START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, DECEMBER 2, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-116.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 2, 2009
Time: 4:05 P.M. to 5:05 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) This was the third meeting to discuss telemetry
provisions to be included in the START Follow-on (SFO treaty.
The U.S. side requested the meeting to present and discuss a
new proposal the United States had provided earlier in the
day to Ambassador Antonov that built on the recently-provided
Russian-proposed treaty text. Mr. Siemon walked through the
proposal and the Russian delegation asked a number of
questions to clarify its understanding. Gen Poznikhir
restated the Russian-proposed concept for inclusion of a
single paragraph in Treaty Article X and the reasons the
Russian delegation found the U.S. proposal unacceptable. End
Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Discussing the U.S. Proposal; Why
the Flight Test Proposal Won't Fly; The Russian Alternative;
and Reporting Out.

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DISCUSSING THE U.S. PROPOSAL
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5. (S) Mr. Siemon explained to Gen Poznikhir that he called
this meeting to review and discuss a new U.S.-proposed
formulation for the treaty article and part of the protocol
containing provisions for the exchange of telemetry data,
which expanded on a Russian-proposed treaty text. Siemon
walked through the text of the proposal, covering the two
paragraphs of the treaty text, the six paragraphs of the part
of the protocol, and the associated notification.


6. (S) Siemon noted the proposal contained many provisions
which were similar to START and the previously-provided U.S.
proposals. He clarified that he had been given the
flexibility to offer up to seven encrypted flight tests each
year, with no more than two of those being ICBM or prototype
ICBM flights and no more than two SLBM or prototype SLBM
flights. He also noted the importance of recording the basic
set of Telemetry Provisions in the telemetry part of the
protocol. Including these provisions in the protocol would
provide basic guidelines to the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC) for defining more detailed procedures while
giving the sides the opportunity to discuss them and make
needed viability and effectiveness changes without having to
go through a re-ratification process in the Senate and the
Duma.


7. (S) Poznikhir commented that the Russian delegation had
read the recent U.S. proposal and compared it with the
Russian-proposed treaty text and previous U.S. proposals. He
noted that in the Russian view the United States was
basically proposing the same thing as it had previously

proposed but in a different form, and that it was taking the
basic Russian proposal for a paragraph in the treaty and
expanding it. He stated that this was not acceptable--a
change of form was not a change of content.


8. (S) Poznikhir noted two substantive changes that the
Russian delegation had observed--one was the lack of a re
striction on transmitting information from the re-entry
vehicle as had been the case in START and in previous
proposals, and the second was a lowering of the allowable
number of encrypted flight tests per year from 11 under START
to 4 in the new proposal. Siemon replied that the intention
was to continue the re striction on encryption of re-entry
vehicle data and that it would be included in the annex. He
also reiterated his new instructions which gave him the
flexibility to increase the number of encrypted flight tests
to seven.

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WHY THE FLIGHT TEST PROPOSAL WON'T FLY
--------------


9. (S) Poznikhir repeated that the U.S. proposal was not
acceptable and asked for answers to questions raised in the
Russian package deal and previous telemetry discussions
concerning data from UK Trident II flight tests and the use
of Russian flight test data in enhancing U.S. missile defense
systems. Siemon replied that these matters had been
discussed before (Refs A and B). While there was no formal
response from the United States yet, he reminded Poznikhir
that he had asked about the possibility of a bilateral
statement on the use of flight test data for missile defense.
He again noted the United States was not in a position to
make commitments for the United Kingdom in a bilateral treaty
between the United States and Russia, but the U.S. delegation
had conducted an initial discussion with UK representatives.


10. (S) Poznikhir restated that he did not wish to discuss
the U.S. proposal and that it was unacceptable. The Russian
position was that its paragraph of treaty text was all it was
asking for--anything beyond that was viewed as unacceptable.
He asked how the United States would envision the terms
"parity" and "mutual agreement" from the first paragraph
being applied in this treaty. Siemon replied that all of the
provisions in the U.S. draft would apply equally to both
Parties.


11. (S) Poznikhir pointed to the provisions for encrypting
two ICBM and two SLBM flights and asked whether a decision by
Russia to conduct 10 flights in a particular year would
require discussion in the BCC. When Siemon replied that the
limit would be seven encrypted flight tests, Poznikhir noted
that the Russian proposal would allow four encrypted flights
of each type each year. Siemon remarked that Presidents
Obama and Medvedev had discussed telemetry during a Monday
telephone conversation. President Obama commented that the
impact of nine types of missiles at four flights per year for
each type would be 36 encrypted flight tests allowed each
year. President Medvedev replied that the number of
encrypted flight tests in a given year should be four.
Poznikhir disagreed, stating that the Russian President was
supposed to have read their proposal word-for-word, but that
he had not received a debrief on the Presidential telephone
call.


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THE RUSSIAN ALTERNATIVE
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12. (S) Poznikhir stated that the reason for the Russian
formulation of the treaty text was that the Russian side was
trying to get the treaty signed on time. It had instructions
from its President to record the obligation in the treaty in
the first paragraph and deal with all other provisions later.
If agreement to exchange data was in the treaty text, all
other details could be resolved in the BCC. He went on to
insist on their proposal as the only way, with 3 days
remaining in the negotiations the Parties could come to
resolution.


