Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1224
2009-12-20 19:03:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1224/01 3541903
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201903Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0999
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6058
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3237
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2247
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7454
S E C R E T GENEVA 001224 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING,
DECEMBER 10, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1198 SFO-GVA-VII-103

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001224

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING,
DECEMBER 10, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1198 SFO-GVA-VII-103

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-110.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 8, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) In an intense exchange at a meeting of the Counting
Rules Subgroup held at the Russian Mission on December 8,
2009, the Russian side focused on getting a detailed
understanding of the U.S. concept for ICBM, SLBM, and heavy
bomber counting rules. The U.S. side explained the reasoning
behind the concept of not/not considering the B-52G,
Peacekeeper (MX) Missile, Minuteman II, and Trident I as
existing types, and the counting of the B-1B under the START
Follow-on (SFO) treaty. The Russian side questioned the
application of the Inspection Protocol under the U.S. side's
interpretation and the usefulness of the U.S.-proposed agreed
joint statements. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: When is an ICBM/SLBM Deployed?;
What Exactly is an Existing Type?; Round Two - Heavy Bomber
Counting Rules; and Article III.

--------------
WHEN IS AN ICBM/SLBM DEPLOYED?
--------------


5. (S) ADM Kuznetsov focused the initial discussions of the
Counting Rules Meeting toward exploring the U.S. position on
when ICBMS, SLBMs, and their associated launchers were
considered to be deployed versus non-deployed to better
understand the implications of the sub-limits set out in
Article IV. These had been introduced in a previous meeting
of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (Ref A).
Since the terms "deployed ICBM" and "deployed SLBM" had

already been agreed, further clarification of "non-deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs" was solicited. Mr. Taylor explained the
U.S. willingness to drop "considered to contain" was the
reasoning behind the U.S. acceptance of these terms. (Begin
comment: Any specific crafting of SFO definitions were
deferred to the Definitions Working Group. End comment.)
Both sides agreed that if an ICBM was removed from its
launcher it would be a "non-deployed ICBM," even, for
example, if it was in a storage area. A "non-deployed
launcher of ICBMs" is a launcher with no ICBM on it. Col
Zaitsev asked about the inspection implications of this but
the U.S. side deferred this question to the Inspection
Protocol Working Group.

--------------
WHAT EXACTLY IS AN EXISTING TYPE?
--------------


6. (S) The Russian side noted that in analyzing the U.S.


list of existing types shown in Article III, the MX Missile,
Minuteman II and Trident I were not included. Taylor
explained that the U.S. concept defined existing types as
ICBMs, SLBMs or heavy bombers, a type of ICBM, SLBM or heavy
bomber for which at least one ICBM, SLBM or heavy bomber of
that type was deployed on the date of signature of the
treaty, as set out in Article III, paragraph 7. Taylor
outlined the facts that the United States has no MX missiles
installed on any MX launchers, and no Trident I SLBMs
installed in any Trident launcher. Therefore, the United
States did not consider these systems to be existing types
under the SFO treaty. Russian inspectors saw that there were
no MX missiles in silos and General Jones has committed that
these silos would be eliminated within the next 7 years.
Taylor stated that the way the accounting would be done
remained to be worked out but under the U.S. concept these
ICBMs were not existing types. Later, Gen Poznikhir insisted
that the Russian side had not yet agreed that the MX would
not/not be an existing type.


7. (S) During the exchange, Kuznetsov pushed back by asking
whether they stopped being strategic offensive arms (SOA) at
the end of START, to which Taylor responded that the MX ICBM
and the Trident I SLBM ceased to be SOA subject to the
provisions of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009. With
respect to the SFO treaty, the United States did not consider
these ballistic missiles to be SOA subject to the terms of
the treaty and therefore not subject to the numerical
limitations set forth in Article II. Kuznetsov also asked
whether the United States would care if the RSM-52 (SS-N-20)
submarine (Typhoon) was not considered an existing type
because there were no plans for using it as a missile system.
Taylor explained that it would be considered an existing
type according to the type rule because SLBMs of that type
would be deployed at the time of treaty signature. When
pushed about SSGNS, he responded that the same rule applied
for the type of launcher of SLBMs. At numerous times during
the discussions the Russian side listed U.S. SOA numbers
taken from the START database and asked whether these would
be counted as existing types. Poznikhir accused the United
States of walking away from the old START Treaty.


8. (S) Kuznetsov asked why the MX launchers were not
eliminated under START and was told that it was a matter of
available funding. He was also displeased that the United
States was planning to use the remaining MX missiles for
other purposes, as was allowed under START, rather than
eliminating them. He explained that Russia had plans and
funding for the elimination of their unused systems. Taylor
reminded the Russian side numerous times during the meeting
that they had not yet provided the U.S. side with its list of
existing types and asked when the information would be shared.


9. (S) The back and forth exchange continued in order to
fully explore the implications of the U.S. position on
existing types and counting, with the sides questioning how
specific examples would be counted. During the discussion on
access for an inspection team, the Russian side realized that
it would be possible to exclude operational launchers on the
site. Kuznetsov opined that having no "former type" in the
SFO treaty was a problem that would result in having SOA that
did not exist on paper but did in reality, and the U.S.
concept would allow for circumvention of the treaty.


Ultimately, Poznikhir stated that Russia "will have to create
a mirror image of how you view existing types" and develop
ideas on existing types now that the U.S. position was better
understood.

--------------
ROUND TWO - HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULES
--------------


10. (S) Turning to heavy bombers, Kuznetsov asked for
clarification on whether heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments had any location or numerical limits.
Taylor responded by saying that to his knowledge, at this
time, there were no re strictions. Kuznetsov asked whether a
deployed heavy bomber remained deployed after it flew to the
location where it would be awaiting elimination. Taylor said
the U.S. side considered the heavy bomber awaiting
elimination based at its home base and counted as a deployed
heavy bomber until elimination was completed, regardless of
where it was located.


11. (S) Poznikhir asked whether the 47 B-52G heavy bombers
would be considered deployed. The U.S. side explained that
these heavy bombers were planed for elimination and that
General Jones committed that the B-52Gs would be eliminated
within the 7-year period after EIF. The bomber would not be
considered an existing type and therefore not a deployed
heavy bomber. This resulted in Kuznetsov accusing the United
States of a selective approach, as was presented with respect
to ICBMs.


12. (S) The discussion continued as Taylor endeavored to
answer Zaitsev's questions regarding the B-1B and the U.S.
offer of continued assurance, through an agreed statement,
that the heavy bombers remain incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments. The U.S. side responded that once all the B-1Bs
were converted, and no longer equipped for nuclear armaments,
they would no longer be subject to the treaty or counted
against the limit on strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). A
draft joint agreement had been proposed to provide Russia
with assurances in place of inspections and database
reporting. Mr. Dean confirmed that the agreed statement
would be included in the treaty package and would supersede
the other terms of the treaty as they might relate to the
B-1B. In response, Zaitsev asked why the Russian side would
want to visit to confirm conversion if the heavy bombers were
not subject to the treaty--what would be the basis for
verification? And, the same principle applied for the
SSGNS. The U.S. side had proposed another agreed statement
as a compromise to bridge the different concepts in order to
provide assurances during the lifetime of the treaty.

--------------
ARTICLE III
--------------


13. (S) The discussion transitioned to the treaty article
regarding existing types and ways to represent the existing
types of Russian ICBMs that could be launched from silos or
mobile launchers. Because the Russian input had not yet been
provided there was no progress on this text.


14. (S) Taylor proposed deleting the brackets in paragraph


2(b),except for the attribution number, but Kuznetsov was
not able to agree at this time. Zaitsev complained that if
this article did not mention the number of warheads then
everything in the Inspection Protocol would be ruined.


15. (S) Finally, the U.S. side proposed dropping
sub-paragraphs 6(b) and (c) on new types of ballistic
missiles and the Russia side requested to see these changes
reflected in a document so as to consider the implications of
dropping the two sub-paragraphs.


16. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- Heavy Bombers, U.S. Non-Paper, December 7, 2009.

17. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Broshar
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Ms. Miller
Mrs. Zdraveky
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Ivanov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Lobach
Ms. Melikbekian
Gen Poznikhir
Col Zaitsev
Mr. Pogodin (Int)


18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS