Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1234
2009-12-20 20:11:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1234/01 3542011
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 202011Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1032
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6091
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3270
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2280
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7487
S E C R E T GENEVA 001234 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 16, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001234

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 16, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-152.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 16, 2009
Time: 10:30 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
(WG) chairs, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, met at the U.S. Mission
on December 15. Orlov and Trout, for the third consecutive
meeting discussed the nomenclature for nuclear weapons for
heavy bombers, with Orlov delivering some additional thoughts
on why "warheads" was more appropriate than "armaments." A
quick review of all remaining brackets was done, with
agreement by both sides on the remaining issues. Both
acknowledged that almost everything that could be
un-bracketed at the working group level had been done. Trout
maintained his position on the nomenclature for launchers at
Space Launch Facilities, but promised to research the issue
some more. With respect to technical recognition features
for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, both sides
agreed to do some homework on what data was required to
support inspections.
End Summary.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Data Exchange Again; Space Launch
Success; General Provisions and Site Diagrams; Heavy Bombers
Issues; and End Comments.

--------------
ONE MORE TIME WITH HEAVY BOMBER WARHEADS
--------------


5. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to examine all the remaining
bracketed issues in the document, starting with Section II,
Aggregate Numbers. For the third meeting in a row, Orlov
asked if the U.S. had accepted the Russian construct of

"nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers." Trout
replied that the U.S. position was still "nuclear armaments
for deployed heavy bombers." He commented that this language
was being discussed at the head of delegation level. Orlov
acknowledged that fact, but delivered a few points on the
Russian rationale behind their language. The main point, he
argued, was that the U.S. language suggested the exact
armaments on the bomber, such as an ALCM or Nuclear Bomb, but
it was the nuclear warhead which is accountable. Trout said
he would deliver this point to his delegation to consider.


6. (S) Regarding the attributed nuclear warhead count listed
in the Database, Orlov confirmed the Russian position that
the number listed in the Database was not related to the
inspection process, adding that the purpose of the heavy
bomber inspection, as written, was not to verify warhead data
in the Database. In the hypothetical case where the three
bombers had more weapons physically on them than were
attributed to the base, the Database would not be updated, as
the two events were not related.




7. (S) Turning to UIDs and warheads on each individual
launcher, Orlov said that Russia was still thinking about the
U.S. proposal to drop the warhead data in exchange for
listing UIDs.


8. (S) Orlov asked if the U.S. had accepted "non-deployed
launcher for ICBMs and SLBMs" as the correct category to list
launchers in the Space Launch Facility section. Trout
replied that the U.S. side was still considering the issue
and would provide an answer soon. Col Pischulov asked LT
Lobner if the U.S. was going to provide a new list of Space
Launch Facilities since the existing types had changed.
Lobner replied that he would provide an updated list when the
language for the section had been agreed.


9. (S) Trout asked Orlov why Russia still insisted on the
numerous categories of technical data for recognition
features for heavy bombers. Orlov admitted that there was no
clear relation between this technical data and counting
rules, but argued that the technical data was important for
inspections, just as there was significant technical data for
ICBMs and SLBMs, such as length. Trout countered, arguing
that such information as length was actually used by
inspectors to determine types, and other information was used
in relation to the "large enough to contain" rule.


10. (S) Orlov agreed to think more about this issue, but
pointed out that he thought inspectors should know basic
measurements for bombers so that they could know what hangars
were capable of housing certain bombers. Trout agreed with
this logic, saying that this kind of information is
understandable, but the pages upon pages of data proposed by
the Russian side were not. Both agreed that this data needed
to be approached from an inspection point of view. Orlov
also cautioned against deleting too much technical data too
quickly. Trout agreed, and said that both sides should
independently determine what they should keep and what should
be deleted.


11. (S) Lobner discussed some conforming issues, mentioning
that the text was nearing completion, and that almost all of
the remaining brackets were related to large issues. Both
sides agreed to continue the conforming process on the
document.

--------------
END COMMENTS
--------------


12. (S) Trout concluded the meeting, saying that much work
had been accomplished the past few days. Orlov agreed.


13. (U) Documents provided: NONE



14. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Trout
LT Lobner
Ms. Stewart


Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Col Pischulov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS