragraph, explaining how
the U.S. Delegation had arrived at the proposed text. With
regard to the preamble, the United States was accepting the
Russian-proposed language on strategic offensive arms as it
was in line with the statements of April 1. There was a
minor change to the language on concluding a Treaty by the
lawyer to use the phrase "is to" vice "will" to ensure that
the document is seen as a political statement rather than as
a legally-binding instrument.
6. (S) Gottemoeller explained that paragraph one was really
the core of the Joint Understanding for both Parties as we
needed to have a clear idea about what we were counting when
establishing numbers. The U.S. Delegation had listened very
carefully during the morning to the responses to its
questions and had looked at the history and previous
discussions of what could comprise the elements of this
paragraph. Gottemoeller then read the paragraph and asked
Taylor to explain how the U.S. Side developed its formulation
on Strategic Nuclear Warheads (SNWs) and how it had arrived
at its proposal to address the limitation on warheads.
7. (S) Taylor began by saying that the United States
recalled Koshelev's admonition to the U.S. Delegation during
the past two Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC)
meetings to review the proposals Russia had presented during
the early sessions of the BIC, as well as Antonov's call to
look at the history and previous discussions of what should
comprise the elements of this paragraph.
8. (S) Taylor stated that, in many BIC meetings, both Sides
have discussed how it intended to define SNWs. As recently
as the last two BIC sessions, Russian BIC Head of
DelegationKoshelev had urged the United States to look at
early BIC discussions concerning definitions. Taylor
acknowledged that the U.S. Side had done so and found a
Russian proffered definition from BIC I in April 2004.
Taylor relayed that the U.S. Side studied this proposal anew
and determined we could use the Russian formulation to define
SNWs. Taylor read from the BIC-I Russian-proposed Plenary
Statement on Categories of SNWs (REF C).
9. (S) Taylor highlighted that the original Russian-proposed
definition of SNWs allowed the Russian Side to not include
warheads associated with heavy bombers to count against their
Moscow Treaty limits because they were not located at storage
facilities on the airbases. In order to address those
warheads, the U.S. Side modified the Russian definition to
include weapons storage areas associated with heavy bomber
airbases. Taylor concluded by stating that the U.S. Side had
taken the majority of the Russian BIC definition to develop
its proposed SNW definition. He then provided a copy of the
BIC-I language, in Russian and English, to the Russian Side.
10. (S) Gottemoeller stated she wanted to make clear that it
was her view that there had been much valuable work done
immediately following the signature of the Moscow Treaty and
she supported looking at that work to see if it could support
our work today. This could be very important for our future
11. (S) Gottemoeller went on to explain that the U.S.
approach was to cite a warhead limit not to exceed 1675 and
the associated launcher limit not to exceed 1100. This
creative approach would give the negotiators the room
necessary to arrive at an agreed number. This was not meant
as a rejection of any lower limits, rather an opportunity to
negotiate and follow Antonov's notion of "creative ambiguity."
12. (S) Gottemoeller read the new U.S.-proposed paragraph 2
(calculating limits), emphasizing that the provisions for
calculating the limits would be drawn from both the START
Treaty and Moscow Treaty, as appropriate. With the
reinsertion of the U.S. paragraph on counting, Gottemoeller
explained that the U.S. had removed the Russian proposal to
include "counting procedures" that had been included in
paragraph 3 (definitions, data exchanges, etc.), and
paragraph 3 was now otherwise as Russia had proposed, with
the deletion of counting procedures.
13. (S) In paragraph 4 (each Party determines its force
structure), Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. lawyer had
changed "will" to "is to" to conform to U.S. legal style.
With respect to paragraph 5 (interrelationship of offensive
and defensive arms), the United States was proposing to use
the word inter-relationship vice inter-dependence when
speaking about the provision on strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms. Paragraph 6 (banning ICBM and
SLBM in non-nuclear configuration) was changed to drop the
prohibition on non-nuclear configurations of ICBMs and SLBMs,
by providing for a provision on such configurations. (Begin
comment: Such provision could include transparency and
confidence-building measures. End comment.) Paragraph 7
(basing SOA on national territory) was a reformulation of the
Russian-proposed text, but the U.S. accepted the Russian
approach. Paragraphs 8 (Implementation Body), 9 (Patterns of
Cooperation), and 10 (Duration) were Russian-proposed text
the U.S. Delegation was prepared to accept. The first
unnumbered paragraph (Commitment to pursue further
reductions), following paragraph 10, had a couple of small
edits by our lawyer based on the fact that we as negotiators
could not "conclude" a treaty. Only our Presidents could do
so, but the negotiators could finish their work on the treaty
14. (S) With regard to the paragraph on further reductions,
the U.S. Side understood that Russia wanted to delete the
provision; however, it was an important paragraph. This was
not so important to the negotiators, but it was important in
a much larger context. Gottemoeller explained that the U.S.
Delegation had taken language from the broader Presidential
Joint Statement in London and modified it for the Joint
Understanding. With that, Gottemoeller stated that the U.S.
Delegation had worked hard to address the concerns raised by
the Russian Delegation and hoped that the text would address
those concerns. It was clear that the Delegations were
coming closer together in our goal of an agreed text.
HARD WORK ACKNOWLEDGED
BY RUSSIAN DELEGATION
15. (S) Antonov stated that he could see that the U.S.
Delegation had worked hard and it was clear that the U.S. was
trying to find compromises and eliminate the difficult
points. These were good steps in the right direction;
however, they were not sufficient. It went without saying
that they would have to look at the text carefully.
16. (S) Regarding the U.S. proposal to use the Russian
proposal from BIC, Antonov said he was very happy that Russia
was finally able to convince the United States of the value
of its proposal, even five years late. Antonov stated that
the U.S. logic was convincing with respect to the last
paragraph, because all the details were in the Presidential
Joint Statements. He would read it all very carefully later
17. (S) Antonov said he was confused with the U.S.-proposed
wording in the "commitment" paragraph. Did it mean that the
negotiators had another obligation to begin negotiations on
another treaty? Antonov said he was a simple Siberian
bureaucrat, moving forward with little steps. He makes a
small step and looks behind his back to see if all is okay.
He wanted his President to say he was satisfied with his work
and that he had accomplished his task. We should wait for
instructions on what the new treaty should deal with before
assuming an obligation to negotiate another treaty.
18. (S) Antonov said that he was not rejecting the U.S.
proposal but that he had to have time to study it. Besides
the general comments he had made, Antonov was concerned that
Russia's proposal on the radical reductions in delivery
vehicles was not addressed in the U.S. proposal.
WAY AHEAD IS CLEAR
19. (S) Gottemoeller stated that our Presidents have already
decided to press ahead with more reductions based on their
recent statements. In the context of the London Statement of
April 1, President Obama stated that this was only the
beginning of a step-by-step process. Additionally, on April
6 in Prague, President Obama made a statement on further
reductions. Within a very short time, President Medvedev
made some important comments on the eventual reductions in
nuclear weapons in Helsinki. So from London, to Prague, to
Helsinki, we have two Presidents who have made political
decisions to proceed with further reductions. In her view,
this would be the only nuclear arms reduction agreement that
would be signed by the two Presidents prior to the 2010 NPT
Review Conference. So this would not only be a unique window
into our intent with regard to our current reductions, but
the potential for further reductions. As to the other
comment regarding reduction in SDVs, we did not reject the
lower limits. This will give the negotiators time to work
20. (S) Antonov confirmed that the two Presidents should
sign the treaty prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference
(RevCon), but they could make another statement that they
intend to negotiate some other instrument. Or they could
say, on the eve of the NPT Revcon, that they have taken the
decision together on what would be done next. Gottemoeller
responded that the two best opportunities, for NPT Article VI
purposes, would be when the two Presidents sign the Joint
Understanding in Moscow and when they sign the treaty.
Antonov closed by saying that the Russian Delegation would
work to try and harmonize our position and reduce differences
in the document.
21. (U) Below is the text of the U.S. non-paper discussed
and provided to the Russian Delegation during the meeting.
The non-paper incorporates elements from the U.S.-proposed
draft Joint Understanding and the Russian-proposed draft.
While the non-paper was provided in line-in line-out form to
the Russian Delegation, the paper provided below represents
the U.S. Delegation's proposal in an unbracketed form.
22. (S) Begin text:
Non-paper of the U.S. Side
in response to the
Paper of the Russian
Side of June 22, 2009
June 23, 2009
The President of the United States of America and the
President of the Russian Federation have decided on further
reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic
offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new
legally binding agreement to replace the current START
Treaty. The new treaty is to contain the following elements:
1. A provision to the effect that each Party is to
reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms, so that seven
years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter,
the aggregate number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and their
associated launchers, deployed submarine-launched ballistic
missiles and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy
bombers) does not exceed 1100 for each nation. In addition,
the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads
on deployed SLBMs, and warheads on deployed heavy bombers, as
well as warheads in storage depots associated with air bases
(airfields) where heavy bombers are based, is not to exceed
1675 for each nation.
2. Provisions for calculating these limits are to be
drawn from the START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty, as
3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges,
notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification
procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency
measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as
appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.
4. A provision to the effect that each Party is to
determine for itself the composition and structure of its
strategic offensive arms.
5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic
offensive and strategic defensive arms.
6. Provisions on intercontinental ballistic missiles
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear
7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms
exclusively on the national territory of each Party.
8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve
questions related to treaty implementation.
9. The provisions of the treaty will not apply to
existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic
offensive arms between a Party and a third state.
10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is
superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the
reduction of strategic offensive arms.
The two Presidents direct their negotiators to finish
their work on the treaty at an early date so that they may
sign and submit it for ratification in their respective
The two Presidents have also directed that the treaty be
accompanied by a commitment to continue to pursue new and
verifiable reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a
Done at (City), this (date) day of (month), 2009, in two
originals, in the English and Russian languages.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(President B. Obama) (President D.A. Medvedev)
23. (U) Documents exchanged.
-- U.S. Non-Paper in response to the Paper of the Russian
Side of June 22, 2009.
24. (U) Participants:
Mr. French (Int)
Ms. Gross (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.