Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA462
2009-06-11 14:32:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON SS-27 RVOSI, PK

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0462/01 1621432
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111432Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8612
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4565
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1730
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0738
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5906
S E C R E T GENEVA 000462 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON SS-27 RVOSI, PK
SILO CONVERSIONS AND ONE-TIME DEMONSTRATION OF MM III FRONT
SECTION, JUNE 9, 2009

REF: A. STATE 057616 ANC/STR 09-411/143 (UNITED STATES
NRRC NOTIFICATION CANCELLING PK SILO
CONVERSION)

B. STATE 8779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (UNITED STATES NRRC
NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION)

C. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS REGARDING UNITED STATES
COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000462

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON SS-27 RVOSI, PK
SILO CONVERSIONS AND ONE-TIME DEMONSTRATION OF MM III FRONT
SECTION, JUNE 9, 2009

REF: A. STATE 057616 ANC/STR 09-411/143 (UNITED STATES
NRRC NOTIFICATION CANCELLING PK SILO
CONVERSION)

B. STATE 8779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (UNITED STATES NRRC
NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION)

C. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERNS REGARDING UNITED STATES
COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-010.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 9, 2009
Time: 10:30 - 11:45 A.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the
Russian Mission on June 9, 2009, to discuss U.S. concerns
with SS-27 RVOSI covers, the re-declaration of Peacekeeper
(PK) Silo Launchers, and the conduct of a one-time
demonstration of the Minuteman III (MM III) front section.
All Parties were represented.


4. (S) The United States reiterated its concerns that the
reentry vehicle (RV) covers used by the Russian Federation
during RVOSIs were overly large and prohibited U.S.
inspectors from ascertaining that the SS-27 did not contain
more than its one attributed warhead. The Russian Delegation
repeated its desire to resolve this issue and stated that
Russian experts were ready to meet in a working group at any
time. Both Parties agreed to meet in a working group later
in the day.


5. (S) Regarding the re-declaration of PK silo launchers,

the Russian Delegation repeated Russia's concerns about the
conversion of 50 PK silo launchers at F.E. Warren AFB,
Wyoming to MM III silo launchers and the lack of
notifications that should have been provided in accordance
with the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. The
U.S. Delegation stated that a Format 143 had been sent, on
June 4, 2009 (REF A),that rescinded the conversion of these
silo launchers and considered the issue resolved. The

Russian Delegation agreed the issue was resolved.


6. (S) On the issue of MM III ICBM RVOSI, the U.S.
Delegation stated that it had determined that the U.S. could
conduct a one-time demonstration of the front section and
outlined the specific procedures that would govern its
conduct.

--------------
A BIG COVER SHAPED
LIKE A TEEPEE
--------------


7. (S) Taylor opened the HOD meeting, held at the Russian
Mission on June 9, 2009, and reiterated U.S. concerns that



the very large covers used by the Russian Federation during
SS-27 RVOSIs prohibited U.S. inspectors from ascertaining
that the number of reentry vehicles present on the front
section did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the
SS-27. He stated that these concerns were increased by the
similarities seen in the acceleration profiles between the
SS-27 and the prototype RS-24 that had been flight-tested
with multiple RVs. He further highlighted press accounts
from inside Russia that continued to indicate plans to deploy
the SS-27 with multiple warheads.


8. (S) Taylor explained that the United States believed it
was the responsibility of the Russian Federation to propose
solutions to this issue and that, during JCIC-XXXII, the
Russian Federation had stated that it was looking for ways to
address U.S. concerns. He noted that since then the United
States had not heard any proposals, and reiterated that the
United States remained willing to explore possible SS-27
RVOSI solutions that took into account whatever sensitive
know-how had led to the use of very large covers.


9. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor and replied that this issue
was an old one on the JCIC agenda and that, despite the short
time left before expiration of the Treaty, the Russian
Federation was interested in resolving it. He stated that,
although the Treaty did not limit thesize of RV covers used
during an RVOSI, he undertood the U.S. concerns about the
covers' large sze, but qualified that statement saying that
theRVOSI was the most sensitive inspection and any changes
to procedures required great deliberation.
--------------
I'VE HEARD (AND MADE)
TIS ARGUMENT BEFORE
--------------


10. (S) Koshelev explained that the SS-27 was designed
tested and eployed with a single RV and that anSS-27 that
carried multiple warheads did not exit. Analysis of the
telemetry data provided to te United States would confirm
this.


11. (S) aylor responded saying that telemetry was not
intended to verify the numbe of warheads on deployed ICBMs,
rather it providd a snapshot in time of a single flight test
of single missile. It did not address capability. That
was the reason for RVOSIs, to verify the numbrs of wrheads
actually deployed.


12. (S) Talor recalled discussions about Russian concerns
hat there were more than eight warheads on the Trient D5.
One of the arguments the United States ha made was that
telemetry analysis confirmed onlyeight warheads were
present, and the Russian Fedration had responded with the
same argument the United States was making now, that
telemetry was not intended to verify numbers of warheads
actually deployed.


13. (S) Koshelev acknowledged the irony of this discussion
and quoted Dr. Ed Ifft (Begin note: Former State
Representative to the START negotiations. End note.) saying,
the position of both Parties were the same, they just tabled
them at different times. He stated that the implementation
of the Treaty's provisions was important and lamented that
the Russian Federation had not been creative enough in


working to find a solution to this problem. He again stated
that his experts were prepared to discuss this issue in a
working group.

--------------
SO WHAT ARE YOU
DOING THIS AFTERNOON?
--------------


14. (S) Next, Ryzhkov relayed the differences that existed
between the discussions of Trident D5 telemetry and the SS-27
and explained that the Russian Federation used the number of
procedures for dispensing RVs and not acceleration profiles
as the determining factor in telemetry analysis. The Russian
Federation believed there were more procedures for dispensing
RVs than the number of warheads attributed to the Trident.
He reiterated the point that the Russian experts were ready
to discuss this in a working group.


15. (S) Taylor asked whether there was time to schedule a
working group during this session and, specifically, could it
be scheduled for the same afternoon.


16. (S) Koshelev agreed to schedule a working group later in
the day so the experts could discuss the issue further.

--------------
THE PRODIGAL SILOS RETURN
--------------


17. (S) Koshelev opened the discussion of the re-declaration
of PK silo launchers, citing the Format 3 notification sent
by the United States in August 2008 declaring the 50 PK ICBMs
at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, to be MM III ICBMs (REF B). The
Russian Federation was concerned that, despite claiming these
silo launchers had been converted to MM III, not all required
notifications had been sent in accordance with the C or E
Protocol. Additionally, during an RVOSI in September 2008,
Russian inspectors were unable to confirm that any conversion
had taken place.


18. (S) Koshelev acknowledged that, during the current
session of the JCIC, the United States had provided a copy of
the START Format 143 notification that was transmitted on
June 4, 2009 that rescinded the Format 3 from August 2008
(REF A).


19. (S) Taylor verified that the START Format 143 had been
sent rescinding the Format 3 and that the United States would
provide the appropriate information in the next six-month
update to the Memorandum of Understanding. He further stated
that the United States regretted any confusion caused by this
issue and considered the matter closed.


20. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for his explanation and
acknowledged that technical mishaps occurred in even the most
advanced bureaucratic systems. The Russian Federation
understood the U.S. position and also considered the matter
resolved.

--------------
HOW LONG HAVE WE BEEN
TALKING ABOUT THIS?
--------------




21. (S) Koshelev opened the MM III RVOSI discussion and
opined that no other issue had been under consideration so
long without a solution. However, in light of discussions at
JCIC-XXXII and JCIC-XXXIII, Russia believed that the United
States was ready to provide its plan for conducting a
demonstration of the MM III front section.


22. (S) Koshelev stated that, in prior sessions, Russia had
stated its concerns with the MM III RVOSI, that those
concerns formed the basis of a plan for conducting a
demonstration, and that he wanted to reaffirm the Russian
position regarding a possible demonstration.


23. (S) Koshelev confirmed that Russia was ready to
participate in a one-time demonstration of the MM III front
section that would confirm that the space in the lower
portion of the front section could not contain objects of
similar dimensions to a reentry vehicle. He acknowledged
that any procedures used in such a demonstration would not
lead to new procedures in future RVOSIs, adding that without
such a demonstration Russian concerns could not be resolved.

--------------
DETAILS OF THE DEMONSTRATION
--------------


24. (S) Taylor stated that the United States had decided to
conduct a one-time demonstration of the MM III front section
that would take place outside of treaty inspection quotas,
and that the United States would inform the other Parties of
the date through diplomatic channels.


25. (S) Taylor explained that the procedures used to conduct
the demonstration would mimic procedures listed in Annex 3 of
the Inspection Protocol. Specifically, after separation from
the ICBM, the front section would be transported to a
specially allocated site where inspectors would be permitted
to view the space inside the lower portion of the front
section to determine that it could not contain items
corresponding to reentry vehicles.


26. (S) Taylor further explained that sensitive elements
might be shrouded, but would not impede the observers'
ability to determine that additional reentry vehicles could
not be located within that space. Finally, he stressed that
no additional devices or equipment would be used during the
one-time demonstration, and that the demonstration would not
lead to new procedures for use in MM III RVOSIs.


27. (S) Taylor stated that the United States would expect a
factual report to be prepared that documented the conduct of
the demonstration, and included procedures used and what
inspectors observed. He further explained that the United
States expected that a satisfactory demonstration would allow
the Parties to resolve this issue, that the result would be
recorded in coordinated statements, and that this issue would
be removed from the JCIC agenda.


28. (S) Taylor provided the following points to explain the
modalities of the demonstration.

Begin Points:

-- The United States would select the ICBM base for silo
launchers of ICBMs at which the demonstration would be


conducted.

-- The observers would designate the silo launcher of ICBMs
containing the MM III front section for the demonstration.

-- The procedures set forth in Annex 3 to the Inspection
Protocol would be followed up to the point of front section
separation. The procedures set forth in paragraph 1 of Annex
2 to the Inspection Protocol would be used to view a silo
launcher declared not to contain a MM III ICBM should that be
encountered.

End Points.


29. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for the business-like
approach and asked that the United States provide the
proposal in writing so the Russian experts could study it and
respond appropriately. He also asked Taylor whether this
demonstration would be open to all Treaty Partners. Koshelev
asked that the details of the demonstration be provided in
written form. Taylor agreed.


30. (S) Taylor confirmed that it would be up to the other
Parties to determine the make-up of the observer team and
explained that the United States would provide the proposal
in a written response to the Russian Aide-Memoire of March
10, 2009 (REF C).


31. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


32. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Lt Lobner
Mr. Smith
Mr. Stein
Mr. Vogel
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ugorich
Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Mr. Nurgozhayev

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Kashirin


Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Petrov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Serov
Mr. Shevtchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Dashko (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Mr. Nykonenko
Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Chernyavskiy
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Shevchenko


33. (U) Taylor sends.
STORELLA