Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA520
2009-06-25 13:27:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0520/01 1761327
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251327Z JUN 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8729
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4631
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1802
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0810
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5982
S E C R E T GENEVA 000520 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION-HOSTED
LUNCH, JUNE 22, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000520

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION-HOSTED
LUNCH, JUNE 22, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-002.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 22, 2009
Time: 1:30 - 3:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Russian Delegation hosted a lunch on June 22,
2009, at the Russian Mission. U.S. Delegation members
engaged members of the Russian Delegation in discussions on a
variety of topics pertaining to the START Follow-on
negotiations that included: Russian President Medvedev's
Amsterdam Statement of June 20, 2009, issues associated with
the Joint Understanding, confusion of the Russian Delegation
regarding how the Russian-proposed numerical limits were
derived, and differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear
warheads. The general impression of the U.S. Delegation was
that the Russian Delegates were less formal than on other
occasions and were not reluctant to engage on substantive
issues, indeed they sought it out.

--------------
PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV'S
AMSTERDAM SPEECH
--------------


4. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed the statement made
by Russian President Medvedev in Amsterdam on the previous
Saturday, June 20, 2009. Antonov said that he had written
the statement as an attempt to begin solidifying the Russian
position and to make several points very clear: (1) the
Russian President has a positive assessment of the
negotiators' work (which was especially important for
Antonov); (2) the Presidents gave us instructions to finish
by the end of the year, and we should do so (the most
important point in the statement to Antonov); and (3) we

should achieve effectively verifiable, realistic reductions,
and the reductions in strategic delivery vehicles should be a
"significant factor" below those in the START Treaty. He
said he realized that there were differences between the U.S.
and Russian positions on reductions and how to get out of
this situation would be a major question for the negotiators.
Antonov emphasized that he was serious about the
negotiations and wanted them to succeed.

--------------
ISSUES WITH THE
JOINT UNDERSTANDING
--------------


5. (S) Antonov told Gottemoeller that the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) was starting to slow-roll the negotiations.
Gottemoeller said that reinforced hints she had gotten during
the June 15-16 meetings in Moscow.


6. (S) Malyugin told Siemon and Buttrick that, since the
previous evening (June 21),the Russian Delegation had been


working on six different drafts of the Joint Understanding.
In fact, Antonov had been changing the language of the Joint
Understanding at the table while he was presenting it to the
U.S. Delegation. He said that only Antonov's approval of the
Joint Understanding was required. Malyugin relayed that part
of the problem associated with the Russian-proposed draft was
based on the MOD's concern with counting rules. He said that
the U.S. Delegation had asked a very good question regarding
the issue of counting rules based on "attribution." Russia
was not proposing the START-like counting rules of
"attributing" a certain number of warheads to each system,
but was proposing the Moscow Treaty rules of associating
strategic nuclear warheads. He said the Russian Delegation
had not realized that the term "attribution" meant START
counting rules to the U.S. Side. Malyugin also said that
there was flexibility with regard to how the United States
and Russia should describe the inter-relationship between
strategic offensive and strategic defensive systems in the
START Follow-on Treaty.


7. (S) Malyugin told Buttrick that the Russian-proposed
version of limitations on locating strategic offensive arms
outside national territory was a "basing" issue, not a
"locational" issue. Buttrick asked if Russia was proposing
the START language regarding basing strategic offensive arms
outside national territory, Malyugin said that was what was
intended by Russia's language in the paragraph contained in
the Joint Understanding. Buttrick confirmed with Malyugin
that Russia's proposal would allow for temporary stationing
of heavy bombers outside national territory with
notifications as permitted under START.


8. (S) Belyakov asked Elliot for clarification regarding the
meaning of specified locations for warheads "associated with"
bomber bases. Elliott explained the U.S. concept that if one
Side acknowledges that it has strategic heavy bombers, then
it was logical that they must also acknowledge the need to
store nuclear warheads for those bombers and that they must
also specify the associated storage area in which the nuclear
warheads were stored, to provide for verification. The only
other alternative was to declare and verify that the
strategic heavy bombers were no longer equipped for nuclear
delivery.


9. (S) Referring to the Russian desire to remove the
commitment to promptly initiate negotiations toward
concluding a subsequent treaty with further reductions,
Koshelev told Ries that, with such low numbers of delivery
vehicles that will exist after the START Follow-on Treaty,
Russia was wondering when the United States thought other
countries should be brought into any negotiations For
example, the Chinese probably have 300 delivery platforms,
which was close to the 500 number the Russians were proposing.


10. (S) Luchaninov told Brown that the Russian Delegation
had been quite surprised, although favorably so, at the
positive reaction that Gottemoeller had conveyed during the
meeting earlier in the day concerning the contents of the
Russian draft Joint Understanding.

--------------
WHAT'S BEHIND THE
RUSSIAN NUMBERS?


--------------


11. (S) Ryzhkov told Trout and Couch that he did not know
the origin of the 500 delivery vehicle number or the 1675
warhead number that Russia had proposed for the new treaty.
He said that the Russian Delegation had only been informed
that those would be the numbers proposed.


12. (S) Venevtsev informed Trout and Couch that he did not
know the method of counting used to develop the Russian
proposal to limit delivery vehicles to 500 and warheads to
1675, but rhetorically asked, "Isn't 1675 less than the
Moscow Treaty?" He then grinned and asked, "Isn't the 500
delivery vehicle number a nice round number?"


13. (S) Siemon and Buttrick explained to Venevtsev that the
reason the U.S.-proposed number of 1100 strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles (SNDVs) was higher than the Russian number
of 500 SNDVs was due to how the United States structured and
deployed its current strategic forces. Siemon asked
Venevtsev how he envisioned that the United States and Russia
could narrow the gap between the U.S. and Russian SNDV
numbers. Venevtsev stated that "arms control was not cheap.
The U.S. will need to reduce the number of submarines and
silos."


14. (S) Ryzhkov told Trout and Couch that SS-18 silos that
did not have missiles deployed in them would not count toward
the 500 delivery vehicle number since Russia proposed to only
count delivery vehicles and not the launchers. When asked
whether Russia could accept gravel put into silos and cuts of
only heavy bomber fuselages as a means for removing those
items from accountability, Ryzhkov replied that easier, less
costly methods of elimination were needed and that such
approaches could be considered. He opined that START had
over fulfilled in the measures required to eliminate items.


15. (S) Ries asked Koshelev what he thought would be the
most difficult part of the negotiation, to which he replied
"counting rules." The Russians were very concerned about
U.S. up-load capacity and would need to have confidence that
the numbers reflected what the United States actually had.
This would be difficult to get done quickly, and might mean
that the new treaty would not be finished by the time START
expires, which would necessitate a political statement. He
added that he hoped working groups would be established as
they would be needed to resolve tough problems.


16. (S) Trout asked Venevtsev whether there was enough time
to complete the difficult tasks necessary to implement a new
treaty by December 5, to which Venevtsev asked what
difference it made since negotiations on the new treaty would
continue regardless. When Trout noted that all verification
measures would terminate without the START Treaty in force,
Venevtsev said that would not be a problem. He did not
believe either Party would move very fast to change the
military situation. He noted that Warner kept telling him
that many U.S. strategic force decisions would have to wait
until after the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are
announced. When Trout said in that case the START Treaty
would be in the same condition as the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty, Venevtsev strongly insisted that they
were completely different. START had served its purpose, but


CFE still had a purpose.

--------------
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN NUCLEAR
AND CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS
--------------


17. (S) Venevtsev told Couch that there was "no such thing
as a conventionally armed ballistic missile."


18. (S) Malyugin asked Buttrick and Siemon how the Sides
could distinguish between a nuclear or conventional warhead
being tested on a new ICBM. Siemon clarified that this issue
was a problem that was still in the concept development phase
and that the United States was still thinking through
solutions to it. Siemon also acknowledged that the Sides
could not even distinguish these differences with telemetry.
When Malyugin asked how Russia could tell if a missile was
nuclear or non-nuclear once it is launched, Buttrick
suggested that perhaps some form of transparency could be
developed within the context of the operations in the Joint
Data Exchange Center (JDEC). Malyugin thought the idea of
using the JDEC for confidence building might prove useful.
He also said that a U.S. approach to counting conventional
ICBMs and SLBMs within the SNDV limit would be a move in the
right direction; however, not counting warheads under the
warhead count was a problem for Russia.

--------------
VISA PROBLEMS PREVENT
NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON
--------------


19. (S) Buttrick and Siemon raised with Venevtsev the issue
of continuing the dialogue between the U.S. and Russian
Delegations to conclude agreement on the Joint Understanding
for the Moscow Summit beyond June 24. Siemon asked about
holding the meetings in Washington. Venevtsev quickly
dismissed Washington as a venue because of problems
associated with obtaining visas. He said that it normally
takes members of the Russian Government over a month to get
visas. He relayed that, during one of his trips to
Washington, it took five weeks, and then it was returned to
him with a multi-entry visa that was only good for a 3-day
period.

--------------
OTHER TIDBITS OF INTEREST
--------------


20. (S) Koshelev briefly commented to Ries on Iran. Russia,
he said, had been careful in its relationship with Iran
because it was concerned about the potential for Iran
supporting Islamic extremist movements in Russia. That said,
Russia was certainly concerned about Iranian nuclear
ambitions and thought concerted action was the best way to
address the problem. Russia did not favor additional
economic sanctions because of a fear that Iran would
retaliate by ceasing cooperation with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Koshelev opined that we could
not afford to have this happen since it was only via IAEA
inspections that we knew details of Iranian nuclear programs.
He added that Russia's commercial interests in Iran had


diminished significantly but this was not true of certain
European countries.


21. (S) Fortier spoke with Koshelev and Ryzhkov about
liquid-propellant SLBM eliminations at Krasnoyarsk. Fortier
recounted that the problem of eliminated SS-N-18 and SS-N-23
SLBM airframes not being displayed in the open, as required
by START, was discussed and successfully resolved during past
JCIC sessions. However, there were now indications that the
problem may have started again. Ryzhkov thanked Fortier for
bringing it to his attention and pledged to have his staff
look into it. He believed there were new workers at the
Krasnoyarsk plant who may not be aware of the Treaty-required
procedures, but he would ensure that they were quickly made
aware of them. Ryzhkov claimed that managers at the plant
had been fired as a result of the previous incident.


22. (S) Venevtsev told Buttrick that Sergey Kashirin,
recently from the Arms Control Office in the MFA and a
regular attendee at the JCIC and the early START Follow-on
sessions, was recently informed that he was being reassigned
to the Russian Embassy in Armenia. He said that Kashirin was
looking forward to the new assignment, and that he should be
moving from Moscow some time this fall.


23. (S) Koshelev mentioned to Ries that the Russian
Delegation was very grateful for U.S. Head of Delegation
Gottemoeller's recognition earlier that day of the Russian
Day of Memory and Sorrow. The commemoration of the day when
the Great Patriotic War began for the Soviet Union with the
Nazi invasion and remembering the large number of human
losses sustained during that war was important to Russia.


24. (U) Participants.

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kron
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin


Mr. Neshin
Col Novikov
Mr. Rudenko
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Semin
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Vasiliev
Mr. Venevtsev
Ms. Brokhovich (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA