Identifier
Created
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Origin
09GENEVA1205
2009-12-20 14:59:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1205/01 3541459
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O 201459Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001205 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, DECEMBER 12, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001205

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, DECEMBER 12, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-127.


2. (U) Meeting Dates: December 12, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva and
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired
by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met twice on
December 12 to review and clarify remaining points of
contention in Sections IV, VI, and VIII of Part Five of the
Protocol and Article XI. Discussion during the morning
session focused on the parameters and guidelines for
inspections, with particular focus on inspections of heavy
bomber bases, the breadth of inspections of mobile ICBM
bases, conversion issues associated with B-1B and SSGNs, and
related matters.


4. (S) The Parties then discussed exhibitions. During this
phase, the Russian side appeared to clarify that it would
declare the RS-24 as a "new type," though Ilin pulled back on
this statement by deferring to the Presidential conversation.
Ilin also said that it was "unlikely" that Russia would
build new silo launchers during the life of the treaty. The
sides also agreed to generalize references to strategic
offensive arms (SOA) and the U.S. side pushed for a
"batching" concept associated with eliminations.


5. (S) In the afternoon session, the sides also agreed to
generalize across ICBM types the minimum number of launchers
required for an inspection. In Article XI, the sides worked

to remove specific listings of types and facilities and to
shift them to appropriate parts of the Protocol, though it
was not clear whether the Russian side agreed to a full
listing of these objects in the Protocol. The sides also
differed on the specifics of heavy bomber movement
notifications and discussed beginning work to reach agreement
on selected parts of the annex, without agreement.


6. (S) During informal conversations during breaks, the
Russian side stated that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was
playing an "active role" in guiding the Russian delegation.
The Russians also provided some information on Defense
Minister Serdyukov. End Summary.


7. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section IV: Activities Beginning
Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry; Section VIII -
Exhibitions and Existing Types; Afternoon Session, Section
IV; The Political Dynamics Guiding the Russian Delegation;
Article XI, Heavy Bomber Notifications; and Annexes.

--------------
SECTION IV: ACTIVITIES BEGINNING
UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY


--------------


8. (S) The meeting began with a review of the previous day's
discussion on Article XI. Ilin regarded the debate as "not
fruitful," but admitted that some of the U.S. points were
valid. In that light, the Russian side had revised their
proposed version of Article XI, and handed over copies.


9. (S) The discussion then turned to Section VI of Part Five
of the Protocol. The chapeau was agreed as written. For
paragraph 1, the sides discussed whether there was a need for
a complete list of what would be subject to Type One and Type
Two inspections. Debate also took place on the parameters of
the agreed statement for B-1Bs; the U.S. side reported that
it was working on a joint draft text (JDT) of the statement.
Warner made clear that the United States would not
characterize heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments
as "non-deployed" heavy bombers and that the B-1Bs to only
conventional weapons carriage would be removed from treaty
accountability. The non-deployed category could, in his
view, include heavy bombers at flight test centers,
maintenance depots, those at storage areas, and those
awaiting elimination. The definition would depend, he
continued, on settlement regarding the central limits,
especially on whether there would be some form of limit on
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.


10. (S) For paragraph 2, the sides noted continued
dissension on the number of annual permitted inspections. In
light of the recent Russian proposal, the sides agreed to
U.S. language on "no more than two facilities being inspected
each year." Paragraph 3 was agreed.


11. (S) With respect to paragraph 4, Col Petrov and Warner
discussed the implications of changing the pre-inspection
movement re strictions. Warner noted that these re
strictions would remain the same under the revised approach,
but simply be moved forward in time.


12. (S) Warner reported that the United States would remove
its proposed paragraph 5 on concentration/recall upon
agreement regarding key elements of Section IV.


13. (S) For paragraph 6, the sides agreed to a number of
wording changes, including using the term "data" instead of
"information" and dropping a specific reference to mobile
ICBMs.


14. (S) For paragraph 7(a) regarding data provided during
inspections of ICBM bases, the sides agreed to drop a
specific requirement for information on mobile ICBM launchers
and generalize this requirement within a broader reference to
ICBM launchers. The U.S. delegation also agreed to clarify
its proposed sentence stipulating that escorts should only
provide information on mobile ICBM launchers within the
basing areas and maintenance area. On Paragraph 7(b) on
inspections of submarine bases, the sides agreed that
resolution of standing differences would depend upon
agreement on the agreed statement on SSGNs.


15. (S) For paragraph 7(c) regarding inspections of heavy
bases, the sides discussed notifications of heavy bomber
movements. Warner emphasized that the most detailed the


United States would be prepared to include in movement
notifications of heavy bombers to locations outside U.S.
territory would be to indicate the theater or continent where
they were temporarily located. Ilin pushed for more clarity,
down to the individual country level. Though no agreement
was reached, Warner volunteered to try another formulation.


16. (S) For paragraph 8(a) on the number of deployed ICBM
launchers to be selected for nuclear warhead inspection, the
U.S. side argued for the ability to designate two such
launchers, while the Russian side advocated for only one.
The issue was not resolved.


17. (S) Petrov then asked for a fuller explanation of the
U.S. vision for Type One inspections at mobile ICBM bases.
Mr. Rust explained that the U.S. proposal would be for the
inspectors to designate one or two mobile ICBM launchers for
nuclear warhead inspection and possibly one empty fixed
structure, which could be substituted for one of the deployed
mobile ICBMs. In addition, inspectors would be able to
inspect the maintenance facility at the base along the lines
provided for during a data update inspection under START. In
addition, the inspectors would enjoy the right to inspect a
designated basing/re stricted area, which would be inspected,
as under START, to confirm the number of deployed mobile
ICBMs in that area, including the right to inspect structures
large enough to contain the given reference cylinder
representing the size of a mobile ICBM.


18. (S) Discussion ensued about the merits of inspectors
having the right to effectively inspect two separate basing
areas and the distinctions in procedures between the two
inspections. Ilin argued that the inspectors should only be
able to go through a single re stricted basing area, because
such inspections were burdensome for the affected base.
Warner agreed to consider limiting inspections to a single re
stricted basing area.


19. (S) After noting that the inspection rights for
submarine bases would reflect the outcome of the SSGN agreed
statement discussion, the sides turned to the question of
inspections of heavy bomber air bases. Warner stated that
the United States could not discuss subjecting more than
three heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to
inspections. He also made clear that, while Russian
inspectors would be able to inspect B-2As and B-52Gs, B-1Bs
converted for non-nuclear armaments would not be liable to
inspection, explaining that the maintenance and
administrative burdens associated with offering these B-1Bs
to inspection would be too onerous. Ilin replied that, in
light of the long-standing disputes about the sufficiency of
B-1B conversion procedures, "many in Moscow" believed that
the proposed U.S. conversion procedures offered for START
Follow-on were insufficient to allay concerns that the B-1Bs
could be reconverted to support nuclear use. He contended
that allowing B-1Bs to be inspected would provide additional
assurance against such reconversion fears. Warner responded
that Russia could use short-notice Type Two inspections to
view Dyess and Ellsworth Air Force Bases, and elaborated on
the proposed U.S. agreed statement on B-1Bs. Ilin stated
that resolution of the issue would depend upon finalization
of the agreed statement.



20. (S) The sides agreed that paragraph 10 on inspectors
rights to read unique identifiers would need to await
decision at the leadership level; the Russian side continued
to refuse to accept this provision


21. (S) For paragraphs 12-15, on what inspectors would be
able to inspect at the various bases, the sides agreed that
the remaining issues therein would depend upon higher-level
decisions. They noted that the remaining key issues
included: whether inspectors could designate two or only a
single deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs at ICBM and
submarines bases for nuclear warhead inspection; the SSGN
matter; recall/concentration requirements for mobile ICBMs;
and definitions for deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.


22. (S) For paragraph 16 on placing covers over reentry
vehicles prior to nuclear warhead inspections, Warner
reaffirmed that the United States would not alter its
position regarding the manner for handling the hard covers
used for Trident II/D5 nuclear warhead inspections. A
discussion ensued on the applicability of the "individual"
cover proposal of the Russian side. Warner commented that it
was critically important that covers not be permitted to
hamper the counting of individual re-entry vehicles as stated
in the paragraph being discussed. Warner stated that the
United States was not prepared to withdraw its position on
measuring covers and suggested that the sides maintain the
brackets, noting that many of the issues would need to be
addressed in the annexes.


23. (S) The Russian side then proposed shifting provisions
for eliminated facilities from Article V to the inspection
sections of the Protocol. Warner pledged to consult with the
U.S. members of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group
and respond later to the Russian proposal.

--------------
SECTION VIII - EXHIBITIONS AND EXISTING TYPES
--------------


24. (S) Turning to Section VIII on exhibitions, the Russian
delegation made clear its opposition to any singling out of
mobile ICBM systems. During the discussions, the Russian
side also commented that it was "not likely" that Russia
would create new silos during the lifetime of the treaty.
The sides also discussed the question of whether existing
launcher types would need to be exhibited. (Begin comment:
The underlying issue here was whether, if the Russian side
declared the RS-24 an existing type as of signature, it would
have to conduct a technical characteristics exhibition on
that ICBM. End comment.) The Russian side also floated the
notion that exhibitions were not obligatory. Warner
therefore noted that the Russian side had not been clear
regarding what systems it would declare at signature as
existing types. For instance, he said, the initial Russian
paper listing existing types of ICBMs did not include the
RS-24, while the latest submission did. Ilin replied that
this was a misunderstanding and stated that Russia would
declare the RS-24 as an existing type of ICBM. After Warner
reminded him of the previous paper, Ilin shifted to stating
that he did not know the outcome and recommended waiting
until Monday after the Presidents had spoken over the
weekend.




25. (S) For paragraph 3, Warner pushed back against the
Russian proposal to refer only to SOA, clarifying that only
three systems could potentially be converted: ICBM
launchers; SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments. ICBMs and SLBMs could not be converted.
Ilin insisted on reference to SOA, and so Warner agreed to
that formulation. Ilin also queried whether B-1B conversion
would fall under this paragraph, and Warner deferred on the
matter to the Conversion or Elimination Working Group.


26. (S) For paragraph 4 on conversion or elimination
exhibitions, Warner explained the batch concept of
elimination exhibitions, whereby the burden on the
eliminating Party could be reduced. Ilin responded that
there was no natural accumulation of eliminated systems at
the elimination facilities. Warner urged the Russian side to
consider the batching approach, especially given that it had
emerged as an informal custom under the START Treaty during
the elimination of mobile ICBMs and their launchers.

--------------
AFTERNOON SESSION, SECTION IV
--------------


27. (S) Turning to Section IV during the afternoon session,
the sides noted agreement on paragraphs 1-5. For paragraph
6, dealing with the number of mobile ICBM launchers available
for an inspection, the Russian side argued for extending the
50 percent floor requirement for the number of deployed
mobile launchers present to all ICBMs (as opposed to the
U.S.-proposed figure of 30 percent). The U.S. side agreed.
The sides also agreed to clarify that the preinspection
movement re strictions would take effect 1 hour after the
designation of the base at the point of entry. The sides also
kept the sequential inspections paragraph in brackets.

-------------- --------------
THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS GUIDING THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION
-------------- --------------


28. (S) Warner then described his understanding of the
agenda for the working group if the Presidents issued
instructions to complete the treaty in short order following
their telephone discussion later that day: first, to reflect
those areas of agreement reached between the Presidents;
second, to solve inspection-specific issues, such as the
number of inspections permitted per year and the inspection
activities to be used to monitor guidelines for elimination;
and, third, to resolve smaller matters. Ilin tellingly
replied, "If we get an impetus, then we shall find a
solution."


29. (S) During a break in the discussions, Warner and Ilin
informally discussed some of the political dynamics in
Russia. Specifically, Warner asked what role Prime Minister
Putin played in guiding the treaty negotiations. Clearly
tight-lipped on the topic, Ilin replied elliptically that
Putin played "an active role" in the negotiations. Warner
also asked the Russian side for background on Russian Defense
Minister Serdyukov. Col Zaitsev described his background as
"hazy," and Ilin noted that he had been the chief Russian tax
official before becoming defense minister but did not know



what he had done before that. The Russian side also
commented that he was "very tough and strict."

--------------
ARTICLE XI
--------------


30. (S) Warner and Ilin asked Mr. Brown and Mr. Lobach to
revise Article XI in order to streamline the text's
specifications of systems subject to Type One and Type Two
inspections and to exhibitions. After consulting with
Lobach, Brown suggested abbreviating paragraphs 2 (Type One
inspections),3 (Type Two inspections),and 4 (exhibitions)
by replacing their listings of systems with references to
Section VI, VII, and VIII of Part Five of the Protocol,
respectively. The only significant step required to
implement this change would be to list the relevant systems
in Section VIII. Ilin responded that the sides should return
to the issue later, but commented that he liked the idea. He
also urged putting more material from Article XI into the
Protocol.


31. (S) Warner then pointed out that if the sides agreed to
remove the lists of facilities from paragraph 3 on Type Two
inspections, they would absolutely need to list them in the
Protocol. Ilin responded that they were in the Memorandum of
Understanding, which should suffice. Warner responded that
that would not be sufficient. Warner explained that the U.S.
side wanted assurances that if the sides were to agree to an
"extremely abbreviated" treaty, then the lists of inspectable
facilities and kinds of SOA being inspected would need to be
included in the Protocol. He noted that this would involve
listing ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments for conversion exhibitions and ICBMS,
SLBMs, ICBM and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers for
elimination exhibitions. For new type exhibitions, the list
would be limited to: ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments, and, as set forth in Part Two of the
Protocol, ICBM launchers. He noted that the last category
would cover mobile ICBM launchers without singling them out
by name. Ilin asked for the list in writing. It was not
clear whether Ilin committed not to shortening the lists in
the Protocol.


32. (S) A short discussion ensued in which Ilin advocated
removing references to specific sections of the Protocol in
the treaty. Brown responded that this was not tenable
because it would create ambiguity. Lobach argued the
reverse. Warner pledged to create a new version of Article
XI based upon the discussions.

--------------
HEAVY BOMBER NOTIFICATIONS
--------------


33. (S) The sides returned briefly to the issue of
notifications of the location of heavy bombers when operating
abroad. The Russian side sought greater specificity in the
location provided by the notification, down to the country
level. Warner pushed back, arguing for only providing
information at the region/continental level. No resolution
was reached.


--------------
ANNEXES
--------------


34. (S) At the close, Warner urged the working group to
begin work on the annexes, specifically 6 and 7. He reasoned
that, if the Presidents gave a "go" signal after their
telephone call later in the day, the group would need to
begin consideration of the annexes the following day. Ilin
was non-committal.


35. (U) Documents provided:

- RUSSIA:

-- Russian Revised Proposal for Article XI


36. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
LTC Leyde
Ms. Pura
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Ms. Zdravecky
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Izrazov
Col Petrov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Voldopolova
Mr. Pogodin (Int for PM Session)


37. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS