Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1187
2009-12-19 10:39:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1187/01 3531039
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191039Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0770
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5840
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3019
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2029
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7236
S E C R E T GENEVA 001187 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING (TTDWG),NOVEMBER 30, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1175 (SFO-GVA-VII-071)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001187

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING (TTDWG),NOVEMBER 30, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1175 (SFO-GVA-VII-071)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-076.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:45 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG)
agreed to send Article II of the draft treaty to conforming
with one remaining bracket. The Russian delegation also put
forth a new proposal for Article III. The United States
dropped its position that ICBM and SLBM launchers should be
"considered to contain" a missile and adopted the Russian
position on deployed missiles and launchers. This allowed
conceptual agreement on the ICBM and SLBM sections of Article
III with the final wording to be determined after the
Definitions Subgroup completed the definitions of deployed
ICBM and SLBM. The Russian delegation also put forth a new
proposed Article IV on locating non-deployed items. The U.S.
delegation raised several questions and deferred further
comment until the proposal could be studied in detail.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Treaty Article II; Treaty Article
III; and Treaty Article IV

--------------
TREATY ARTICLE II
--------------


5. (S) Admiral Kuznetsov asked whether the United States had
any comments on treaty Article II. Mr. Taylor responded that
the United States proposed inserting the word "nuclear" in
paragraph 1(b) so the sentence would read, "...and nuclear
warheads on ((or associated with))1 deployed heavy bombers."
Kuznetsov concurred and both sides agreed to send the article

to the Conforming Group with the one remaining bracket.

--------------
TREATY ARTICLE III
--------------


6. (S) Kuznetsov next stated that the Russian delegation had
studied the U.S. working paper on Article III (Reftel)
carefully, especially paragraph 3. It agreed with paragraph
1, paragraph 2--except for subparagraph 2(b),paragraph 3,
and paragraph 4--except for subparagraph 4(c). (Begin
comment: All these paragraphs dealt with counting rules,
specifically what would count against the central limits and
when new items of strategic offensive arms (SOA) would begin
to count. End comment.) Taylor asked Kuznetsov to explain
what the Russian side meant by the term "protective device"
in the description of when a silo launcher began to count
under the treaty. After a brief discussion both sides agreed
that "silo door" was a better term in the Russian bracket and
that it had been used in the START Treaty, but Taylor


retained the option to confirm it with the Conversion or
Elimination (CorE) Working Group. The Russian delegation
then tabled a proposed joint draft text (JDT) for Article III.


7. (S) Kuznetsov directed the U.S. delegation's attention to
a new proposed paragraph on deployed SOA. Kuznetsov made the
point that it was important to state in the treaty article
exactly which SOA would be counted.

Begin Text:

4bis. Strategic offensive arms shall be counted toward the
aggregate limits provided for by this Treaty as follows:

(a) ICBMs or SLBMs: from the time an ICBM or SLBM is
installed in an ICBM or SLBM launcher to the time the ICBM or
SLBM is removed from the ICBM or SLBM launcher;

(b) Heavy bomber: from the time a heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments begins to be attributed to an
airbase to the time when it ceases to be attributed to this
airbase;

(c) Warheads:

(i) On ICBMs or SLBMs: from the time a reentry
vehicle is placed on an ICBM or SLBM to the time the reentry
vehicle is removed from a deployed ICBM or SLBM, or this ICBM
or SLBM is removed from a deployed ICBM or SLBM launcher with
a front section containing reentry vehicles;

(ii) On heavy bombers:

(A) If nuclear armaments are absent on a
deployed heavy bomber: from the time a heavy bomber begins to
be attributed to an airbase to the time when a heavy bomber
ceases to be attributed to an airbase. In addition, one
warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber;

(B) If nuclear armaments are present on a
deployed heavy bomber: from the time each nuclear armament
unit is installed on a deployed heavy bomber to the time that
the nuclear armament unit is removed from that deployed heavy
bomber.

End Text.


8. (S) After reviewing the Russian proposal, Taylor
responded that the United States was prepared to drop the
phrase, "considered to contain" in its proposed text
regarding definitions of deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs.
The United States was prepared to accept the Russian position
on what constituted deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Therefore, the
current agreed text in Article III, paragraphs 1 and 2,
encompassed the intent of the proposed Russian paragraph 4.
Taylor continued that the current agreed text was simplified,
not redundant, and properly covered the counting of deployed
SOA and warheads. Kuznetsov replied that this logic was
clear to him; however, he asked how the United States would
interpret the case of a deployed missile that had no warheads
emplaced on it. Taylor responded that this would count as an
SDV but with zero warheads. The Russian side also agreed
with this interpretation. Taylor then noted that the United


States still disagreed with the Russian formulation of the
counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments and this
text should remain bracketed. Ms. Kotkova asked to confirm
that the United States still agreed to paragraph 1(c) that,
"Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit."
Taylor concurred.


9. (S) The Working Group next addressed the bracketed text
in paragraph 5 pertaining to when items ceased to be subject
to the treaty, "((recorded))1 ((determined)2) within the
framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)."
Kotkova stated that "recorded" did not translate properly
into Russian without reference to what was being recorded.
Mr. Brown agreed that this needed further explanation.
Taylor stated that this was tied to the "wildcard" procedures
being developed in the CorE Working Group and so both sides
agreed to wait until that group provided more clarity.


10. (S) Kuznetsov opened discussion of paragraph 6 and said
the Russian delegation objected to subparagraphs (b) and (c)
on not counting non-nuclear ballistic missiles and on
counting ballistic missiles if any of the type had been
tested for nuclear weapon delivery. Taylor agreed to drop
subparagraph (b) and to drop the word "nuclear" from (c).
Kuznetsov asked whether the working group should define "new
type." Taylor responded that both sides already had proposed
definitions. Col Kamenskiy then explained the Russian view
that any newly developed system would go through the proper
notifications and BCC procedures, eventually becoming an
existing type captured under the provisions. Therefore, he
stated, the subparagraph was superfluous. Taylor stated that
the United States would consider this point of view.
Kuznetsov remarked that the Russian delegation had no issues
with subparagraph (d) on distinguishing heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments from those equipped for
non-nuclear armaments.


11. (S) The discussion on paragraph 7 centered on the naming
convention to be used for existing types. The Russian
delegation expressed the desire that only one term be used
for each system. Taylor asked about Russia's existing types
of heavy bomber armaments and especially when the Russian
delegation expected to list their existing types. Kuznetsov
responded, "sometime." He added that he was waiting for
additional guidance from Moscow.

--------------
TREATY ARTICLE IV
--------------


12. (S) Kuznetsov tabled a Russian proposal for Article IV
covering locational restrictions for deployed and
non-deployed SOA.

Begin Text:


1. Each Party shall locate and base deployed strategic
offensive arms only at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air
bases.


2. Each Party shall locate:

(a) Non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs only at ICBM bases,


submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, repair
facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs
or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or
SLBMs, training facilities, test ranges, and production
facilities. Prototype ICBMs and SLBMs shall not be located
at ICBM bases or submarine bases.

(b) Non-deployed ICBM or SLBM launchers only at ICBM
bases, submarine bases, production facilities for mobile
launchers of ICBMs or ballistic missile submarines, repair
facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities
for mobile launchers of ICBMs, conversion or elimination
facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, training
facilities, test ranges, and production facilities.


3. Each Party shall base non-deployed heavy bombers only at
air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, heavy bomber flight test centers, production
facilities for heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy
bombers, repair facilities for heavy bombers, and conversion
or elimination facilities for heavy bombers.


4. Non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs as well as non-deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party
shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities
to no more than 30 days.


5. Each Party shall provide to the other Party notification
concerning the transfer of deployed strategic offensive arms
into non-deployed strategic offensive arms and vice versa in
accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.


6. The number of ICBM and SLBM test launchers and training
launchers shall not be increased beyond those needed for
testing and training purposes.

End Text.


13. (S) Taylor stated that the Russian approach was quite
logical, with the understanding that it omitted the U.S.
position on limits to mobile launchers of ICBMs and test
heavy bombers. Dr. Fraley asked the Russian delegation to
clarify the separation of transit concepts into a separate
paragraph. Kuznetsov replied that it allowed for the easier
separation of clauses that applied specifically to mobile
launchers of ICBMs. The U.S. side expressed its
understanding but offered that paragraph 4 might make a more
logical fit as subparagraph (c) of paragraph 2. Kuznetsov
agreed. Fraley then noted that since the U.S. side had
dropped the "considered to contain" concept, it would have to
consider carefully the implications for non-deployed SLBM
launchers in subparagraph 2(b). Fraley then took up
discussion of paragraph 5, noting that the English
translation of "concerning the transfer of deployed SOA into
non-deployed SOA" was vague. Both sides agreed that the
issues were tied up with both Article VIII and notifications,
and agreed to defer further discussion.


14. (S) Looking at paragraph 6, Taylor stated that the
paragraph as worded raised several questions. He asked what
the test and training requirements would be and who would
decide whose needs would dictate the number. Kuznetsov
responded that this was an area that required mutual trust.


Taylor retorted, "Trust but with a limit." Kuznetsov said
that he would raise the subject with his delegation but
rejected any limits on non-deployed SOA. Taylor ended the
discussion with a request to seriously consider limits on
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers as this was a necessary
requirement to dropping the U.S. proposal of "considered to
contain."


15. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

- U.S. Working Paper, Article IV, November 30, 2009

- RUSSIA:

- Russian-Proposed JDT for Article III, November 29,
2009; and

- Russian-Proposed JDT for Article IV, November 30, 2009


16. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
LTC LaGraffe
Mr. Marshall
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Trifinov
Mr. Pogodin (Int)


17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS