NSC SAMANTHA POWER'S UNHCR CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000198

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019
TAGS: IZ PGOV PREF PREL
SUBJECT: NSC SAMANTHA POWER'S UNHCR CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ

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Classified By: Mark C. Storella, Charge d'Affaires, reasons 1.4 b, d


1. (C) Summary: UNHCR officials told NSC's Samantha Power
that Government of Iraq and the UN itself are the biggest
immediate obstacles to developing sustainable mechanisms to
help Iraqi Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees
return and reintegrate inside Iraq. In the case of the GOI,
UNHCR reps claimed that PM al-Maliki is uninterested in
providing active support on refugee issues. As to the UN, an
inability to make logistical/bureaucratic decisions that
would permit an increase in the number of UN personnel in
Iraq and movement outside the Green Zone is hindering
humanitarian agencies from doing their work. Resettlement of
Iraqi refugees to third countries is on track and, together
with lower estimates of those requiring resettlement, most
cases should be addressed within two years. UNHCR has had
little luck raising funding from Gulf states and stated that
most European countries have been hiding behind a "the U.S.
created it, the U.S. pays for it" approach. UNHCR feels
there might be some scope for attracting contributions from
European donors for projects promoting sustainable returns as
many European countries, who would like to send Iraqi asylees
back to Iraq, will see this as in their direct interest. End
Summary.

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Responsible Withdrawal: Addressing the Human Consequences
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2. (C) NSC Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Multilateral Affairs Samantha Power met March 5
with UNHCR Director for Middle East and North Africa
Radhouane Nouicer and Head of the Iraq Support Unit Andrew
Harper. RMA Counselor was notetaker. Power explained that
the U.S. is reviewing its approach to Iraqi refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the context of the
planned U.S. military withdrawal by August 2010. The
President is intent on making this a responsible withdrawal,
addressing the human consequences of the decision.
Therefore, the U.S. is pondering what actions need to be
taken to ensure adequate support and protection for IDPs and
refugees who choose to return home or settle permanently
elsewhere in Iraq, as well as for refugees who decide to
remain in neighboring countries for the time being. In
addition, the U.S. supports maintaining a resettlement option
for those who will never be able to return to Iraq. She
welcomed UNHCR's views on both that broader picture and the
role UNHCR could play during this process.

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Initial Hurdles: GOI and UN Bureaucratic Inaction
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3. (C) Nouicer welcomed the new Administration's review. He
stated that return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs in
Iraq will be the crucial issue in the coming year. UNHCR is
planning to increase staffing and activities within Iraq to
assist the reintegration of returning refugees (see also para
6). Smooth and sustainable reintegration cannot happen
without the active participation of the GOI. However,
Nouicer claimed that the GOI is neither very interested nor
cooperative on reintegration. He said that this was
reaffirmed by a recent GOI decision not to approve additional
funding to support returning refugees. Harper stated that PM
al-Maliki is not opposed to refugee returns. In fact,
al-Maliki wants them to come home, he said, but hopes they
will return without the GOI having to provide support.
According to Harper, that would prove that "al-Maliki won,"
and that the refugees never should have left in the first
place. Nouicer stated that, even without active support, the
least al-Maliki could do would be to name a competent
Minister for Displacement and Migration.


4. (C) The UN itself constitutes the second "enemy" on
returns and reintegration, according to Nouicer, as UN
"paranoia" over security and an inability to take decisions
is preventing UNHCR and other operational agencies from
becoming active on the ground in Iraq. "It's time to move
beyond August 19, 2003 and start doing our work again,"
Nouicer stated, referring to the date of the bombing of the
UN headquarters in Iraq that killed UN Envoy Sergio Vieira de
Mello and 21 others.


5. (C) Harper outlined the four logistical/bureaucratic areas
that are limiting the UN's humanitarian action on the ground:

-- Transport/Logistics: Getting in and around Iraq is a
problem. There is one UN plane (that breaks down often)
serving the whole country. That means one Baghdad-Erbil
flight and two Baghdad-Amman flights per week. UN personnel
are still not permitted to fly Royal Jordanian Airlines,
which many diplomats are now using. If this were a serious
operation, according to Harper, there would be at least three

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planes and three helicopters serving the UN in Iraq.

-- Accommodations: There are 150 beds in approved
accommodations for the whole UN, only 20 of which are
available for the humanitarian operational organizations
(UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, IOM). Security regulations require
"overhead protection," but there currently is no UN plan to
build additional housing to these specifications.

-- Office Space: UNHCR received money from Sweden for an
office building, but has to build it as an annex to a school
building which the UN is still using, despite the GOI
allocating land for a new UN complex, because none of the
other UN agencies appear interested in moving out of the
school and into expanded office space.

-- Private Security: UNHCR currently must provide a 25-day
notice to MNFI for escort outside the Green Zone and
authorization is not always granted. This is untenable for
an organization trying to run programs on the ground. Harper
said that what UNHCR needs is a "low-profile," dedicated
private security service to accompany UN personnel.


6. (C) Harper stated that 18 months ago the above elements
were moot points as the overall security environment
precluded a ramping up of UN operations. Now, with an
improved security environment, the UN has only to make
decisions to address the logistical/bureaucratic obstacles,
but appears unwilling or unable to do so because it has "no
vision, no strategy," according to Harper. For example, UNHCR
has a plan to develop a network of offices in Baghdad where
large numbers of returns are expected. Working with local
NGOs and the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, the
offices would collect information on returnee needs (social
services, broken infrastructure, etc.) and match them to
appropriate actors (GOI, World Bank, bilateral donors). This
is crucial to making returns sustainable and encouraging
further returns. UNHCR has identified increased
international staff to manage this and other activities on
the ground. Some have already begun their assignments, but
are waiting in Amman because they cannot move permanently to
Iraq, according to Nouicer.

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Resettlement On Track
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7. (C) Power asked the significance of UNHCR's recent
reduction of the number of Iraqi refugees requiring
resettlement from 86,000 to 60-65,000 and whether the current
set-up for processing resettlement cases was adequate.
Nouicer responded that the calculation was based on a more
sophisticated understanding of the numbers of refugees in
neighboring countries (probably no more than 250,000 in
Jordan, he said) and their situations. If the U.S. takes
another 20,000 or so in FY09 and other countries take up to
10,000, Nouicer felt the pipeline will continue to move and
within a couple of years will have dealt with most of the
potential candidates. He also did not preclude the
possibility of the number needing resettlement decreasing
again at some future point, depending on political and
security developments in Iraq. (Comment: In a separate
conversation, Harper told RMA Counselor that he had argued to
lower the figure now to 50,000. End comment.)


8. (C) Nouicer mentioned that UNHCR would also soon revise
its Iraq policy setting out the criteria for new status
determinations. This will only affect new applicants and not
those who have already received refugee status. The new
policy will continue to provide prima facie status to
applicants from the five central governates. Those from the
south, however, will now be considered for refugee status on
a case-by-case basis.

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In Search of Other Donors
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9. (C) In response to Power's question on encouraging other
donors to step up to the plate on Iraqi refugees, the UNHCR
reps expressed clear frustration. High Commissioner Guterres
has spent a lot of time in the Gulf in the past couple of
years trying to encourage funding for Iraq and other UNHCR
priorities. The result has been pathetic according to
Harper. He said the Europeans have largely hidden behind a
strategy of "the U.S. created it, the U.S. pays for it,"
though traditional European humanitarian donors (Nordics,
Netherlands) have given some. Harper suggested that the only
way to entice European contributions is to offer them
something they want to pay for. He noted that the Nordics
prefer community-based projects, for example. In addition,
many European countries are now eager to see Iraqis that have
been granted temporary protection go home. Thus, there is a

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preference among these countries to support activities inside
Iraq and not in refugee host countries.

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Responsible Withdrawal
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10. (C) Nouicer offered two other suggestions that would
address the human consequences of a U.S. withdrawal. First,
he said that tens of thousands of Iraqis who have worked for
the U.S. will find themselves out of employment in an economy
that is not producing many jobs. Developing livelihood
projects to increase employment and develop skills would be
an important gesture. Finally, he noted that Jordan and
Syria have shown considerable goodwill in hosting refugees.
As operations wrap up there, he believes it would be an
important gesture to do something for the host communities or
governments that is clearly in recognition of their
hospitality.
STORELLA