START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000419


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):
RUSSIAN PAPER CONTAINING QUESTIONS ON U.S. "ELEMENTS" PAPER

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-007.


2. (U) The text at paragraph 3 is the official translation
of the Russian paper containing questions on the U.S.
"Elements" Paper.


3. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

Paper of the Russian Side
June 2, 2009

Questions of the Russian Side in Connection with
the U.S. Paper "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty"
of May 19, 2009


1. Paragraph (e) of Section I, "General Obligations and
Objectives," says that the U.S. seeks to work cooperatively
with the Russian Federation to reduce strategic nuclear
arsenals as part of our efforts to "strengthen deterrence for
both sides" (("ukrepleniye sderzhivaniya dlya obeikh
storon")) (the original reads: "strengthen deterrence for
both sides"; the translation received from the U.S.
delegation reads: "strengthen mutual deterrence"
(("zakrepleniye (sic) vzaimnogo sderzhivaniya)).

We would ask the U.S. side to explain in greater detail
exactly what it means here. Are we really talking about
"mutual deterrence" or about deterrence in a "multilateral"
context?


2. In Subsection A of Section II, "Central Limits and
Counting Rules," the U.S. side anticipates that a "small
number of spare strategic nuclear warheads" would not be
considered to be operationally deployed.

We would like to receive detailed explanations from the
U.S. side as to what portion of the total number of warheads
could constitute the aforementioned "small number."


3. The same subsection provides for a "warhead limit"
(( Trans. Note: Throughout the text the English word "limit"
is rendered in Russian as "level" ("uroven'"))) and goes on
to say that "the central limit would be on operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads."

We would request clarification as to whether the U.S.
side has in mind that besides the "central limit" on
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the new
treaty could provide for some other limits on warheads, and
if so, what warheads.


4. Why does the U.S. side use different approaches to
counting warheads on ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) and on
heavy bombers?

Specifically which facilities does the U.S. side
anticipate classifying as "a specified weapon storage area
associated with or directly supporting a heavy bomber base"
(Section II, Subsection A)?


5. In Subsection B of Section II the U.S. side proposes
establishing limits on deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed
launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.

We would request clarification as to the reason for this
proposal, which provides for lumping together in the same
limits deployed launchers for strategic delivery vehicles -
ICBMs and SLBMs - and one of the types of delivery vehicles -
heavy bombers.


6. Subsection B of Section II contains the wording
"ICBMs and SLBMs tested for nuclear weapon delivery."

We would ask you to clarify the specifics of this
wording, taking into account that according to the
understanding between the Parties at the time the START
Treaty was concluded, all their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers subject to the Treaty are nuclear weapon delivery
vehicles. Does the U.S. side have in mind producing and
testing new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration?


7. We would ask you to provide a more detailed
explanation as to what is meant by launchers "that are no
longer capable of supporting operational ICBMs or SLBMs."
What are the criteria the U.S. side intends to use to define
the transfer of a launcher into this category? What are the
criteria for "considerable time and expense"?


8. In the context of Subsection D of Section II, which
deals with "deployment of non-nuclear warheads," the
following question arises: do technical methods of
verification exist which would make it possible to guarantee
that the other Party could identify that a reentry vehicle in
flight is conventionally armed?


9. In the context of Subsection E of Section II, which
deals with terminology:

Is a definition of the term "new type," for example,
necessary if the new treaty does not provide for limitations
applicable to ICBMs and SLBMs?


10. In Section IV, "Elimination," elimination
procedures for only silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers
are cited as examples of elimination procedures.

Does the U.S. side have in mind that in the new treaty
the application of elimination procedures would be limited
specifically to silo launchers and heavy bombers?


11. Section V, "Notifications, Monitoring, and
Verification," proposes retaining and adapting, "as
appropriate," the main START Treaty provisions concerning
data exchange, notifications, and inspections.

We would request clarification as to how the U.S. side
intends to accomplish this task, given its approach that
provides for rejecting the reduction and limitation of an
aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs.


12. Subsection C of Section V, which deals with
verification, proposes adapting the relevant START Treaty
provisions for the new treaty's requirements.

Since the U.S. position does not provide for reduction
and limitation of the aggregate number of ICBMs, a question
arises as to whether verification of ICBMs and SLBMs is
necessary, especially in view of the fact that Russian ICBMs
and SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported either as
assembled missiles without launch canisters or as assembled
missiles in launch canisters, while U.S. missiles are
maintained, stored, and transported in stages of such
missiles. And if ICBMs and SLBMs are subject to
verification, as the U.S. side proposes, then in that case
what should be the goal of verification, given that counting
of ICBMs and SLBMs is not envisaged?

In this context a question also arises as to the
advisability of conducting exhibitions to confirm the
relevant technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs and
exchanging telemetric information in connection with flight
tests of these missiles -- in the absence of any qualitative
limitations for these strategic delivery vehicles.


13. Questions concerning Section VIII. In the U.S.
side's version, the duration of the Treaty is defined as 5-10
years. It is anticipated that the new levels will be reached
in 3-5 years. Does the U.S. side envisage establishing a
strict time line for phasing -- if phasing is provided for --
as is done in the START Treaty?

End text.


4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA


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