Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1222
2009-12-20 18:52:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1222/01 3541852
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201852Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0991
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6050
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3229
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2239
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7446
S E C R E T GENEVA 001222 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 7, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0920 (SFO-GVA-VI-009)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001222

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 7, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0920 (SFO-GVA-VI-009)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-113


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 7, 2009
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 4:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At an Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of
Defense Representative, Dr. Warner, and Russian Ministry of
Defense Representative, Col Ilin, the entire meeting was
devoted to a discussion of counting rules as related to the
formerly Russian-proposed, and now U.S.-supported, separate
limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.
The U.S. side noted that it had revised its assessment of the
potential utility of the Russian-proposed combined limit on
deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Such a limit was
now pegged at a level 100 units higher than the agreed
strategic delivery vehicle (SDV) limit as the likely agreed
limit on SDVs had begun to approach 750. At this level, the
United States had come to support a limit on non-deployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers, whether it was achieved via a
separate limit of roughly 150, as General Jones had proposed
in Moscow in late October, or via a combined ceiling on
deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. The
Russians discussed the impact of the combined limit at higher
than the original level they had proposed and suggested that
non-deployed heavy bombers be included in that limit as well.
End Summary.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Russian Concept Demonstrated;
Unresolved Issues Affecting SDV Limit; What SOA Are Included
in U.S. Concept.

--------------
RUSSIAN CONCEPT DEMONSTRATED

--------------


5. (S) Warner began the meeting stating that A/S
Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov agreed that a meeting to
discuss Article II central limits would be useful. The sides
had previously discussed the Russian concept for a limit of
500 SDVs and an additional limit of 600 on deployed and
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers on October 21 (Reftel).
At that time, the U.S. side demonstrated that since a side
could determine the composition of its forces, under the
Russian-proposed separate limit, the Russian side could
readily fit under the combined limit, particularly if it was
set as high as 850 or 950. Consequently, the Russian concept
would provide little incentive for the Russia to eliminate
either ICBM or SLBM launchers. Warner stated that over the
past few weeks, the U.S. side had studied the Russian
combined ceiling concept. It understood the logic behind the
concept and had come to see the benefit of the concept at
somewhat lower SDV and combined ceiling levels, for example,
at 700 SDVs, as proposed by President Medvedev, which would
produce a combined ceiling of 800 deployed and non-deployed

ICBM and SLBM launchers. Using a whiteboard to depict
various combinations of the two limits, Warner explored the
Russian concept, first using the original Russian-proposed
500 SDV limit plus a separate limit of 600 deployed and
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and then walking through
the 650-700 SDV limit that had been recently proposed by
President Medvedev. Warner further demonstrated the concept
with a 750 SDV limit, which he said was a number that had
been discussed by the U.S. senior leadership, in combination
with an 850 combined launcher limit.


6. (S) Warner explained the United States was still
proposing a separate limit of approximately 150 non-deployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers that did not include deployed ICBM
and SLBM launchers as the Russian concept did. However, the
U.S. side had also come to support the combined limit
approach as an effective means to place a needed constraint
on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.

--------------
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AFFECTING SDV LIMIT
--------------


7. (S) Warner stated that both of the U.S.-proposed
approaches addressed several issues that remained unresolved:
the central limit on SDVs; the question of a separate limit
on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers; the
concept of when a strategic system was considered deployed or
non-deployed; and when an item would count against the
central limit.

--------------
WHAT SOA ARE INCLUDED IN U.S. CONCEPT
--------------


8. (S) Gen Poznikhir said that he understood that the United
States was proposing either a separate limit on non-deployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers or a combined limit that would be 100
above the SDV limit. He asked what items would be included
in this overall, higher limit on deployed and non-deployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers. Warner responded that deployed and
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers would be included in the
U.S.-proposed overall limit. Poznikhir suggested that
non-deployed heavy bombers should also be included in the
higher ceiling on deployed and non-deployed strategic
systems. Poznikhir then asked whether the U.S. proposal
would result in the elimination of strategic offensive arms
(SOA),to which Warner responded that this would depend on
which side's concept was accepted. The United States was
looking for an approach that would provide a clear incentive
to eliminate older strategic systems. This was the weak point
of the current Russian approach; under the current Russian
proposal, which lacked any form of a limit on non-deployed
systems, very little elimination of strategic systems by
either side would be required.


9. (S) Ilin asked what SOA the U.S. side planned to
eliminate or convert under its concept of a 750 limit on SDVs
combined with an overall limit of 850 deployed and
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Warner indicated the
United States planned to eliminate all of the retired B-52Gs
and some of the older B-1Bs and B-52Hs currently stored at
Davis-Monthan AFB, as well as the empty Peacekeeper and MMIII
silos. Most of the B-1 fleet would be converted to a

non-nuclear role and some number of B-52Hs would also likely
be converted to a non-nuclear role during the life of the
treaty. However, under the Russian proposal, there would be
little incentive to eliminate those non-deployed launchers
that fell above the agreed limit, and consequently they would
simply be retained as non-deployed systems.


10. (S) Ilin asked whether non-deployed heavy bombers would
be included in the U.S. overall limit of 850 deployed and
non-deployed launchers. Warner answered that so far that was
not the case. To do so would only be possible if the sides
decided to include a definition of a non-deployed heavy
bomber in the treaty. According to the Russian definition, a
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments became
non-deployed when it was no longer attributed to an air base
and, therefore, could be included in the overall limit on
deployed and non-deployed systems, should the sides agree to
include these bombers in the combined limit. He reiterated
that this was not the U.S. position but simply reflected an
application of the Russian approach. Poznikhir remarked that
the B-52Gs at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination
facility awaiting elimination would be considered to be
non-deployed, as would the SLBM launch tubes on Russian SSBNs
awaiting elimination.


11. (S) Warner indicated the U.S. concept provided each side
the opportunity to determine the composition of its force
structure within the constraints of the overall SDV and
combined launcher limits. This was an important attribute
since force structure requirements and domestic politics had
to be considered when the United States shaped its strategic
nuclear forces to fit within the agreed SDV limit. Warner
explained that the 14 Trident II SSBNs, 450 Minuteman silo
launchers, 20 B-2s and 90 B-52Hs, which the United States
currently possessed would be reduced in some manner to reach
whatever overall limit was ultimately agreed between the
sides. This would certainly include eliminations to meet,
for example, a 750 SDV limit and an 850 overall limit on
deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Adm
Kuznetsov indicated that for Russia to meet an overall limit
in the area of 850 would require it to eliminate 150
accumulated older non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.


12. (S) Ilin stated that the Russian side would study the
two U.S. approaches to limiting non-deployed launchers and
request instructions from Moscow.


13. (U) Documents provided. None.


14. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Hanchett
Ab Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev
Adm Kuznetsov
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS