START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001197

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, DECEMBER 7, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-102.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 7, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

Time: 4:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired
by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met twice on
December 7th to discuss Sections V, VI, and VIII to Part V of
the Protocol on Inspection Activities. Discussion focused on
exemptions for inspections of submarines, inspections at
heavy bomber air bases, covering of front sections during
nuclear warhead inspections, when new types would be
exhibited, the necessity for elimination exhibitions,
inspections of ballistic missile defense-related items, and
size criteria to be used for access during inspections and
related matters. While the sides confirmed agreement on
substantial sections of text and clarified differing
positions on a number of key issues, a number of significant
outstanding issues remained.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VI: Inspections; Section
VIII: Exhibitions; Afternoon Session, Section VIII and
Missile Defense; and Section V: Inspection Activities.

--------------
SECTION VI: INSPECTIONS
--------------


5. (S) The meeting began with a discussion of the provision
that submarines and SLBM launchers located in the waters of a
submarine base shall not be considered to be within the
boundaries of the inspection site and shall not be subject to
inspection. Ilin argued such an exemption was illogical and
unnecessary and that the nature of Type One inspections made
it obvious that during the inspection of non-deployed systems
a submarine was not subject to inspection, but Warner
contended it was, and noted that the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission (JCIC) had dealt with and resolved this
issue under START. Warner agreed to attempt to reformulate
the text.


6. (S) Ilin then argued against a provision for mobile ICBMs
in the Section VI provision on rights to inspect declared
non-deployed launchers discovered to contain warheads during
a nuclear warhead inspection. Warner explained that this was
simply a way to prevent incorrect information being provided
during pre-inspection procedures concerning the number of
warheads contained on ICBMs or SLBMs. Ilin replied that the
Russian side wanted to rid the treaty of any special
provisions for mobile ICBMs.



7. (S) Moving to airbases for heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments, Warner suggested specifying that
inspections would be directed "to confirm the number of"
nuclear armaments on heavy bombers. Ilin counter-offered a
provision stating that inspectors would have the right to
inspect heavy bombers for non-nuclear armaments. Debate
ensued on the definitions of deployed and non-deployed heavy
bombers, without resolution. The sides agreed that "to
confirm the number of" would be included in the section, but
brackets would remain regarding the inclusion of heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.


8. (S) In paragraph 15(c) on inspector rights to inspect
structures capable of containing heavy bombers, the sides
agreed to delete the term "deployed" before heavy bombers and
the word "only" with respect to inspector rights to
"ascertain whether or not such structures contain a deployed
heavy bomber."


9. (S) Turning to the issue of covers for re-entry vehicles
during a nuclear warhead inspection, Warner proposed the U.S.
formulation which called for the viewing and measurement of
all covers, and noted that more detailed information on the
size and type of covers would be provided at the annex level.
Ilin contended that the text should specify that the covers
should be "individual covers," that the inspectors should
confirm the number of re-entry vehicles equals the number of
warheads, that the provision would apply only to deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs, and that inspectors should have the right to
view any cover and only measure hard covers. Col Petrov then
handed over a formal Russian proposal regarding the text on
covers. Warner, noting that this was a sensitive, tough
issue, stated that the sides would discuss the matter further
at a later date.

--------------
SECTION VIII: EXHIBITIONS
--------------


10. (S) In paragraph 2, on general exhibition rights and
obligations, Ilin questioned including reference to
exhibitions which had already been completed under START with
respect to requirements for exhibitions of new types. Warner
explained that this was necessary so that the sides would not
have to re-exhibit strategic offensive arms (SOA) and
suggested deferring to the lawyers on the matter.


11. (S) Discussion then turned to data exchange, and Ilin
again opposed reference to START with respect to the
requirement to populate data in the treaty's Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). Warner responded that the rationale for
incorporating these references to START was to address the
potentially significant gap between the expiration of START
and the entry into force (EIF) of the START Follow-on treaty.
He commented that the United States was particularly
interested in the new Russian mobile ICBM. (Begin comment:
This was a reference to the RS-24 Mod 2/SS-27 Mod 2 mobile
ICBM that the Russian side is expected to introduce in the
near future. End comment.) Obliquely referring to the RS-24
Mod 2, Ilin retorted that the requirement to exhibit a new
type 45 days after EIF was inconsistent with the paragraph's
other provision stipulating that exhibitions would be
conducted at the exhibiting Party's discretion. Col Zaitsev


intervened that the Russians would exhibit any new type when
they had it. Ilin then stated that the Russian side opposed
the 45-day requirement but agreed that exhibitions should be
carried out before inspections begin under the new treaty,
which would be 60 days after EIF. He pledged to think
further about how to formulate this position. Ilin also
argued that elimination exhibitions should not be included in
paragraph 3. The Russians then handed over their version of
the paragraph.


12. (S) For paragraph 4 on conversion or elimination
exhibitions, Ilin queried why the United States believed such
exhibitions should be obligatory. Warner replied that total
discretion was not tenable. The paragraph therefore remained
in brackets.


13. (S) For Russian-proposed paragraph 5 on exhibitions of
missile defense interceptors, Warner made clear that such a
provision would be impossible for the United States to
accept.


14. (S) Discussion followed on elimination exhibitions.
Warner stated that both sides agreed that national technical
means are sufficient to confirm the elimination of silo-based
ICBMs, silo launchers, SLBMs, and SLBM launchers.
Dissension, he remarked, focused on mobile ICBMs and their
launchers. He continued that the leading candidate for the
elimination of mobile ICBMs would require the burning out of
the solid fuel in the ballistic missile and the drilling of a
hole or multiple holes in the motor casing. The U.S. side,
he said, wanted the chance to conduct an inspection of a
batch of several eliminated missiles, which would likely add
up to only about four such inspections or exhibitions each
year. These inspections could not, however, be deducted from
the total quota of inspections, since the total number of
Type II inspections was only expected to be eight. Ilin
replied that national technical means would be sufficient for
the confirmation of eliminations. A back and forth ensued on
what would be sufficient for such purposes, with Warner
pointing out the inequality implicit in the inspection quota
because the Russian side would be able to inspect the smaller
number of U.S. bases under the quota while the U.S. side
would not be able to do the same to the Russian side because
of their larger number of bases. No resolution of the issue
was reached.

--------------
SECTION VIII AND MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


15. (S) At the beginning of the afternoon session, the U.S.
side handed over a revised version of Section V and the
Russian side handed over its proposed version of Section
VIII. Ilin sought inclusion of provisions on ballistic
missile defense as a trade for higher elimination exhibition
quotas, but Warner explained that the United States could not
tolerate incorporating such measures into the treaty. Warner
suggested that Ilin raise such proposals in the appropriate
fora for U.S.-Russian missile defense discussions, including
with Under Secretary Tauscher during her visit later in the
week.

--------------



SECTION V: INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
--------------


16. (S) Warner then turned to Section V on inspection
activities. For paragraph 7, the sides retained brackets
around the 14-hour requirement for movement from the point of
entry to the inspection site, pending further discussion of
pre-inspection movement re strictions.


17. (S) For paragraph 10, the sides maintained their
positions, with the Russians seeking to include nuclear
armaments loaded on heavy bombers as items of inspection and
the U.S. side holding to its position on including weapons
storage area inspections, pending further discussion of
counting rules.


18. (S) On paragraph 11's 97 percent size criteria, Warner
offered that the details of the issue could be settled at the
annex level. Ilin recommended removing the 97 percent rule
and replacing it with a provision allowing for size criteria
to be settled in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Warner urged settling the matter in the annex, noting that it
was important for provisional application, as volume
assessment would be key for inspections. The sides left the
matter bracketed.


19. (S) For paragraph 13, the sides retained brackets
regarding the number of inspectors permitted on an
inspection. The Russians did not present an alternative
number to the U.S.-proposed figure of 10.


20. (S) For paragraph 16, the Russian side suggested
removing the 24-hour time limit for inspections of heavy
bomber air bases. Warner pledged that the U.S. side would
get back to the Russians on the proposal.


21. (S) For paragraph 18 on sequential inspections, the
sides maintained brackets.


22. (S) Warner then handed over a revised joint draft text
of Section VII. He proposed discussing the annexes the
following day but Ilin resisted talking about the annexes.


23. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- U.S. Revised Proposal for Section VI; and

-- U.S. Revised JDT for Section VII.

- RUSSIA:

-- Russian Proposal on Covers for Section VI;

-- Russian Proposal for Section VI, paragraph 3; and

-- Russian Proposal for Section VIII.


24. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Izrazov
Col Petrov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Voldopova
Ms. Evaroskaya (Int for AM Session)


25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS