START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000447

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 3, 2009, MORNING SESSION

REF: A. GENEVA 443 (SFO-GVA-I-001)

B. STATE 50910

C. MOSCOW 1347

D. GENEVA 414 (SFO-GVA-I-007)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-008.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 3, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations to the START Follow-on
negotiations met in Geneva on June 3, 2009, to discuss
planning for the next session and U.S. questions on the
Russian "vision" for a START Follow-on Treaty (REF A). The
Russian Delegation said that the next round of negotiations
should take place in Geneva, June 22-24, and that it could
not meet the week of the June 15 because there was
insufficient time to prepare. The U.S. Delegation countered
that it was concerned that waiting until June 22 was too late
considering the looming deadline of the July 6 Summit and the
obligation to provide a progress report to Presidents Obama
and Medvedev. The U.S. Delegation proposed that a small
delegation travel to Moscow to meet on June 18-19 to provide
a draft report for the Presidents, written responses to
Russian questions, and any refinement of the U.S. "Elements"
paper (REF B),and then reconvene in Geneva on June 22 for as
long as it takes to finalize the report. The U.S. Delegation
agreed to provide a copy of the draft report through
diplomatic channels prior to the meeting, emphasizing that
the U.S. vision is to have a substantive report to the
Presidents modeled on the July 1992 Joint Understanding for
the START II Treaty. The Russian Delegation countered that
this proposal was unfair since it would have only a weekend
to review the U.S. draft, prepare a response, get it cleared
in Moscow, and then travel to Geneva. The Russian Delegation
complained that the U.S. Delegation did not come to Geneva
for this session as well-prepared as the Russian Delegation
since all the discussion had been on Russian papers. Still,
it would meet with the United States anytime to work on the
Presidential report as long as it addressed the relationship
between strategic offensive and defensive forces and the
Russian Delegation was given time to work the Russian
interagency. The United States offered to meet in Moscow on
June 15 to allow time to prepare for meetings in Geneva on
June 22. The Russian Delegation tentatively agreed to this
schedule and asked that the United States also respond in
writing to the eight papers provided in Moscow (REF C).


4. (S) The U.S. Delegation asked the Russian Delegation
several questions to clarify the U.S. understanding of the
Russian "vision" paper provided on June 1 (REF A). The
Russian Delegation promised to provide complete answers in
writing, but did comment on some of the questions. On the
principle of equal security, the Russian Delegation stated
that the new treaty should create conditions so that each
Party's security is better and stronger. On "strategic

delivery vehicles," it said that the Russian view includes
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, but not launchers, but was
open to including launchers. On a prohibition to not base
outside the "continental" portion of each Party's national
territory, the Russian Delegation said that the provision
means what it says and, on the similar prohibition of
stationing of heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs
outside the "continental" portion of each Party's national
territory, that provision should apply to any vehicle
designed to deliver nuclear weapons. On the question on
information provided in flight test notifications, the
Russian Delegation said that there are several START
notifications that could be changed to make the system more
efficient, but that the Russian Federation would honor its
obligations under the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch
Notification Agreement. On the difference between
inspections, visits, and exhibitions, it said that
inspections would apply to deployed forces, including to
verify data on delivery vehicles, launchers, and warheads;
visits would be conducted to support transparency for
non-deployed forces; and exhibitions would apply to new types
of armaments. On the question of the proposed Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC) being able to make viability
and effectiveness changes to the new treaty, the Russian
Delegation said that it believed the BCC should function in a
similar fashion as the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission (JCIC). On the question of effectively
verifying mobile ICBMs, it said that since the Cold War was
over, special verification measures were no longer needed for
mobile ICBMs and that national technical means (NTM) of
verification was sufficient. And, on telemetry, the Russian
Delegation said that since the new treaty would focus on the
actual deployment of warheads and not on attributed warheads,
telemetry was not needed.


5. (S) There was a brief discussion of the status of getting
the U.S. and Russian Delegations officially accredited with
the Swiss Government and the Russian Delegation provided the
text of a press release that the Russian MFA will post on its
website on June 4 (REF D).

--------------
WHEN AND WHERE
TO MEET AGAIN
--------------


6. (S) Antonov opened the meeting by recapping the
significant events of the last two days, noting that the
Russian Delegation provided a paper describing Russia's
vision of the new treaty (REF A). He said that Russia
planned for the next round of negotiations to take place in
Geneva, June 22-24, and that it could not meet the week of
June 15 because there was insufficient time to prepare.
Gottemoeller countered that she was concerned that waiting
until June 22 for the next meeting was too late considering
the looming deadline of the July 6 Presidential Summit and
the obligation to provide a progress report to Presidents
Obama and Medvedev on that date.


7. (S) Gottemoeller proposed that a small U.S. delegation
travel to Moscow to meet on June 18-19 to provide a draft
report for the Presidents for the summit, written responses
to Russian questions. for instance, the relationship between
ODSNW and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV),and any

refinement of the U.S. elements paper. This schedule would
allow the Russian Side to digest substantive U.S. answers
prior to Geneva. The delegations could then reconvene in
Geneva on June 22 for as long as it takes to finalize the
report.


8. (S) Gottemoeller assured Antonov that she would endeavor
to provide a copy of the draft report through diplomatic
channels prior to the meeting, emphasizing that the U.S.
vision is to have a substantive document for the Presidents
to sign modeled on the July 1992 Joint Understanding for the
START II Treaty and that work on the document should occupy
most of the delegations' time until it was complete. Antonov
countered that he was ready to meet with the United States as
early as tomorrow in Moscow, but that this proposal was
unfair to the Russian Delegation since it would have only a
weekend to review the U.S. draft, prepare a response, get it
cleared in Moscow, and then travel to Geneva.


9. (S) Antonov chided the U.S. Delegation for not coming to
Geneva as well-prepared as the Russian Delegation, since all
the discussion had been on Russian papers. He said that he
would meet with the United States anytime to work on the
Presidential report as long as it addressed the relationship
between strategic offensive and defensive forces and that he
was given time to work the Russian interagency. Antonov
asked that the United States not revert to previous models by
presenting a paper on a Saturday and demanding an answer on
Monday. He reiterated that the Russian Side was ready to
meet again as early as tomorrow, but without receiving papers
from the United States in advance, there would be nothing to
discuss.


10. (S) Antonov added that, if the U.S. Delegation came to
Moscow on June 18 to brief the Russian Delegation, he would,
in turn, need a week to brief his superiors which would mean
that the soonest he could meet again in Geneva would be June
29, stating again that he would need more than a weekend to
review U.S. papers and then fly to Geneva for a Monday
meeting. Further, in his opinion, the two Sides may need
more than three days in Geneva to complete the work but,
since the United States has not provided a draft Presidential
report, he was unable to assess how much time was needed
since he did not know the substance of any U.S. paper, nor
did he know how his Russian colleagues would react. Again,
he said, the United States was welcome to come to Moscow on
June 18 with a small or large delegation, but that the
Russian Side would need time to prepare answers.


11. (S) Returning to the report to the Presidents, Antonov
did not have an issue with the title of the report; it could
be a Joint Understanding, a statement, an aide-memoire, or
another name. What was important to Russia was to know the
content of the report and that the report address the
relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
forces. Without an answer to that question, he could go no
further. According to Antonov, before either of the two
Sides takes a draft report to their respective Presidents,
the delegations should coordinate their approach to the
report.


12. (S) Antonov reminded Gottemoeller that the Russians had
provided eight papers in Moscow on May 20 and that the United
States had yet to provide a written response to those papers.

He said that he will leave Geneva today without a single
U.S. paper and that, for two weeks, his delegation would not
have anything to do. Only on June 18 would the Russian
Delegation have something to do. He said that he was not
blaming either Side, nor did he want to create problems, he
was only recognizing the realities of the interagency process
in Washington and Moscow. He needs reciprocity from the
United States on time to prepare answers to U.S. papers. He
is willing to meet on June 18 and 19, but needs copies of the
U.S. papers a few days in advance to work them in Moscow. He
emphasized that he was not against work, the problem was how
to deal with the issue.


13. (S) Gottemoeller complimented the Russian Delegation for
its preparation for this round of talks and its "Vision"
paper on the START Follow-on Treaty. She then reminded
Antonov that, during the May 19 and 20 talks in Moscow, the
United States had provided its "Elements" paper and that the
Russian Delegation had had time this week to ask questions on
the U.S. position. She added that the U.S. proposal to come
to Moscow on June 18 was out of courtesy and concern with
Antonov's travel schedule and to give the Russians a head
start on preparing for talks in Geneva on June 22. She
assured Antonov that she would do all she could to get papers
to him in advance through diplomatic channels so that he
would have time to prepare for the meetings. Antonov
retorted that even then he would only have one day to think
about a U.S. proposal.


14. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. Delegation could
come to Moscow as soon as June 15, but she was trying to give
Antonov an opportunity to clear his in-basket. She added
that, if he preferred, she would just send the papers through
diplomatic channels and leave it at that; however, it would
be more useful to have experts in Moscow that week to get
concepts on the table. Antonov responded that if she really
wanted to give the Russian Delegation time to review any U.S.
papers in time to meet in Geneva on June 22, then she should
hand them over today. He went on to say that he did not
understand the U.S. point of view. If the United States
brings a paper on Friday (June 19),how can I react by
Monday? Gottemoeller responded that both Sides are in the
same bind to provide a report to our Presidents by July 6 and
that we are in an intensive period of negotiations. In times
like this, we may have to work on the weekends.


15. (S) Antonov denied any aversion to working on the
weekend and reiterated his point that it was not fair for the
U.S. Delegation to be prepared for a meeting and the Russian
Delegation to not have time to prepare, especially since he
would have no way to get his position cleared through the
Foreign Minister. He suggested that the United States
consider a practical approach, come to Moscow on June 18 and
19, or earlier, and the Russian Delegation would listen. The
issue is not that he would read the U.S. papers, but whether
there would be time for others in the Russian Government to
read and clear them with their superiors. He added that the
United States has the same interagency process and that if he
started the clearance process on a Saturday, he would not be
able to respond on a Monday. He said that we are dealing
with "serious issues" and the Ministry of Defense needs more
time. Antonov stressed that the Russian Delegation will work
on weekends and will do everything possible to get the work
done, but that it would not be ready to meet on June 22. He

stated again that the U.S. Delegation was welcome to come to
Moscow on June 15, June 18 or June 19, and he will ask Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov to meet with the United
States and then we could meet again in Geneva on June 29.
According to Antonov, the process needs discipline.


16. (S) Gottemoeller agreed that both Parties needed time to
prepare for meetings, but that the report to the Presidents
must be completed and that it was important that the U.S.
position arrive in Moscow in time for the Russian Delegation
to review it. Gottemoeller added that it would be useful for
U.S. experts to come to Moscow the week of June 15; in her
view the sooner the better. She assured Antonov that she
would get the U.S. paper to him in advance. Antonov stated
that there was no linkage between receiving a paper and
meeting, he will meet with the United States anytime.
Gottemoeller stated that it was important to have papers in
writing and that the two delegations must focus on the
reports to the Presidents, she does not want to leave Moscow
with nothing to do.


17. (S) Gottemoeller then proposed that the delegations meet
in Moscow on June 15 so that Antonov would have time to
prepare for meetings in Geneva on June 22, reminding Antonov
that both Sides were under pressure to meet the Summit
deadline. Antonov tentatively agreed to this schedule;
however, he noted that the Russian Delegation will have to
resolve some logistic issues and that it can only stay in
Geneva until June 24. He suggested that the agenda for the
next Geneva meeting include a draft Joint Understanding for
the Presidents and a separate paper that will go to ministers
and then to the Presidents. Gottemoeller said that the U.S.
Delegation would be prepared to discuss the report to the
Presidents and asked whether the separate paper to ministers
was just a transmittal memo. Antonov said he would think
about it. Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that the key item is
the report.


18. (S) Antonov asked, again, that the United States also
respond in writing to the eight papers provided to the United
States in Moscow. Gottemoeller stated the priority was the
report to the Presidents for the Summit, nevertheless, the
U.S Delegation would endeavor to respond to some of the eight
Russian papers in writing. Antonov stated that Russia needed
answers to its key concerns on the new treaty. Gottemoeller
replied that many of those concerns would be worked out in
preparing for the Presidential paper and that she did not see
a need for separate papers. Antonov said that it was an
issue of principle; the Russian Side needed written answers
to work at home. He said that the Russian Delegation had
provided written answers to U.S. papers and the Russian
Delegation expected written answers to its papers. The
Russian Delegation is especially interested in a response on
the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
forces, the conversion of strategic offensive arms (SOA) for
non-nuclear armaments, and the deployment of SOA outside the
continental portion of national territory. Again, he
reminded the U.S. Delegation that it knows the Russian
position on these issues but the Russian Delegation does not
know the U.S. position. Antonov said that the Russian
Delegation needs answers to its questions and that the United
States had time to answer but just did not do so.


19. (S) Gottemoeller stated that it was true that the

Russian Delegation provided a response to the U.S. "Elements"
paper after ten days, but that the U.S. Delegation could not
respond to the Russian paper in just two days in Geneva --
the U.S. Delegation is not made of supermen and superwomen.
Antonov responded that he was not asking Gottemoeller to be a
superwoman, but that the United States should not provide a
paper on a Friday and expect a response on a Monday. Russia
was asking for equal consideration.

--------------
QUESTIONS POSED
BY THE U.S. SIDE
--------------


20. (S) Elliott asked what the Russian Side meant by the
"principle of equal security?" Antonov explained the
principle by stating that the treaty should establish the
same rights and obligations for each Party, and each
country's security should be improved or strengthened through
the treaty. He said that he could not imagine a situation in
which it would be acceptable if Russian security was enhanced
and U.S. security was diminished. The treaty should give the
same level of security to both countries and should be of
equal value. As an aside, he mentioned that the NATO-Russia
council was a bit of an enigma to him, asking why should
there be more security for NATO and less for Russia. He
claimed that his U.S. colleagues had struck the notion (of
equal security) while Russia had always included that thought
in all forums. He asserted that he could think of no other
policy for any arrangement where a Party would accept unequal
security. He asked that the U.S. Side not try to read into
the Russian proposal any double meaning.


21. (S) Elliott then asked what the Russian side meant by an
obligation to reduce and limit strategic offensive arms
"qualitatively," which appeared to be a change from what was
contained in paragraph 1 of Article V of START that
permitted, inter alia, modernization unless otherwise
prohibited. Ilin responded that the Russian Side would have
to provide that answer at a later time. Finally, Elliott
asked whether the term "strategic delivery vehicles," as
understood by the Russian side, included launchers of ICBMs
and SLBMs as well as ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Ilin
responded that it did not include launchers.


22. (S) Warner asked whether the Russian Side intended to
use the term "strategic delivery vehicle" in the new Treaty,
noting that it had not been used in START. Ilin stated that
Russia would say "ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers," although
he did not have anything against using the term in principle.
Warner stated that the Sides needed to return to this matter
later, noting that, in START, the key references in Article
II are to "ICBMs and their associated launchers" and "SLBMs
and their associated launchers."


23. (S) Warner asked what was intended by the new
formulation regarding not basing SOA "beyond the continental
portion...of each Party's national territory," which is
different from what is contained in START. Ilin responded
that the Russian Side would provide a more complete answer
later, but acknowledged that it was different from what was
in START and that it meant what it said.


24. (S) Warner posed the question of whether the proposal of

the Russian Side to ban the stationing of heavy bombers with
long-range nuclear ALCMs outside the continental portion of
national territory referred to heavy bombers that are
"equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs" or did the ban refer
only to heavy bombers that are actually loaded with
long-range nuclear ALCMs? Ilin, noting that he was providing
a quick answer at this point but could provide more detail
later, said that it should cover all heavy bombers that are
designed to deliver long-range nuclear ALCMs.


25. (S) Taylor noted the Russian concept of simplification
of the notification regime and, citing the notification for
flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, asked how that would differ
from what is already required to be provided under the 1988
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement? Ryzhkov
answered that the Russian Side had approached the issue of
notifications by noting that most of the 154 different
formats of notifications had never been provided, and that
only about 20 are in normal use. He noted that the Russian
paper had outlined the principle of data exchange and had not
really looked carefully into the issue of launches in detail.
He said that additional details, such as telemetry-related
information provided under START, would not be provided under
the new Treaty, although he admitted that this was the view
"at this stage" and that "for the time being" Russia was not
considering telemetry exchanges.


26. (S) Taylor asked the Russian Side to explain the
difference between inspections, visits and exhibitions.
Ryzhkov responded that he thought Antonov had already
answered this question: inspections would concern deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, heavy bombers, deployed launchers, and
the warheads on them; visits would concern non-deployed
items; and exhibitions would be related to technical
information on new types. Concerning the details of these
various regimes would be the subject of negotiation. Taylor
asked for clarification on the inclusion of launchers under
inspections, and Ryzhkov confirmed that deployed launchers
would be included. (Begin comment: Deployed launchers had
not been included in the Russian vision paper under
inspections. End comment.) Finally, Taylor asked whether
the Bilateral Consultative Commission would have the
authority to make the same type of "viability and
effectiveness" changes as are provided for in START? Antonov
responded that this was not really a question of principle,
stating that it could be discussed. He cited the rich
experience of the JCIC and proposed that the best of that
experience be continued. He added, smiling, that Taylor
would still have a job.


27. (S) Siemon noted that START recognized the inherent
difficulty in effectively verifying mobile ICBMs. It
contains extensive measures to facilitate verification,
including perimeter and portal continuous monitoring,
cooperative measures, designated deployment areas, and data
exchanges covering deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and
their launchers. What is different now? How would Russia's
position provide for effective verification of mobile ICBMs?
Ilin stated that, during START implementation, there had
never been any problems with mobile ICBMs, adding that we
have had much experience with mobiles, including
notifications, but that there is now a new relationship
between Russia and the United States; it is no longer the
Cold War, and under the new conditions we do not need such

strict control. He observed that submarines were essentially
mobile and there was not the same type of control over them
in START. Thus, the Russian Side did not see a need for a
special regime for this type of arms. He also claimed that
each country has sufficient NTM. Siemon stated that there
had been no problems with mobiles during START implementation
precisely because all of the additional provisions on mobiles
had been included.


28. (S) Siemon posed the question as to why the Russian Side
believed that telemetry was no longer important. Asking what
was different now, he noted that telemetry provided data
about throw-weight and the potential number of reentry
vehicles, as well as the number of reentry vehicles tested,
and that this data could be used to assess characteristics of
new types. Ryzhkov acknowledged that the Russian document
did not envision the use of telemetry, and further admitted
that START did provide the three types of assessment data
that Siemon had mentioned. But he noted that Russia and the
United States had different tasks now and the treaty had
another subject. He claimed that, since neither the Russian
nor the U.S. document contained any reference to
throw-weight, there was no need to make an assessment as to
potential, all that had to be done is to count the number of
warheads. Concerning the question of new types, this could
be dealt with without telemetric data, such as by providing a
different kind of technical data. In closing, Ryzhkov stated
that the Russian side looked forward to comments and
reactions from the U.S. Side. Siemon responded that we have
to make certain that the treaty is effectively verifiable.

--------------
DELEGATION ACCREDITATION
WITH THE SWISS GOVERNMENT
--------------


29. (S) Antonov informed Gottemoeller that the Russian
Federation had been informed by the Swiss Government that the
Russian Delegation to START Follow-on negotiations would be
granted special mission status in accordance with Swiss
legislation. Antonov suggested that both delegations thank
the Swiss and that the two delegations should agree to keep
the delegations about the same size. Gottemoeller asked
Brown to explain the results of his research on similar
accreditation issues. Brown stated that he was certain that
Russian lawyers had also researched previous U.S. practice in
this regard. According to his research and understanding,
the United States and the Russian Federation would craft
identical notes and exchange them separately with the Swiss
Government. He added that he would meet with the Russian
Delegation legal advisor to compare texts, but he was still
checking if the notes would be provided to the Swiss
Government in Geneva or in Bern. Antonov thanked Brown for
his work and said that he would consult with Russian legal
experts to provide options. (Begin comment: Kotkova later
informed Brown that the Swiss Government apparently did not
require an exchange of notes because it had already sent a
letter to the Russian Permanent Mission that offered special
mission status to the Russian Delegation. The U.S.
Delegation will seek to identify the requirements for the
Swiss Government to offer the same to the United States. End
comment.)


30. (S) Gottemoeller stated that the U.S. Delegation was


also considering other venue options for the negotiations and
that the Austrian Government had offered to host the
delegations in Vienna. Antonov said he was unaware of any
such offer by Austria and that the Russian Delegation was
only considering Geneva and Moscow. Gottemoeller added that
the Russian Delegation was also welcome in Washington.

--------------
RUSSIAN PRESS RELEASE
--------------


31. (S) Antonov closed by providing the text of a press
release that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will
post on its website on June 4. Antonov said that the Russian
Delegation had no plans for media interviews, but noted that
members in the Conference on Disarmament would be interested
in the START Follow-on talks.


32. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Draft Press Release by Russian Delegation to START
Follow-on Negotiations


33. (U) Participants.

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LtCol Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kron
Dr. Look
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ermakov
Mr. Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Lychaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Schevtchenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Smirnov

Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Ubeev
Mr. Vasiliev
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Brokhovich (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
Mr. Lakeev (Int)


34. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA