Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1189
2009-12-20 08:52:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #1189/01 3540852 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 200852Z DEC 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0780 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5850 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3029 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2039 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7246
S E C R E T GENEVA 001189
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP, DECEMBER
4, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T GENEVA 001189
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP, DECEMBER
4, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-097.
2. (U) Meeting Date: December 04, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) During the meeting of the Notifications Working
Group, held at the Russian Mission on December 4, the sides
briefly discussed Article VIII noting that it was ready for
negotiation by the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group
(TTDWG). Mr. Siemon discussed the Preamble and three
sections of the U.S.-proposed Part Four of the Protocol,
Notifications, and Col Ryzhkov provided comments on
individual notifications.
4. (S) Ryzhkov described his concept of notifications for
conversion or elimination (CorE) noting it was possible to
have only two notifications. Siemon recommended that there
should also be a discussion with CorE Working Group Chair,
Mr. Elliott, and Ryzhkov agreed. The two sides also
discussed heavy bombers. Ryzhkov opined that notifications
should be provided when visiting heavy bombers landed at any
facility, declared and undeclared. Siemon replied that data
with respect to the movement of U.S. bombers to specific
overseas locations was sensitive, however he agreed the
Russian proposal could be discussed further. End Summary.
5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Treaty Article VIII and Part IV
Preamble; Sections I and II; Conversion or Elimination
Notifications; and Heavy Bombers.
--------------
TREATY ARTICLE VIII AND PART IV PREAMBLE
--------------
6. (S) Ryzhkov began the meeting by stating that Amb Antonov
required that the working group chairs agree on the concepts
of treaty articles before the TTDWG be permitted to negotiate
that text. He proceeded to note two minor concerns with the
current U.S.-proposed text, and both were resolved during the
discussion. Siemon indicated that the United States was
prepared to accept, in the TTDWG, the first four paragraphs
for Article VIII in a slightly revised form, and
consequently, Ryzhkov could notify Antonov that his
requirement had been met.
7. (S) Siemon shifted the discussion to the Preamble to Part
Four of the Protocol to the treaty, Notifications. He
suggested use of a "General Provisions" section to capture
notifications in Greenwich Mean Time, and Ryzhkov agreed that
was possible. Ryzhkov stated he would generate new proposed
text for this section, and Siemon agreed to do the same.
--------------
SECTIONS I AND II
--------------
8. (S) Siemon opened discussion on Section I by noting that
the START format was in bold text after each notification.
He stated the intention was for each side, at a later time,
to properly map notifications from START to the new treaty,
where applicable. Ryzhkov indicated that he was proceeding
down a different path. First, he believed a Format 3,
Notification of Change in Data with Respect to Items Subject
to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty, would be used
in all cases where data was changed. Therefore, there would
be no need for any other Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
data change notifications. He cited Format 4, Notification
of Loss as a Result of Accident and Format 5, Notification of
Disablement Beyond Repair, as examples of notifications that
could be combined with Format 3. Additional Russian comments
regarding this section were specific to individual formats as
indicated below:
- Format 8, Notification for Variants of ICBMs and SLBMs,
and New Versions of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, the location
for the Exhibition or Exhibitions Conducted Pursuant to the
Treaty. Russian comment: Notification was not required
since variants are not considered under this treaty.
- Format 11, Notification of Planned Numbers of Nuclear
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and on or
Associated with Deployed Heavy Bombers. Russian comment:
Notification was not required since no drastic reduction in
numbers would occur under this treaty.
- Format 12, Notification of Expected Number of Deployed
Strategic Offensive Arms in Excess of Previously Notified
Planned Number. Russian comment: Notification was not
required since this document alters data provided in a Format
11.
- Format 15, Notification of the Transfer of Items to or
from a Third Party. Russian comment: Notification was not
required since Russia would not transfer items to third
parties and since U.S. transfers to the United Kingdom would
be minimal. When a transfer by the United States did take
place, the United States could use either a change in MOU
data or a Format 144, "Additional Messages" notification.
- Format 16, Notification of Exit from a Newly Constructed
Facility. Russian comment: Notification was not required
since neither side was likely to construct a new production
facility during the life of this treaty. If new construction
did occur, this could be notified under Format 144,
"Additional Messages."
- Format 31, Notification of Visit of Deployed Heavy Bomber
to Specified or Eliminated Facility. Russian comment:
Notification was required.
- Format 44, Notification of Beginning of Major Strategic
Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. Russian comment:
Notification was required.
- Format 45, Notification of Completion of Major Strategic
Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. Russian comment:
Notification was required.
- Format 63, Notification of Arrival of Converted Heavy
Bomber at Viewing Site. Russian comment: A separate
notification is not required. This would be covered by
Format 3.
- Format 68, Notification of Annual Schedule for Conversion
and Elimination. Russian comment: Notification has not been
used for the past 8 years. Transfer of this information
would occur through other notifications.
- Format 83, Notification, no less than 48 hours in
advance, of the Planned Departure from a Production Facility
of the First Prototype ICBM or SLBM. Russian comment:
Russia was still considering a notification of this type.
- Format 88, Notification, no less than 48 hours in
advance, of the Departure of a Mobile Launcher of Prototype
ICBMs from its Production Facility. Russian comment: This
notification was never used in the history of START and
proposed deleting it in the new treaty.
- Format 91, Notification of Exit of First Long-Range
Nuclear ALCM of a New Type from a Production Facility.
Russian comment: This notification was not required since
radiation equipment would be used to determine nuclear from
non-nuclear in lieu of distinguishing features.
- Format 94, Notification of Arrival of First Nuclear ALCM
of New Type at First Air Base. Russian comment: This
notification was not required since radiation equipment would
be used at air bases for heavy bombers.
--------------
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION NOTIFICATIONS
--------------
9. (S) Ryzhkov stressed that only two notifications were
needed with respect to CorE activities: Notification of
Intention and Notification of Initiation. Siemon replied
that the U.S. side had attempted to capture the current CorE
text and asked questions regarding notification of specific
steps in the process. Ryzhkov reiterated that only
notifications of intent and initiation were required in
addition to a change in MOU notification to close each
process. Siemon recommended Ryzhkov and Elliott discuss this
matter to ensure the needs of both sides were met. Ryzhkov
agreed.
--------------
HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------
10. (S) Ryzhkov raised a concern regarding visiting heavy
bombers. He stated that bombers were highly mobile and they
often visited undeclared facilities where no notification was
required. He recommended a notification be required in these
cases as well as with declared facilities. Siemon responded
that maintenance issues can force heavy bombers to land at
undeclared facilities. He asked if Russia,s concern was
about continental or overseas movements of heavy bombers.
Ryzhkov replied that Russia was concerned about both, and
clarified that his primary concern was about the movement of
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Siemon stated
heavy bomber movement notifications were sensitive for
specific overseas locations because of tactical support to
the ongoing U.S. war effort but the concept of heavy bomber
notifications could be discussed at a later working group
meeting.
11. (U) Documents provided: None.
12. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Dwyer
LTC LaGraffe
LT Sicks
Mr. Hopkins (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP, DECEMBER
4, 2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-097.
2. (U) Meeting Date: December 04, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) During the meeting of the Notifications Working
Group, held at the Russian Mission on December 4, the sides
briefly discussed Article VIII noting that it was ready for
negotiation by the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group
(TTDWG). Mr. Siemon discussed the Preamble and three
sections of the U.S.-proposed Part Four of the Protocol,
Notifications, and Col Ryzhkov provided comments on
individual notifications.
4. (S) Ryzhkov described his concept of notifications for
conversion or elimination (CorE) noting it was possible to
have only two notifications. Siemon recommended that there
should also be a discussion with CorE Working Group Chair,
Mr. Elliott, and Ryzhkov agreed. The two sides also
discussed heavy bombers. Ryzhkov opined that notifications
should be provided when visiting heavy bombers landed at any
facility, declared and undeclared. Siemon replied that data
with respect to the movement of U.S. bombers to specific
overseas locations was sensitive, however he agreed the
Russian proposal could be discussed further. End Summary.
5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Treaty Article VIII and Part IV
Preamble; Sections I and II; Conversion or Elimination
Notifications; and Heavy Bombers.
--------------
TREATY ARTICLE VIII AND PART IV PREAMBLE
--------------
6. (S) Ryzhkov began the meeting by stating that Amb Antonov
required that the working group chairs agree on the concepts
of treaty articles before the TTDWG be permitted to negotiate
that text. He proceeded to note two minor concerns with the
current U.S.-proposed text, and both were resolved during the
discussion. Siemon indicated that the United States was
prepared to accept, in the TTDWG, the first four paragraphs
for Article VIII in a slightly revised form, and
consequently, Ryzhkov could notify Antonov that his
requirement had been met.
7. (S) Siemon shifted the discussion to the Preamble to Part
Four of the Protocol to the treaty, Notifications. He
suggested use of a "General Provisions" section to capture
notifications in Greenwich Mean Time, and Ryzhkov agreed that
was possible. Ryzhkov stated he would generate new proposed
text for this section, and Siemon agreed to do the same.
--------------
SECTIONS I AND II
--------------
8. (S) Siemon opened discussion on Section I by noting that
the START format was in bold text after each notification.
He stated the intention was for each side, at a later time,
to properly map notifications from START to the new treaty,
where applicable. Ryzhkov indicated that he was proceeding
down a different path. First, he believed a Format 3,
Notification of Change in Data with Respect to Items Subject
to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty, would be used
in all cases where data was changed. Therefore, there would
be no need for any other Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
data change notifications. He cited Format 4, Notification
of Loss as a Result of Accident and Format 5, Notification of
Disablement Beyond Repair, as examples of notifications that
could be combined with Format 3. Additional Russian comments
regarding this section were specific to individual formats as
indicated below:
- Format 8, Notification for Variants of ICBMs and SLBMs,
and New Versions of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, the location
for the Exhibition or Exhibitions Conducted Pursuant to the
Treaty. Russian comment: Notification was not required
since variants are not considered under this treaty.
- Format 11, Notification of Planned Numbers of Nuclear
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and on or
Associated with Deployed Heavy Bombers. Russian comment:
Notification was not required since no drastic reduction in
numbers would occur under this treaty.
- Format 12, Notification of Expected Number of Deployed
Strategic Offensive Arms in Excess of Previously Notified
Planned Number. Russian comment: Notification was not
required since this document alters data provided in a Format
11.
- Format 15, Notification of the Transfer of Items to or
from a Third Party. Russian comment: Notification was not
required since Russia would not transfer items to third
parties and since U.S. transfers to the United Kingdom would
be minimal. When a transfer by the United States did take
place, the United States could use either a change in MOU
data or a Format 144, "Additional Messages" notification.
- Format 16, Notification of Exit from a Newly Constructed
Facility. Russian comment: Notification was not required
since neither side was likely to construct a new production
facility during the life of this treaty. If new construction
did occur, this could be notified under Format 144,
"Additional Messages."
- Format 31, Notification of Visit of Deployed Heavy Bomber
to Specified or Eliminated Facility. Russian comment:
Notification was required.
- Format 44, Notification of Beginning of Major Strategic
Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. Russian comment:
Notification was required.
- Format 45, Notification of Completion of Major Strategic
Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. Russian comment:
Notification was required.
- Format 63, Notification of Arrival of Converted Heavy
Bomber at Viewing Site. Russian comment: A separate
notification is not required. This would be covered by
Format 3.
- Format 68, Notification of Annual Schedule for Conversion
and Elimination. Russian comment: Notification has not been
used for the past 8 years. Transfer of this information
would occur through other notifications.
- Format 83, Notification, no less than 48 hours in
advance, of the Planned Departure from a Production Facility
of the First Prototype ICBM or SLBM. Russian comment:
Russia was still considering a notification of this type.
- Format 88, Notification, no less than 48 hours in
advance, of the Departure of a Mobile Launcher of Prototype
ICBMs from its Production Facility. Russian comment: This
notification was never used in the history of START and
proposed deleting it in the new treaty.
- Format 91, Notification of Exit of First Long-Range
Nuclear ALCM of a New Type from a Production Facility.
Russian comment: This notification was not required since
radiation equipment would be used to determine nuclear from
non-nuclear in lieu of distinguishing features.
- Format 94, Notification of Arrival of First Nuclear ALCM
of New Type at First Air Base. Russian comment: This
notification was not required since radiation equipment would
be used at air bases for heavy bombers.
--------------
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION NOTIFICATIONS
--------------
9. (S) Ryzhkov stressed that only two notifications were
needed with respect to CorE activities: Notification of
Intention and Notification of Initiation. Siemon replied
that the U.S. side had attempted to capture the current CorE
text and asked questions regarding notification of specific
steps in the process. Ryzhkov reiterated that only
notifications of intent and initiation were required in
addition to a change in MOU notification to close each
process. Siemon recommended Ryzhkov and Elliott discuss this
matter to ensure the needs of both sides were met. Ryzhkov
agreed.
--------------
HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------
10. (S) Ryzhkov raised a concern regarding visiting heavy
bombers. He stated that bombers were highly mobile and they
often visited undeclared facilities where no notification was
required. He recommended a notification be required in these
cases as well as with declared facilities. Siemon responded
that maintenance issues can force heavy bombers to land at
undeclared facilities. He asked if Russia,s concern was
about continental or overseas movements of heavy bombers.
Ryzhkov replied that Russia was concerned about both, and
clarified that his primary concern was about the movement of
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Siemon stated
heavy bomber movement notifications were sensitive for
specific overseas locations because of tactical support to
the ongoing U.S. war effort but the concept of heavy bomber
notifications could be discussed at a later working group
meeting.
11. (U) Documents provided: None.
12. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Dwyer
LTC LaGraffe
LT Sicks
Mr. Hopkins (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS