Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA467
2009-06-12 13:05:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIV: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UPDATED

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 121305Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8626
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4574
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1739
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0747
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5915
S E C R E T GENEVA 000467 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UPDATED
PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THE SS-27 ROAD-MOBILE ICBM, SS-25
ELIMINATIONS AND SS-27 RVOSI, JUNE 9, 2009

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000467

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UPDATED
PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THE SS-27 ROAD-MOBILE ICBM, SS-25
ELIMINATIONS AND SS-27 RVOSI, JUNE 9, 2009

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-011.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 9, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Working Group (WG) meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on June 9, 2009, to discuss the U.S. request for
updated SS-27 road-mobile ICBM memorandum of understanding
(MOU) photographs, SS-25 Elimination Procedures and SS-27
Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) procedures. All
Parties were represented except Belarus.


4. (S) The U.S. Delegation stated that current MOU
photographs of the road-mobile SS-27 ICBM in its launch
canister no longer corresponded to the configuration of these
missiles as they currently exit the Votkinsk Portal
Monitoring Facility (VPMF). The United States requested
updated photographs to assist monitors and inspectors in
differentiating RS-24 and SS-27 ICBMs in the future.


5. (S) The Russian Delegation said that it had thoroughly
examined the issue prior to arriving in Geneva and noted that
SS-27 ICBMs leave the production facility in various
configurations. Monitors could use the current MOU
photographs in conjunction with measurement procedures to
confirm the item of continuous monitoring. As such, Russia
did not see the need to provide an updated MOU photograph.


6. (S) The U.S. Delegation acknowledged the Russian
Federation's cooperation in bringing its SS-25 ICBM
elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty,

noting that 54 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire
self-contained dispensing mechanisms (SCDMs),had been fully
eliminated and are considered removed from accountability.
The U.S. Delegation requested clarification as to when the
Russian Federation intended to eliminate the remaining 109
SCDM casings declared eliminated by Russia prior to 2008.


7. (S) The Russian Delegation responded that it intended to
eliminate the remaining SCDM casings; however, there is no
set timeline as the eliminations could occur prior to or even
after Treaty expiration. If any casings are eliminated prior
to Treaty expiration the Parties would be notified in
accordance with the Treaty.


8. (S) The Parties also discussed potential solutions to the
shroud used by Russia during SS-27 RVOSIs which impedes U.S.
inspectors from ascertaining that the SS-27 does not have
more than one reentry vehicle. The United States posed a
series of questions to better understand Russian concerns and
drew from previously resolved RVOSI issues as examples of
methods that could be used for potential resolution of the
current issue.


9. (S) The Russian Delegation responded that it is prepared
to work toward resolving the issue but if there was an easy


solution it would have already been resolved. Ryzhkov stated
that the SS-27 ICBM is a different system, and provides a
different set of obstacles. The procedures that had been
developed for SS-25 RVOSI were not applicable to SS-27 RVOSI.
The Russian Delegation said it was not prepared to answer
specific questions posed by the United States and requested
that the U.S. Delegation provide its questions in writing.


10. (S) The Ukrainian Delegation supported a previous
Russian argument that telemetric information from flight
tests could be used to confirm that the SS-27 ICBM can only
be equipped with one warhead and military experts would not
want to deploy a system that had not been tested beyond its
capabilities. The U.S. Delegation suggested that applying
this logic would resolve Minuteman III issues as well, which
seemed to result in a consensus to dismiss Ukraine's
suggestion.

--------------
WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL? SCDMS
CAN'T FLY ON THEIR OWN
--------------


11. (S) Couch opened the WG Meeting on June 10, 2009, and
said the United States would like to acknowledge the Russian
Federation's cooperation in bringing its SS-25 ICBM
elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty.
Since January 2008, 54 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire
self-contained dispensing mechanisms, had been fully
eliminated. The United States concurred with the removal of
these missiles from accountability. During JCIC-XXXIII, the
United States asked the Russian Federation for clarification
on whether the treaty-required elimination procedures would
be applied to the 109 SS-25 ICBMs declared eliminated by
Russia prior to 2008.


12. (S) Couch reminded the Russian Delegation that, in its
JCIC-XXXIII Closing Plenary Statement, the Russian Federation
said it intended to seek the possibility of eliminating the
casings of the instrumentation compartments of the 109 SS-25
ICBMs in question. However, no progress had been made on
this issue since that time. Couch said the United States
continued to seek clarification as to when the Russian
Federation intended to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings,
and requested a timeline for those eliminations.


13. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia carried out requirements
adopted in January 2008 in the spirit of goodwill by
presenting these casings to U.S. inspectors during
elimination inspections at Votkinsk. In response to the U.S.
question, Ryzhkov declared to all Parties that the Russian
Federation intends to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings
belonging to missiles that Russia had already eliminated.
Ryzhkov explained that there were delays in the dismantlement
of these casings which are done outside of Votkinsk. The
delivery of these items for elimination would occur at a
later date and, if it occurred prior to expiration of START,
then the Parties would be notified in accordance with the
Treaty.


14. (S) Couch acknowledged that Russia said it planned to
eliminate the remaining SCDM casings, but requested further
information regarding the schedule. Ryzhkov responded that
the Parties have already been notified and did not believe
that the issue was as sensitive as it had been made out to


be. Ryzhkov stated that a SCDM casing cannot fly by itself.


15. (S) Couch reiterated that the United States would like
to know if the eliminations would occur within the framework
of START or after the Treaty expires. Ryzhkov answered that
a portion of the casings could be eliminated prior to START
expiration and others after, but Russia is not looking to
store them for future use.

--------------
HOW MANY WAYS CAN
I SAY "NO DEAL?"
--------------


16. (S) Couch said the U.S. Delegation previously informed
the Russian Delegation that the current MOU photographs of
the SS-27 ICBM launch canister no longer corresponded to the
configuration of these missiles as they currently exited VMPF
and requested more updated MOU photographs to better assist
U.S. monitors and inspectors in differentiating RS-24 and
SS-27 ICBMs in the future. However, updated MOU photographs
have not yet been received and U.S. portal monitors continue
to document differences in SS-27 launch canisters in
inspection reports. The United States would like to know
whether the Russian Federation would provide updated MOU
photographs of the SS-27 ICBM launch canister.


17. (S) Ryzhkov responded that the Russian Federation had
studied this issue in detail prior to arriving in Geneva and
understood U.S. concerns. Ryzhkov stated that the Treaty
provides two methods for confirming an item of continuous
monitoring: viewing and measuring the dimensions. The
results of measurements conducted by U.S. monitors
corresponded to the data provided in the MOU for the declared
type. Therefore, measurements allowed monitors to confirm
that canisters contain an SS-27 ICBM.


18. (S) Ryzhkov said the Russian Federation had thoroughly
reviewed comments made in U.S. monitoring reports noting the
differences regarding the presence and absence of cables and
boxes on the exterior portion of the missile canister.
Ryzhkov noted that missiles leave the production facility in
various configurations and that exterior components were not
necessarily consistent features. It was the Russian
Federation's opinion that using the current MOU photographs
in conjunction with measurements provides sufficient
information to confirm that the item of continuous monitoring
is of the declared type. The Russian Delegation cited that
all U.S. official monitoring reports had confirmed that the
item of continuous monitoring was of the type declared and as
such Russia does not see the need to provide an updated MOU
photograph.


19. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian Federation was not
prepared to provide a photograph for all the various canister
configurations. He showed a photograph of an SS-27 launch
canister and highlighted potential differences in various
configurations stating that such differences did not change
the type of missile. Smirnov noted that these differences
were not modifications, but only changes to configurations.
Ryzhkov said that final assembly is carried out at bases for
strategic offensive arms adding that SS-27 launch canisters
have a common configuration once deployed and that U.S.
inspectors could confirm this during data update inspections.
Ryzhkov drew upon a previous analogy used to explain


differences in confirming transporter-erector launchers.
Ryzhkov said that, just because one Mercedes does not have an
antenna for example, it does not change the type of vehicle;
it is still a Mercedes.


20. (S) Couch responded to Ryzhkov's reference to viewing
and measuring. He said monitors compared the item declared
to the appropriate MOU photograph. Couch acknowledged the
Russian Delegation's explanation, but reiterated that an
updated MOU photograph may help to resolve the problem.
Couch stated that it was the totality of differences that
caused concern. He then spoke of the differences noted by
U.S. portal monitors using the following points.

Begin points:

-- The United States would like to inform the Russian
Federation of the following list of differences in SS-27
launch canisters that have been observed by portal monitors
and documented in inspection reports:

-- The pair of black cables on the forward end of the
non-unique identifier (UID) side were missing.

-- Two white cables running from and under the first box from
the left on the forward end of the non-UID side and running
lengthwise down the canister under the cable raceway were
missing.

-- The two large raceways visible on the non-UID side of the
canister, toward the top of the canister, were separated by a
gap roughly 2/3 down the canister toward the launch assist
device in the MOU photographs. The gap was noticeably
smaller on the inspected launch canister.

-- Extending from the second box on the non-UID side were
three large conduits not present in the MOU photographs.

-- On top of the canister and running the length of the
canister to a point above the UID, monitors observed a long
narrow rectangular raceway over ten supporting boxes and then
another long narrow rectangular raceway over nine additional
supporting boxes with four cables attached to the forward end.

-- The white cable running from the second box from the right
on the forward end of the UID side to the launch assist
device end of the UID side was missing.

-- On the UID side extending from the first boxes forward of
the launch assist device were 14 cables not visible in the
MOU photographs.

-- Just forward of the first box forward of the launch assist
device were eight cables not visible in the MOU photographs.

-- A new box was present just aft of the UID and is not
visible in the MOU photographs.

End points.


21. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that the Russian Federation could
not provide photographs for each potential launch canister
configuration and a photograph with each component would not
help either because the missile would still leave Votkinsk in
various launch canister configurations. Ryzhkov stated that


Russia understood that the issue may create an awkward
situation for monitors but they are experienced enough to
differentiate between systems.


22. (S) Fortier explained that one of the problems is that
the only updated SS-27 road-mobile ICBM MOU photograph
provided by the Russian Federation was that of the missile
deployed on the launcher as opposed to a photograph of the
SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister. This also created
problems for U.S. inspectors confirming missile canisters at
Plesetsk. (Begin note: The two photographs together provide
views of opposing sides of the missile canister. End note.)


23. (S) Ryzhkov noted U.S. concerns and said he would take
them back to Moscow for consideration.

--------------
RUSSIA LETTING
THE CLOCK RUN OUT
--------------


24. (S) Couch set the stage for the discussion on resolving
U.S. concerns with SS-27 RVOSI procedures by proposing an
open dialogue with the Russian Delegation to brainstorm
potential solutions. He stated that the United States did
not presume to tell Russia how to conduct an RVOSI, only to
facilitate the process of resolving the issue.


25. (S) Couch said the United States believed that the
responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve
U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, not only
because it was the obligation of the inspected Party not to
hamper the inspecting Party in ascertaining that the front
section contained no more reentry vehicles than the number of
warheads attributed to missiles of that type, but also
because Russia, not the United States, understood the
sensitivities involved with the SS-27 system. The United
States repeats its readiness to work seriously, and in good
faith, with Russia to resolve this issue to the satisfaction
of both Parties. The United States would be willing to
explore possible SS-27 RVOSI solutions that took into account
whatever sensitive know-how exists on that system that has
led to the use of overly large covers.


26. (S) Ryzhkov agreed to allow the U.S. Delegation to
commence the meeting by asking questions. Fortier stated
that the first issue is to understand the need for the
oversized cover. During discussions on the SS-25 RVOSI
issue, the Russian Delegation said that the large
barrel-shaped cover was needed to protect sensitive know-how.
Was this the case with the very large conically shaped cover
currently being used during SS-27 RVOSIs? Ryzhkov responded
that Russia never said that a large cover was needed to
protect sensitive technology. The shape of the shroud
depended on the design of the missile and this missile was
different than others. Ryzhkov responded that he was not
prepared to answer the question, Russia would need to talk
with the missile's designer. Ryzhkov offered that the SS-25
RVOSI procedures that had been agreed on would not be
applicable to the SS-27 RVOSI. Ryzhkov could only respond
that the Russian Delegation was prepared to work the issue
and requested that the United States provide its questions in
writing to avoid confusion.


27. (S) Smith said that Russia had expressed concerns with


the space beneath the Minuteman III (MM III) front section.
If we were to compare the space beneath the MM III front
section with the space under the SS-27 cover, we would find
the space under the SS-27 cover to be much larger. With that
in mind would it be possible to use a more conformal cover?
During the SS-25 RVOSI demonstration, the Russian Federation
used a conformal cover over the single reentry vehicle and
then demonstrated the construction of the large barrel-shaped
cover and showed how it was placed over the reentry vehicle.
Was it possible to conduct a demonstration of the SS-27 front
section using a similar conformal cover over the single
reentry vehicle in order to show U.S. observers the
relationship between the large cover and the single reentry
vehicle, as well as the rationale for the use of the large
cover?


28. (S) Ryzhkov responded that the deployed SS-27 ICBM
road-mobile and silo configurations were designed before the
missile entered into service, so it would be difficult to
change the technical specifications. If it were easy to
solve this problem, Russia would have resolved it already.
As evidenced by the morning meeting on the MM III RVOSI
issue, the U.S. Delegation had been studying the issue for
quite a while and had potentially found a solution. (Begin
note: Ryzhkov was attempting to bring the discussion to a
close. End note.)


29. (S) Dunn said it was Russia that proposed to hold a WG
session to discuss the issue further. The Russian Delegation
indicated during the morning Heads of Delegation meeting that
it had considered the issue further and had some suggestions
or new information to provide. Dunn asked whether this was
correct and, if so, was the Russian Delegation prepared to
provide that information during this meeting?


30. (S) Ryzhkov replied that all people think alike, ask
themselves the same questions and follow the same line of
reasoning. This issue could be approached from various
angles. Ryzhkov said one approach may involve changes to
provisions governing the configurations of shrouds. He added
that RVOSIs are sensitive and that we had to come to serious
agreement. Russia began studying resolution to the SS-27
RVOSI issue long after the United States began its study of
the MM III issue. Only in the final stage of the Treaty's
life had we reached a possible settlement. Ryzhkov repeated
that the Russian Federation understood U.S. concerns and
would wait for its written questions on the matter.


31. (S) Fortier asked how an experienced Russian inspection
team chief. such as Colonel Petrov, would deal with this
situation during a reentry vehicle inspection when he peered
down into a silo or looked at a road-mobile launcher and saw
only a large teepee covering the entire opening of the launch
canister where the front section was supposed to be, knowing
that his job was to confirm that the front section contained
no more reentry vehicles than the one warhead attributed to
it. Ryzhkov referred to the Russian proposal to use the
Karousel Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE). That proposal
showed Russia was ready to resolve the issue in question
unilaterally. Maybe, in the future, the Parties could
explore such methods to improve inspection procedures.
Ryzhkov opined that, on one hand, more sensitive means and
measures could help in confirming the number of warheads and
on the other hand avoid disclosing sensitivities. To answer
the question, Petrov would need to use his arsenal of


knowledge to fulfill his duties.


32. (S) Shevtsov supported a previous Russian argument that
telemetric information from flight tests could be used to
confirm that the number of reentry vehicles deployed on the
SS-27 ICBM did not exceed the number of warheads attributed
to it. The issue with the SS-27 is different than the issue
with the Trident II, in that Trident II telemetry information
identified more warhead releases than the number of warheads
currently attributed to that system. The SS-27 ICBM flight
test and telemetry information did not indicate releases of
more than one warhead. Shevtsov asked whether a system would
be operationally deployed without the appropriate flight
tests. He opined that this question is the root of the
issue. Military experts would not deploy a system that had
not been tested beyond its capabilities. Shevtsov said the
United States should pose this question to U.S. military
experts.


33. (S) Fortier replied that, according to this logic, there
would be no need to conduct the MM III demonstration.
Shevtsov responded that the MM III is much like the Trident.
Fortier responded that the SS-27 ICBM is similar to the RS-24
prototype ICBM, to which Shevtsov agreed. Smirnov also
agreed.


34. (S) Stein said that both Parties understood the need to
protect sensitive technologies and to conduct flight tests
prior to deployment. He acknowledged that the conduct of
RVOSIs for particular systems differs in practice. Stein
noted that the Russian Federation had resolved issues
associated with SS-25 and SS-18 ICBM RVOSIs and asked the
Russian Delegation to consider adopting some of the concepts
used to resolve those issues, such as a more conformal cover,
in thinking about the SS-27 RVOSI issue.


35. (S) Ryzhkov replied that it took three JCIC sessions to
think through the nuances and invent devices to resolve the
SS-25 issue. However, the SS-27 ICBM issue is more complex.
The procedures used for the SS-25 ICBM RVOSI issue could not
be used to resolve the SS-27 ICBM RVOSI issue.


36. (S) The Russians agreed that it is their responsibility
to propose a solution to the problem. Smith returned to his
earlier question and asked if Ryzhkov's response implied that
a more conformal cover could not be used. Ryzhkov responded
that he could not answer that question, but would get back to
the U.S. on it.


37. (S) Couch concluded the discussion stating that over the
years the JCIC had a successful track record of resolving
RVOSI issues, such as the SS-25, SS-18 and Trident II, and
the United States was working hard to reach resolution of the
MM III issue. The United States only asked that the Russian
Delegation take the next step in resolving the SS-27 issue.


38. (U) Documents exchanged. None


39. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Couch
Mr. Beddoes
Lt Col Comeau


Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
LT. Lobner
Mr. Smith
Mr. Stein
Mr. Vogel
Ms. Gross (Int)

KAZAKHSTAN

Mr. Nurgozhayev

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Ivanova
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Petrov
Mr. Shevtchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Shevchenko


40. (U) Taylor sends.
STORELLA