START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 23, 2009 MORNING
SESSION

REF: A. GENEVA 00511 (SFO-GVA-II-001)

B. STATE 60487

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-003.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 23, 2009
Time: 11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) Russian HOD Antonov began the meeting by saying that
the Russian-proposed edits of the U.S. Joint Understanding
tabled in Moscow were an attempt to harmonize the Russian and
U.S. approaches as much as possible and to maintain
"constructive ambiguity" in some areas, for later
negotiation. He added that it is unlikely that we would
resolve all differences in definitions. As for the
definition of Strategic Delivery Vehicles, Antonov said that
the Russian use of the term included ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers and the Russians understood that the U.S. wants to
include the associated launchers. United States HOD
Gottemoeller responded that the U.S. was drawing from
existing START definitions where possible. Antonov added
that it made sense for the Sides to "nail down" definitions
and that the Russians agreed to use START terms where
possible.


4. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain how, if the
term "launcher" were to disappear from the treaty, the
Parties would be able to verify the limits on missiles.
Antonov said that he could not answer right away but noted
that there had been a question on sub-limits on launchers.
All he could say was that the Russian Side was prepared to
discuss this during the negotiations. Warner reminded
Antonov that the U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding was
formulated using the existing START text as the Russian
Delegation had suggested. Trout said that since the Russian
definition of Strategic Delivery Vehicles did not include
launchers, did the Russian-proposed limit of 500 Strategic
Delivery Vehicles include both deployed and non-deployed
missiles. Neither Antonov nor Ilin could answer the question
and deferred it to a later meeting.


5. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov why the Russian draft used
the term "interdependence" when addressing strategic offense
and defense when President Medvedev had used the term
"relationship" with regard to strategic offensive and
defensive arms. Antonov replied that "interdependence"
better reflected what the Russians want in the treaty and
reminded Gottemoeller that Medvedev said Russia would only
make reductions if the United States addressed all of
Russia's concerns. Gottemoeller replied that the U.S.
position remained clear that there would only be a single
mention of defensive arms in the treaty and that would be in
the preamble.


6. (S) Elliott explained that the United States cannot agree


to the Russian proposal to ban ICBMs and SLBMs with
conventional warheads and that the U.S. believed appropriate
verification and transparency measures could be developed to
satisfy Russia's concerns.


7. (S) Gottemoeller explained that it was important for both
Sides to understand how delivery vehicles and warheads were
counted. Warner provided a detailed explanation of how the
U.S. had more than 300 START-accountable missile silos,
submarine launch tubes, and heavy bombers that cannot be used
to deliver nuclear weapons and that such "phantom" delivery
vehicles need to come "off the books." Gottemoeller added
that there were situations with regard to Russia's forces
where such "phantom" delivery vehicles also existed. The
United States and Russia structured their forces differently
and the U.S. needed more delivery vehicles to maintain its
force structure while the Russians needed fewer delivery
vehicles to maintain essentially the same number of warheads.

--------------
OPENING REMARKS
--------------


8. (S) Antonov welcomed the U.S. Delegation back to the
Russian Mission for day two of the third round of
negotiations. He expressed his hope that the Russian
proposal for the Joint Understanding (REF A) did not ruin the
U.S. Delegation's afternoon but was sure we had a good
discussion. Antonov stressed that the U.S. should not try to
read between the lines of the Russian proposal and there was
not a hidden bottom-line in their position. The Russian
proposal tried to provide maximum details while preserving
"constructive ambiguity." Additionally, the Russian Side
thought the Joint Understanding would give the Presidents an
opportunity to help the Delegations take a step forward and,
after a break, the Delegations could continue the
negotiations in a more deliberative atmosphere (Begin
comment: That is, not having the Moscow Summit deadline. End
comment). Antonov concluded by stating that the Russian Side
was prepared for a constructive discussion of both proposals.


9. (S) Gottemoeller confirmed that the U.S. Side had a busy
but not ruined afternoon. She mentioned she had re-read
Russian President Medvedev's Amsterdam statement and noted
that it provided a good guide for the Delegations'
discussions. She highlighted Medvedev's challenge that the
new treaty be a "totally objective, absolutely specific and
at the same time binding agreement."


10. (S) Gottemoeller proposed that the U.S. Side take the AM
session to ask questions to clarify the Russian position on
its proposed Joint Understanding (Ref A). She proposed that,
in the afternoon session, the U.S. Side could return with a
draft text combining both Sides' positions. Antonov accepted
this proposal.

--------------
U.S. DELEGATION QUESTIONS ON
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED CHANGES TO
U.S. DRAFT JOINT UNDERSTANDING
--------------


11. (S) Gottemoeller began by addressing numbered paragraph



1 in the Russian text regarding its formulation on central
limits of Strategic Delivery Vehicles. Specifically, she
pointed out that, in the original U.S. draft proposal (Ref
B),the U.S. Side used language from the START Treaty
("Deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers"); in the
Russian text, it appeared they only addressed the Strategic
Delivery Vehicles without the associated launchers. She
asked the Russians what was their point in dropping the START
terminology in regard to launchers.


12. (S) Antonov responded that it was highly improbable that
both Sides would resolve all the issues concerning
definitions prior to the July Summit. He noted that, in the
U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding, the U.S. Side used the
term "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" and
that terminology was not used in Moscow Treaty. He also
highlighted that the problem of creating that definition had
been around for many years. Antonov noted that previously we
had been close on such a definition but failed to reach
agreement. He deferred any detailed discussion of coming up
with a definition to an experts working group at a later
time. He concluded his point by stating that it was possible
to come up with an agreed definition and the Russian Side
wanted to work constructively on developing a common
definition as soon as possible, but it might require a new
term or change in the content of the definition.


13. (S) Antonov stated that the Russian proposal used the
general term of Strategic Delivery Vehicle to describe the
central limit of the new treaty. He reiterated, from the
Russian text, that the Russian Side defined that term as
"intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers."


14. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether the Russian Side included
the launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the
launchers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in their
definition or did the Russian Side suggest that the general
term "strategic delivery vehicle" be used in the new treaty?
Antonov stated that the Russian Side was still preparing an
answer to that question and was prepared to discuss this
during the course of the negotiations.


15. (S) Gottemoeller said the U.S. Side had used START
terminology whenever and as far as possible. She asked what
had changed since START went into force to make the Russian
Side not want to use the same terminology in regard to the
limit on missiles and their associated launchers? Antonov
responded, stating that it did not make sense to try to nail
down definitions at this time but he agreed START terminology
should be used, with the caveat that Gottemoeller had taught
him about the "hybrid" and, therefore, it is not easy to
decide when the START terminology was appropriate or
necessary. He stated that the Russian Side was ready to
work with the U.S. Side on the issue of strategic delivery
vehicles and to take into account U.S.-proposed terminology
on this issue. In any case, the Russian Side was open to any
idea in the interest of arriving at a mutually-acceptable
solution.


16. (S) Picking up on the mention of hybrid approaches,
Gottemoeller stated that concept extended to transparency and
verification measures that may have to go beyond what was in


START. She asked if associated launchers disappeared from
the new treaty, how did the Russian Side propose to verify
the limit on missiles without a limit on launchers?


17. (S) Antonov responded that he was in a more advantageous
position because President Medvedev's Amsterdam statement
gave him specific instructions that the new treaty needed
"effectively verifiable" measures, adding that perhaps
President Obama would make a statement that could change the
situation. Antonov said that he completely supported
Gottemoeller's remarks on transparency and openness, noting
that this had been the problem the Russian Side had with the
previous U.S. administration. He claimed that all the
measures he was talking about now included aspects of
transparency, openness and verification measures. But, as to
whether there would be limits on launchers, the Russian Side
was not prepared to talk about it at this time. Experts
could find the answers to verification problems as they
developed the detailed Treaty text.


18. (S) Gottemoeller answered that the U.S. Side's view was
that the new treaty covered Deployed Missiles and their
associated launchers and Operationally Deployed Strategic
Nuclear Warheads. Warner stated that, in the U.S. original
non-paper on the Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty, the
U.S. central limit was on operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads. Warner continued that the Russian Side had
effectively argued limiting warheads alone was not enough.
There had to be limits on launchers. The U.S.-proposed Joint
Understanding went back to the original START language as the
most effective way to capture the entire assembly.


19. (S) Antonov replied that the Russian side was still
getting used to the hybrid concept, and each Side had its own
logic on how to develop the new treaty. He relayed that,
after extensive discussion within his Delegation, the Russian
Side thought its formulation was best, but he recommended
postponing further discussion on the issue at this stage to
allow a more detailed discussion by experts later, adding
that he did not want the U.S. Side to think that he was
ignoring the U.S. logic.


20. (S) Antonov also recognized that the first paragraph of
the Joint Understanding was the critical paragraph, but aaid
he did not see how the Sides would be able to resolve the
complexities before the Summit. Antonov acknowledged how
difficult it was for the U.S. Side to come up with numbers
for the Joint Understanding and stated that it was also
difficult for the Russian Side. However, for the Russian
Side, the decision was made at a much higher level.


21. (S) Gottemoeller responded that the same higher levels
expected the negotiations to resolve the numbers issue and
provide figures in the Joint Understanding. She emphasized
how important it was to determine how the limits would be
counted under the new treaty to understand what actually was
being limited. She stated that the U.S. Side would come back
in the afternoon with more thoughts on the matter.


22. (S) Antonov answered, stating that Medvedev's Amsterdam
speech dictated that Strategic Delivery Vehicles needed to be
reduced by a significant factor vis-a-vis the START levels,
and that associated warheads needed to be below the Moscow


Treaty. Antonov continued that perhaps at this stage of the
negotiations it would be better to keep this language very
general vice specific numbers.


23. (S) Gottemoeller moved on by reiterating that she
believed more concrete options were needed for the Presidents
and that the U.S. Side looked forward to further discussions
to define Strategic Delivery Vehicles.

--------------
MORE U.S. QUESTIONS
--------------


24. (S) Gottemoeller asked about the Russian terminology in
their proposed Joint Understanding concerning the limit "1675
warheads associated with" the Strategic Delivery Vehicles.
What was the relationship between warheads and delivery
vehicles?


25. (S) Again, Antonov said this would be a topic of further
discussion, but that the Russian Side had begun to accept the
idea of a hybrid treaty and decided to take one parameter
from START and one from the Moscow Treaty. He also stated
that, to the Russian Side, the reduction of delivery vehicles
was more important in the context of the reduction of
strategic offensive arms.


26. (S) At this point Trout noted that, in the
Russian-proposed text, the Russian definition of strategic
delivery vehicles did not include launchers. He asked
whether the proposed Russian limit of 500 Strategic Delivery
Vehicles included deployed and non-deployed missiles? Ilin
responded that the Russian Side would think it over and
provide a written reply.


27. (S) Gottemoeller pointed out that, for the U.S. Side,
definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations,
inspections, and verification procedures for the new treaty
would be adapted from the basis of the START Treaty. She
asked whether the Russian Side intended using the START
Treaty as a basis?


28. (S) Antonov agreed that the Russian Side wanted to take
the maximum from START as the basis for these measures, to
see what was appropriate, but that both Sides would need to
figure out together how to make them less costly. However,
Antonov said that his formulation would not prejudge this
work, so he did not think it was possible to give specific
answers while the Sides were just beginning their work. He
added that the presentation of the Russian "vision" paper
should have demonstrated where the Russian Side had taken
whole sections and elements from START.

--------------
NEW RUSSIAN POSITION ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS
--------------


29. (S) Gottemoeller reserved the right to return to the
paragraph on counting rules, but first stated that she would
ask a simple question. In the Russian-proposed text on a
provision about the relationship between strategic offensive


and defensive arms, why did the Russian Side use the term
"interdependence" when Medvedev in his Amsterdam speech used
the term "interrelationship?"


30. (S) Antonov replied that the Russian Side did not have
philologists on its Delegation, but he thought
interdependence was a better choice of words and captured the
essence of the issue. The Russian Side wanted the term
interdependence to highlight that it could accept proposed
reductions only if Russian concerns were removed, noting that
Medvedev's comment about removing Russian concerns referred
to missile defense.


31. (S) Gottemoeller responded that the U.S. thought it had
addressed Russian concerns by agreeing to address the issue
in the preamble of the new treaty on the understanding that
was to be the only reference to the issue.


32. (S) Antonov replied that there may be a problem as the
Russian Side no longer felt that preamble language was
enough. Again, he wanted to defer this discussion until the
future, but he wanted to understand what the U.S. objections
were to the Russian proposal. He wanted the opportunity to
understand the U.S. logic and what the differences were. He
thought maybe the U.S. did not have a clear position yet,
since it had not elaborated its objections. He emphasized
that the Russian proposals would only address the
interdependence of strategic offense and strategic defense
and not be about missile defense. He recognized that Russian
concerns about the "'third site" missile defense deployments
would not be addressed in the START Follow-on negotiating
venue. The U.S. proposal on preamble language was a step in
the right direction but not enough.


33. (S) Gottemoeller stated that she thought the U.S. had
carried through on addressing Russian concerns by having the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency, LTG O'Reilly, visit
Moscow to discuss missile defense and the Joint Data Exchange
Center as well as the prospect that it could be a topic of
discussion for the Presidents at the July Summit
.

34. (S) Gottemoeller turned to Elliott to provide a further
explanation of the U.S. position on the Russian-proposed ban
on non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Elliott stated
that the U.S. could not agree to the Russian-proposed ban on
ICBMs and SLBMs armed with non-nuclear warheads. He
acknowledged the Russian concerns and stated that the U.S.
believed appropriate verification measures could be developed
for such deployed ICBMs and SLBMs that would confirm that
nuclear warheads are not deployed on missiles declared to
have solely non-nuclear strike capabilities.


35. (S) Antonov replied that the Russian Delegation had
prepared an official document on the issue but had not
received anything back from the U.S. Delegation. He also
stated that the Russians were not prepared at this time to
say that the U.S. explanation has removed Russian concerns.
He said that the two Delegations should calmly discuss this
matter so that each could understand each other's logic,
emphasizing that this was one of the most critical problems
in the future treaty. As soon as Russia is able to see that
the U.S. is able to remove Russian concerns "on treaty
paper," it will remove many concerns and it will be easier to


resolve other outstanding issues because it will demonstrate
that the United States is prepared to have a constructive
relationship based on "equal security."

--------------
CONTINUING THE
DISCUSSION ON COUNTING
RULES AND EXEMPTIONS
--------------


36. (S) Gottemoeller said she wanted to return to the issue
of counting rules and why the U.S. thought that the second
paragraph of the Joint Understanding must include the basis
for calculating limits. She noted that, originally, when the
United States arrived at its numbers it noted that it was
very possible to not include certain systems in the count.
She then turned to Warner to continue the presentation he
made in Moscow.


37. (S) Warner noted that the U.S. Strategic Nuclear
Delivery Vehicles, as delivered in the START January
Memorandum of Understanding and noted by the Russian Side at
the small group meeting in Moscow on June 15-16, was 1198.
Warner highlighted that this number included many delivery
vehicles that were no longer in use by the U.S. Side. He
noted the following that the United States mentioned in its
elements paper.

- 100 Empty Silos.

- 51 B-52 G models that have been cut apart and are no longer
flyable.

- 4 B-52 H models that are in similar condition.

- 96 Launch tubes associated with 4 Ohio-class submarines
that have been modified so they cannot carry or launch SLBMs.

- 66 B-1s in the process of being converted to a non-nuclear
role that cannot be used in the delivery of nuclear armaments.

- 17 B-1s that will remain in long-term storage at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ.

- Adding these systems together totaled 334 systems that
START accounts for that the U.S. cannot use for the delivery
of nuclear armaments.

- Warner pointed out that subtracting this number from the
approximately 1200 START-accountable delivery systems showed
that the U.S. could not accept a Strategic Nuclear Delivery
Vehicle limit below 870. He then highlighted that the actual
U.S. requirement was approximately 900 Strategic Nuclear
Delivery Vehicles when taking into account how the U.S.
operationally deploys its Strategic Nuclear Warheads.


38. (S) Gottemoeller concluded these comments by pointing
out that each Side had two very different arsenals. The U.S.
Side pursued the de-MIRVing path as laid out in the START II
Treaty (in relation to the ICBM force),but the Russian
Federation did not pursue such a path. She noted that this
was not a comment on Treaty obligations since the START II
Treaty never entered into force, but she wanted to highlight


that there were structural differences in the two arsenals.
It was up to each Side to structure its arsenal to meet its
requirements and each Side would need to understand that in
the future. It was the hope of the U.S. Side that the
Russian Side would understand that the United States wanted
to remove unused systems under the new treaty.


39. (S) Gottemoeller concluded by pointing out that the
Russian Side also had approximately 300 "phantom"
START-accountable delivery vehicles that could be removed
from the new treaty, citing a number of empty SS-18 ICBM
silos and empty SLBM launch tubes on Typhoon submarines and
Bulava test platforms.


40. (S) Both Sides agreed to conclude the morning session
and return to the Russian Mission in the afternoon.


41. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


42. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Mr. French (Int)
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ilin
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Venevtsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


43. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA