Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA476
2009-06-12 17:00:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON B-1 HEAVY BOMBER

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5939
S E C R E T GENEVA 000476 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON B-1 HEAVY BOMBER
CONVERSION AND BASING OF U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS AND UKRAINIAN
POSITION ON EXPIRATION OF START, JUNE 10, 2009

REF: A. STATE 54967 (U.S. RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AIDE-MEMOIRE ON CONVERSION OF THE B-1
HEAVY BOMBER)

B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS OVER U.S. ACTIVITY INVOLVING
CONVERSION OF B-1 HEAVY BOMBERS FOR
NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND THE BASING OF
SUCH BOMBERS DATED OCTOBER 20 2008

C. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS REGARDING UNITED STATES
COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009

D. STATE 58439 (JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE 002)

E. GENEVA 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000476

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON B-1 HEAVY BOMBER
CONVERSION AND BASING OF U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS AND UKRAINIAN
POSITION ON EXPIRATION OF START, JUNE 10, 2009

REF: A. STATE 54967 (U.S. RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AIDE-MEMOIRE ON CONVERSION OF THE B-1
HEAVY BOMBER)

B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS OVER U.S. ACTIVITY INVOLVING
CONVERSION OF B-1 HEAVY BOMBERS FOR
NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND THE BASING OF
SUCH BOMBERS DATED OCTOBER 20 2008

C. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS REGARDING UNITED STATES
COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009

D. STATE 58439 (JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE 002)

E. GENEVA 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-013.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 10, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on June 10, 2009, to discuss the conversion of
the B-1 heavy bomber to a heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armament, basing of U.S. heavy bombers, and the
Ukrainian position on the expiration of START. The United
States, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were represented.


4. (S) The U.S. Delegation explained that the conversion
should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments but should not render the aircraft incapable of
carrying conventional armaments. The U.S. Delegation also
showed a photograph depicting a forward weapons bay before

the conversion process is completed and explained what was
actually done to convert the weapons bay. The Russian
Delegation stated that they understood the conversion process
of the B-1 heavy bomber, but were not certain that the
process could not be quickly reversed. They also offered
that they had been provided a copy of the photograph that the
U.S. Delegation had shown. The U.S. Delegation stated that
the key to progress on this issue would come in a mutual
understanding of the term "incapable of carrying" and
encouraged discussion of the U.S.-proposed Draft Joint
Statement provided to the Parties on June 5, 2009 (REF A).
The Russian Delegation said it would study the issue during
the intersession and provide a recommendation on how the
issue could be resolved.


5. (S) On the issue of the Ukrainian position regarding
expiration of the START Treaty, Nykonenko read a lengthy
statement expressing Ukraine's view that START should be
extended to provide the time necessary for negotiations of a
follow-on agreement and asserted Ukraine's right to be a part
of any follow-on treaty.

--------------
SAME OLD ISSUES


--------------


6. (S) Koshelev opened the meeting, stating that the issue
of conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber had been discussed in
detail at JCIC-XXXII and JCIC-XXXIII. In addition, Russian
concerns had been stated in two aides-memoire dated October
20, 2008 and March 10, 2009 (REFS B and C). Russia continued
to have concerns about the U.S. process to convert the B-1 to
a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments because
Russia still believed the B-1s that had undergone the
conversion process retained the capability to carry nuclear
armaments.


7. (S) Koshelev said that the United States was applying a
new concept or definition that was not provided for in the
Treaty. He added that the requirements of Section VI,
Paragraph 11, of the Conversion or Elimination (C or E)
Protocol were quite clear that "all weapons bays equipped to
carry nuclear armaments be modified so as to render them
incapable of carrying nuclear armaments." (Begin comment:
Koshelev, when referring to a "new concept," was referring to
the capability to operationally deploy or deliver a nuclear
weapon. End comment.)

--------------
WE NEED TO SEE
BEFORE AND AFTER
--------------


8. (S) Koshelev recalled the July 10, 2008 inspection at the
Davis-Monthan C or E Facility and stated that the
distinguishability exhibition provided did not give the
inspectors the opportunity to view both a non-converted B-1
and a converted B-1. Specifically, inspectors had seen
partially disassembled pylon attachments from a non-converted
B-1 and could not distinguish them from the converted pylon
attachment joints. By not providing this distinguishability
and technical analysis, Russia could not determine the
conversion methods used by the United States. Additionally,
Koshelev stated that the Russian Federation was not convinced
that the attachment joints from the converted and
non-converted aircraft had external and functional
differences.

--------------
AIR BASE DEFINITION
--------------


9. (S) Koshelev reiterated Russia's concerns with basing
heavy bombers of different categories at the same base. He
said this practice conflicted with the requirements of
Paragraph 23 of Article V. While the Russian Federation did
not have an issue with the presence of B-1 aircraft at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, it did not believe they should
be based there. Koshelev said that the Russian Federation
was still studying the U.S. non-paper, "On Conversion of the
B-1 Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Weapons to a Heavy
Bomber Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments," dated May 27,
2009 (REF D).

--------------
LET US EXPLAIN WHAT WE DID
--------------


10. (S) Taylor stated that the Parties appeared to have


different viewpoints on "irreversibility." Koshelev
immediately replied back that he had not used the term
"irreversibility" and that, in fact, this was not the issue.
Taylor responded that he believed this was an issue that came
out of a working group from the previous JCIC session (REF E).


11. (S) Taylor proceeded to deliver the U.S. explanation and
interpretation of the B-1 conversion process. He referred to
Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Section VI of the C or E Protocol
which contains the "incapable of carrying nuclear armaments"
clause. He argued that this clause did not mean that nuclear
weapons cannot physically fit inside the weapons bay.
Likewise, the term "carrying nuclear armaments" did not
simply mean the ability to load or to hold an object the size
and weight of a nuclear weapon.


12. (S) Taylor assured the other Parties that the United
States had no plans or intentions of returning the B-1 to a
nuclear role. Once converted, the B-1 could no longer be
used for the delivery of nuclear armaments.


13. (S) Taylor said that the United States was prepared to
work with the other Parties to develop an understanding on
the intent of the term "no longer capable of carrying" and
that if there were to be a resolution of this issue, the
Parties needed to develop a practical solution that did not
entail the removal of the capability for the B-1 to deliver
non-nuclear weapons.


14. (S) Taylor added that, if such a practical solution
could be reached for the weapons bay issue, a solution could
also be reached for the pylon attachment joint issue.


15. (S) Taylor addressed the July 10, 2008 Data Update
Inspection at the Davis-Monthan C or E Facility by adding
that although at a distance the pylon attachment joint for a
B-1 that had been converted and a B-1 that had not been
converted appear similar, they served a different function.
He assured the Parties that there were indeed physical
differences which make the pylon attachment joint unusable
for the pylons for LRNAs.


16. (S) Taylor turned to the issue of basing and stated that
there had been no change in the location where B-1 heavy
bombers were based. For accountability purposes, the B-1s
were being attributed to Davis-Monthan when the conversion
process was initiated.


17. (S) Taylor emphasized that the Treaty provided for the
conversion of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
other than LRNA to the category of heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments and that definitions for these terms
existed.


18. (S) Taylor welcomed Russian views on what conversion
procedure would meet Treaty requirements in their mind.

--------------
YOU HAVE A PHOTO?
--------------


19. (S) Koshelev said he believed that the United States had
the correct approach to solve this issue, but there were some

terms in the Treaty that had dual interpretations. An
understanding between the Parties must come from focusing on


a common understanding of terms. He reiterated Russia's
concern that the B-1 could still be quickly returned to a
nuclear role.


20. (S) Ryzhkov asked about a photograph that had been
promised in the U.S. Delegation Paper, provided to the
Parties on June 5, 2009, that stated that the U.S. Delegation
would show a photograph depicting the B-1 weapons bay prior
to conversion (REF A). Taylor provided the photograph for
the Parties to review and Hanchett explained the various
items in the photograph to include explaining the conversion
process, identifying the various elements within the weapons
bays that were modified during the conversion process.
Taylor called for a break to let the Parties examine the
photograph.


21. (S) After a short break, during which the Parties
reviewed the photograph, Ryzhkov noted that he already had
the photograph since it was provided during the
pre-inspection briefing at the distinguishability exhibition.

--------------
MORE HOMEWORK
--------------


22. (S) Koshelev stated he understood that the
distinguishing characteristic of the B-1 that made it
incapable of carrying a nuclear armament is the removal of a
unique cable and a cap placed over its lead to the weapons
bay. Despite this, the Russian Federation was still not
convinced that those cables could not be reinstalled just as
quickly as they were removed. He said this is a good example
of where our interpretations diverge and warrant a more
concrete understanding of the term "incapable of carrying."
He again pointed out that the United States had a good
approach to alleviate Russian concerns and that Russia would
like to think about this and other possible methods as
"homework" and respond at a later date.


23. (S) Taylor stated that it was important to reach a joint
understanding of the term "incapable of carrying" and that
this was the vital piece to making progress. He added that
he welcomed Russian ideas and looked forward to hearing their
thoughts.


24. (S) Koshelev echoed Taylor's statement and noted that it
was clear where U.S. and Russian opinions diverged, but by
sitting down together we could solve this issue. He added
that he understood the U.S. interpretation of "incapable of
carrying," but again asked what the time required would be to
re-convert the B-1 back to a nuclear role. Koshelev asked
for any additional points Taylor had made be provided in
written form. Taylor agreed to provide them. The additional
points, in the form of a U.S. Delegation Paper, are provided
below. (The Delegation Paper was provided on June 12, 2009
to the Russian Delegation.)

Begin text:

JCIC-XXXIV
U.S. Delegation Paper
June 10, 2009

Additional Points on Conversion of the B-1 Heavy
Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Weapons to a Heavy Bomber


Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments

- If the parties can develop a practical solution for the
weapons bay issue, the United States is confident that the
Parties could also move to a practical solution for the pylon
atachment joint issue.

- Regarding the data updae inspection that occurred on July
10, 2008, at avis-Monthan, Russian inspectors made an
observaion that the pylon attachment joit for the B-1 that
had not been converted appeared to be identical to the
modified pylon attachment joint. The United States offers
the fllowing comments:

1) There may be some simiarity in viewing the modified
pylon attachment jint and unmodified pylon attachment joint
from adistance. The modified pylon attachment joints seve
a function which is different from that of th unmodified
pylon attachment joints.

2) Te United States assures the other Paties that
there are physical differences which make the pylon
attachment joint unusable for the pylons for long-range
nuclear ALCMs.

- On the issue of location, basing, and attribution of
converted B-1 heavy bombers, the United States notes that
there has been no change in the location where the B-1 heavy
bombers are based. For administrative purposes, the heavy
bombers are being attributed to Davis-Monthan when the
conversion process is initiated. They will remain attributed
to Davis-Monthan until the conversion process for all B-1
heavy bombers is complete.

- The Treaty provides for the conversion of heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA to the
category of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
Additionally, the Treaty contains a definition for a heavy
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The implication
of these provisions is that the Treaty allows for the
converted heavy bomber to retain a capability to
operationally deploy non-nuclear armaments.

- The United States would welcome Russian views on what
conversion procedures would meet the Treaty's requirement
that a converted heavy bomber be "incapable of carrying"
nuclear armaments, while retaining the capability of carrying
and operationally deploying non-nuclear armaments.

End text.


25. (S) Shevtsov stated that there was a broad range of
perspectives on this issue. In a narrow view, "incapable of
carrying" could just mean operationally incapable. In this
case, certain cables have been removed. In an extreme view,
it could mean bomb bay doors being welded shut, for example,
which would make the bomber "physically incapable" of
carrying nuclear armaments, but would also make the bomber
obsolete. He pointed out transparency based on promises
required trust, but the "guarantee" required physical
incapability. Shevtsov concluded there was a compromise that
was possible, but it may not be achievable within the time
remaining under START.


26. (S) Taylor concluded by reemphasizing the importance of


reaching a joint understanding of "incapable of carrying."
He said the task before the Parties was to find a compromise
and that "where there is a will, there is a way." He added
that he hoped we could continue these discussions during the
intersessional period. Koshelev said the Russian Delegation
would study the issue during the intersession and provide a
recommendation on how it would resolve the issue.

--------------
WE WANT TO BE INVOLVED
IN THE FUTURE
--------------


27. (S) Nykonenko delivered the Ukrainian statement on START
expiration. He promised to provide a written copy to all
Parties. The official translation of the Ukrainian statement
follows.

Begin text:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXXIV
Non-Paper of the
Ukrainian Side
June 10, 2009

The Ukrainian side placed on the agenda the issue of
Ukraine's position in connection with expiration of the
Treaty.

On the substance of the issue, the Delegation of Ukraine
is authorized to state the following:


1. Ukraine is in favor of extending the Treaty -- its
mechanism has proven its effectiveness throughout the fifteen
years of its existence. Such a decision ensures a favorable
time frame for thorough preparation of the new Agreement.


2. Having signed the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992,
Ukraine acquired the status of a START successor state to the
USSR as a full-fledged party, i.e. it not only assumed
obligations, but also obtained certain rights. Ukraine's
unprecedented contribution to nuclear disarmament and its
active participation in reducing strategic offensive arms
confirmed our country's status as a reliable and predictable
partner.


3. The situation that has now emerged, where, in
essence, Ukraine is excluded from the intensive negotiating
process being conducted by Russia and the U.S., which should
result in conclusion of an agreement to replace the START
Treaty, is not only of great concern to the leadership of
Ukraine, but is also becoming a subject of widespread
discussion in political circles and among the most
politically active segment of Ukraine's population.


4. Ukraine has been quite sensitive about the decision
of the U.S. and Russia to begin negotiations to work out a
new agreement in a bilateral format. Ukraine, which
possesses significant potential in terms of missile
technology production and has sufficient experience in
nuclear disarmament verification activities, believes that it
is fully entitled to participate actively in the new treaty.



5. Moreover, since it has a legal right to develop
non-nuclear strategic offensive arms, Ukraine believes that
because the new agreement is expected to deal with the
category of "non-nuclear strategic weapon delivery vehicles,"
it is possible for Ukraine, from both a formal and a legal
point of view, to participate in the new agreement as a party
to the treaty.


6. Ukraine urges the interested parties to engage in a
constructive dialogue with a view to ensuring that there is
maximum transparency and that the interests of all the
Parties to the START Treaty are taken into account to the
fullest extent on the issue of strategic offensive arms
control, and Ukraine believes that its absence among the
Parties to the new international agreement in this area could
cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Treaty being
negotiated.


7. The Ukrainian side believes that the proposal in the
statement by the Belarusian side at the meeting of the
Commission on June 8, 2009, on adoption of a document that
would reflect each Party's contribution to implementation of
the Treaty is timely and appropriate. We also believe it
would be advisable to reflect in that document the prospects
for our further cooperation in reducing strategic offensive
arms.


8. In connection with the foregoing, Ukraine once again
tables its proposal to hold an additional working session of
the JCIC in order to discuss and adopt decisions on the
outstanding issues, including those raised by the Ukrainian
side.

End text.


28. (S) Koshelev thanked the Ukrainian Delegation and noted
that their issues were both within the scope of the JCIC and
outside the scope of the JCIC. He mentioned that the Russian
Delegation would explore these issues and comment on them at
a later time.


29. (S) Taylor also thanked the Ukrainian Delegation and
informed them that the U.S. Delegation would take these
issues back to Washington for study. He stated that these
issues required serious thought and, therefore ,the United
States would reserve comment at this time.


30. (S) The U.S. Delegation also provided a U.S. Delegation
Paper containing the modalities of the Minuteman III
demonstration. That text of the paper follows.

Begin text:

JCIC-XXXIV
U.S. Delegation Paper
June 10, 2009

U.S. One-time Demonstration of the Minuteman III
ICBM Front Section

The United States has decided to organize a one-time
demonstration of the Minuteman III front section. This
one-time demonstration will be conducted outside the
obligations of the Treaty and will not be counted against the
quotas of inspections allocated to the other Parties. The



United States will inform the Parties to the Treaty through
Diplomatic channels of the date of the demonstration.

The procedures used to conduct the demonstration will
mimic procedures listed in Annex 3 of the Inspection
Protocol. After separation from the ICBM, the front section
will be transported to a Specially Allocated Site where
members of the Observing Team will be permitted to view the
space inside the lower portion of the front section to
determine that it cannot contain items corresponding to
reentry vehicles.

Shrouding of sensitive elements may be present and will
not impede any determination that additional reentry vehicles
cannot be located within the space of the lower portion of
the front section of a Minuteman III ICBM.

The United States stresses that no additional devices or
equipment will be used during the one-time demonstration.

The U.S. expectation for the results of the
demonstration will be a factual report documenting the
conduct of the demonstration, including procedures used and
what the Observing Team observed.

The Minuteman III ICBM RVOSI demonstration is a one-time
event and will not be a demonstration of a new method of
presenting the Minuteman III ICBM front section for use
during future RVOSIs. The demonstration is intended to
foster confidence and predictability in the existing
Minuteman III RVOSI procedures.

The United States does not intend that any new
procedures specific to this one-time demonstration will be
codified.

The United States expects that satisfactory conduct of
the demonstration will allow the Parties to resolve this
issue, that the Parties will record this result in
Coordinated Statements at a JCIC session following the
demonstration or through diplomatic channels, and that this
issue accordingly will be removed from the JCIC agenda.

Details concerning the modalities of the demonstration
are as follows:


1. The United States will select the ICBM base for silo
launchers of ICBMs at which the demonstration will be
conducted.


2. The Observing Team will designate the silo launcher
of ICBMs containing the Minuteman III front section for the
demonstration.


3. The procedures set forth in Annex 3 to the
Inspection Protocol will be followed up to the point of front
section separation. The procedures set forth in paragraph 1
of Annex 2 to the Inspection Protocol will be used to view a
silo launcher declared not to contain a Minuteman III ICBM
should that be encountered.


4. Following completion of the demonstration, a
narrative report will be prepared documenting the conduct of
the demonstration, including what procedures were used and
what the Observing Team observed.




End text.


31. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.

-- U.S. Delegation Paper Containing Additional Points on
Conversion of the B-1 Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear
Weapons to a Heavy Bomber Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments,
dated June 10, 2009 (provided to the Russian Delegation on
June 12, 2009);

-- U.S. Delegation Paper containing Questions from the
United States Delegation to Help Resolve U.S. Concerns on
SS-27 RVOSI Procedures, dated June 9, 2009; and

-- U.S. Delegation Paper on the U.S. One-Time
Demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM Front Section, dated
June 10, 2009.

- UKRAINE:

-- Ukrainian Paper, Ukraine's Position on the Expiration
of the START Treaty, dated June 10, 2009.


32. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Beddoes
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
LT Lobner
Mr. Smith
Mr. Stein
Mr. Vogel
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ugorich
Mr. Ponomarev

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Kashirin
Ms. Kotkova
Col Petrov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Schevtchenko
Mr. Serov
Mr. Smirnov


Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Dashko (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Mr. Nykonenko
Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Chernyavskiy
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Shevchenko


33. (U) Taylor sends.
STORELLA