Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1225
2009-12-20 19:10:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1225/01 3541910
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201910Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1003
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6062
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3241
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2251
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7458
S E C R E T GENEVA 001225 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING,
DECEMBER 13, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1198 (SFO-GVA-VII-103)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001225

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING,
DECEMBER 13, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1198 (SFO-GVA-VII-103)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-134.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 13, 2009
Time: 10:00 P.M. - 11:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Subgroup on Counting Rules met on December 13 and
made significant progress toward completing Articles III and
IV. A productive exchange resulted in resolving issues
related to "space launch facilities," the list of existing
types, and the U.S. position on strategic offensive arms
(SOA) that are subject to the Start Follow-on (SFO) treaty.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: On the Fast Train; Space Launch
Facilities and Article III; Existing Types; What are SOA?;
and Reviewing Article IV.

--------------
ON THE FAST TRAIN
--------------


5. (S) Mr. Taylor stated the U.S. willingness to be flexible
now that both sides were on the fast train following the
telephone call between the two Presidents the previous night
and hoped that the Russian side would show flexibility as
well. ADM Kuznetsov indicated that he had not yet received
the official result of the telephone call and would be
grateful for any information the United States could share.
Kuznetsov quickly agreed to drop the Russian paragraph 11 in
Article IV. (Begin comment: Deleted language was, "Nuclear
armaments shall not be stored at air bases for heavy bombers
converted for non-nuclear armaments. End comment.) In
addition, Kuznetsov agreed to the U.S.-proposed language
taken from the eighth START Agreed Statement on limitations
of basing and locations of heavy bombers and submarines

outside national territories.


6. (S) Taylor agreed to drop the text in sub-paragraph 3(b)
that limited the number of non-deployed ICBMs at each ICBM
base to no more than five. However, the U.S. side stressed
that the substance of paragraph 3(a) would not be dropped.
Kuznetsov added that Russian experts had assessed that the
number of non-deployed ICBMs could be greater than five at an
ICBM base, depending on different conditions.

--------------
SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES AND ARTICLE III
--------------


7. (S) Following a HOD discussion regarding the U.S.
position of not combining space launch facilities with test
ranges Taylor requested flexibility in permitting separate
declarations for each, with the understanding that the United
States would only declare such facilities if they contained



existing types of launchers. The Russian side agreed after
the two sides agreed to the list of existing types in Article
III.


8. (S) Kuznetsov believed that the United States should
declare Trident I, MX, Minuteman II, and Minuteman III as
existing types of ICBMs. Even if launchers do not exist the
missiles could be used to "launch items into space," he said.
Mr. Taylor stated that the United States was prepared to
accept Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper as
existing types. Taylor stated that the U.S. side preferred
to use the term Peacekeeper rather than MX for the
designation. A proposed agreed statement would designate
that when launchers of these existing types were eliminated
or converted in accordance with the treaty, such ICBMs or
SLBMs would no longer be subject to the treaty. The U.S.
side confirmed that the agreed statement would include the
last launcher of a type. The U.S. side undertook to provide
text on the proposal. (Begin comment: The language on when
a type ICBM and SLBM ceases to be subject to the treaty was
subsequently inserted into the treaty in lieu of an agreed
statement. End comment.)

--------------
EXISTING TYPES
--------------


9. (S) In Article III paragraph 7(d)(ii),Russia proposed to
designate the RS-12M and RS-12M2 as two existing types. When
pressed further, the Russian side explained that this was
consistent with the Russian-proposed definition of "new type"
where a difference of five percent length of either the
assembled missile without front section or length of first
stage and/or a change in diameter of the first stage of three
percent. (Begin comment: This definition is not yet agreed.
End comment.) The U.S. side accepted this pending the final
definition of "new type."


10. (S) Taylor noted that the Russian side had added the
RS-24 as an existing type yet the United States had never
seen the missile, nor had there been any exhibition during
START. Kuznetsov acknowledged that there would be an
exhibition and data exchanges with respect to this ICBM under
the terms of the treaty once it entered into force.


11. (S) The sides turned to the differences in position on
the Trident I being designated as an existing launcher of
SLBMs. Taylor held that the United States would retain the
brackets. Kuznetsov explained that the Russian Duma needed
to understand that these systems were being addressed if they
were not included in the treaty text. To address Russian
concerns an agreed statement had been proposed as a solution
to what Kuznetsov previously referred to as the "golden
middle" (Reftel). Mr. Warner and Col Ilin would be
discussing a mechanism that would permit the Russian side to
confirm the conversion of the SSBNs to SSGNs. The United
States would provide notification on ballistic missile
launchers under the 1988 Agreement.

--------------
WHAT ARE SOA?
--------------



12. (S) Following discussions during a previous Counting
Rules Subgroup meeting (Reftel),the U.S. side presented an
analogy, using agricultural products, vodka, and fertilizer
to help explain the U.S. view that certain SOA would be
captured by the treaty while others were not, and that some
items other than SOA could also be limited. The key point
was that the treaty would not define SOA overall but only
define which SOA would be limited by the treaty. SFO is
about deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers
equipped with nuclear armaments and not about new
conventional heavy bombers. Kuznetsov acknowledged the
rationale and agreed that it would be useful to convey these
ideas to the Russian delegation.


13. (S) With this understanding, Taylor agreed to drop
brackets so that the United States would declare Minuteman II
and the Peacekeeper as existing types of ICBMs and the B-52G
as an existing type of heavy bomber. The United States would
not/not drop the brackets for Trident I as an existing type
of SLBM and SLBM launcher.


14. (S) The United States was not willing to drop the
brackets in 4(f) insisting that "heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments" was an important distinction and should be
maintained in the text that described when SOA are "born."
Taylor stated that this issue could be resolved when the
heavy bomber counting rules were resolved.

--------------
REVIEWING ARTICLE IV
--------------


15. (S) The U.S. side agreed to drop paragraph 6 limiting the
aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at test
ranges to no more than 15. Paragraphs 7 and 8 on test and
training launchers were accepted by both sides. The
U.S.-proposed that the number and locational limits for test
heavy bombers in paragraphs 9 and 10 remain in brackets.
Russia's paragraph 7 on basing re strictions for non-deployed
heavy bombers, and paragraph 8 on joint basing of heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments with heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments remained in brackets until
the overall issue involving heavy bombers had been resolved.
The sides agreed to drop Russian paragraph 11 to re strict
storage of nuclear armaments at airbases for heavy bombers
converted for non-nuclear armaments.


16. (U) Documents provided: None.


17. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Dr. Dreicer
Mr. Highsmith
Mrs. Zdravekey
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA


ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Trifonov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS