Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1227
2009-12-20 19:27:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #1227/01 3541927 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 201927Z DEC 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1010 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6069 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3248 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2258 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7465
S E C R E T GENEVA 001227
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS AND INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUPS,
DECEMBER 10, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T GENEVA 001227
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS AND INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUPS,
DECEMBER 10, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-120.
2. (U) Meeting Date: December 10, 2009
Time: 4:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At a joint meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions
Working Group (TTDWG) and the Inspection Protocol Working
Group (IPWG),the sides reviewed a U.S.-proposed joint draft
text for Article XI. Substantial progress was made in
developing agreed text, though differences remained including
determining how to address visiting heavy bombers at air
bases for deployed heavy bombers during an inspection. End
Summary.
4. SUBJECT SUMMARY: What To Call The Inspections; Visiting
Bombers during Inspections; Defining Items of Inspection;
Exhibitions.
--------------
WHAT TO CALL THE INSPECTIONS
--------------
5. (S) Dr. Warner began by providing a draft of a proposed
definition for "declared data." He noted the TTDWG would
formally propose this term at its next meeting. As the term
appeared frequently in the article language, it was important
for both sides to understand and agree to its meaning.
6. (S) Discussion proceeded to the draft of Article XI that
had been developed in the IPWG. Both sides readily agreed to
the U.S. text of the first paragraph of the article, which
establishes the right to conduct inspection activities for
the purpose of confirming the declared data and ensuring
verification and compliance with the provisions of the treaty.
7. (S) Turning to paragraph 2 (Type 1 Inspections),Ilin
pulled the Russian bracketed text and offered to work from
the U.S.- proposed text. He noted both sides shared a common
understanding of the framework for addressing each
inspection. The paragraphs on each type of inspection
activities should include the purpose of the inspection
activity, a description of locations affected, and an
indication of the items subject to inspection. At the same
time, he wondered what would be the best way to capture the
definition of each type of inspection.
8. (S) A discussion ensued concerning the need for a formal
definition of "types of inspections" or if the term could be
defined as first mentioned in the text (e.g., "herein after
referred to as Type one"). Amb Ries pointed out that the
treaty was a public document and many would read primarily
the treaty articles. As a result, there was a need to ensure
the reader would understand the substance of the terminology
contained in the article. Warner then proposed what became
the agreed solution to note at the end of each paragraph that
the inspection specified therein would thereafter be known as
a Type One or Type Two inspection.
--------------
VISITING BOMBERS DURING INSPECTIONS
--------------
9. (S) Continuing with the discussion, Ilin then asked about
the U.S. formulation for Type One inspections at heavy bomber
bases, noting the U.S. wording called for inspections of
"deployed" heavy bombers. Warner pointed out the fact that
the wording of the sentence was designed to capture the place
to be inspected instead of specifying the actual items to be
inspected. He observed such a base might have deployed or
test heavy bombers present at the time of inspection. He
offered an example in which a non-deployed heavy bomber might
come out of storage and be on its way to one airbase and
stopover at a base that was subject to inspection. Such a
bomber was clearly a "visitor" and should not be subject to
inspection.
10. (S) Ilin took a more re strictive view. If a
non-deployed heavy bomber were to come to a declared air
base, it would be characterized as a deployed heavy bomber
for purposes of an inspection. Warner conceded an inspecting
Party might want to inspect a visiting aircraft, but he
reminded Ilin that such an aircraft would not be the source
of data that should be confirmed during an inspection. Ilin
asserted further that any bomber, be it equipped or not
equipped for nuclear armaments, would be subject to an
inspection if it was present at the airbase. For the heavy
bombers not equipped for nuclear armaments, the procedure
would be confirmation that it had not been reconverted back
to carrying nuclear armaments and was not equipped for
nuclear armaments. Warner disputed this approach. With
that, the sides agreed to move to the next paragraph and
leave the word "deployed" in brackets for the time being.
--------------
DEFINING ITEMS OF INSPECTION
--------------
11. (S) The sides then turned to paragraph 3 of the article
which covers Type Two inspections, focusing on non-deployed
SOA, formerly declared facilities, and eliminations. Looking
at the sentence which read, "The purpose of such inspections
shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the
number and types of non-deployed items at such facilities,"
Ilin asked for a definition of the term "items." Ilin
wondered if this meant merely SOA, or did it have a broader
meaning.
12. (S) Warner explained the term "items" referred to the
thing to be inspected. He showed Ilin an agreed list of
"items" which were in Section VII of the Inspection Part of
the Protocol. After further discussion, the sides agreed to
incorporate this list into the wording of paragraph 3 of
Article XI as well.
--------------
EXHIBITIONS
--------------
13. (S) Looking briefly at paragraph 4, Warner asked Ilin if
the Russian side still needed the last sentence on
exhibitions to confirm differences between SOA and missile
defense interceptors in light of the recent discussion on
agreed statements. (Begin comment: The substance of the
Russian proposal called for the question of such an
exhibition to be handled in the Bilateral Consultive
Commission. End comment.) Ilin agreed to drop the Russian
language from paragraph 4 in light of the most recent Russian
proposal.
14. (U) Documents provided:
- UNITED STATES.
-- Non-Paper, Draft Definition, "Declared Data," dated
December 10, 2009.
15. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Amb Reis
Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Rust
Mr. Taylor
Ms. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ilin
Mr. Lobach
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Colonel Zaitsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)
16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS AND INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUPS,
DECEMBER 10, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-120.
2. (U) Meeting Date: December 10, 2009
Time: 4:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At a joint meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions
Working Group (TTDWG) and the Inspection Protocol Working
Group (IPWG),the sides reviewed a U.S.-proposed joint draft
text for Article XI. Substantial progress was made in
developing agreed text, though differences remained including
determining how to address visiting heavy bombers at air
bases for deployed heavy bombers during an inspection. End
Summary.
4. SUBJECT SUMMARY: What To Call The Inspections; Visiting
Bombers during Inspections; Defining Items of Inspection;
Exhibitions.
--------------
WHAT TO CALL THE INSPECTIONS
--------------
5. (S) Dr. Warner began by providing a draft of a proposed
definition for "declared data." He noted the TTDWG would
formally propose this term at its next meeting. As the term
appeared frequently in the article language, it was important
for both sides to understand and agree to its meaning.
6. (S) Discussion proceeded to the draft of Article XI that
had been developed in the IPWG. Both sides readily agreed to
the U.S. text of the first paragraph of the article, which
establishes the right to conduct inspection activities for
the purpose of confirming the declared data and ensuring
verification and compliance with the provisions of the treaty.
7. (S) Turning to paragraph 2 (Type 1 Inspections),Ilin
pulled the Russian bracketed text and offered to work from
the U.S.- proposed text. He noted both sides shared a common
understanding of the framework for addressing each
inspection. The paragraphs on each type of inspection
activities should include the purpose of the inspection
activity, a description of locations affected, and an
indication of the items subject to inspection. At the same
time, he wondered what would be the best way to capture the
definition of each type of inspection.
8. (S) A discussion ensued concerning the need for a formal
definition of "types of inspections" or if the term could be
defined as first mentioned in the text (e.g., "herein after
referred to as Type one"). Amb Ries pointed out that the
treaty was a public document and many would read primarily
the treaty articles. As a result, there was a need to ensure
the reader would understand the substance of the terminology
contained in the article. Warner then proposed what became
the agreed solution to note at the end of each paragraph that
the inspection specified therein would thereafter be known as
a Type One or Type Two inspection.
--------------
VISITING BOMBERS DURING INSPECTIONS
--------------
9. (S) Continuing with the discussion, Ilin then asked about
the U.S. formulation for Type One inspections at heavy bomber
bases, noting the U.S. wording called for inspections of
"deployed" heavy bombers. Warner pointed out the fact that
the wording of the sentence was designed to capture the place
to be inspected instead of specifying the actual items to be
inspected. He observed such a base might have deployed or
test heavy bombers present at the time of inspection. He
offered an example in which a non-deployed heavy bomber might
come out of storage and be on its way to one airbase and
stopover at a base that was subject to inspection. Such a
bomber was clearly a "visitor" and should not be subject to
inspection.
10. (S) Ilin took a more re strictive view. If a
non-deployed heavy bomber were to come to a declared air
base, it would be characterized as a deployed heavy bomber
for purposes of an inspection. Warner conceded an inspecting
Party might want to inspect a visiting aircraft, but he
reminded Ilin that such an aircraft would not be the source
of data that should be confirmed during an inspection. Ilin
asserted further that any bomber, be it equipped or not
equipped for nuclear armaments, would be subject to an
inspection if it was present at the airbase. For the heavy
bombers not equipped for nuclear armaments, the procedure
would be confirmation that it had not been reconverted back
to carrying nuclear armaments and was not equipped for
nuclear armaments. Warner disputed this approach. With
that, the sides agreed to move to the next paragraph and
leave the word "deployed" in brackets for the time being.
--------------
DEFINING ITEMS OF INSPECTION
--------------
11. (S) The sides then turned to paragraph 3 of the article
which covers Type Two inspections, focusing on non-deployed
SOA, formerly declared facilities, and eliminations. Looking
at the sentence which read, "The purpose of such inspections
shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the
number and types of non-deployed items at such facilities,"
Ilin asked for a definition of the term "items." Ilin
wondered if this meant merely SOA, or did it have a broader
meaning.
12. (S) Warner explained the term "items" referred to the
thing to be inspected. He showed Ilin an agreed list of
"items" which were in Section VII of the Inspection Part of
the Protocol. After further discussion, the sides agreed to
incorporate this list into the wording of paragraph 3 of
Article XI as well.
--------------
EXHIBITIONS
--------------
13. (S) Looking briefly at paragraph 4, Warner asked Ilin if
the Russian side still needed the last sentence on
exhibitions to confirm differences between SOA and missile
defense interceptors in light of the recent discussion on
agreed statements. (Begin comment: The substance of the
Russian proposal called for the question of such an
exhibition to be handled in the Bilateral Consultive
Commission. End comment.) Ilin agreed to drop the Russian
language from paragraph 4 in light of the most recent Russian
proposal.
14. (U) Documents provided:
- UNITED STATES.
-- Non-Paper, Draft Definition, "Declared Data," dated
December 10, 2009.
15. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Amb Reis
Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Rust
Mr. Taylor
Ms. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ilin
Mr. Lobach
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Colonel Zaitsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)
16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS