START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001190

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, NOVEMBER 30, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1188 (SFO-GVA-VII-068)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-072.


2. (U) Meeting Dates: November 30, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired
by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Ministry of Defense Representative Col Petrov, met twice on
November 30th to discuss U.S.-proposed joint draft texts
(JDTs) for Sections V, VII, and VI of SFO Protocol Part 5 on
Inspection Activities. Discussion during the morning session
focused on Section VII, Type II inspections of non-deployed
strategic offensive arms (SOA) and formerly declared
facilities, while the afternoon focused on Section VI, Type I
inspections of deployed SOA, warheads and operational bases.


4. (S) Both sides agreed to correct all references to other
treaty sections or annexes in accordance with the
newly-developed agreed-upon treaty structure. The U.S. side
agreed to drop references to support equipment and empty
launch canisters throughout the protocol but retained
brackets on other items of inspection (IOI) until the sides
could agree on a list of IOI.


5. (S) Petrov indicated Russia intended to alter its concept
of the size criteria or reference cylinder used for Type I
and Type II inspections and argued for rights to inspect
SSGNs during Type I inspections of submarine bases. Petrov
also indicated Russia might have to change its use of covers
used during warhead inspections.


6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Terminology; Section V on
Non-Disclosure; Section VII Type II Inspections; Section VI
Type I Inspections; and Heavy Bombers and Warhead Cover
Issues.

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TERMINOLOGY
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7. (S) Dr. Warner deferred further discussion on treaty
Article XI (Inspection Activities) due to issues that arose
in the Conforming Group, and provided the Russians with an
updated draft JDT for Section VI, which had been discussed
during the IPWG morning session on November 29 (Reftel).
After a short discussion, both sides agreed to use the term
warheads on deployed ICBMS and SLBMs rather than the term
deployed warheads. Kotkova offered initially the term
warheads on deployed SOA but finally agreed that both sides
clearly understood the concept.



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SECTION V ON NON-DISCLOSURE
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8. (S) On the issue of non-disclosure of information by
inspectors, Warner explained the U.S. side's rationale for
the addition of the term publicly in paragraph 3. The
Russians agreed to lift the brackets after Warner assured the
Russians that the phrase shall not publicly disclose conveyed
the same concept as in paragraph 6 of Article X of START.

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SECTION VII TYPE II INSPECTIONS
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9. (S) Section Title. Despite previous Russian agreement
to drop the Russian term "new facilities" from the title of
Section VII, Warner agreed to retain the brackets until
Petrov could consult with his delegation. Russia retained
brackets around the U.S.-proposed term "formerly declared
f"acilities. Warner proposed generalizing the titles of both
Sections VI and VII and use the short titles of Type I or
Type II inspections. Kotkova said she saw no legal issues
provided the longer title was used in Article XI. She agreed
that the Section titles could have Type I or Type II in
parenthesis at the end of the long title.


10. (S) Paragraph 1. The list of facilities subject to
inspection under the Type II construct was discussed at
length. Petrov struck the bracketed phrase "bases for
submarines equipped with SLBMs," but expressed concern that
facilities for heavy bombers (HB) in non-nuclear
configuration were not listed. Warner noted that the U.S.
side had proposed transparency measures for such HBs to
address Russian concerns over reconversion but not under Type
II inspections. Warner countered Petrov's claim that the
list of facilities was not needed again in Section VII as the
list was already included in Article XI, noting that specific
facilities should be spelled out in each section.


11. (S) Paragraph 3. Petrov accepted the U.S.-proposed
language and struck the Russian-proposed text in the
introductory paragraph. Warner ultimately deleted the term
"support equipment" in sub-paragraph (a) and throughout the
remainder of the sections of Part V. Both sides agreed to
retain brackets around all other items until an agreement
could be reached on what items constitute IOI. Petrov
confirmed that Russia disagreed with the START concepts for
reference cylinder and access criteria based on large enough
to contain. Petrov agreed to sub-paragraph (b) provided no
HBs of any type located at the inspected base could leave, to
include test HBs.


12. (S) Paragraph 4. During the afternoon session, Warner
agreed that the inspected Party would provide the
pre-inspection briefing information in written form to the
inspecting Party. Sub-paragraph (b) was moved to the third
tier group of documents, and both sides agreed to consolidate
sub-paragraph (a) as the final sentence of paragraph 4. All
text in the revised paragraph 4 was agreed, however, Petrov
retained brackets around the requirement to provide a reason
for the absence of each item from an inspection site.



13. (S) Paragraph 5. Warner noted that this paragraph would
have to be updated based on the recent U.S. proposal to
expand the application of unique identifiers (UIDs). Petrov
agreed to provide language on exceptions to the right to read
UIDs for test and soft-site launchers. Both sides agreed to
retain brackets around all text in this paragraph for the
time being.


14. (S) Paragraph 7. Petrov accepted the U.S.-proposed text
in the introduction and in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b),but
retained brackets around sub-paragraph (c) until the issues
of IOI and test ranges were decided. Warner deleted the
entire sub-paragraph (d) during the afternoon session.


15. (S) Paragraphs 8 through 11. Warner retained brackets
around all text in paragraph 8. With the addition of "within
the boundaries of the site diagram" in paragraph 9 and the
deletion of "submarines in dry dock" in paragraph 10, Petrov
agreed to the U.S. text. Russia proposed to add a new
paragraph on training models of missiles (TMOMs) as new
paragraph 11. The text would be similar to paragraph 12 of
Section VI.

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SECTION VI TYPE I INSPECTIONS
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16. (S) Warner and Petrov first engaged in a short, but
ultimately fruitless discussion on how the sides could
broaden the right to read UIDs to ICBMs and SLBMs loaded in
launchers during Type I inspections. Petrov claimed it would
not be technically possible to see the UIDs since they would
be placed on the first stage of a missile and had no purpose
for inspections of warheads.


17. (S) Paragraph 12. Petrov confirmed that inspectors
would have the right to inspect TMOMs during an inspection
unless such TMOMs were loaded in training silos.


18. (S) New paragraph 13 ICBM Bases. With the retention of
brackets around the number of deployed ICBMs subject to
warhead inspections and deletion of the word "nuclear" before
warheads, Petrov agreed to the U.S.-proposed text in the
introduction and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). Petrov accepted
(c) after Warner agreed to modify the text to read "items
specified during pre-inspection procedures at maintenance
facilities." Petrov retained brackets around all text in
sub-paragraphs (d) and (e).


19. (S) New paragraph 14 Submarine Bases. With the retention
of brackets around the number of deployed SLBMs subject to
warhead inspections and deletion of the word "nuclear" before
warheads, Petrov agreed to the U.S.-proposed text in the
introduction and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b),but argued that
sub-paragraph (b) should include the right to inspect SLBM
launchers converted to launch sea-launched cruise missiles
(SLCMs). Warner disagreed, citing the U.S. position that a
SLCM launcher is not an SLBM launcher. Petrov said he would
provide new language on inspection of SLCM launchers to be
added to sub-paragraph (b). Petrov accepted the first
sentence in sub-paragraph (c) with minor changes, but
retained brackets around the second sentence regarding other
SSBNs located in waters of the base but not selected for the


warhead inspection. Petrov indicated the Russians wanted to
include SSGNs in this section.

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HEAVY BOMBERS AND WARHEAD COVER ISSUES
--------------


20. (S) After a long discussion on the inspection of deployed
HBs, the number of deployed HBs to be inspected, and on HBs
carrying non-nuclear armaments located at air bases during
Type I inspections, Warner and Petrov agreed to retain
existing brackets around this kind of inspection until issues
were resolved by Washington and Moscow.


21. (S) Petrov recommended that the issue of reentry vehicle
covers used for warhead inspection of ICBMs and SLBMs be
moved to third tier as a technical issue to be resolved by
the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Petrov cited
the fact that the United States only has two systems subject
to warhead inspections while Russia has six completely
different systems, and indicated Russia might need to change
either its warhead covers or the warhead covering procedures
to adapt to the changed treaty inspection requirements.
Warner argued that is precisely the reason to have general
provisions in the protocol that applied to any covers used
during Type I inspections. Petrov retained brackets around
the entire paragraph pertaining to covers used during warhead
inspections.


22. (S) Petrov agreed to the concluding paragraphs related to
fixing the time of completion and transport of the inspection
team to the location designated for post-inspection
procedures. Warner and Petrov also discussed whether Section
VI should have a provision allowing parallel inspection
activities to take place during Type I inspections. Both
sides agreed that parallel inspection activity by subgroups
was the preferred method, but ultimately agreed not to write
specific text in the protocol as the inspection team chief
and local base personnel would be best suited to make such a
decision.


23. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- U.S. Proposed JDT for Section VI, Inspections of
Strategic Offensive Arms at Operational Bases, Including the
Nuclear Warheads On or Associated With Them, Conducted
Pursuant to Subparagraph TBD of Article XI of the Treaty,
dated November 30, 2009, showing updates through November 28.


24. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Celusnak
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura


Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int for AM Session)
Mr. Bennett(Int for PM Session)

RUSSIA

Col Petrov
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int for AM Session)
Mr. Pogodin (Int for PM Session)


25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS