START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): AD HOC MEETING, DECEMBER 16, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-154.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 16, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. to 5:10 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At an Ad Hoc Meeting on December 16, Dr. Warner
presented two alternative proposals that attempted to address
many of the remaining interlinked issues in the START
Follow-on treaty negotiations. After detailed discussion,
the Russian side asserted that the new proposals would not
help advance the process of coming to agreement on several
key issues. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: U.S. Proposal Paths; and The
Inspections Dialogue.

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U.S. PROPOSAL PATHS
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5. (S) Warner explained that the leadership on the U.S. side
had asked the U.S. delegation to set up this meeting to
address the most important remaining issues with their
Russian counterparts. He listed the six main issues that the
U.S. delegation believed remained. The first, exchange of
telemetric information, would not be addressed in today's
meeting. The second issue was the annual quota on Type One
and Type Two inspections, including both the aggregate total
and the quotas for the two types of inspections. Third was
how to address the inspection activities related to
elimination. Both the second and third issues involved
inspection activities and were important aspects of the
verification regime for the treaty. Fourth was the issue of
cooperative measures as described in Article XII of the
treaty. While this topic was also related to the overall
treaty verification regime, it was not covered in the
Inspection Activities section of the protocol. The fifth and
sixth issues involved verification measures associated with
mobile ICBMs and were directly related to the U.S. decision
to withdraw its proposal regarding continuous monitoring
activities at the Votkinsk Missile Assembly Production Plant.
Specifically, the fifth issue involved advance notification
of the exit of newly-produced SLBMs and ICBMs at the Votkinsk
plant which would be matched by similar notifications
regarding the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from U.S. production
plants. The sixth was the application of unique identifiers
(UIDs) on all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers of the two
sides.


6. (S) Warner laid out two alternative proposals to address
five of the six remaining issues. In the first proposal, the
aggregate number of Type One and Type Two inspections would
be 18 each year and there would also be a maximum of 6
exhibitions each year to confirm conversion or elimination
procedures have been completed on ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for

nuclear armaments. Warner noted that the U.S. side was also
seeking Russian agreement to provide advance notification of
the exit of newly-produced SLBMs and ICBMs from the Votkinsk
plant in return for reciprocal U.S. notifications of a
similar nature; the application of unique identifiers on all
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; and cooperative measures
associated with heavy bombers and mobile ICBMs.


7. (S) The second proposal placed the number of Type One
inspections at 12 and the number of Type 2 Inspections at 12,
with inspections to confirm elimination procedures limited to
the Type Two Inspection quota. The advance notifications,
use of unique identifiers, and cooperative measures described
as part of the first proposal were included in this proposal
as desired results associated with solution of the key
inspection issues.

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THE INSPECTIONS DIALOGUE
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8. (S) Ilin agreed with the list of six issues presented by
Warner and added a seventh, counting rules or central limits,
as of prime concern to Russia. Warner concurred that
counting rules were indeed at the heart of the new treaty
but, as with the issue of telemetry exchange, were not to be
discussed in today's meeting. Ilin responded that all of
these issues had been discussed by the delegations to some
extent. Ilin claimed he was surprised by the references to
continuous monitoring at Votkinsk, commenting that he
believed that set of issues had been resolved fully in the
past. Both sides recounted their changing positions over
time on numbers of inspections and the lack of convergence on
this issue.


9. (S) The U.S. side reviewed the various proposals it had
put forward to try to engage the Russian delegation in
discussions regarding cooperative measures that would enhance
the ability of each side to use national technical means
(NTM) in verification of the treaty. Mr. Koshelev remarked
that several of these measures were viewed as impractical by
the Russian delegation. Warner responded that the U.S side
was willing to consider any that the Russian side would
propose as alternatives. The Russian delegation stated they
believed this approach, which was largely focused on mobile
ICBMs, had been addressed long ago and that the U.S.
delegation was stirring up old issues that could not be dealt
with if a treaty was to be signed on December 18 or 19.
Warner pointed out that all of these issues were unresolved,
interlinked, and needed to be addressed before treaty
signature was possible from the U.S. side. He said there had
been valuable compromises on many issues, but that this set
clearly remained unresolved.


10. (S) Col Ryzhkov commented that while Type One and Type
Two inspections appeared to be an agreed formulation, Russia
had only accepted this concept on the condition of a reduced
number of inspections. He further pointed out that the
workload calculations for the Russian facilities showed an
increased burden at the higher inspection numbers proposed by
the Untied States in comparison with the workload burdens
under START. He also pointed out that they had worked hard
in the Conversion or Elimination Working Group to come up
with procedures that could be verified by NTM rather than by

inspection. Based on that, he could not see why so many
inspections would be necessary. Moreover, he asserted,
calling the inspection of an eliminated item an "exhibition"
did not change its character.


11. (S) Elliott pointed out that a right to inspect without
a sufficient number of inspections was not a real right. If
the U.S. President and U.S. delegation did not believe the
opportunities for inspection of converted and eliminated
items were adequate, there would be no signature of the
treaty. Warner pointed out that while the Conversion or
Elimination Working Group had greatly reduced the on-site
inspection requirements, in many cases the use of NTM was
insufficient to be confident that the same items were
actually eliminated and not being repeatedly displayed for
NTM. The United States was prepared to conduct a small
number of specific exhibitions, for which the United States
would pay the in-country expenses of the inspectors, using
small teams of inspectors, in order to gain the confidence it
desired.

12. (S) Ilin suggested that the proposals presented by
Warner would not advance the process of coming to closure on
the treaty and protocol sections. Warner assured the Russian
delegation that his intention had not been to delay, extend
or complicate the negotiations, but rather to propose some
potential solutions to a difficult set of interlinked
problems. He challenged the Russian side to present their
ideas regarding how these important issues could be resolved.


13. (S) Documents provided: None.


14. (S) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Elliott
Ms. Pura
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Kuznetsov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS