Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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09GENEVA521 | 2009-06-25 14:50:00 | SECRET | Mission Geneva |
VZCZCXYZ0006 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0521/01 1761450 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 251450Z JUN 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8735 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4637 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1808 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0816 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5988 |
S E C R E T GENEVA 000521 |
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-004. 2. (U) Meeting Date: June 23, 2009 Time: 3:45 - 4:45 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------------------- SUMMARY -------------------------- 3. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations resumed work on the draft Joint Understanding. The meeting focused on the U.S. response to the draft text tabled by Russia on Monday, June 22, 2009, (REF A). A/S Gottemoeller introduced the proposed draft by saying that the U.S. Delegation had listened very intently and studied very carefully the answers the Russian Delegation had provided during the morning session (REF B). As a result, the U.S. Delegation was tabling a U.S. non-paper (see paragraph 22) that was a combination of the Joint Understanding the United States had tabled in Moscow on June 15, the Russian response provided the day prior, and some revisions by U.S. lawyers that would make the text more consistent with accepted legal style. Gottemoeller explained that the text was not a bracketed text, but rather a working document and proceeded to review the text paragraph- by-paragraph. Antonov thanked the U.S. Delegation, saying it was clear that the U.S. Delegation had worked very hard and he could see that the United States was trying to find compromise and eliminate the difficult points. This was a step in the right direction but in some areas was not sufficient. Two areas that were especially bothersome for the Russian Delegation were the issues involving the "commitment" to continue to pursue new and verifiable reductions and the fact that the United States had not included Russia's proposal on radical reductions. Gottemoeller countered that it was clear that both Presidents Obama and Medvedev had already made the decision to proceed with additional reductions beyond the replacement of the START Treaty, given their statements in London, Prague and Helsinki. In addition, the U.S. Delegation was not rejecting Russia's proposal on radical reductions, rather the U.S. formulation stipulated a "to not exceed" level leaving the determination of the final numbers for negotiation at a later time. -------------------------- U.S. TABLES COMPROMISE TEXT -------------------------- 4. (S) Antonov welcomed the U.S. Delegation back to the Russian Mission and turned the floor over to Gottemoeller. Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. Delegation had been listening very intently to the Russian Delegation's response to U.S. questions during the morning meeting. In addition, the United States had carefully read the Russian proposal and was prepared to provide a compromise text. The non-paper the United States was presenting was a combination of our joint language based on the document the United States had provided in Moscow on June 15, the Russian-proposed text and some stylistic changes by our lawyer. 5. (S) Beginning with the preamble, Gottemoeller proceeded to review the document paragraph-by-paragraph, explaining how the U.S. Delegation had arrived at the proposed text. With regard to the preamble, the United States was accepting the Russian-proposed language on strategic offensive arms as it was in line with the statements of April 1. There was a minor change to the language on concluding a Treaty by the lawyer to use the phrase "is to" vice "will" to ensure that the document is seen as a political statement rather than as a legally-binding instrument. 6. (S) Gottemoeller explained that paragraph one was really the core of the Joint Understanding for both Parties as we needed to have a clear idea about what we were counting when establishing numbers. The U.S. Delegation had listened very carefully during the morning to the responses to its questions and had looked at the history and previous discussions of what could comprise the elements of this paragraph. Gottemoeller then read the paragraph and asked Taylor to explain how the U.S. Side developed its formulation on Strategic Nuclear Warheads (SNWs) and how it had arrived at its proposal to address the limitation on warheads. 7. (S) Taylor began by saying that the United States recalled Koshelev's admonition to the U.S. Delegation during the past two Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) meetings to review the proposals Russia had presented during the early sessions of the BIC, as well as Antonov's call to look at the history and previous discussions of what should comprise the elements of this paragraph. 8. (S) Taylor stated that, in many BIC meetings, both Sides have discussed how it intended to define SNWs. As recently as the last two BIC sessions, Russian BIC Head of DelegationKoshelev had urged the United States to look at early BIC discussions concerning definitions. Taylor acknowledged that the U.S. Side had done so and found a Russian proffered definition from BIC I in April 2004. Taylor relayed that the U.S. Side studied this proposal anew and determined we could use the Russian formulation to define SNWs. Taylor read from the BIC-I Russian-proposed Plenary Statement on Categories of SNWs (REF C). 9. (S) Taylor highlighted that the original Russian-proposed definition of SNWs allowed the Russian Side to not include warheads associated with heavy bombers to count against their Moscow Treaty limits because they were not located at storage facilities on the airbases. In order to address those warheads, the U.S. Side modified the Russian definition to include weapons storage areas associated with heavy bomber airbases. Taylor concluded by stating that the U.S. Side had taken the majority of the Russian BIC definition to develop its proposed SNW definition. He then provided a copy of the BIC-I language, in Russian and English, to the Russian Side. 10. (S) Gottemoeller stated she wanted to make clear that it was her view that there had been much valuable work done immediately following the signature of the Moscow Treaty and she supported looking at that work to see if it could support our work today. This could be very important for our future work. 11. (S) Gottemoeller went on to explain that the U.S. approach was to cite a warhead limit not to exceed 1675 and the associated launcher limit not to exceed 1100. This creative approach would give the negotiators the room necessary to arrive at an agreed number. This was not meant as a rejection of any lower limits, rather an opportunity to negotiate and follow Antonov's notion of "creative ambiguity." 12. (S) Gottemoeller read the new U.S.-proposed paragraph 2 (calculating limits), emphasizing that the provisions for calculating the limits would be drawn from both the START Treaty and Moscow Treaty, as appropriate. With the reinsertion of the U.S. paragraph on counting, Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. had removed the Russian proposal to include "counting procedures" that had been included in paragraph 3 (definitions, data exchanges, etc.), and paragraph 3 was now otherwise as Russia had proposed, with the deletion of counting procedures. 13. (S) In paragraph 4 (each Party determines its force structure), Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. lawyer had changed "will" to "is to" to conform to U.S. legal style. With respect to paragraph 5 (interrelationship of offensive and defensive arms), the United States was proposing to use the word inter-relationship vice inter-dependence when speaking about the provision on strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. Paragraph 6 (banning ICBM and SLBM in non-nuclear configuration) was changed to drop the prohibition on non-nuclear configurations of ICBMs and SLBMs, by providing for a provision on such configurations. (Begin comment: Such provision could include transparency and confidence-building measures. End comment.) Paragraph 7 (basing SOA on national territory) was a reformulation of the Russian-proposed text, but the U.S. accepted the Russian approach. Paragraphs 8 (Implementation Body), 9 (Patterns of Cooperation), and 10 (Duration) were Russian-proposed text the U.S. Delegation was prepared to accept. The first unnumbered paragraph (Commitment to pursue further reductions), following paragraph 10, had a couple of small edits by our lawyer based on the fact that we as negotiators could not "conclude" a treaty. Only our Presidents could do so, but the negotiators could finish their work on the treaty text. 14. (S) With regard to the paragraph on further reductions, the U.S. Side understood that Russia wanted to delete the provision; however, it was an important paragraph. This was not so important to the negotiators, but it was important in a much larger context. Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. Delegation had taken language from the broader Presidential Joint Statement in London and modified it for the Joint Understanding. With that, Gottemoeller stated that the U.S. Delegation had worked hard to address the concerns raised by the Russian Delegation and hoped that the text would address those concerns. It was clear that the Delegations were coming closer together in our goal of an agreed text. -------------------------- U.S. DELEGATION'S HARD WORK ACKNOWLEDGED BY RUSSIAN DELEGATION -------------------------- 15. (S) Antonov stated that he could see that the U.S. Delegation had worked hard and it was clear that the U.S. was trying to find compromises and eliminate the difficult points. These were good steps in the right direction; however, they were not sufficient. It went without saying that they would have to look at the text carefully. 16. (S) Regarding the U.S. proposal to use the Russian proposal from BIC, Antonov said he was very happy that Russia was finally able to convince the United States of the value of its proposal, even five years late. Antonov stated that the U.S. logic was convincing with respect to the last paragraph, because all the details were in the Presidential Joint Statements. He would read it all very carefully later that evening. 17. (S) Antonov said he was confused with the U.S.-proposed wording in the "commitment" paragraph. Did it mean that the negotiators had another obligation to begin negotiations on another treaty? Antonov said he was a simple Siberian bureaucrat, moving forward with little steps. He makes a small step and looks behind his back to see if all is okay. He wanted his President to say he was satisfied with his work and that he had accomplished his task. We should wait for instructions on what the new treaty should deal with before assuming an obligation to negotiate another treaty. 18. (S) Antonov said that he was not rejecting the U.S. proposal but that he had to have time to study it. Besides the general comments he had made, Antonov was concerned that Russia's proposal on the radical reductions in delivery vehicles was not addressed in the U.S. proposal. -------------------------- WAY AHEAD IS CLEAR -------------------------- 19. (S) Gottemoeller stated that our Presidents have already decided to press ahead with more reductions based on their recent statements. In the context of the London Statement of April 1, President Obama stated that this was only the beginning of a step-by-step process. Additionally, on April 6 in Prague, President Obama made a statement on further reductions. Within a very short time, President Medvedev made some important comments on the eventual reductions in nuclear weapons in Helsinki. So from London, to Prague, to Helsinki, we have two Presidents who have made political decisions to proceed with further reductions. In her view, this would be the only nuclear arms reduction agreement that would be signed by the two Presidents prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. So this would not only be a unique window into our intent with regard to our current reductions, but the potential for further reductions. As to the other comment regarding reduction in SDVs, we did not reject the lower limits. This will give the negotiators time to work 20. (S) Antonov confirmed that the two Presidents should sign the treaty prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), but they could make another statement that they intend to negotiate some other instrument. Or they could say, on the eve of the NPT Revcon, that they have taken the decision together on what would be done next. Gottemoeller responded that the two best opportunities, for NPT Article VI purposes, would be when the two Presidents sign the Joint Understanding in Moscow and when they sign the treaty. Antonov closed by saying that the Russian Delegation would work to try and harmonize our position and reduce differences in the document. 21. (U) Below is the text of the U.S. non-paper discussed and provided to the Russian Delegation during the meeting. The non-paper incorporates elements from the U.S.-proposed draft Joint Understanding and the Russian-proposed draft. While the non-paper was provided in line-in line-out form to the Russian Delegation, the paper provided below represents the U.S. Delegation's proposal in an unbracketed form. 22. (S) Begin text: Non-paper of the U.S. Side in response to the Paper of the Russian Side of June 22, 2009 June 23, 2009 JOINT UNDERSTANDING The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have decided on further reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty. The new treaty is to contain the following elements: 1. A provision to the effect that each Party is to reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms, so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers) does not exceed 1100 for each nation. In addition, the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and warheads on deployed heavy bombers, as well as warheads in storage depots associated with air bases (airfields) where heavy bombers are based, is not to exceed 1675 for each nation. 2. Provisions for calculating these limits are to be drawn from the START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty, as appropriate. 3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty. 4. A provision to the effect that each Party is to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. 5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. 6. Provisions on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. 7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national territory of each Party. 8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve questions related to treaty implementation. 9. The provisions of the treaty will not apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third state. 10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The two Presidents direct their negotiators to finish their work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries. The two Presidents have also directed that the treaty be accompanied by a commitment to continue to pursue new and verifiable reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a step-by-step process. Done at (City), this (date) day of (month), 2009, in two originals, in the English and Russian languages. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (President B. Obama) (President D.A. Medvedev) End text. 23. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S: -- U.S. Non-Paper in response to the Paper of the Russian Side of June 22, 2009. 24. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Mr. Dunn Mr. Elliott Mr. Fortier Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mr. French (Int) Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Mr. Belyakov Mr. Ilin Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Mr. Neshin Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) 25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. STORELLA |