START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001196

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL
WORKING GROUP, DECEMBER 6, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1180 (SFO-GVA-VII-099)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-100.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 6, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group
(IPWG) on December 6 focused on the portions of Section VI of
Part V of the Protocol on Inspection Activities--Type 1
Inspections--that describe how the inspection team leader
would designate what is to be inspected in a given inspection
and what the inspection team would have the right to inspect.
Seven paragraphs were discussed and some portions of text
were agreed but the major differences between the sides
remained at the end of the meeting. These differences
included a number of provisions that were related to the
inspection of mobile ICBMs and how B-1Bs that had been
converted from nuclear to non-nuclear configuration and SSBNs
converted to SSGNs would be handled during Type 1
inspections. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: What Happened to the Annexes?;
Designating What is Going to be Inspected; Getting Down to
the Inspection.

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WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ANNEXES?
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5. (S) Col Ilin opened the meeting by stating that the
agenda for the day should consist of continuing to work
through Section VI of the Protocol, then addressing Sections
VII and VIII of Part V of the Protocol on Inspection
Activities if there was sufficient time. Dr. Warner agreed,
remarking that with an additional opportunity for the Russian
and U.S. Presidents to meet in the near future, the IPWG
should plan on an additional 5 to 6 days of work to come to
conclusion. He reminded the group that Heads of Delegation
(HODs) Gottemoeller and Antonov had agreed that the IPWG
would address three selected parts of the annex prior to
treaty signature. The portions of the Annex on Inspection
Activities to be addressed were Section 4 (Site Diagrams -
derived from Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Annex J),
Section 6 (Procedures for Inspections of Deployed Strategic
Warheads and their Nuclear Warheads - Type 1 inspections),
and Section 7 (Procedures for the Inspection of Covered
Objects, Containers, Launch Canisters, Vehicles, and
Structures--primarily Type 2 inspections). The remaining
portion of Annex J of the MOU would be shifted to the IPWG
for discussion and inclusion in its remaining annexes as had
been agreed by the MOU Working Group chairs, Trout and Orlov.
Ilin replied that he had received no such instructions from
Antonov concerning either the inclusion of any annexes to be
addressed prior to signature or the shifting of MOU Annex J


to the responsibility of the IPWG. Both Warner and Ilin
agreed to check with their HOD on these commitments and the
shifting of responsibilities.

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DESIGNATING WHAT IS GOING TO BE INSPECTED
--------------


6. (S) Discussion picked up where it had left off in the
previous IPWG meeting (Reftel) on the third part of U.S.
subparagraph 9(a) of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol
on Inspection Activities, concerning the designation of ICBM
launchers for inspection at ICBM bases. This text included
the U.S. proposal for an option to designate two deployed
silo launchers from the same launcher group for inspection.
Warner re-stated the U.S. intention to agree to the Russian
position of requiring only one deployed launcher for
inspection if the number of inspections agreed upon was at
least 20. The brackets stayed in place.


7. (S) The next portion of text addressed the right to
designate a fixed structure declared not to contain a mobile
launcher for inspection. Both sides recognized the
continuing difference over "re stricted" versus "basing"
areas and agreed to let the Definitions Subgroup resolve the
issue. Ilin attempted to explain the rationale for Russian
text that would allow the right to inspect a fixed structure
only if a fixed structure not containing ICBMs was actually
at that base. After some discussion, Ilin agreed to work on
a re-formulated version of this text.


8. (S) The following portion of text, on not designating
mobile launchers at maintenance facilities, was agreed text.
The next part was a U.S.-proposed provision for designating
one re stricted area for inspection at a mobile ICBM base.
At Ilin's request, Warner described the U.S. rationale for
this provision based on the Data Update Inspection (DUI)
under START. He explained that the inspecting Party
designated one re stricted area for inspection, after which
the inspected Party would declare the number of launchers as
well as deployed ICBMs and support equipment in the area.
The inspecting Party would proceed to the area, confirm the
data provided, and use size criteria to check for any
additional missiles or support equipment. The one change
with START Follow-on (SFO) would be that support equipment
would no longer be inspectable. This provision was an
important component of the START DUI inspection process that
the United States wanted to retain in the SFO Type 1 combined
inspection; it allowed the inspecting Party to confirm the
number of deployed ICBMs and launchers in a designated re
stricted or basing area. Ilin objected that this was another
provision that singled out mobile ICBM systems and that there
was no analog for silo-based ICBMs or SLBMs. In other words,
at a silo base only the maintenance area was subject to
inspection and not the entire missile field so mobile ICBMs
were again being singled out. He re-stated the Russian
position that any such provision for mobile systems was
unacceptable. Warner committed to discuss a couple of
variations on the recall provision for mobile systems with
Ilin during the next meeting, one of which would be a
provision applicable to all types of systems and not just
mobile ICBMs. The provision was left in brackets.



9. (S) The discussion moved on to subparagraph (b),
designating SLBMs for inspection at submarine bases. The
first part was agreed text other than the number of SLBMs
that could be designated for a nuclear warhead inspection,
with the United States proposing two and Russia proposing
one. This was left bracketed. The next part concerned the
right to select for inspection an SLBM launcher that was
declared not to contain a deployed SLBM. After some
discussion it was agreed that this was similar to the
selection of empty ICBM launchers. The U.S. approach would
be to select one empty launcher for inspection as one of its
two launchers or would select two launchers that contained
SLBMs unless the number of inspections agreed upon in the
treaty was 20 or greater. In that case, the United States
would inspect one empty and one occupied launcher or just one
occupied launcher if an empty launcher was not available, in
a similar fashion to the Russian proposal. The Russian
approach would be to allow selection of one occupied and one
empty launcher.


10. (S) The Russian text also included a provision for
inspecting a launcher on a submarine which had been converted
to an SSGN, describing this as a "non-deployed SLBM
launcher." Warner stated that, once converted, an SSGN would
not be capable of launching an SLBM and so it would no longer
be considered an SLBM launcher at all, and would not be
subject to the treaty. The U.S. view was that no
inspections of SSGN should take place during a Type 1
inspection but that there would be a provision for inspection
of SSGNs separately in an agreed statement on SSGN conversion
that the U.S. side planned to propose. Ilin brought up the
case of a submarine that could launch both nuclear SLBMs and
non-nuclear SLCMs and stated that he believed they should be
able to inspect for that possible configuration. Warner
stated that while that was hypothetically possible, the
United States had no plans to do so and that nuclear-capable
and non-nuclear submarines would be kept separate from one
another.


11. (S) An additional difference in the wording of this part
was over the range of selection options for the empty
launcher to be inspected. The Russian side took the view
that the selection must be from the same SSBN originally
selected for inspection while the U.S. side would allow
selection from any SSBN subject to inspection. Warner
clarified that the selection of two launchers containing
SLBMs would be from the same SSBN while the selection of an
empty launcher could be from a different submarine. This was
analogous to the U.S. approach to ICBM selection from within
the same launch group for those "containing" and outside the
launch group selected for the warhead inspection for an empty
ICBM launcher.


12. (S) When Zaitsev asked why the United States wanted to
inspect the warheads on two rather than one SLBM, Warner
explained that two provided for a stronger statistical
sample. Zaitsev said he believed that the probabilities were
the same but that inspecting two would increase operational
difficulties for the inspected Party. Warner said the United
States was prepared to go down to inspecting one SLBM
launcher containing an SLBM and one that was empty if the
annual number of inspections was large enough since a larger
number of inspections would help compensate for a smaller


number of launchers/missiles being inspected during each
inspection.


13. (S) The discussion of subparagraph 9(c),designating for
inspection at air bases, focused on two topics, the Russian
proposal for selection of "3 plus 3" heavy bombers for
inspection and inspection of B-1Bs under START Follow-on.
The U.S. proposal called for the selection of three deployed
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to be inspected
in a Type 1 inspection at an air base. In addition to this,
the Russian proposal included the option to select three
heavy bombers visiting the air base that are of another type
equipped for nuclear armaments or that are equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. This text remained bracketed. After
some discussion of the logistical and timing complexities of
the ongoing B-1B conversion, both sides decided to leave the
existing brackets in place based on the positions each
continued to hold.

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GETTING DOWN TO THE INSPECTION
--------------


14. (S) The discussion of paragraph 10, on transporting the
inspection team to the items to be inspected, focused on the
Russian objection to singling out "re stricted area" for
mobiles rather than naming the item to be inspected as for
other systems. After some discussion of the rationale for
the option of transporting inspectors to a re stricted area
as one choice of discrete destination during an inspection of
mobiles, the text was left bracketed.


15. (S) Ilin agreed to remove the general Russian provision
for inspection of strategic offensive arms in Russian
paragraph 9, recognizing that other paragraphs described this
right much more comprehensively. An extended discussion of
paragraph 11 on unique identifiers (UIDs) focused on the
Russian concerns that the right to read the data from them
was preferentially applied to mobile ICBMs. The crux of the
issue was that access to the UIDs would be difficult for
silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs when these missiles were deployed
in their launchers, while it was straight forward to read the
UIDs on mobile ICBMs deployed on its launcher. Warner
proposed a number of options for placement of UIDs that would
make the provision more evenly applied and challenged the
Russian delegation to propose an alternative solution.


16. (S) The discussion of paragraph 13 focused on the items
and areas where an inspection team would have the right to
inspect at ICBM bases. Re-wording of subparagraph (a) by the
U.S. delegation led to a clearer description of the
launcher-missile-warhead relationship for a deployed ICBM.
Warner also stated that the United Stateswould be willing to
accept the Russian concept of deployed and non-deployed
armaments conditional on acceptance by the Russians of some
form of limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. The
last two subparagraphs, (d) and (e),remained bracketed
because of references to re stricted areas and how they would
be handled. It was agreed that the inspection rights at
submarine bases should parallel those at ICBM bases during
the discussion of paragraph 14. The Russian version also
included a reference to non-deployed launchers that was
intended to allow inspection of launchers on SSBNs that had


been converted to SSGNs. Ilin said he would provide a
modified Russian formulation that more clearly called out a
launcher on an SSGN, although Warner unequivocally stated the
U.S. position that this would not be covered under the treaty.


17. (S) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES

-- Section VIII. Exhibitions, December 6, 2009


18. (S) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Ms. Purcell
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Lobach
Col Petrov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Pogodin (Int)


19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS