Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA468
2009-06-12 13:19:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON COURTLAND MISSILE

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0468/01 1631319
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121319Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8634
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4582
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1747
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0755
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5923
S E C R E T GENEVA 000468 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON COURTLAND MISSILE
ASSEMBLY FACILITY AND RS-24 NEW TYPE, JUNE 9, 2009

REF: A. SECSTATE 40874 (JCIC-DIP-02-002) PROVISIONS IN
ADVANCE OF DATA ON THE LV-2 SPACE LAUNCH
VEHICLE

B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS REGARDING U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE START TREATY
DATED MARCH 10 2009 (E-MAILED FROM
MOSCOW-NO REPORTING CABLE)

C. GENEVA 466 (JCIC-XXXIV-015)

D. STATE 58439 (JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE 002)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000468

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON COURTLAND MISSILE
ASSEMBLY FACILITY AND RS-24 NEW TYPE, JUNE 9, 2009

REF: A. SECSTATE 40874 (JCIC-DIP-02-002) PROVISIONS IN
ADVANCE OF DATA ON THE LV-2 SPACE LAUNCH
VEHICLE

B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS REGARDING U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE START TREATY
DATED MARCH 10 2009 (E-MAILED FROM
MOSCOW-NO REPORTING CABLE)

C. GENEVA 466 (JCIC-XXXIV-015)

D. STATE 58439 (JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE 002)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-012.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 10, 2009
Time: 10:30 - 11:30 A.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on June 10, 2009, to discuss Russian concerns
with the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility and the U.S.
concerns associated with the Russian declaration of a
prototype of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). All Parties were represented.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation reiterated its position on
Courtland as a production facility and planned to review the
additional information provided this session by the U.S.
Delegation (REF A). The U.S. Delegation stated U.S. concerns
with Russia's prototype RS-24 ICBM and expressed hope that
the Russian Delegation would soon provide additional
information on its plans to test and deploy the prototype
ICBM. The Russian Delegation assured the Parties that all
Treaty obligations would be met when the testing and
development of the prototype was complete.


--------------
THEY ARE WHAT THEY WERE
--------------


5. (S) Koshelev opened the HOD Meeting and offered that the
issue of the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility was first
discussed at JCIC-XXXI. He thanked the U.S. Delegation for
the additional document provided on April 23, 2009 (REF A),
and the U.S. Delegation Paper containing a U.S. response to
the Russian aide-memoir of March 10, 2009 (Ref B),that had
been provided on June 9, 2009 (Ref C). He reviewed the
points made in the Russian Federation aide-memoire from March
10, 2009. He noted that there had not been time for the
Russian Delegation to analyze the paper provided the previous
day by the U.S. Delegation. He noted that the United States
had not yet responded to Russian questions; specifically,
Russia still questioned the declaration of Courtland as a
production facility, the definition of a target vehicle as a
submarine launch ballistic missile (SLBM),and what to do if
a target vehicle was encountered by Russian inspectors.


6. (S) First, Koshelev stated Courtland did not conform to
the START Treaty definition of the term "production facility"


and the activities as briefed were not consistent with
paragraph (a) of the START definition for "production
facility."


7. (S) Second, Koshelev explained that the Russian
Federation did not think it was correct for a target vehicle
incorporating a Trident I first stage SLBM to be considered a
Trident I SLBM. He paraphrased paragraph 3(a) of Article III
of the Treaty on the first stages of a particular type of
SLBM. He repeated that a target vehicle was not a Trident I
SLBM and there was no category for target vehicles. He
continued that, if any missile with the first stage could be
referred to as an SLBM of that type, there would be a
conflict with confirmation of type in terms of technical
characteristics.


8. (S) Lastly, Koshelev said there remained a question of
what a Russian inspection team would do when encountering a
target vehicle. He opined that the United States should have
identified and provided inspection procedures to the other
Parties. Koshelev asked the United States for further
clarification.


9. (S) Taylor assured all Treaty Parties that the activities
conducted at the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility were in
compliance with Treaty requirements. He pointed out the
related portions of the Treaty definition for "production
facility" which states that "for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility
at which first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained,
stored and transported in stages are assembled." He reminded
all Parties that the United States maintains, stores, and
transports the Trident I SLBM in stages, so that when a
Trident I SLBM first stage was encountered, it was considered
to be a Trident I SLBM.


10. (S) Taylor described the activities at Courtland at
which Trident I SLBM first stage motors were accountable as a
Trident I SLBM and would undergo activities consistent with
work done at production facilities, including stage assembly.
He stated that Trident I SLBM first stages assembled at the
Courtland Facility would be incorporated into launch
vehicle-2 (LV-2) space launch vehicles and that these LV-2
would begin exiting the Courtland Facility in the near future.


11. (S) Taylor reiterated that the LV-2 would be accountable
under the START Treaty as a Trident I SLBM; it was the
Trident I SLBM first stage that was the item of
accountability in accordance with START, Article III,
paragraph 3(a). He quoted the Treaty and reminded the
Parties of the Diplomatic Note (REF C) that provided the LV-2
technical information. Taylor concluded that an LV-2 target
vehicle, if encountered by Russian inspectors, would be
considered a Trident I SLBM first stage.


12. (S) Koshelev asked his Russian Delegation experts if
they were satisfied with the U.S. response. Ryzhkov answered
that they planned to study the document that was provided and
comment in detail during the intersession. Taylor clarified
with additional points and explained that it would be a
similar situation if U.S. inspectors encountered a START or a
START I space launch vehicle. Both space launch vehicles
were SS-25s in terms of accountability, notifications, and
other obligations of the Treaty. In similar fashion, when
Russian inspectors encountered a Trident SLBM in a loading
tube and requested that it be removed, they determined type
of SLBM by viewing and measuring the first stage only.

Ryzhkov asked whether telemetry would be provided for an LV-2
flight test and Taylor assured him that all Treaty
obligations would be met and all Treaty notifications would
be provided.

--------------
WHEN, OH WHEN, WILL
THE PROTOTYPE BE
--------------


13. (S) Taylor addressed the second agenda item, stating
that issues associated with Russia's prototype of a new type
of mobile ICBM (RS-24) were discussed extensively since
JCIC-XXIX. He added that, although the Russian Federation
had provided some information, Washington still had concerns
with regard to the Russian Federation's plans for testing and
deployment of the new prototype ICBM. Taylor noted that,
during the last JCIC session, the United States provided a
written copy of those concerns to be taken back to Moscow for
consideration. Taylor cited statements in the Russian press
by both the chief designer of the RS-24 ICBM and the
commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces indicating that the
RS-24 ICBM would enter service by the end of 2009. He stated
that the United States continued to await a response
regarding the Russian Federation's plans for the testing and
deployment of the RS-24 ICBM.


14. (S) Koshelev said he consulted with Russian missile and
legal experts and wanted to stress that the RS-24 was still a
prototype ICBM. He stated that the missile's final technical
characteristics were not finalized. He indicated that, when
the development of the prototype of the RS-24 was complete,
the Russian Federation would provide all of the information
required by the Treaty. Koshelev cautioned that the media
should not be relied upon since some statements were made for
political reasons and may not be based on fact. He reminded
the Parties that he was the Russian Federation's authority
and would provide the official report on this issue. He
closed saying he would do his best to provide the information
to help the United States understand, or as his foreign
minister says, allay concerns.


15. (S) Shevtsov raised the point that Russia had many
variants and asked whether there was a special name or index
for the new type of missile under development. Koshelev
said, again, that when the Russian Federation had the
information they would provide it to all Parties, as required
by the Treaty.


16. (S) On the margins of the meeting, Hanchett provided a
U.S. Delegation paper to Ryzhkov containing the U.S. response
(REF D) to the Russian Aide-Memoire of December 23, 2008 on
Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM flight test
on August 13, 2008, and two interpretive data sheets to
correct interpretive data sheets that had errors.


17. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Delegation Paper from JCIC-XXXIV of June 9, 2009,
U.S. Response to Russian Aide-Memoire of December 23, 2008,
on Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM Flight
Test on August 13, 2008.


18. (U) Participants:


U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Beddoes
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
LT Lobner
Mr. Smith
Mr. Stein
Mr. Vogel
Ms. Gross (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ugorich
Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Mr. Nurgozhayev

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Kashirin
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Petrov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Serov
Mr. Shevtchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Dashko (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Mr. Nykonenko
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Shevchenko
Dr. Shevtsov


19. (U) Taylor sends.
STORELLA