13. (S) When Siemon replied that it was necessary to have a
treaty article that established the commitment for the
exchange of telemetry data, Poznikhir stated the Russian
proposal was intended to be that treaty article. Siemon
replied there was also the need for a protocol with enough
substance for the Parties to understand their
obligations--the basic number of flight tests that would be
encrypted with the commitment to provide specific details in
the annex. The protocol would provide guidelines to develop
the information in the annex. Both the treaty and protocol
would be signed by the U.S. and Russian Presidents. Once
signed and ratified, the articles in the treaty could not be
easily changed without going back for re-ratification but the
protocol could be changed if necessary for viability and
effectiveness reasons. Siemon stated that when Gottemoeller
and Antonov had met on the morning of December 2 and
discussed the U.S.-proposed language for Article X of the
treaty, Antonov's initial reaction was that it appeared to be
workable text.


14. (S) Poznikhir admitted he had not discussed the matter
with Antonov after his most recent meeting with Gottemoeller
but Poznikhir's own opinion was that the U.S. proposal was
simply a rewritten version of its previous proposals in
different form and, therefore, it was unacceptable. While
the United States had taken the Russian-proposed treaty
paragraph to start its proposal, it changed one very
important word--from "The Parties may exchange" to "The
Parties shall exchange"--and changed the meaning completely.
The words as stated in the Russian proposal were the words of
their President and they had no right to change those words.


15. (S) Ryzhkov asked whether the U.S. proposal intended to
include reentry vehicle or front section data when it
referred to the exchange of "all telemetric information" or
whether the exclusions of START were to be continued. Siemon
assured him the same exclusions as were in START on the
broadcast of data and the provision of interpretive data for
re-entry vehicle information were intended.


16. (S) Zaitsev asked whether the previously-discussed U.S.
telemetry proposal had been removed. Siemon said that the
current proposal was the only one now on the table and he
clarified that the proposal looked much like the original
U.S. proposal. Poznikhir suggested the U.S. delegation go
back and consider the Russian proposal of including one
paragraph in the treaty and then coming to terms on the
detailed provisions after treaty signature.



17. (S) Ryzhkov commented that all of the U.S. telemetry
proposals could have been xeroxed from the START text. If
Russia had wanted that, it would have agreed long ago. His
belief was that the appropriate verification regime was still
developing for both Parties and this should be worked out in
ongoing discussions.


18. (S) Poznikhir reiterated that none of the parameters of
START requiring telemetry for verification were included in
the START Follow-on treaty. The Russian side had repeatedly
stressed that the exchange of telemetry data was unacceptable
and Poznikhir believed Gen Makarov had reinforced that
message in his discussions with Adm Mullen. Poznikhir
believed that it could take a very long time to come to
terms, so the sides should accept the idea of a single
paragraph in the treaty, work together on the phrasing, and
move everything else to future discussions. Siemon stated
that was not acceptable to the United States but that he
would report the Russian position to the U.S. delegation and
to Washington; Poznikhir said he would do the same on his
side.


19. (S) Ryzhkov asked what types of information, including
missile parameters and other telemetry data, the U.S.
envisioned exchanging under this treaty. Siemon replied it
would be the basic telemetry data similar to START, with
interpretive data. The protocol would provide the format and
the details would be negotiated in the annex. He envisioned
an exemption for encryption on 7 flight tests, lower than the
limit of 11 on START, but the types of missiles on which
encryption would be used was much broader than in START.


20. (S) Poznikhir asked what would be exchanged in terms of
flight test data. Siemon replied that both sides could
determine what they would broadcast and, just as it had been
done in START, the exchange would be based on the data that
was broadcast. The proposal read "an agreed amount" so the
volume and content could be discussed, decisions made, and
agreement reached in the negotiation of the annex.

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REPORTING OUT
--------------


21. (S) Siemon summarized what he would report on the
Russian position. He clarified that the Russian delegation
did not believe telemetry was necessary for verification of
the treaty. The Russian concept was to include a small but
direct paragraph in the treaty stating that the Parties "may"
exchange telemetric information based on parity. The Russian
intent was to agree on the type of data exchange within the
framework of the BCC. Poznikhir made one addition--the
Parties did not have to agree on what the protocol would
contain. His view was that the treaty would be signed, the
sides would then come to terms on the protocol, and then the
rest would be worked out through the BCC. Siemon stated the
U.S. position was that the treaty and protocol would be
signed at the same time by the U.S. and Russian Presidents,
the annex would be agreed later, but not signed by the
Presidents; however, all three documents or tiers would be
part of the package for ratification.


22. (S) Siemon concluded the sides were at an impasse on


telemetry.


23. (U) Documents provided: None.

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon
Mr. Engelhardt
Ms. Pura
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznikhir
Ge Orlov

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko

Col.Voloskov
Col Zaitsev
Mr. Pogodin (Int)


24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS