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09GENEVA1195 2009-12-20 11:22:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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					  S E C R E T GENEVA 001195 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 1187 (SFO-GVA-VII-076)

B. GENEVA 1175 (SFO-GVA-VII-071)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-098.



2. (U) Meeting Date: December 4, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:50 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) At the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group
(TTDWG) meeting chaired by Amb Ries and Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Representative Mr. Koshelev, discussion
focused on Articles II, III, IV, IX and XII. The Russian
side objected that its proposal to combine locational and
numerical limits into single paragraphs for each item in
U.S.-proposed Article IV Joint Draft Text (JDT) was not
accepted. Additionally, the Russian side objected that its
proposal for locational restrictions on non-deployed heavy
bombers did not appear in the U.S.-proposed JDT. The Russian
side stated that it was difficult to maintain the same
concept for the formulation "armaments for" when translating
this U.S.-proposed text into Russian and recommended adding
"units of" prior to "armaments for" in order to permit
applying numerical limits to warheads as addressed in Article
IV. The Russian side questioned the meaning of the text
"within the limitations set forth in this Treaty" versus
"within the aggregate limits in this Treaty" as they appeared
in Article II. The U.S. side accepted the Russian proposal
to have a single list oQxisting types of ICBMs in Article
III that included both ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs
and ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs. The U.S. side offered
new Article IX text proposing to use unique identifiers
(UIDs) on all strategic offensive arms (SOA). The Russian
side declined the offer stating it could not accept the
proposal since the U.S. side had not accepted the Russian
package deal. The Russian side again rejected discussion of
Article IX on Cooperative Measures. End Summary.



4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Agenda; Article IV, Article II
Deployed Heavy Bomber Warhead Limit; Article II Limitations
Versus Aggregate Limit; Article III; Article IX Use of UIDs;
and Article XII Cooperative Measures.



--------------------------


AGENDA


--------------------------





5. (S) Although Ries suggested the agenda consist of
discussions on Article II, IX, XII and XIII, Kuznetsov
hijacked the agenda and suggested discussion of Article II,
III, IV, and IX, defining the agenda for the meeting.



--------------------------


ARTICLE IV


--------------------------






6. (S) The U.S. side provided proposed JDT of Article IV
which reflected the previous day's discussion (Ref A). Ries
indicated several large conceptual issues remained unresolved
from the package deals presented by both sides that were
linked to each other and to the resolution of the text in
Article IV. Mrs. Zdravecky noted that the translation of
paragraph 3 (a), which addressed the limit on non-deployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers, revealed an awkward formulation of
U.S.-proposed text. The text was corrected by inserting the
word "aggregate" in the last phrase of the paragraph. This
additional word clarified the English translation and did not
change the paragraph substantively.



7. (S) Kuznetsov stated that he did not see Ms. Kotkova's
request from the previous meeting to gather numerical and
locational formulations for the same items in the same
paragraph. Koshelev added that combining the limits on
non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges in paraQaph 6
with the limits on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers in
paragraph 3 demonstrated this Russian concept. He noted that
combining paragraph 3 and 3(a) further added clarification.



8. (S) Kuznetsov continued to criticize the U.S.-proposed
JDT and stated that only U.S.-proposed locational
restrictions on non-deployed heavy bombers were reflected.
He believed the JDT should reflect the Russian position
provided in the proposal of the Russian side provided on
November 30, 2009 (Ref B). Ries assured Kuznetsov this was
an administrative oversiQt. Kuznetsov recommended the
Russian-proposed textQe placed after the last paragraph of
the U.S.-proposed JDT. Ries agreed.



--------------------------


ARTICLE II DEPLOYED HEAVY
BOMBER WARHEAD LIMIT


--------------------------





9. (S) Ries noted that in paragraph 2(b) which addressed the
warhead limit, the U.S. side had changed its bracketed text
to reflect nuclear "armaments for" deployed heavy bombers in
contrast to the Russian-proposed formulation "warheads on"
deployed heavy bombers. Koshelev and Mr. Lobach engaged in a
lengthy discussion on the impossibility in the Russian
language of having a limit attached to armaments. The word
"armaments" in Russian was a noun to which a number could not
be attached. The text "units of" could be added prior to
"armaments for" in the U.S.-proposed text to accurately
reflect the concept of a limit on warheads: either armaments
for deployed heavy bombers in the U.S. formulation or a limit
on warheads on deployed heavy bombers as in the Russian
concept. The sides agreed this was a linguistic problem and
could be left for the Conforming Group to resolve.



--------------------------


ARTICLE II LIMITATIONS
VERSUS AGGREGATE LIMIT


--------------------------





10. (S) Kuznetsov mounted a repeat attack on the formulation
"within the limitations set forth in this Treaty" as used in
paragraph 2 of the U.S.-proposed JDT. (Begin comment: This
discussion was essentially the same discussion between Mr.
Taylor and Kuznetsov conducted in the November 30, 2009,


TTDWG (Ref B). End comment.) Lobach indicated there was a
major substantive difference in the U.S.-proposed formulation
and the Russian-proposed formulation "within the aggregate
limits in this Treaty." Whereas "aggregate limits" in the
Russian formulation reflected a maximum number, "within the
limitations" as used in the U.S. formulation denoted a
limitation that was both quantitative and qualitative.
Lobach stated a phrase such as "as provided for in this
Treaty" would resolve the linguistic difference in the
formulations proposed by each side. If the sides chose not
to use such a phrase, Lobach indicated that deleting "within
the limitations set forth in this Treaty" would also resolve
the difference. Ries asked the Russian side to provide
proposed text so the U.S. side could better understand the
linguistic differences. Since the Russian side believed
paragraph 2 touched on both a numerical and locational limit,
Ries offered that moving this paragraph to Article IV could
also resolve the issue. Koshelev offered to pass this idea
back to Russian experts in Moscow.



--------------------------


ARTICLE III


--------------------------





11. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the formulation of paragraph 7
(a) which addressed the existing types of ICBMs, to include
ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, presented a problem for
Russia. Since the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) existed as both
an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and an ICBM for silo
launchers of ICBMs, it would be better to just list ICBMs in
generic terms in this paragraph. Whether an ICBM was the
mobile or silo version of the ballistic missile could be
determined in the MOU since facilities would be declared as
either ICBM bases for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or
ICBM bases for ICBMs of silo launchers of ICBMs and the
numbers of mobile ICBMs or silo based ICBMs would be declared
for each type of facility.



12. (S) In addition, Kuznetsov said he understood that the
Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) had resolved the
issue of heavy bomber counting rules by the sides accepting
an attribution rule, and as such, it was no longer necessary
to list the existing types of nuclear armaments for heavy
bombers in paragraph 7. He understood the IPWG resolved to
inspect nuclear armaments "on deployed heavy bombers" and
inspecting weapons storage areas was no longer incorporated
in Part V, Inspection Activities. Ries made clear the U.S.
position on counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments could
change only if Russia accepted other proposals offered by the
United States, to include a limit on deployed and
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. She explained the
word "for" in English was interpreted to mean both "on" and
"associated with." Koshelev suggested it was time that the
TTDWG and the IPWG meet to come to agreement on the concepts
each used. Ries agreed.



--------------------------


ARTICLE IX USE OF UIDS


--------------------------





13. (S) Ries provided a U.S. working paper on Article IX to
the Russian side. She noted that since Russia had stated the
use of UIDs was a one-sided procedure, the United States was


proposing to broaden the use of UIDs to include use on ICBMs,
SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and deployed heavy
bombers.



14. (S) Kuznetsov stated he could understand the use of UIDs
on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, but did not understand the
concept of using UIDs on SLBM launchers. He believed the
United States would never let Russian inspectors below deck
on an SSBN to confirm UIDs on individual SLBM launchers.
Ries explained the U.S. side proposed to use UIDs to identify
one unit from another unit. She understood that each side
currently had its respective methods to track armaments,
equipment and SOA. This being the case, the United States
was proposing to use such numbering to identify individual
units.



15. (S) Dr. Fraley stated that if applying UIDs to SLBM
launchers concerned the Russian side, the United States would
simply remove this part of the proposal or the sides could
consider creative ways to apply UIDs to SLBM launchers.
Kuznetsov stated the Russian side could not accept the
proposal even if a creative way to apply UIDs to SLBM
launchers was determined since the use of UIDs was part of
the U.S. package deal and the package deal was an all or
nothing offer by the U.S. side. Additionally, Article IX
dealt with national technical means (NTM) of verification and
the use of UIDs did not belong there since a side could not
possibly see a UID with NTM. The discussion ended with Ries
commenting that Article IX concerned verification, which
included the use of UIDs.



16. (S) Referring to paragraph 1 (c) which addressed
concealment practices at ICBM bases, Kuznetsov stated the
brackets on the text "and deployment areas" could not be
removed until this term had been properly defined. Koshelev
clarified that the Russian delegation had now taken
"ownership" of this bracketed text, which had been a previous
U.S. proposal that the U.S. delegation had since dropped.



--------------------------


ARTICLE XII COOPERATIVE MEASURES


--------------------------





17. (S) Ries hoped the sides could have further discussion
on the use of cooperative measures (CM). Kuznetsov remarked
that the issue was not for the TTDWG to discuss.
Additionally, the Russian package deal stated all procedures
needed to be applied equally over all SOA. Article XII only
addressed CM as it pertained to mobile launchers of ICBMs and
as such, the Russian side could not consider its use. Ries
noted the proposed text in Article XII included procedures
for both mobile launcher of ICBMs and deployed heavy bombers.
Cooperative measures added additional verification measures
based on the unique features of these two systems.



18. (S) Kuznetsov agreed with Ries' statement, however, as
previously noted, the Russian package deal stated that
measures had to be applied to all SOA and he did not see
SSBNs mentioned in Article XII. Ries asked whether Kuznetsov
was proposing adding CM procedures for SSBNs, to which
Kuznetsov answered that he could add these procedures but it
was too late in the negotiating process to add new procedures
to the treaty.





19. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- U.S.-Proposed Article II Joint Draft Text, dated
December 4, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian;

-- U.S.-Proposed Article IV Joint Draft Text, dated
December 3, 2009, in English and unofficial Russian; and

-- U.S. Article IX Working Paper, dated December 4,
2009, in English and unofficial Russian.



20. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Holleran
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Ivanov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Lobach
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)



21. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS