Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1220
2009-12-20 18:20:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1220/01 3541820
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O 201820Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0977
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6036
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3215
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001220 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S.-PROPOSED JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE
TREATY, DECEMBER 19, 2009 (CABLE 1 OF 2 CABLES)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001220

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S.-PROPOSED JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE
TREATY, DECEMBER 19, 2009 (CABLE 1 OF 2 CABLES)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-161.


2. (S) The text at paragraph 3 is the working document from
which the U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will be prepared. The
draft text is dated December 19, 2009. It establishes the
baseline for the next round of negotiations. Because of the
length of the document, text will be sent in separate cables.
This is Cable 1 of 2 cables.


3. Begin text:

SFO-VII
U.S. Proposed
Joint Draft Text
December 19, 2009


TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Believing that global challenges and threats require new
approaches to interaction across the whole range of their
strategic relations,

Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based
on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation,

Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into
alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring to
reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons,

Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the
historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat,

Expressing strong support for global efforts in
non-proliferation,

Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus
to, the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear
arms while maintaining the safety and security of their
nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process
in the future, including to a multilateral approach,

Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced
that measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this
Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus
the security of both Parties,

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms and


that this interrelationship will become more important as
strategic nuclear arms are reduced,

Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs
on strategic stability,

Taking into account the positive effect on the world
situation of the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear
arsenals at the turn of the 21st century,

Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with
the obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and
made less costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as
the START Treaty,

Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of
America, and that the reduction levels envisaged by the
Treaty were achieved,

Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear
disarmament and to strengthening international peace and
security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I


1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive
arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and
shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this
Treaty and its Protocol.


2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol
are provided in Part One of the Protocol.

Article II


1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM
launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM
warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments,
so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance
with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers;

(b) ((1500))1 ((1550))2, for warheads on deployed ICBMs,
warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for
deployed heavy bombers.


2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself


the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

Article III


1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this
Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one unit.

(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one unit.

(c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one
unit.


2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this
Treaty:

(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be
the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and
deployed SLBMs.

(b) For each deployed heavy bomber, the number of
nuclear armaments shall be ((three))1 ((one))2 warhead((s))1.


3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs
and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of
a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM
of that type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters,
an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered
to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an
assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch
canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that
type.

(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain
an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at
which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it until an ICBM or
SLBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM or SLBM has
been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister
shall not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it
contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on
static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a
particular type shall be distinguishable from launch
canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.


4. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to
be subject to this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM when it first leaves a production facility;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a
production facility;



(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is
first installed and closed;

(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that
launcher is installed is first launched;

(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when
its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or
building in which components of such a heavy bomber are
assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe
is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which
existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber
airframes.


5. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and
deployed heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to this
Treaty in accordance with procedures provided for in Parts
Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMS or
SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this
Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type for such an
ICBM or SLBM have been eliminated or converted in accordance
with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.


6. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested
solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the
surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a
ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty
apply.

(b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(c) Heavy bombers of ((a given))1 ((the same))2 type
shall cease to be subject to ((the limitations of))2 this
Treaty when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments of that type is either eliminated or converted to a
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance
with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.


7. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman
II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M,
RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24.

(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52,
RSM-54, and RSM-56;

(ii) for the United States of America, the Trident
II.


(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the B-52G,
B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and
Tu-160.

(d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers
are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers
RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50,
RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;

(ii) for the United States of America, ICBM
launchers Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the
SLBM launcher Trident II.

Article IV


1. Each Party shall locate:

(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;

(b) deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic
missile submarines.


2. Each Party shall base deployed heavy bombers only at air
bases.

((3. Each Party shall limit deployed and non-deployed
launchers of ICBMs and deployed and non-deployed launchers of
SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this
Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number of such launchers
does not exceed 800.))1

((4))1 ((3.))2 Each Party shall locate:

(a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases,
production facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities,
conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities,
test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile launchers
of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance
facilities of ICBM bases.

(b) non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs only at ICBM bases,
submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance
facilities of ICBM bases, repair facilities for ICBMs or
SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or
elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training
facilities, test ranges, space launch facilities, and
production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs,
however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of
ICBM bases or at submarine bases.

((5.))1 ((4.))2 Non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs as well as
non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit.
Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between
facilities to no more than 30 days.

((6.))1 ((5.))2 Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be
located only at test ranges.



((7.))1 ((6.))2 Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be
located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test
ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at
each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed
one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

((8.))1((7))2 Each Party shall limit the number of test
heavy bombers to no more than ten.

((9.))1((8))2 Test heavy bombers shall be based only at
heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities
for heavy bombers.

((9. Each Party undertakes not to carry out joint basing of
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at an air base,
unless the Parties agree otherwise.))2


10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at
eliminated facilities except during their movement through
such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such
facilities.


11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall
not be based outside the national territory of each Party.
The obligations of this paragraph shall not affect the
Parties' rights under generally recognized principles and
rules of international law relating to the passage of
submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of
submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be
temporarily located outside the national territory,
notification of which shall be provided in accordance with
Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article V


1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization
and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried
out.


2. The Parties agree that modernization and replacement of
their strategic offensive arms ((as nuclear weapon delivery
vehicles))1 may ((only))1 involve ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy
bombers.


3. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic
offensive arms is emerging, that Party shall have the right
to raise the question for consideration in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission in accordance with subparagraph (a)
of Article ((XIV))1 ((XII))2 of the Treaty.

((4. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or SLBM
launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors
therein. Each Party further undertakes not to convert or use
launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of
ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to
ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this
Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors
therein.))2

((Article VI



1. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles shall be based only in re stricted areas. A re
stricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size
and shall not overlap another re stricted area. No more than
ten deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles may be based or located in a re stricted area. A re
stricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for mobile
launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.


2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for
mobile launchers of ICBMs within each re stricted area so
that these structures shall not be capable of containing more
mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of mobile launchers
of ICBMs specified for that re stricted area.


3. Each re stricted area shall be located within a
deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000
square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another
deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more
than one ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs.


4. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles may leave re stricted areas only for routine
movements, or relocations. Deployed mobile launchers of
ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment
areas only for relocations. Prior to the departure of
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles from re stricted areas or deployment areas for
purposes other than those specified in this paragraph, the
Parties shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission to agree upon any additional measures
that may be necessary.


5. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more
than 15 percent of the total number of deployed mobile
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such
launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is
greater, may be outside re stricted areas at any one time for
the purpose of relocation.))1

Article ((VII))1 ((VI))2


1. Conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from
accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities
shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the
Protocol to this Treaty.


2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or
other means of removal from accountability shall be provided
in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to
this Treaty.


3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance
with this Treaty shall be carried out by:

(a) national technical means of verification in
accordance with Article IX of this Treaty; and,

(b) inspection((s))2 ((activities))1 as provided for in
Article XI of this Treaty.

Article ((VIII))1 ((VII))2



1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this
Treaty is set forth in Part Two of its Protocol, in which
data specified for items subject to the provisions of this
Treaty are listed according to categories of data.


2. Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in
such data and shall provide other notifications provided for
in the Protocol to this Treaty, in order to ensure the
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty.


3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise
provided for in this Treaty.


4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a
voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified
in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to
ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed
under this Treaty.

((5. Each Party shall have the right to release to the
public or a third party the information from the initial
exchange of data described in paragraph 2, Section I, Part 2
of the Protocol, which shall be listed in Part Two of the
Protocol and associated Annexes, as well as any photographs
appended thereto, except as otherwise provided in this
Article. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing
to the public data and other information provided pursuant to
this Article or received in fulfilling the obligations
provided for in this Treaty.))1

((6.))1 ((5))2 Geographic coordinates ((relating to data
contained in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty))2,
((unique identifiers,))1 site diagrams ((provided by the
Parties pursuant to this Treaty))2, and coastlines and waters
diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty
shall not be released to the public, unless otherwise agreed
by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.

((6. Each Party may release to the public data and other
information of which it becomes aware in the course of
implementation of this Treaty, subject to the consent of the
other Party. The Parties shall consult within the framework
of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on release to the
public of such data and information, including data on
aggregate numbers of warheads.))2

((7. The aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, on
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear armaments for deployed heavy
bombers, as stated in subparagraph (b)of Article II, may be
released to the public. All other nuclear warhead data shall
not be released to the public or any third party unless
otherwise agreed by the Parties.))1

Article ((IX))1 ((VIII))2

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this
Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness and predictability
concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive arms, in those cases where, in the estimation of
one of the Parties, ambiguous situations may arise, that
Party shall take measures, including providing information in


advance, inter alia through diplomatic channels, on
activities being conducted with respect to strategic
offensive arms, which are associated with their deployment or
increasing readiness, so as to preclude the possibility of
misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party.

Article ((X))1 ((IX))2

By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on
((test))1 launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a
parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of
exchange of such telemetric information.

Article ((XI))1 ((X))2


1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) to use national technical means of verification at
its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally
recognized principles of international law;

(b) not to interfere with the national technical means
of verification of the other Party operating in accordance
with this Article; and

(c) not to use concealment measures that impede
verification, by national technical means of verification, of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.


2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes
the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including
measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM
launchers , or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and
their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use
concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment
practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use
of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

((3. The Parties shall provide notification no later than 48
hours in advance of the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from
production facilities for solid fuel ICBMs and SLBMs. For the
purpose of this paragraph, such production facilities are,
for the Russian Federation, the Votkinsk production facility,
and for the United States, (to be provided). Such
notifications shall identify whether the ballistic missile is
an ICBM or SLBM, and shall include the unique identifier, the
destination of such ICBMs and SLBMs and the estimated time of
arrival.))1

((4. To aid verification, each ICBM, SLBM, ICBM launcher, and
deployed heavy bomber shall have a unique identifier as
provided for in Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.))1

Article ((XII))1 ((XI))2


1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared
data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and
ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspection activities in accordance with this Article and
Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.



2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at
ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases for deployed heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The purpose of such
inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data
on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number
of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and
the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy
bombers. Such inspection activities shall hereinafter be
referred to as Type One inspections.


3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at
facilities identified as facilities subject to inspection in
Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty except for the
facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Article. The
purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy
of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical
characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms
subject to this Treaty ((and to confirm that strategic
offensive arms have been converted or eliminated))2.

In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections at formerly declared facilities ((subject to this
Treaty))2, which are listed in Part Two of the Protocol to
this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being
used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

The inspection activities set forth in this paragraph shall
hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections.


4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right
to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party.
The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate
distinguishing features and to confirm technical
characteristics of new types, to demonstrate the results of
conversion of the first item of each type ((and to confirm
the conversion or elimination))1 of strategic offensive arms
subject to this Treaty.

((Article XIII


1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means
of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a
request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the
Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative
measures:

(a) a display in the open of the mobile launchers of
ICBMs located within each re stricted area of one ICBM base
specified by the requesting Party with the exception of those
mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in routine movement. For
each specified ICBM base, the roofs of fixed structures for
mobile launchers of ICBMs in all re stricted areas at that
base shall be open for the duration of a display. The mobile
launchers of ICBMs located within the re stricted areas shall
be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of
such fixed structures. Those mobile launchers of ICBMs at
the base specified by the requesting Party that will not be
displayed due to routine movement shall be specified by the
requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with
paragraph XX of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such
a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after
the request for display has been made;



(b) a display in the open of all deployed heavy bombers
located within one air base specified by the requesting
Party, except those heavy bombers that are not readily
movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers
shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its
fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the
air base. Those deployed heavy bombers at the air base
specified by the requesting Party that are not readily
movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified
by the requested Party in a notification provided in
accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification
Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later
than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.


2. Mobile launchers of ICBMs and deployed heavy bombers
subject to each equest pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
Article sall be displayed in open view without using
concalment measures. Each Party shall have the right t
make five such requests each year, but shall not request a
display at any particular ICBM base for mobile launchers of
ICBMs, or any particular air base more than one time each
year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single
request, only a display of mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a
display of deployed heavy bombers. A display shall begin no
later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall
continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the
request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a
display due to circumstances brought about by force majeure,
it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in
accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification
Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a
case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is
entitled shall not be reduced.


3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for
a facility that has been designated for inspection until such
an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have
departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative
measures have been requested shall not be
designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have
been completed or until notification has been provided in
accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification
Protocol.))1

Article ((XIV))1 ((XII))2

To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),procedures for the
operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol
to this Treaty, to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the
obligations assumed;

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this
Treaty; and

(c) resolve questions related to the application of
((relevant))1 ((the))2 provisions of this Treaty to a new
kind of strategic offensive arm((, after notification has


been provided in accordance with paragraph TBD of Section TBD
of Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty))1.

Article ((XV))1((XIII))2

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty,
each Party shall not assume any international obligations or
undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The
Parties undertake not to transfer strategic offensive arms
subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall
hold consultations in accordance with Article ((XIII))1
((XII))2 of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities
that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not
apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations,
in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time
of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third
State.

(( ))1 Proposed by the United States
(( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation


4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS