START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001191

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-069.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 29, 2009
Time: 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) This was the first meeting to discuss telemetry
provisions to be included in the START Follow-on treaty. The
sides discussed the telemetry portion of a Russian package
proposal and a U.S. revised telemetry proposal, each provided
to the other side on November 28. Each side asked a series
of questions to clarify the positions outlined in the
proposals. While progress was made in understanding the
positions of the two sides, it was agreed that they were not
ready for technical level discussions at this point. It was
clear there were many policy issues yet to be worked through
in further discussions. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Setting the Stage; Questioning the
Russian Proposal; Questioning the U.S. Proposal; Clarifying
Terms; and Closing Remarks.

--------------
SETTING THE STAGE
--------------


5. (S) Mr. Siemon thanked General Poznihir for scheduling a
meeting on the topic of telemetry on such short notice.
Poznihir welcomed the U.S. portion of the delegation and
pointed out that there were a number of difficult questions
to resolve. The Russian proposal was described as a package
deal and a "final offer." He emphasized that the United
States needed to respond to the package as a whole and that
telemetry could not be separated out from the Russian
package. Parity was a key provision and required the United
States to address: 1) UK flight tests; 2) resolution of new
type criteria; and 3) the relationship of telemetric
information to missile defense. Poznihir and his colleagues
had studied the U.S. proposal and believed it did not address
the major Russian concerns but were willing to listen to the
U.S. presentation.


6. (S) Siemon remarked that the United States played the
same chess game and that put the sides in the position of
turning proposals over on a daily basis. The latest U.S.
proposal had been delivered the night before, after
incorporating changes in response to the latest Russian
package proposal, and was the result of work in Washington
over the last week. The U.S. proposal attempted to address
the concepts discussed by Admiral Mullen and General Makarov
early the previous week.

--------------
QUESTIONING THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL
--------------


7. (S) Siemon raised a number of questions to better

understand the telemetry portion of the Russian package
proposal. He asked whether in the phrase "recording media of
an agreed type," it was intended that playback equipment be
included. It was clear from Poznihir's and Zaitsev's answers
that Russia did not consider playback equipment in their
proposal. Poznihir admitted that playback equipment probably
was required but noted that it was not in the U.S. proposal
either. He said that issue would be clarified later.


8. (S) Siemon asked how it was expected that encrypted data
would be exchanged according to the Russian proposal.
Poznihir replied that each Party had the right to encrypt or
not encrypt whatever data it wanted but that there was an
intention to exchange all data--the question was how the
sides would provide access to each other's data.


9. (S) Siemon's third question concerned the number of
flight tests for which the exemption from providing encrypted
data would apply. There was some discussion of the number of
flight tests implied in the Russian proposal as well as in
the U.S. original and most recent proposals. The number
intended in the Russian proposal was not fully clarified but
it was stated that both sides would have the same number.
The U.S. delegation raised the point that its understanding
of the Russian proposal of 4 flight tests of each type to be
exempted from data exchange, with 3 ICBMs and 4 SLBMs
currently declared, would amount to 28 flight tests per year.
The Russian view appeared to be that the actual number of
flight tests would be negotiated. Poznihir also indicated
that prototypes of new systems were a part of the Russian
view of the flight test calculus. Zaitsev suggested that
flight tests from UK submarines could be included in the
calculus as well.


10. (S) Siemon remarked that the last two provisions in the
Russian proposal were problematic for the United States. The
first of these provisions would have the United States
"undertake the obligation to provide telemetry information
on...launches of Trident-II SLBMs from SSBNs of the United
Kingdom." Siemon pointed out that the pattern of cooperation
between the United States and the United Kingdom was a
45-year program and was discussed extensively in the
development of the START Treaty. The United Kingdom is an
independent sovereign nation with the right to its own
weapons program and should not be a part of this treaty.


11. (S) The last provision in the Russian telemetry proposal
was a call for a "unilateral statement on the non-use of
telemetry information provided by Russia in the interest of
missile defense." Siemon emphasized that their call for a
unilateral statement could be considered but that it was yet
another demand for U.S. assurances on a topic that should not
be a part of a treaty that limits strategic offensive arms
(SOA).

--------------
QUESTIONING THE U.S. PROPOSAL
--------------


12. (S) The Russian delegation then asked a series of
questions to better understand the U.S. proposal. Poznihir
asked what country produced the telemetry equipment for the
UK Trident II missile tests. Coussa replied that the United
States produced the telemetry system but it was used only on

the UKflight tests and was not integral to the missile
system. Poznihir pointed out the Russian concern tat the
data could be accumulated and used by theUnited States if
that were the case.


13. (S)Zaitsev remarked that the actual and simulated
nmber of Trident RV dispensing procedures by the lauchers
on UK submarines had been observed to be as high as 12. This
hasbeen seen by high-level Russian officials as a way for
the United States to get around the treaty. or that reason,
they believed these flight testsshould be notified and
included under the treaty Siemon replied that the United
Kingdom has theright to possess and maintain its own
independent deterrent force The front section and warheadsof the UK Trident are both designed and produced b the
United Kingdom. The United States does notshare its
warheads with the United Kingdom or an other country--these
are not flight tests covere under START nor would they be
covered by START ollow-on. Poznihir remarked that the
Trident misile used a U.S.-produced guidance system. If the
Trident missile could contain 12 warheads on theUK system,
it could have that number on the U.S. ersion as well. He
remarked that Russia was very concerned about this point and
that he did not think telemetry provisions could be agreed
without solving this issue.


14. (S) Siemon presented the main features of the U.S.
proposal, emphasizing exchange of encrypted telemetry on test
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on te basis of parity,
including: 1) the requirementto broadcast telemetry; 2)
pre-notification of fight tests; 3) a ban on denial
techniques; 4) exhange of recording media & advanced
cryptovariable keys; and 5) exchange of interpretive data.
The provisions associated with implementation of this
approach include the following:

"The parties shall have the right to encrypt
information for a specific number of test launches and will
provide information to the other party on such test launches
except for two ICBM test launches and two SLBM test launches
each year. The specific elements associated with this
agreement are:

-- A right to encrypt the telemetry of test launches
using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256, AES with 256
bit cryptovariables) unless the test launch is specified in
advance as one of a launches for which information needed to
decrypt the telemetry will not be provided.

-- Exchange of all information and parameters need to
decrypt the AES standard used during the test launch.

-- Each missile test launch would use a unique
cryptovariable, shared in advance between the two Parties.

-- Additional encryption details, to include encryption
modes and parameters, will be determined through
deliberations between technical representatives from both
countries.

-- Sample data, both encrypted data and its associated
unencrypted data, will be provided to assist in testing the
validity of the encryption code and associated key.

-- A right to use any encryption standard for
encrypting the telemetry of the limited number of test
launches declared as exempt from the requirement to provide
information and parameters to decrypt the telemetry data."


15. (S) Poznihir asked first how the U.S. proposal was meant
to address or remove the expressed concerns of Russia and
then what the U.S. side believed the fundamental difference
was in the new U.S. proposal from START and the previous
START Follow-on proposal. Siemon replied that the primary
difference was the shift from the broadcast of unencrypted
telemetry to the broadcast of encrypted telemetry in response
to the concerns raised by Makarov regarding third Party
(specifically Chinese and Japanese) access to unencrypted
Russian telemetry. He clarified how encryption would work.
There would be a difference between flight tests where data
was shared and where encrypted data was not shared. All
tests would be notified and those tests where all data would
remain encrypted would be identified. For those tests where
a side wanted full encryption and no sharing of unencrypted
information, AES 256 with cryptovariable would not be
required. For those tests in which data was exchanged, AES
256 would be used with the exchange of a unique
cryptovariable used by both sides. This would enable the
receiving Party to turn encrypted telemetry data into
unencrypted data.


16. (S) Poznihir reiterated that Russia could not accept
what appear to be START treaty approaches. There will not be
limitations on throw-weight or number of reentry vehicles
tested that would require telemetry for verification as there
were under START. He expressed the concern that the U.S.
side had not heard and understood the Russian concerns.


17. (S) Zaitsev asked what the United States saw as the
differences between the U.S. and Russian proposals. Mr.
Siemon replied that the U.S. proposal included more
information describing the practical details of how the sides
would implement encryption. He remarked that the U.S. side
had heard the Russian position concerning the change in
verification requirements but that continuing exchange of
telemetry data was of value in START Follow-on for
transparency reasons and for understanding the development
programs of the other side to enhance strategic stability.
While it was true that the sides would be going to lower
numbers of warheads as a result of the treaty, they would
also be building a new strategic relationship. Going from
attribution to counting and inspecting actual warheads
represents a fundamental change impossible to consider 20
years ago during the negotiation of START. It is important
to exchange information on future developments in order to
achieve strategic stability.

--------------
CLARIFYING TERMS
--------------


18. (S) Several more questions were broached to attempt to
clarify the positions of the two sides. Trout asked about
the flight test calculus of the Russian proposal to try to
determine the maximum number of exempted flights. The U.S.
proposal would allow 2 ICBM and 2 SLBM flights yielding a
maximum of 4 flight tests per year--by analogy, would the
Russian proposal of 4 of each type mean the United States

could have 8 flights? Poznihir replied that he could
envisage in some cases, such as the SS-25 flight tests this
year, more than 4 of one type. He said he would not venture
beyond the current Russian proposal. When asked by Trout
what basis for equality Russia was looking for, Poznihir
replied that the already-expressed elements of flight testing
from UK submarines, exchange of telemetry on new types, and
the relationship to missile defense constituted that basis.

--------------
CLOSING REMARKS
--------------


19. (S) Siemon and Poznihir both commented that the meeting
had been useful in better understanding the positions of the
two sides although they had not resolved the differences
between them. Poznikhir did not believe the Russian side was
ready for technical level discussions at this point, and it
was premature to send a U.S. expert. He felt there were
still too many policy issues to be worked through in further
discussions. Both agreed to report on the discussions to
their delegations and their respective capitals.


20. (U) Documents exchanged: None.


21. (S) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon
Mr. Coussa
Ms. Pura
Mr. Trout
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznihir
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS