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09GENEVA1194 2009-12-20 11:10:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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					  S E C R E T GENEVA 001194 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-094.



2. (U) Meeting Date: December 3, 2009
Time: 4:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) U.S. and Russian representatives to the Treaty Text
and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) met for a shortened
session following a meeting of the Definitions Subgroup. The
sides reviewed Article III and resolved some bracketed
language. Major points for discussion involved
accountability of nuclear warheads and inclusion of mobile
launchers of ICBMs among existing types of ICBMs. Article IV
was mostly agreed with the exception of certain sub-limits
concerning test ranges, space launch facilities, and test and
training heavy bombers. In Article IX, the Russian side
provisionally agreed with the U.S. position to preclude
concealment measures that impede verification. End Summary.



4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article III; On to Article IV;
Article IX.



--------------------------


ARTICLE III


--------------------------





5. (S) Mr. Taylor and ADM Kuznetsov began the working group
while Amb Ries and Mr. Koshelev conducted a separate
one-on-one discussion. Taylor reviewed outstanding issues
related to Article III on counting rules. For paragraph 7
(listing of existing types of strategic offensive arms
(SOA)), he proposed language to ease Russian concerns over a
separate sub-paragraph devoted to mobile ICBMs. The proposal
would drop the separate paragraph for existing types of
mobile ICBMs. Instead, all existing types of ICBMs would be
listed together in one sub-paragraph with an additional
phrase identifying those ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.
Kuznetsov agreed to take the proposal for study.



6. (S) In paragraph 2 (counting rules toward the aggregate
limit), Taylor asked whether the Russian side had constructed
alternate language for treatment for deployed heavy bombers,
to which Kuznetsov replied there was nothing new. Kuznetsov
embarked on a monologue in which he stated he was not able to
understand the proposed U.S. counting rules for heavy
bombers. He went on say the latest proposal to count three
warheads for each deployed heavy bomber was difficult to
grasp, and was further compounded by the lack of agreed terms
to define deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. He noted
the Russian side had proposed new definitions to support its
position almost 3 weeks earlier and had yet to hear a formal
response from the U.S. side. Taylor explained the original
text for paragraph 2 had been formulated when the United
States had proposed inspections of nuclear weapon storage
areas. Since the U.S. position had changed, revised language
would be required. Taylor undertook to provide some more


clarifying language on paragraph 2 for the next meeting.



7. (S) Kuznetsov stated the Russian side was withdrawing its
language for 4bis (Russian-proposed counting rules for
deployed SOA). Turning to paragraph 5 (end of the life cycle
for counting SOA), Kuznetsov stated the Russian side had no
objections to the proposed language, though he wanted no
reference to the protocol or reference to the role played by
the Bilateral Consultative Commission.



8. (S) For paragraph 6 (when new types would be considered
subject to treaty provisions), Kuznetsov asked about
sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) which addressed treatment of new
types of conventional and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
Taylor stated the United States was still considering the
Russian proposal to drop "nuclear" from sub-paragraph (c).
At this point, Kuznetsov and Ms. Kotkova proposed deletion of
paragraph (b) (exclusion of conventional-only ballistic
missiles), deletion of the word "nuclear" from sub-paragraph
(c) (ballistic missiles flight tested for nuclear armaments),
and replacement of ballistic missile in sub-paragraph (c)
with weapon delivery vehicle. Taylor advised that the United
States would take the proposal for study. At that point
Kuznetsov determined the two major issues left in Article III
were accountability of nuclear warheads and inclusion of
mobile launchers of ICBMs among existing types of ICBMs.



--------------------------


ON TO ARITCLE IV


--------------------------





9. (S) Kuznetsov noted that he had received, the day before,
the latest U.S.-proposed draft for Article IV on locational
and numerical re strictions. In principle, there were no
issues with the exception of paragraph 1(b) (location of
deployed launchers of SLBMs), which evoked a spirited debate
on the meaning of this one sentence. Taylor appreciated the
difficulty the Russian side might have in accepting the
language from a linguistic perspective; however, the language
used ("Each party shall locate deployed launchers of SLBMs
only on ballistic missile submarines based at submarine
bases.") was similar in wording and concept to the language
for locational and related re strictions found in START
Article IV, paragraph 9(a).



10. (S) Kotkova agreed in principle, but her logic ran that
there should be a direct link between the deployed launcher
and the submarine without the intermediate step of a
submarine base to further define the location. Mr. Dean
acknowledged the point, but stated the logic rested on what
would be the final definition of a deployed launcher of SLBMs.



11. (S) This prompted another appeal by Kuznetsov for
agreement on key terms for deployed and non-deployed systems.
Looking at the term for deployed launchers of SLBMs, Taylor
noted the key feature for the launcher of SLBMs was its
installation on a submarine that had itself been launched.
The Russian version of the definition said a launcher of
SLBMs meant an SLBM launcher that contained an SLBM and was
not intended for testing or training. To accept the Russian
proposal one would have to know that the launcher was located
in a submarine. Kotkova replied that the locational
clarification was not the requirement of the definition but


of the treaty articles. Both sides finally agreed to the
language of the sentence by dropping the phrase indicating
the submarine containing a deployed SLBM launcher was "based
at a submarine base."



12. (S) At this point, as time was running short, Kuznetsov
quickly covered the Russian positions for the remaining
paragraphs of Article IV:

- Paragraph 2 (deployed heavy bomber location) was agreed,
but Kuznetsov again asked for an agreed definition of heavy
bombers.

- In paragraph 3 (limits on non-deployeds), Kuznetsov said he
now understood this to mean the Parties would have 7 years to
reach this limit. He requested the U.S.-proposed text be
redrafted to spell that out in writing.

- For paragraph 4 (locations of non-deployed launchers and
non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs), the Russian side agreed to
virtually all text in sub-paragraph 4(a) including the U.S.
proposal for prototypes, but left "space launch facility" in
brackets. Paragraph 4(b) was also agreed with the exception
of "space launch facility."

- In paragraph 5 (transit limits), the Russian side agreed to
the U.S. language.

- For paragraph 6 (limit on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at
test ranges), Kuznetsov was not willing to budge. This
paragraph was still bracketed.

- For paragraph 7 (limit of test launchers only to test
ranges), the Russian side was in agreement. Paragraph 8
(location of training launchers) was also agreed.

- In paragraph 9 (limit on test heavy bombers), the Russian
side did not agree.

- In paragraph 10 (basing of test and training heavy
bombers), Kuznetsov said he was not able to understand the
U.S. position. He indicated no progress was possible until a
definition of a deployed heavy bomber could be agreed.



--------------------------


ARTICLE IX


--------------------------





13. (S) Having completed their one-on-one discussions, Ries
and Koshelev rejoined the working group. Ries raised Article
IX, paragraph 3, and asked the Russian side about its
objections to the U.S.-proposed language precluding
concealment measures that impede verification. Ries pressed
the Russian side to acknowledge that the language of the
opening sentence, which was agreed, meant that impediments to
verification could not be used at space launch facilities.
Kotkova agreed, but opined the language in the second
sentence which listed various facilities captured by this
paragraph was redundant in light of the wording of the
opening sentence. Ries responded that the second sentence
served the function of elaboration of the concept, while the
third sentence provided for operational exclusions. At this
point, the Russian side agreed to the language of this second


sentence. Kuznetsov then raised the final sentence related
to operational exclusions from impediments to verification.
He said the Russian side disagreed with language referring
specifically to road mobile launchers of ICBMs. Kuznetsov
raised the issue of definitions again, saying the matter
could be clarified if both sides could agree to definitions
for "basing area," "deployment area," "re stricted area," and
"ICBM base." Ries proposed compromise language for treatment
of road mobiles, which the Russian side provisionally
accepted.



14. (U) Documents provided: None.



15. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Highsmith
Mr. Taylor
Ms. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Kamenskiy
ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Trifinov
Ms. Evanovskaya (Int)



16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS