Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1231
2009-12-20 19:49:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1231/01 3541949
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201949Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1021
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6080
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3259
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2269
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7476
S E C R E T GENEVA 001231 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING, DECEMBER
14, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1225 (SFO-GVA-VII-134)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001231

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING, DECEMBER
14, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1225 (SFO-GVA-VII-134)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-141.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 14, 2009
Time: 11:30 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Counting Rules Subgroup of the Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) met on December 14 to
continue the discussion of Articles III and IV of the treaty.
The sides agreed that existing types of missiles would cease
to be included in the treaty when all the launchers of that
type of missile were gone. The Russian side agreed not to
seek inclusion of the U.S. Trident I system in the list of
existing types based on a discussion of which space launch
facilities would be included in the treaty. The sides also
discussed joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
and non-nuclear armaments.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article III: When Do ICBMs and
SLBMs Die?; Heavy Bomber Warhead Attribution; Inspecting
Converted Heavy Bombers; Trident I, Once Again; Existing
Types Vis--Vis Space Launch Facilities; Armaments or Not;
Review Changes to Article IV; and Follow-Up.

--------------
ARTICLE III: WHEN DO ICBMS AND SLBMS DIE?
--------------


5. (S) Mr. Taylor began the meeting of the Counting Rules
Subgroup of the TTDWG on December 14, by handing over a paper
with a U.S. proposal for Article III, paragraph 5, which
contained a new sentence to deal with the cessation of
application of the treaty to existing types of ICBMs and
SLBMs. The new sentence read: "ICBMs or SLBMs of an
existing type shall cease to be subject to the Treaty if all

ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type for such an ICBM or SLBM
have been eliminated or converted in accordance with the
provisions of Part Three of the Protocol to the Treaty."
Taylor said that the U.S. intention was to address the status
of the missiles when a particular type of launcher ceased to
exist. Because there was no category for "retired type" as
there had been under START, the new treaty needed a mechanism
to cover this scenario.


6. (S) ADM Kuznetsov quickly noted that the proposed
sentence matched the thinking of the Russian delegation. He
asked one linguistic question about the difference between
"subject to the provisions of the treaty" in the previously
existing sentence and "subject to the treaty" in the new
sentence. Mr. Dean acknowledged that the shorter formulation
was preferred and agreed to change it. Kuznetsov said he
needed to consult with the rest of his delegation, but
asserted that the sentence could be added to the joint draft
text (JDT) without brackets.



--------------
HEAVY BOMBER WARHEAD ATTRIBUTION
--------------


7. (S) Returning to a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the
remaining brackets in Article III, Taylor said the Heads of
Delegation (HOD) were talking about the number of warheads to
be attributed to each deployed heavy bomber, as shown in
paragraph 2. Kuznetsov insisted that the number had been
agreed at one. Taylor demurred, awaiting confirmation by the
HOD. Kuznetsov read a previously-dropped sentence and said
that it should be reflected in the text: "If there are no
nuclear armaments on a deployed heavy bomber, one warhead
shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber." Taylor
responded that the U.S. could not accept the sentence and it
would have to be bracketed.


8. (S) Taylor asked whether the Russian delegation had any
flexibility regarding the phrase "equipped for nuclear
armaments" in paragraph 4(f),on when such heavy bombers
would first become subject to the treaty. Kuznetsov said the
Russian delegation had been convinced by the U.S. arguments
for this phrase and could now accept it. The sides agreed to
remove the brackets.

--------------
INSPECTING CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


9. (S) Kuznetsov provided a JDT for Article III and pointed
out a new proposal for paragraph 6, which covered those items
that should not count under the treaty.

Begin text:

6.(c) Within the same type, heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments shall cease to be subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty when the last of them
is converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to
this Treaty. Such heavy bombers may be inspected to confirm
that they have not been reconverted to heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments.

End text.


10. (S) Kuznetsov explained that this new provision was
necessary to make clear that, when the last of a type of
nuclear equipped bomber was converted to be non-nuclear, all
bombers of that type would remain inspectable to ascertain
they had not been reconverted. Taylor answered that the
agreed statement on this subject was being worked between the
delegations and that he would have to take this language back
for consideration by the U.S. side. Kuznetsov clarified that
the agreed statement covered the B-1B bomber, but this
provision covered the B-52H. Taylor noted that the B-1B
agreed statement included a paragraph on future conversions,
which he believed covered the possibility of conversion of a
number of B-52H heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments.

--------------


TRIDENT I, ONCE AGAIN
--------------


11. (S) On the list of existing types under the START
Follow-on treaty, Taylor reiterated that the U.S. side would
not accept Trident I as an existing type because there were
no such launchers. The agreed statement on the SSGNs would
satisfy Russia's concerns about the status of the SSGNs and
their inability to launch such missiles. In response to a
question from Kuznetsov, Taylor spelled out that the U.S.
delegation had decided to create the text the sides had
agreed to earlier in the meeting for paragraph 5, rather than
deal with this issue in another agreed statement.

-------------- ---
EXISTING TYPES VIA-A-VIS SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES
-------------- ---


12. (S) Kuznetsov said the problem was not the Trident I,
but rather the Peacekeeper and Minuteman II systems. What,
he asked, if the existing launchers were at a space launch
facility? Taylor stated that if there was an existing
launcher, even at a space launch facility, the missiles would
be considered existing types. Kuznetsov persisted,
specifying the Minuteman II launchers at Vandenberg and at
Wallops Island. If those continued to exist, he proclaimed,
the Minuteman II would be an existing type. Taylor
concurred. "And what about the Peacekeeper," Kuznetsov
asked. Taylor said it would also be an existing type.
Kuznetsov carried on by asking whether the answer would
depend on the alert status of the launchers. Taylor said it
would not.


13. (S) Kuznetsov stated there had been some confusion
during a late night meeting of the database group the
previous day. He sought clarification that the United States
would list its space launch facilities in the database. The
confusion had caused the Russian delegation to decide it
needed to see the names of (though not the data for) all U.S.
facilities in the database before signature of the treaty.
Taylor used the opportunity to stress that the United States
believed it would be difficult for the Presidents to sign a
treaty without any actual information in the database. The
sides needed to agree on the data that would be exchanged at
the time of signature.


14. (S) Kuznetsov closed this portion of the discussion by
repeating that the Russian delegation would drop Trident I
from its proposal for existing types.

--------------
ARMAMENTS OR NOT
--------------


15. (S) Moving to the next subparagraph, on existing types
of nuclear armaments for deployed heavy bombers, Taylor said
the list of nuclear armaments would still be required for
inspections of heavy bombers. Kuznetsov listened to the
argument and said only that he would report it back to his
delegation.

--------------
REVIEW CHANGES TO ARTICLE IV


--------------


16. (S) The U.S. delegation provided a proposed JDT to
capture the changes that had been made at the last meeting
(Reftel) and the sides walked through the document. Taylor
pointed out that the United States had dropped its
subparagraph on a limit of non-deployed ICBMs per ICBM base.
Kuznetsov asked about "joint basing" of heavy bombers for
nuclear and non-nuclear armaments and whether the need to
base these heavy bombers together would continue for the life
of the treaty. Taylor explained the B-1B conversion was
expected to end in the fall of 2010 but he did not have the
timeline for the B-52H. He hoped the Russian delegation
would understand the predicament of having fewer than a base
worth of bombers and needing to support their operation out
of another base. He noted that the treaty conversion or
elimination procedures would give Russia ample opportunity to
observe those procedures and follow-up with inspections.


17. (S) Reading from the latest START Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) data on heavy bombers, Kuznetsov listed
the number of U.S. airbases. "Will you convert the bombers
from each base in parallel or one at a time? Will you do one
base at a time?" He opined that there would be combined
basing of nuclear and non-nuclear equipped heavy bombers for
the entire life of the treaty. Kuznetsov wondered whether it
would help to add "unless otherwise agreed" to the end of the
sentence prohibiting joint basing. Taylor said he did not
see how that would resolve the problem; Kuznetsov agreed
that, personally, he did not think it would be a solution.
Taylor ended the exchange by reassuring that the agreed
statement would address Russia's concerns.

--------------
FOLLOW-UP
--------------


18. (S) Later the same day, Kuznetsov conveyed to Taylor
that the Russian side had no objection to paragraph 6 as
formulated during the morning meeting. The Russian side
agreed to exclude Trident I from the list of existing types
in paragraph 7(b) and (d). With regard to the issue of
existing types of nuclear armaments for deployed heavy
bombers, Kuznetsov referred the solution to Dr. Warner and
Col Ilin. Taylor replied that the issue was linked to the
heavy bomber counting rules in paragraph 2(b) and would be
solved by the HOD. As a result, the new version of the JDT
retained only two brackets in paragraphs 2(b) and 7(e) and
the United States committed to providing a new version.


19. (S) With respect to Article IV, Russian-proposed
paragraph 8, restricting joint basing of heavy bombers
equipped with nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments at an airbase, Kuznetsov indicated
that he understood the difficulty this paragraph posed for
the U.S. side but that it would be hard to make a case to
Moscow to drop it.


20. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Article III, Paragraph 5, dated


December 14, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian; and

-- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Article IV, dated December 14,
2009, in English.

- RUSSIA:

-- Russian-Proposed JDT, Article III, dated December
14, in Russian and unofficial English.


21. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Mrs. Zdravecky
Ms. Smith (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Trifonov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS