START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) U.S.-PROPOSED JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE
PROTOCOL, DECEMBER 19, 2009 (CABLE 12 OF 12 CABLES)

REF: A. GENEVA 1208 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 1 OF 12 CABLES)

B. GENEVA 1209 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 2 OF 12 CABLES)

C. GENEVA 1210 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 3 OF 12 CABLES)

D. GENEVA 1211 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 4 OF 12 CABLES)

E. GENEVA 1212 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 5 OF 12 CABLES)

F. GENEVA 1213 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 6 OF 12 CABLES)

G. GENEVA 1214 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 7 OF 12 CABLES)

H. GENEVA 1215 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 8 OF 12 CABLES)

I. GENEVA 1216 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 9 OF 12 CABLES)

J. GENEVA 1217 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 10 OF 12
CABLES)

K. GENEVA 1218 (SFO-GVA-VII-162 CABLE 11 OF 12
CABLES)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-162.


2. (S) The text at Paragraph 3 is the working document from
which the U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text of the Protocol to
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms dated December 19,
2009 will be prepared. It establishes the baseline for the
next round of the negotiations. Because of the length of the
document, text will be sent as separate cables. This is
Cable 12 of 12 cables.


3. (S) Begin text:

PART SIX - BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Conforming Group
JDT
December 8, 2009


Section I. Composition of the Commission


1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party through
diplomatic channels the names of its designated Commissioner
and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission no later than 30
days after ((signature))1 ((entry into force))2 of the Treaty.


2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a
session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members,
advisors, and experts. A session of the Commission may be
convened without the participation of the Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual
provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative
of a Party to a session of the Commission.


3. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working
groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in
paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific
questions raised in the Commission.

Section II. Convening a Session of the Commission


1. A session of the Commission shall be convened at the
request of either Party. No later than 15 days after


receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a
response. Requests and responses shall include the following:

(a) the questions that the Party intends to raise,

(b) the name of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner,
or the head representative of the Party; and

(c) the proposed, accepted or alternate date and
location for the convening of the session.

Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other
Party prior to the convening of the session.

No fewer than two sessions of the Commission shall be
convened each year, unless otherwise agreed.


2. A session of the Commission shall be convened not later
than 45 days after the date proposed in the request provided
for in paragraph 1 of this Section.


3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva,
Switzerland, and shall remain in session for no more than 15
days, unless otherwise agreed.


4. The Commissioners of the Parties may communicate with
each other during the intersessional period in order to
clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions.

Section III. Agenda


1. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist
of those questions that the Parties have included in the
communications provided to each other in accordance with
paragraph 1 of Section II of this Part.


2. Each Party shall have the right to raise in the
Commission questions that arise during a session of the
Commission; provided, however, that consideration of such
questions during the current session shall be subject to
agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the
Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of
such questions for preparation and any changes in the
composition of their delegations that are required.

Section IV. Work of the Commission

The work of the Commission shall be confidential, except
as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may
record ((agreements))1 ((arrangements))2 or the results of
its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in
two originals, each in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not
be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission.

Section V. Costs

Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in
the work of the Commission.

Section VI. Communications

Communications in accordance with this Part shall be


provided through diplomatic channels; or through the Nuclear
Risk Reduction Centers of the Parties.

Section VII. Additional Procedures ((and Provisional
Application))1

((1.))1 The Parties shall have the right to agree upon
additional procedures governing the operation of the
Commission.

((2. The provisions of Article XIII of the Treaty and the
provisions of this Part shall apply provisionally from the
date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period,
unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision
to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of
Article XIII of the Treaty and the provisions of this
Protocol; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application
for additional periods, subject to the same conditions
specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.


3. The provisions of Article XIII of the Treaty and the
provisions of this Part shall apply provisionally in light of
and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.))1

PART SEVEN - TELEMETRY
((General Obligations))1

((1.))1 ((For a three-year period, b))2 ((B))1eginning
((at))1 entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall
exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on ((no
more than))2 five flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs per year.
((2. Each Party shall provide telemetry on any five of seven
test flights selected by the monitoring Party from a list
provided by each Party, as specified in the Notifications
Part of this Protocol, at the beginning of each year of all
ICBM and SLBM flight test planned for that year.


3. If a test flight on which telemetric information is to be
exchanged is not conducted, then telemetric data shall be
exchanged for another of the test flights, as specified in
the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol.


4. In the event a Party conducts less than 5 test flights
during a calendar year, it will provide telemetry on all test
flights except one test flight that it chooses to exclude
from this requirement.))1

((In addition, if Trident II SLBM launches take place on
behalf of Great Britain, telemetric information about them
shall be included in the annual quota of the U.S. side.))2
((4. Prior to the three-year anniversary of entry into force
of this Treaty, the Parties shall review,))1((After three
years of treaty implementation, the sides shall consider the
conditions and method of further telemetric information
exchange on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs))2 within the
framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission((, the
results of the telemetric information exchange and shall


decide whether to modify the telemetric information exchange
on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs and prototypes of ICBMs
and SLBMs. Unless the Parties agree otherwise in the BCC,
the exchange shall continue as specified in this Part and in
the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol))1.

((5. The Parties agree to the following for flight tests of
ICBMs and SLBMs and prototypes of ICBMs and SLBMs on which
telemetry shall be exchanged:
a) Telemetry shall be broadcast without data denial
techniques;
b) The notification of the flight test shall include
the frequency and modulation of the telemetric information;
c) Telemetric information broadcast during the test
flight shall be exchanged on recording media; and
d) Information shall be exchanged to interpret the
telemetric information and, if the telemetric information
broadcast during the test flight is encrypted, information to
unencrypted the telemetric information.))1

((6. The exchanges of information required by paragraph 5
above shall be conducted as specified in the Annex on
Telemetric Information to this Protocol.))1

((The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out
for an equal number of flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs
conducted by the Parties, and in an agreed amount.))2

PART EIGHT - PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

As of November 30, 2009

The Parties agree to apply the following provisions of the
Treaty and Protocol provisionally from the date of signature
of the Treaty pending the entry into force of the Treaty:

(TO BE DETERMINED)

(a) Treaty Articles
(i) Article xx
(ii) Article xx
(iii) Article xx
(iv) ...

(b) Protocol
(i) Part xx of this Protocol
(A) ...
(B) ...

(ii) The following portions of Part xx of this Protocol
(A) ...
(B) ...

PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS

SFO-GVA-VII
U.S. Proposed JDT
December 19, 2009

Protocol to the Treaty

U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) Converted from SSBNs


Fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that((, other
than the provisions contained herein,))1 the U.S. guided
missile submarines, known to the United States of America as
"SSGNs" and to the Russian Federation as "PLARK",(( shall not
be subject to the provisions of the Treaty.))1 ((shall be
subject to the Treaty, taking into consideration the
provisions of this document.))2

In order to provide assurances that all four SSGNs of the
United States of America are incapable of launching SLBMs,
the following provisions shall apply to such submarines:

(a) No later than three years after entry into force of the
Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct an initial
one-time exhibition of each of the four SSGNs. The purpose
of such exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on
such submarines are incapable of launching an SLBM. The
procedures for the exhibition shall be consistent with the
procedures for the exhibition of the conversion of an SLBM
launcher in accordance with Part Three and Part Five of this
Protocol.

(b) Subsequent to the completion of the initial exhibitions,
the United States of America shall also provide periodic
opportunities for the Russian Federation to confirm that none
of the four SSGNs have been reconverted to make them capable
of launching SLBMs. In order to provide assurances that an
SSGN has not been re-converted and that the launchers on such
a submarine are incapable of launching an SLBM, the Russian
Federation shall have the right, while conducting a Type One
inspection, to inspect the designated launcher((s))2 of each
converted SSGN if such a submarine is located at the
designated submarine base during the period of inspection.
The number of such inspections shall not exceed a total of
six, during the duration of the Treaty, for all four
converted SSGNs existing at the time of entry into force of
the Treaty, and shall not exceed two inspections for each
SSGN.

(c) The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be
consistent with the procedures for conducting an inspection
of an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM, in
accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, with the
following modifications:

(i) The SSGNs at the designated submarine base shall be
subject to pre-inspection re strictions specified in
paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol and
shall be subject to inspection. After pre-inspection re
strictions have been implemented, no temporary shelters, each
of which obstructs the viewing of four SSGN launchers, shall
be installed. If such temporary shelters were installed prior
to the implementation of pre-inspection re strictions, the
SSGN launchers under these shelters shall not be subject to
inspection. The total of SSGN launchers obstructed from
viewing because they are under such shelters on a single SSGN
shall not exceed eight launchers.

(ii) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the
submarine base, and in addition to the provisions contained
in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a
member of the in-country escort shall provide written
information on the number of SSGNs subject to inspection


under the terms of this Agreed Statement and the number of
launchers on those submarines.

(iii) The location of each SSGN subject to
pre-inspection re strictions shall be annotated on the
coastline and waters diagram.

(iv) The inspection team leader shall have the right to
designate ((one))1((two))2 SSGN launcher((s))2 for
inspection, if such launchers are located on submarines
located at that base, instead of ((one non-deployed SLBM
launcher or one deployed SLBM launcher))1 ((one non-deployed
SLBM launcher))2 as specified in subparagraph 6 (b) of
Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol.

(v) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate
to the inspectors that the designated launcher is incapable
of launching an SLBM.

(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded
in the official inspection report.

(d) If the United States of America converts other SSBNs
into SSGN guided missile submarines, such SSGNs shall be
subject to the measures specified in this Agreed Statement,
and an additional number of inspections will be agreed
between the Parties within the framework of the BCC.

As of December 3, 2009
SFO-GVA-VII
U.S. Proposed JDT
December 19, 2009

Protocol to the Treaty

Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers

First Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that((, other
than the provisions contained herein))1, after completion of
the conversion of the final B-1B heavy bomber, ((B-1B heavy
bombers shall not be subject to the provisions of the
Treaty.))1 ((B-1B heavy bombers shall be subject to the
Treaty based on the provisions provided for in this
document.))2

In order to provide assurance that the B-1B heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments remain incapable of
employing nuclear armaments, the following procedures shall
apply thereafter to such B-1B heavy bombers:

(a) No later than one year after entry into force of the
Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct a one-time
exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments to demonstrate it is incapable of employing nuclear
armaments. The procedures for such an exhibition shall be
consistent with the procedures for a heavy bomber conversion
exhibition as provided for in Part Three of the Protocol of
the Treaty. Following the exhibition, the distinguishing
features that differentiate a heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armaments from a heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments shall be recorded in the official report of
that exhibition and shall be applied thereafter for
identification of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for


non-nuclear armaments.

(b) The United States will notify the Russian Federation
that Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Dyess Air
Force Base, Texas, have been eliminated when all the B-1B
heavy bombers based there have been converted to heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(c) Such eliminated facilities where converted B-1B heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based may be
inspected as formerly declared facilities. Such inspections
shall fall within the annual quota for Type Two inspections
established in accordance within Section VII of Part Five of
this Protocol. Moreover, no more than one such inspection at
one of the two B-1B bases may be conducted each year. This
inspection may be used to demonstrate that the converted B-1B
heavy bomber remains incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

(d) The procedures for the conduct of such an inspection
shall be in accordance with Section VIII of Part Three and
Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modified Type
One inspection procedures:

(i) At the point of entry, which for such an inspection
is Travis Air Force Base, California, the inspection team
that has designated either Ellsworth Air Force Base or Dyess
Air Force for a formerly declared facility inspection will be
informed of the number of B-1B heavy bombers currently
located at the base. If less than 50 percent of such heavy
bombers based at that base are present, the inspection team
leader shall have the right to:

(A) inform the member of the in-country escort that
the inspection of the designated base shall take place; or

(B) designate another inspection site associated
with the same point of entry; or

(C) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the
territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of
such inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled
shall not be reduced.

(ii) Upon arrival at the eliminated facility, the
in-country escort team lead shall provide an annotated site
diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B heavy
bombers that are present at the base;

(iii) After pre-inspection procedures have been
completed, the leader of the team attending the inspection
will designate no more than three B-1B heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments for inspection;

(iv) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect
each of the three designated B-1B heavy bombers to confirm
that those heavy bombers remain incapable of employing
nuclear armaments; and

(v) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded
in the official inspection report.

(e) If, after the completion of the conversion of all B-1B
heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear


armaments, during a Type One inspection being conducted at an
air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments,
B-1B heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are
present when pre-inspection movement re strictions are
implemented, those heavy bombers shall not be subject to the
Type One inspection.

(f) If the United States decides to convert all of another
type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, in
accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, into heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, those converted
heavy bombers shall also be subject to the aforementioned
verification measures.

SFO-GVA-VII
U.S. Proposed JDT
December 19, 2009

Protocol to the Treaty

Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments
and Heavy Bombers Equipped Non-Nuclear Armaments

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that,
notwithstanding the provisions provided for in paragraph 8 of
Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to
carry out joint basing at an air base of heavy bombers of a
type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the
same type converted in accordance with the provisions of Part
Three of this Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments until the last of them is converted
into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(a) Before completion of conversion of the last such heavy
bomber of a type equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy
bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments,
all heavy bombers located at an air base may be inspected.
In this connection, inspections with respect to heavy bombers
declared during pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for
nuclear armaments shall be conducted within the established
annual inspection quota in accordance with the provisions of
Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol (Type One
inspections). At the same time, within one and the same
inspection heavy bombers declared to be equipped for
non-nuclear armaments may be inspected to confirm that they
have not been converted into heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments.

(b) The inspection procedures for an air base of heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and converted heavy
bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments
shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this
Protocol, with the following modified Type One inspection
procedures:

(i) At the point of entry, if the inspection team has
designated such an air base for inspection, the provisions
specified in paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this
Protocol shall apply to deployed heavy bombers. The
inspection team shall also be informed of the number of heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments currently located
at that base.


(ii) The heavy bombers equipped for both nuclear and
non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be
subject to the pre-inspection re strictions specified in
paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol.

(iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to
the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part
Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort
shall provide written information on the number and types of
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at that air
base at the time pre-inspection re strictions went into
effect. In addition, a member of the in-country escort shall
add to the site diagram the locations of each such declared
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been
completed, the inspection team leader shall designate no more
than three heavy bombers ((equipped for nuclear armaments))2
depicted on the site diagram for inspection.

(v) In addition to the rights specified in paragraph
((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol,
the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, if so
designated, no more than ((one))1((three))2 heavy
bomber((s))1 equipped for non-nuclear armaments to confirm
that the bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear
armaments.

(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded
in the official inspection report.

(((d) The application of this Agreed Statement with respect
to each specific type of heavy bombers shall be agreed within
the BCC.))2

SFO-GVA-VII
U.S. Proposed JDT
December 19, 2009

Protocol to the Treaty

Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments
and Heavy Bombers Equipped Non-Nuclear Armaments

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that,

notwithstanding the provisions provided for in paragraph 8 of
Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to
carry out joint basing at an air base of heavy bombers of a
type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the
same type converted in accordance with the provisions of Part
Three of this Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments until the last of them is converted
into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(a) Before completion of conversion of the last such heavy
bomber of a type equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy
bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments,
all heavy bombers located at an air base may be inspected.
In this connection, inspections with respect to heavy bombers
declared during pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for
nuclear armaments shall be conducted within the established
annual inspection quota in accordance with the provisions of
Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol (Type One


inspections). At the same time, within one and the same
inspection heavy bombers declared to be equipped for
non-nuclear armaments may be inspected to confirm that they
have not been converted into heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments.

(b) The inspection procedures for an air base of heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and converted heavy
bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments
shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this
Protocol, with the following modified Type One inspection
procedures:

(i) At the point of entry, if the inspection team has
designated such an air base for inspection, the provisions
specified in paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this
Protocol shall apply to deployed heavy bombers. The
inspection team shall also be informed of the number of heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments currently located
at that base.

(ii) The heavy bombers equipped for both nuclear and
non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be
subject to the pre-inspection re strictions specified in
paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol.

(iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to
the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part
Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort
shall provide written information on the number and types of
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at that air
base at the time pre-inspection re strictions went into
effect. In addition, a member of the in-country escort shall
add to the site diagram the locations of each such declared
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been
completed, the inspection team leader shall designate no more
than three heavy bombers ((equipped for nuclear armaments))2
depicted on the site diagram for inspection.

(v) In addition to the rights specified in paragraph
((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol,
the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, if so
designated, no more than ((one))1((three))2 heavy
bomber((s))1 equipped for non-nuclear armaments to confirm
that the bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear
armaments.

(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded
in the official inspection report.

(((d) The application of this Agreed Statement with respect
to each specific type of heavy bombers shall be agreed within
the BCC.))2

SFO-GVA-VII
U.S. Proposed JDT
December 19, 2009

Protocol to the Treaty

Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or



Elimination Facility
Located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona

Third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that,
notwithstanding the definition of the terms "air base" and
"deployed heavy bomber" in Part One of this Protocol, and
paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, heavy bombers
awaiting conversion or elimination at Davis-Monthan AFB,
Arizona shall be considered deployed heavy bombers until such
time as they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments or eliminated.

Other Agreed statements

Rapid reload ??

PART TEN - GENERAL PROVISIONS

As of December 3, 2009


1. The Parties may agree to Annexes that shall contain
procedures for the implementation of this Protocol. These
Annexes shall be an integral part of this Protocol.


2. This Protocol shall be subject to and governed by the
Treaty and is an integral part thereof. This Protocol shall
enter into force on the date of entry into force of the
Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty
remains in force.

Done at on , in two
originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both
texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:
OF AMERICA:

(( ))1 Proposed by the United States
(( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation

End text.


4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS