Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA183
2009-03-03 08:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

FEBRUARY 17-18 GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA: READOUT

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 030849Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8079
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0848
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5779
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0674
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0106
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2973
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000183 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 17-18 GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA: READOUT
FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON SECURITY

GENEVA 00000183 001.2 OF 003


/// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y PAR ONE NEEDED CLASSIFICATION ///

Classified By: CDA Mark Storella, Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000183

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 17-18 GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA: READOUT
FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON SECURITY

GENEVA 00000183 001.2 OF 003


/// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y PAR ONE NEEDED CLASSIFICATION ///

Classified By: CDA Mark Storella, Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: During the February 17-18 Geneva Talks on
Georgia, the Working Group on Security accepted by consensus
&Proposals for joint incident prevention and response
Mechanisms.8 The mechanisms -- one for Abkhazia and one for
South Ossetia -- will consist of &representatives of
structures with responsibility for security and public
order8 (Georgian, Russian, and separatist),as well as
&representatives of international organizations8 (UN, OSCE
and EU). The possibility of joint visits by the participants
to &sites of incidents8 was the most contentious point of
the discussion, with significantly watered-down language
leaving it to the de facto authorities to approve of access
for the mechanisms, participants to the separatist regions.
The Working Group on internally displaced persons and
humanitarian issues failed to reach agreement on a document
that would have granted humanitarian access to the separatist
regions from both north and south, amid strong opposition
from South Ossetian and Russian representatives. No plenary
session was held and there was no discussion of the future UN
or OSCE mandates for Georgia. End Summary.


--------------
Format
--------------


2. (SBU) The Geneva talks on Georgia began on February 17 at
15:00 and ended on February 18 at 14:00. The entire course
of the discussions was spent in working group sessions, with
a lunch for all participants held at the conclusion of the
talks. Although there was no plenary session, the plenary
representatives (EU Special Representative Pierre Morel, UN
Special Representative Johan Verbeke, OSCE Special Envoy
Charalampos Christopoulos, EUR A/S Fried, Georgian Deputy FM
Giga Bokeria, and Russian Deputy FM Grigoriy Karasin) sat at
one table during the lunch, while the de facto Abkhaz and
South Ossetian representatives sat at separate tables with
the other participants.


-------------- ---
Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
-------------- ---


3. (SBU) The Working Group on Security and Stability spent

the entire course of the two days discussing the proposed
agreement on a Joint Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism (JIPRM),just as during the previous round of talks
on December 17-18, 2008. (Note: the final agreed version of
the Proposal on the JIPRM was emailed to EUR/CARC on February

19. End Note.)


4. (SBU) The Georgian delegation was represented by Deputy FM
Giga Bokeria. While the Tbilisi-backed Head of the Temporary
Administrative Unit for South Ossetia, Dmitri Sanakoyev, and
Abkhaz government-in-exile member Ada Marshania were both
present in the Working Group, neither took the floor.
Bokeria was measured and constructive throughout the talks,
emphasizing on several occasions that the Georgian delegation
would be flexible on issues relating to status. Bokeria
welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 1866, and repeated on
several occasions that the August 12 ceasefire agreement
called on Russia to return its troops to pre-conflict
positions. On the JIPRM, Bokeria was willing to compromise
on numerous points within the text, insisting only that no
mention be made of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.


5. (SBU) By contrast, the de facto South Ossetian delegation,
led by &Deputy Prime Minister8 Boris Chochiev, repeatedly
re-opened discussions on sections of the text that had
already been agreed, attempting to pocket concessions only to
later take back their own compromises. A visibly frustrated
Morel continuously interceded to urge the South Ossetians to
be more flexible and less inflammatory, but without much
success.


6. (SBU) Russian Deputy FM Karasin also proved rather
inflexible on numerous points. For example, when the final
draft of the JIPRM agreement was circulated and the title was
changed so that the words &Proposals for8 were removed
immediately preceding the phrase &Joint Incident Response
and Prevention Mechanisms,8 Karasin insisted that the term
&Proposals8 be kept. Both Morel and Verbeke argued his

GENEVA 00000183 002 OF 003


insistence was illogical, and even trifling, but Karasin kept
his ground, even with the EU, UN, OSCE, U.S., and Georgian
representatives arguing the change was simply equivalent to
removing the term &draft8 from a text that had been
finalized. Karasin also insisted on diluting the language
proposed by the Co-Chairs on access for the international
monitoring organizations to the separatist territories.
Thus, the final text reads that the participants of the
mechanisms &could discuss...follow up to incidents...as
appropriate...through agreed joint visits.8 Finally,
Karasin made reference on several occasions to the alleged
buildup of Georgian &spetznaz8 forces along the &borders8
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and called for an immediate
Non-Use of Force pledge from Georgia to be signed with the
leaders of the separatist &republics.8


7. (SBU) EUMM Head Ambassador Hansjorg Haber categorically
rebutted Karasin,s assertion that Georgian spetznaz forces
were massing in the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Haber explained that the Georgian Ministries of
Defense and Internal Affairs had both signed Memoranda of
Understanding with the EUMM, and that the EUMM was in a
position to monitor Georgian troop movements very closely in
these areas. Haber praised the Georgian side for providing a
model of military transparency and for cooperating so readily
with the EUMM. Haber also regretted that he had been unable
to sign a similar agreement with the Russian side, and was
unable to have regular contacts with Russian military
commanders or the separatist militias. A/S Fried also raised
this issue, arguing that Russia could not demand military
transparency from Georgia while being completely inflexible
on the issue of its own military transparency, particularly
with reports of new Russian bases being constructed in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although Karasin backed down
after this initial exchange, he made the same claims in a
smaller working group on the second day of the talks.


8. (SBU) On the issue of the Non-Use of Force, Karasin
praised UNSCR 1866 for referring to the principle of Non-Use
of Force and called on Georgia to sign agreements with South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Fried agreed with Karasin that this
was a vital principle, and suggested that the next round of
Geneva talks be devoted to this subject. In discussions on
the margins of the talks, however, the Russian side was
unwilling to agree to any resumption of the talks prior to
June, despite Morel,s and Verbeke,s repeated calls for
holding the next round of talks prior to the UN Secretary
General,s mandated report on Georgia, due on May 15.


9. (C) In the IDP working group, Russian and South Ossetian
participants refused to accept the joint offer of the UN and
EU to deliver humanitarian assistance from two directions
simultaneously: (1) via Russia, a longer, more expensive
route favored by Moscow and Tskhinvali and opposed by
Tbilisi; and (2) via undisputed Georgia, a shorter and safer
route favored by Tbilisi and opposed by Moscow and
Tskhinvali. Despite Georgia,s agreement to the northern
route as well as the southern one, the Russian and South
Ossetian participants blocked the proposal with spurious
arguments that the UN could not be trusted to deliver
humanitarian aid without generating (unspecified) security
threats, and that the route from undisputed Georgia was more
dangerous (even though UN guidelines dub this southern route
safer than the northern one from Russia and across unsecured
South Ossetia). The EU and UNHCR Co-Chairs were infuriated
by this Russian and South Ossetian obstructionism, and
concurred with DAS Bryza,s observation that such behavior
was contrary to UNSCR 1866,s call for &unhindered8
humanitarian assistance.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) The one-step-forward-half-a-step-back pattern of the
Geneva talks reflects both Russian uncertainty about its next
steps in Georgia and South Ossetian/Abkhazian insecurity
about their own regimes. The Russians seem torn between
wanting to stabilize and consolidate their tactical victory
in the war last August and wanting to keep up tension with
Georgia. The breakaway regimes seem to fear outside monitors
that could interrupt or expose their ongoing pressure on
remaining Georgian residents and general lawlessness,
especially in South Ossetia. The Georgians, by contrast,
were constructive and creative, and ought to be encouraged to

GENEVA 00000183 003 OF 003


keep looking at the conflicts from a long-term perspective.
STORELLA