START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1174 (SFO-GVA-VII-063)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-068.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 29, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.; and
3:00 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The ninth and tenth meetings of the Inspection
Protocol Working Group (IPWG) of this session were held on
November 29, 2009. Dr. Warner and Col Petrov discussed a
revised treaty Article XI text and Sections I, V, and VI of
Part Five of the Protocol. Unresolved issues concerning
heavy bombers and mobile launcher systems continued to limit
clearing of bracketed text. Russian concepts to limit the
scope of inspections became clearer as the Russian side gave
some details on reducing site diagrams and adjusting
reference cylinders to re strict access. End Summary.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Review of Adjusted Treaty Article
XI; Nothing is Agreed Until All is Agreed; Section VI and
Issues on Mobiles; Shrinking Basing Areas; Rights and
Obligations Must Stay in Tier Two; Section V Revisited: TwoQSteps Forward, One Back; Large Reference Cylinders, Little
Access.

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REVIEW OF ADJUSTED TREATY ARTICLE XI
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5. (S) The sides agreed to discuss joint draft text (JDT)
paragraphs from treaty Article XI, then Section VI and V to
Part Five of the Protocol.


6. (S) In treaty Article XI, the U.S. side agreed to use the
term "warhead" instead of "nuclear warhead;" the only bracket
remaining concerned inspections of heavy bomber nuclear
armament weapons storage areas (NAWSA),which remains a
continuing issue. In the paragraph on exhibitions, the sides
agreed to retain brackets on technical characteristic
exhibitions and periodic checks of converted items of
strategic offensive arms (SOA). (Begin comment: The term
"SOA" remains under discussion in the Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group (TTDWG). End comment.) End
Summary.


7. (S) The sides next discussed Section I, General
Obligations, to Part Five of the Protocol (Inspection
Activities). The sides also agreed to paragraphs 2 and 4.
The sides also agreed to paragraph 1 after removal of
reference to continuous monitoring. One word remained
bracketed in paragraph 3, which concerned the use of
"publicly" regarding the non-disclosure of information.
Petrov said Russia would need to study this further.
Paragraph 5, concerning the number of inspectors, was moved


to Section V of Part Five, but the numbers of inspectors for
the various types of inspections was left bracketed. The
Russian-proposed provision in paragraph 6 to allow only one
inspection activity at any one time was left bracketed.
Paragraphs 7 and 8, concerning the number of inspections,
were moved to Sections VI and VII, respectively.
Disagreements remained unresolved on the yearly quota of
inspections and the number of sites that could be inspected a
second time in 1 year.

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NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED
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8. (S) Petrov stated that the proposed Russian package (Ref
A) was to be accepted only as a whole and that individual
provisions could not be accepted with others rejected.
Warner noted that Russia had demonstrated no compunction
about breaking up U.S. package proposals in the recent past
and stated the United States would follow the same practice
in responding to the recent Russian "package," noting that
"nothing is agreed until all is agreed."

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SECTION VI AND ISSUES ON MOBILES
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9. (S) Discussions continued on Section VI of Part Five of
the Protocol regarding Type 1 combined inspections, and
pickQup at paragraph 9, which concerned designation
procedures. Warner noted that in general, many issues could
be cleared up once definitions concerning heavy bombers were
resolved. He suggested that Col Ilin and Col Petrov needed
to talk to Gen Orlov and Adm Kuznetsov about this matter.
The sides agreed to use the term "structure for mobile
launchers of ICBMs" instead of "fixed structure" throughout
the Protocol. The Russians held fast that re stricted areas
should not be inspectable and that only one vice two ICBM or
SLBM launchers Qd the missiles in or on them should be
designated for RVOSI/nuclear warhead inspection. The sides
agreed to discuss provisions for designation of heavy bombers
at a later time.

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SHRINKING BASING AREAS
--------------


10. (S) Warner noted that for re stricted areas at the
mobile ICBM bases, the Russian proposal did not include
procedures to look for ICBMs in structures large enough to
contain them, but at submarine bases, inspectors could
inventory SLBMs in magazines; this was an inconsistency.
Petrov responded that there was no need to look in re
stricted areas as there was no limit on non-deployed
missiles. Warner noted that such a limit had been proposed,
the inspectors had the right to confirm declared data at the
base which included data on the number and location of
undeployed mobile ICBM launchers, and that inspectors would
need to look for additional deployed mobile launchers as
well. Petrov stated that Russia would only include the
structures that were intended to contain launchers on the
site diagrams for basing areas. (Begin comment: Petrov thus
implied that the site diagrams at road mobile ICBM re


stricted areas would only include nine buildings; the sliding
roof garages for road mobile ICBM launchers. End comment.)


11. (S) During a discussion of paragraph 10 of Section VI,
the sides agreed to a 12-hour limit to transport inspectors
to a designated silo launcher, but left transportation time
to a re stricted area for mobile ICBMs bracketed.

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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS MUST STAY IN TIER TWO
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12. (S) The sides discussed Section VI, paragraph 11, which
developed into a more general discussion of the remaining
paragraphs of Section VI. The Russian side wanted to put a
link at this paragraph to "refer our readers" to the third
tier annexes for these procedures; Petrov noted this was
similar in structure to START. Warner asked whether the
Russian side was walking back on the previous agreement to
keep the provisions that pertained to rights and obligations
in the first two tiers of the treaty, that is, to the treaty
itself and the protocol, and that it was unacceptable to move
rights and obligations to the third tier. Warner reminded
Petrov that in any event, Annexes 6 and 7, later redesignated
as Sections 6 and 7 of the Inspection Activities Part of the
Protocol, needed to be finished before treaty signature, and
that if the Russian side proposed to push additional
provisions from Section VI to the annexes, they should
provide the entire text of the proposed annex.

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SECTION V REVISITED: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE BACK
-------------- --------------


13. (S) The afternoon meeting focused on a discussion of
Section V, General Rules for the Conduct of Inspection
Activities. The sides agreed to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6,
12, 14, 17 and 19. In paragraph 3, the Russian side had not
yet determined if it could accept the word "publicly" to
describe the non-disclosure of information. In paragraph 7,
the sides agreed on a 14-hour transport time limit from the
point of entry to the designated inspection site, but not on
a provision related to the recall of mobile launchers. The
Russian side wanted to move a provision concerning use of
cameras to the Annex 5, so the language remained bracketed.


14. (S) In paragraph 9, the Russian side insisted on
bracketing previously agreed text concerning the right to
view and measure items and linked this to concerns that it
would allow measurement of warheads. The Russian side
initially proposed that paragraph 10 include warheads and
silos, confusing the term "item of inspection" with
treaty-accountable items. To resolve the confusion, the
Russian side proposed adding a clarifying phrase in the
chapeau of paragraph 10, "about which technical data has been
provided in Part Two of this Protocol," which was added in
brackets for U.S. review. Also remaining in brackets in
paragraph 10 were references to items of inspection within a
heavy bomber NAWSA. Petrov and Warner acknowledged the need
to discuss a forthcoming U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on
B-1B heavy bombers, which could help clear some brackets in
paragraph 10.


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LARGE REFERENCE CYLINDER, LITTLE ACCESS
--------------


15. (S) The United States proposed a shortened version of
paragraph 11 on size criteria and reference cylinders, and a
discussion ensued; no brackets were cleared. The Russian
side opposed the use of its smallest first stage in the
calculation of reference cylinders. Petrov maintained that
this would be unfair because the classification of Russian
ICBMs and SLBMs are such that they would only be found in
canisters or as completely assembled missiles. He proposed
basing reference cylinders on what would actually be found at
the bases. Warner argued it would be more efficient to
employ one reference cylinder. (Begin comment: If the
Russian proposals were accepted, reference cylinders at
Russian facilities would be much larger than at U.S.
facilities, and thus re strict access at certain Russian
bases as compared to U.S. bases. A canisterized SS-18
without front section is 30.5 meters long and 3.5 meters in
diameter, while a Minuteman III first stage is 6.3 meters
long and 1.68 meters wide. End comment.)


16. (S) The sides continued to disagree on the maximum
number of inspectors for each type of inspection activity but
only for Type 2 inspections. Petrov said that Russia intends
to decrease the size of the inspectable area at Plesetsk so
it would be possible for 7 inspectors to complete a Type 2
inspection there within 24 hours. For Type 1 inspections and
exhibitions the Russians agreed on 10 inspectors rather than
9 inspectors.


17. (S) The sides reached agreement on the duration of all
inspections except for Type 1 inspections at air bases. The
Russian side bracketed "24 hours" because they were concerned
that 24 hours might not allow sufficient time to use
radiation detection equipment associated with the possible
need to distinguish nuclear from non-nuclear armaments
encountered during the inspection of a heavy bomber.


18. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- Updated Section VII of Part Five of Protocol; and

-- Proposed Annex 7 to Protocol.


19. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Couch (a.m. meeting)
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell (p.m. meeting)
Mr. Rust (a.m. meeting)
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith


Mr. Shkeyrov (Int a.m. meeting)
Mr. Hopkins (Int p.m. meeting)

RUSSIA

Col Petrov
Col Izrazov
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Vodopolova
Ms. Komshilova (Int a.m. meeting)
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int p.m. meeting)


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS