Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA269
2009-03-31 15:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

Human Rights Council 10th Session - Postmortem

Tags:  PHUM PREL UNHRC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5449
RR RUEHAT RUEHSK
DE RUEHGV #0269/01 0901547
ZNR UUUUU ZZH PSA RMA
R 311547Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8229
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2993
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000269 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR IO-RHS, L-HRR, DRL-MLGA,

TAGS: PHUM PREL UNHRC

SUBJECT: Human Rights Council 10th Session - Postmortem

Ref: (A) Storella-IO-RHS-DL et al email March 23, 2009
(B) Chambers-IO-RHS-DL et al email March 27, 2009 (vote count)

Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000269

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR IO-RHS, L-HRR, DRL-MLGA,

TAGS: PHUM PREL UNHRC

SUBJECT: Human Rights Council 10th Session - Postmortem

Ref: (A) Storella-IO-RHS-DL et al email March 23, 2009
(B) Chambers-IO-RHS-DL et al email March 27, 2009 (vote count)

Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The Human Rights Council (HRC) concluded its 10th session
on March 27. The United States participated actively as an observer
in the Council for the first time in nearly a year. Passing over 30
resolutions, the session produced mixed results, continuing some of
the disappointing trends that have characterized the work of the
Council since its inception. Positive highlights included solid
resolutions on Burma, the DPRK, arbitrary detention, torture, and
human rights while countering terrorism, all with U.S. support and
co-sponsorship. Lowlights were the passage of yet another
defamation of religion resolution, a Cuban resolution to create a
special procedures mandate on Cultural Diversity, and a weak
resolution on the DRC. The HRC paid very little attention to
burning human rights issues such as Sri Lanka or Darfur, and
continued its structurally unbalanced criticism of Israel. Of
equally negative consequence were the many procedural attacks and
counter-productive initiatives that diverted the CouncilQs attention
and further demonstrated the powerful and entrenched interests of
delegations such as Egypt, Pakistan, and South Africa.


2. (SBU) USG participation in the negotiations directly improved
many resolutions; however, those gains attributable to the United
States were marginal when compared with the overall need to improve
the general direction of the HRC.


3. Nevertheless, many delegations and NGOs spoke positively about
U.S. reengagement, saying that our presence helped shape the debate
and provide a voice that others needed to hear. End summary.

Poor Grades for the Council Session
--------------


5. (SBU) Although still early to evaluate fully the results,
diplomats and NGOs we have spoken with to date have given the 10th
session mixed but largely negative reviews. A well-respected NGO
representative told us that in his long career of observing the
Human Rights Council and its predecessor Commission, this session
was the worst. He equated it to adolescents picking fights and
calling votes to win points, as opposed to a serious body addressing
serious issues.


6. (SBU) Many diplomats with whom we spoke were disappointed with

the session, but found it to be comparable with previous ones. Some
diplomats took solace in the several solid resolutions (see below
and Ref B for full list of resolutions and vote counts).

Evaluating U.S. Reengagement
--------------

7. (U) Based on Ref A outlines for success, the USG did reasonably
well this session.

8.(SBU) CHANGING THE TONE: Active USG engagement and broad coverage
made clear the U.S. had returned to the Council. We met with a
large number of special procedures mandate holders, most of whom
lauded the USGQs new approach and policies. Our public remarks in
side events and in plenary about detainee policies, the PresidentQs
Executive Orders and many other issues were extremely well received.
Using our voice often in plenary interventions attracted press
inquiries, requests for our statements, and frequent comments that
the U.S. was taking a new approach to many issues. Our PA section
maintained real-time updates on the Mission website of our
interventions, which were picked up by international media outlets.
Most notable to the diplomatic community was the professional
competence that the USG brought to the table during the negotiations
of resolutions. Delegations of all stripes told us repeatedly that
U.S. viewpoints were often able to carry the day because they were
well-articulated and founded on a clear understanding of law and
practice.


9. (SBU) That said, the session featured typical over-emphasis on
Israel (per the structural imbalance codified in an agenda item
dedicated to the Occupied Palestinian Territories) and a
particularly egregious effort by Egypt and some other OIC countries
to hold Israel to a different standard than any other country with
respect to the Universal periodic Review (UPR) process, by demanding
that Israel explicitly indicate its acceptance or rejection of each
of the recommendations made, something very few countries have done
and which is not required by the rules. Our quick intervention in
Geneva, Cairo, and Washington helped prevent the Egyptians from
making a bad situation worse.


10. (SBU) The Council also lost an opportunity seriously to address

GENEVA 00000269 002.2 OF 003


human rights in the DRC, and paid only scant attention to burning
human rights issues in countries such as Sri Lanka or Darfur. Of
equally negative consequence were the many procedural attacks and
counter-productive initiatives that diverted the CouncilQs attention
and further demonstrated the powerful and entrenched interests of
delegations such as Egypt, Pakistan, and South Africa.


11. (SBU) USG objections to the worst attempts to undermine the
Council may have helped bolster others who agree with us, and our
efforts to raise important country-specific issues did draw some
attention to those problems. However, the overall tone of the HRC
remained confrontational and unbalanced, and the USGQs presence this
session may have had only a marginal effect in altering that.


12. (SBU) ADVANCING KEY MANDATES: The renewal of the special
procedures mandates on Burma and DPRK was particularly positive.
The Burma resolution passed by consensus and active negotiation by
the USDel ensured that the compromise language remained strong. The
Somalia mandate renewal, although only six months in duration, was
an improvement from the initial three months proposed by the African
Group. Heavy USG lobbying over the past several weeks may better
position us to engage positively when the mandate comes up for
renewal in September.


13. (SBU) Of great disappointment was the extremely weak resolution
on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The African Group,
led by Egypt, squelched the EUQs efforts to create an independent
expert mandate, despite heavy USG lobbying in Geneva and Kinshasa.
Egypt tabled a weak, competing resolution and eventually used a
rarely invoked procedural vote to sideline the EU text. Repeated
EU, U.S. and like-minded proposals and concessions that would have
only minimally altered the African Group text met with continued
refusals by the DRC and the African Group (read: Egypt) to make any
compromise at all. In the end, Egyptian and DRC intransigence
prompted the EU to table a very modest package of amendments from
the floor, which failed to pass. The only silver lining was that
the vote against the EU amendments (21N 18Y 8A) was only narrowly
lost--and included abstentions by Senegal, Ghana, and Burkina Faso,
demonstrating a rare break from monolithic African Group voting.


14. (SBU) IMPROVING RESOLUTIONS: The greatest USG contribution to
this session can possibly be found in the many small and large
improvements to individual resolutions. We were able to co-sponsor
seven (DPRK, Burma, Torture, Arbitrary Detention, Counter-Terrorism,
Disabilities, and for the first time the Argentine QRight to
TruthQ/Forensics resolution). USG lobbying in capital and in Geneva
helped press Egypt to postpone its freedom of religion resolution.


15. (SBU)After lengthy negotiations, the EUQs resolution on
religious intolerance was rejected by Pakistan on behalf of the OIC.
In a last minute attempt to secure consensus, the EU reverted to
their original tabled text for adoption by the HRC, which resulted
in adoption of a weaker text than the USG was ultimately able to
co-sponsor. The resolution passed without a majority. The OIC, led
by Pakistan, abstained because the resolution did not include
adequate language condemning expressions of religious intolerance,
among other reasons.


16. For the first time South Africa cast the lone opposing vote,
claiming the text insufficiently addressed redress to victims of
discrimination based on religion or belief, and thereby diminished
the real plight of those who suffer from such discrimination.


17. (SBU) The USG also secured a slight increase in support to
oppose the defamation of religions resolution. In a first for the
Group of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (GRULAC),Chile voted
against the resolution, signaling that this problematic concept is
not a fight between the QNorthQ and QSouth.Q The defamation
resolution passed as expected, but with the QnoQ and Qabstention
votes again greater than the QyesQ votes. Although the vote was
similar to previous years, an increasing number of abstaining
countries, particularly among the GRULAC, indicated to us privately
that they were moving towards no votes. Japan and Brazil issued
explanations of vote for their abstentions that offered hope that
they may be moving towards no votes and ChileQs strongly worded
defense of their no vote provided added pressure on states that
traditionally abstain or support the resolution. Other delegations
such as Ghana and Bosnia were grateful for our outreach on
defamation, which helped them articulate arguments to their capitals
in favor of abstentions or no votes.


18. (SBU) Several very problematic resolutions passed, such as the
Cuban initiative to create a mandate on Cultural Diversity, South
African resolutions on racism and on complementary standards, plus
five resolutions related to Israel.

Comments

GENEVA 00000269 003 OF 003


--------------


19. (SBU) The U.S. managed our reengagement competently and in a
manner that elicited substantial good will. However, the sessionQs
true successes appear outweighed by its failures and shortcomings.
We will long be fighting the many problematic resolutions adopted,
such as the resolution on complementary standards to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. While presented as a procedural resolution for the
purpose of confirming the continued mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee,
its legacy will be substantive. The resolution expresses the need
to enhance the momentum of the process of elaborating complementary
standards with a view to ensuring the timely fulfillment of the Ad
Hoc CommitteeQs mandate. That mandate has been interpreted-Qdespite
vigorous protest from the EU and other like-minded delegations--by
OIC and African Group delegations to include the elaboration of new
normative instruments, such as an Optional Protocol to the ICERD
that would seek to protect against, among other things, the
defamation of religions. Equally worrisome is the level of support
this resolution received: it was adopted with 34 votes in favor
(including Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico) and 13 against
(primarily EU members).


20. (SBU) As both the closing act and one of the defining moments of
the session, a debate about the usefulness of the vote on the DRC
resolution will likely ensue. The vote on the EUQs modest
amendments was surprisingly close and demonstrated two things: the
Europeans and other like-mindeds will not always go-along to get
along, and the African Group moderates will not always support Egypt
and the hardliners when the situation merits better action by the
Council. If the DRC vote is subsequently spun as a confrontational
fight, it could become a rallying call for the NAM to push against
the Qwest.Q If it is characterized as a principled disagreement and
effort to improve human rights in a dire situation, it could provide
the opportunity to encourage greater cooperation with African
moderates who generally prefer to keep their heads down. We will
continue our efforts to court greater independence by those
moderates.


21. (SBU) In the bigger picture, the HRC remains a problematic body.
Its membership is skewed in favor of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference and the African Group. Key players from those
groups -Q particularly Egypt, South Africa and Pakistan -- guard
their entrenched dominance with vigor. Their secure majority
translates into a readiness to be confrontational without concern
for the consequences. Even if the USG is more influential than
other like-minded delegations, improving the HRC and changing its
dynamics is a long-term project, will be a significant struggle, and
will require a coordinated effort in Washington, New York, Geneva,
and foreign capitals. These dynamics Q- and the desire of many to
keep them -Q will also shape the upcoming 2011 review of the HRC.
End comment.