START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 8, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-109.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 8, 2009
Time: 3:45 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
chairs, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, met at the Russian Mission
on December 8. The United States delivered a revised General
Provisions section, discussed heavy bomber counting rules and
the recent U.S.-proposed agreed Statement on Heavy Bombers,
and confirmed the U.S. existing types intended to be declared
in the treaty. Trout floated the idea of using an agreed
statement to take care of Peacekeeper (PK) and possibly
Trident I, while Orlov floated limits of 700 for deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers with an 800 limit on deployed
and non-deployed ICBMS, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Some
bracketed issues in the text were also discussed, with some
brackets removed. End Summary.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: We Need General Provisions; Heavy
Bombers; PK, MM-II, TRIDENT I; The Central Limits; U.S. and
Russian Force Structure; Bracketed Text And Other Issues; and
Closing Comments.

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WE NEED GENERAL PROVISIONS
--------------


5. (S) Trout delivered a revised section on General
Provisions for the database. LT Lobner explained the
rationale for the new text, citing the deletion of
introduction paragraphs, or chapeaus, in all parts of the
Protocol. Additionally, he pointed out, the United States
had worked to incorporate more of the Russian-proposed text
and parts of the former START Annex J.


6. (S) Begin Text of U.S.-proposed Section I of Part Two of
the Protocol:

December 7,
2009

Section I. General Provisions


1. The Parties shall use the categories of data contained in
Part Two, Database for Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter
referred to as the Database, when providing data required by
the Treaty and this Protocol.


2. The Parties shall exchange data related to their
strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty, current as of
(Date of Signature),no later than 45 days after signature of
the Treaty, except as provided for in paragraph 6 of Article
VIII.


((3. Each party acknowledges that it is responsible for the
accuracy of its own data.))1


4. For the purposes of this Part and for exchanges of data,
the word "dash" is used to denote that the entry is not
applicable in such case. The word "blank" is used to denote
either that this data will be provided when available, or
that this data shall not be publicly released, pursuant to
paragraph 6 of Article VIII.


5. The parties shall provide, as a category of data,
geographic coordinates relating to the data contained in the
Database. All geographic coordinates provided for in the
Database shall be expressed in latitude and longitude to the
nearest minute, except in cases where two or more locations
are within one minute of latitude and longitude of each
other, and are of the same type or have the same appearance;
in such cases, the latitude and longitude shall be expressed
to include seconds.


6. In specifying geographic coordinates, each Party shall use
the system of coordinates commonly employed by it.


7. Geographic coordinates for silo launchers of ICBMs located
in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base and fixed test
launchers at a test range shall be expressed to the nearest
minute.

End Text.


7. (S) Orlov focused on the data exchange requirements of
the revised document, citing recent information provided to
him by the Notifications Working Group which specified that
the first data exchange would occur 45 days after
entry-into-force (EIF). Trout reiterated the U.S. position
that, in addition to a data exchange within a certain amount
of days after EIF, the United States would exchange data
current as of signature within 45 days after signature.
Lobner added that the Notifications Working Group would take
care of the EIF requirements with input from the MOU Working
Group, but argued that the MOU Working Group would have to
specify any requirements to exchange data prior to EIF.
Orlov agreed to evaluate this position.

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HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


8. (S) Moving to the recent U.S. proposal for an agreed
statement on the B-1 heavy bombers, Orlov retorted that the
paper had caused great commotion in the Russian delegation
and they had formed a "war room" to discuss the paper.

Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement:

PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS

Agreed Statement: The Parties agree that in order to provide
assurances that B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments continue to satisfy the requirements for conversion
in accordance with Part III of the Protocol, the following
provisions shall apply after the completion of the
elimination or conversion, using conversion procedures


employed previously under START, of the final B-1B heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments:


1. The United States of America will notify the Russian
Federation that the Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota
and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas have been eliminated. Once
eliminated, these facilities will not be subject to
inspection.


2. B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments will
no longer be subject to the provisions of the Treaty, other
than those provisions contained herein.


3. The United States will offer an annual exhibition of B-1B
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The
Russian Federation has the right to participate in this
exhibition within the 30-day period following notification.


4. The procedures for conduct of such annual exhibitions will
be identical to those for heavy bomber conversion
confirmation exhibitions, contained in Section VIII to Part
Five of the Protocol and Part Three of the Protocol, with the
following additional procedures:

(a) The point of entry will be Travis Air Force Base,
California.

(b) The United States will indicate in the notification
the B-1B base where the exhibition will take place.

(c) Upon arrival at the B-1B base, the in-country
escort team lead shall provide an annotated site diagram to
show the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments.

(d) After pre-inspection procedures have been
completed, the inspection team leader may designate no more
than one B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments
for exhibition.

(e) A member of the in-country escort shall permit
inspectors to view the designated B-1B heavy bombers that
were converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol
and therefore are incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

(f) The conduct of such an exhibition shall be recorded
in the official report.

End text.


9. (S) Orlov asked some clarifying points about the paper
beginning with the U.S. position to not have non-deployed
heavy bombers. Trout answered stating the U.S. position in
the non-paper that the United States would have deployed
heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments. He made a caveat on the deployed
heavy bomber term, stating that there was still discussion
within the U.S. delegation about using non-deployed heavy
bombers to refer to bombers at Davis Monthan, adding,
however, that the United States would still eliminate these
bombers in the 7-year reduction period. (Begin comment:
Davis Monthan Air Force Base is a U.S. conversion and
elimination facility for heavy bombers. End comment.) Orlov


commented that it would have been helpful if the U.S. paper
had stated this fact. Orlov asked about heavy bombers in
long term maintenance for 1 year or more. Trout replied that
the United States still considered these heavy bombers
deployed but that the U.S. delegation was still thinking
about this concept. Orlov pointed out the absence of B-52Gs
in the paper. Trout said that under the U.S. proposal this
bomber was not an existing type.


10. (S) Orlov turned to the last paragraph of the non-paper
regarding new types of non-nuclear heavy bombers which would
not be declared if built, asking why new non-nuclear heavy
bombers would not fall under the provisions of the treaty.
Trout replied that the United States would not consider new
non-nuclear aircraft to be subject to the treaty and noted
that the United States had no active plans to build such
aircraft.


11. (S) Finally, Orlov commented on the U.S. analysis on the
number used for attribution of nuclear armaments for heavy
bombers. First he confirmed that the United States wanted
the warhead ceiling at 1500 if 1 was used as the attribution
number for heavy bombers, but the warhead ceiling would be
1600 if 3 was the attribution number for bombers, to which
Trout agreed. Orlov then stated that the United States must
have performed significant analysis on the connection of
these numbers with respect to the number of heavy bombers and
nuclear armaments the United States would have by the end of
the 7-year reduction period. Trout acknowledged this point
and agreed that there was a specific relationship.

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PK, MM-II, TRIDENT I
--------------


12. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States intended to
declare PK, MM-II, and Trident I in the database. Trout
replied that these systems were not existing types and were
not deployed launchers, nor would they be at the time of
signature. Orlov remarked that it was odd to have launchers
with missiles somewhere but not be covered by the treaty.
Trout replied that as the United States had stated, the
United States would eliminate the PK empty launchers and
commented that the MM-II launchers at Vandenberg were test
launchers, and therefore non-deployed. Orlov pointed out
that Russia also had many silos and submarines awaiting
elimination, including its heavy ICBMs. He asked whether
Russia could remove them from the MOU. Trout turned back to
the U.S. systems saying that perhaps we could use an agreed
statement or other document to capture the U.S. pledge to
eliminate the PK within 7 years of EIF of the treaty. Orlov
commented that this was the first time he had heard this
proposal and would take it back to his delegation. He
recalled though that in START there were definitions for
"former type" and "retired type" and that perhaps this was
another possible way to address this situation.


13. (S) Trout took the opportunity to ask when the Russians
would provide a list of what existing types they intended to
declare for the treaty. Orlov joked that perhaps he would
provide half the list.

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THE CENTRAL LIMITS
--------------


14. (S) Orlov broke into a "personal" musing regarding the
limits and floated 700 as a number for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs
and heavy bombers, and 800 as a number for deployed and
non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Trout
reiterated the U.S. position on non-deployed heavy bombers
but said that these were interesting numbers.

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U.S. AND RUSSIAN FORCE STRUCTURE
--------------


15. (S) Trout and Orlov engaged in a quick discussion about
force structure differences with Trout pointing out that the
United States looked to find bilateral ways for each side to
better understand each other's forces. Both joked that after
15 years of START, each side had a very good idea about force
structure. Trout continued, referring to the Russian
"MIRVing" of mobile ICBMs against the U.S. "De-MIRV-ing" of
the MM-III silos. This, he argued, is why the United States
had kept so many MM-III silos and hypothesized that if the
United States had continued to MIRV the MM-III the United
States would probably have a much smaller number of strategic
delivery vehicles (SDVs). If that had been the case, the
original Russian proposal of 500 SDVs would not have been so
drastically opposite to the initial U.S. proposal. Orlov
agreed with this logic but added that Russia had some
different strategic concerns, referring to Russian concerns
with the United Kingdom, France, China, and the increasing
technological ability of U.S. missile defense systems. He
further pointed out that the U.S. goal of "Nuclear Zero" made
Russia take into account U.S. precision weaponry and
development of a conventional ballistic missile, exclaiming
that soon U.S. conventional systems would "almost be
equivalent to" nuclear systems. Trout pointed out that
though it might seem different to Russian logic to spend so
much money on a technology like conventional ballistic
missiles which would only be used to target a few terrorists,
this was important to U.S. strategy and interests.

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BRACKETED TEXT AND OTHER ISSUES
--------------


16. (S) Turning to some bracketed text issues, Orlov asked
whether the United States would drop the "associated with"
regarding the central limits. Trout deferred all such
counting rule related questions saying that once agreement
was reached on the third non-deployed limit, and also on the
counting rules, all of these brackets would drop away.


17. (S) Trout asked whether the Russian position had changed
regarding test heavy bombers. Orlov stated the United States
knew very well the Russian position on this matter.


18. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States would drop
other mobile ICBM requirements if the Russian side accepted
the U.S. package. Trout spoke indirectly about this matter,
stating that it was possible that some other re strictions
would drop; however, it was still the U.S. position that
mobile systems were unique from any other type of system and


that some additional re strictions would still apply. He
then qualified the statement though by adding that the United
States had been looking to impose equality among systems
where possible, citing the unique identifier proposal on all
systems as an example. Orlov commented that negotiating with
"packages" was very difficult, to which Trout agreed.


19. (S) Pischulov then asked some specific questions about
the database text. Bracketed text in the introductory first
and second paragraph sentences was agreed to. Annex C,
Nuclear Armaments Technical Data, was deleted. Trout agreed
to consider, therefore, deleting the category of names for
nuclear armaments in Annex D. Trout agreed to drop "weight
of fully loaded stage" in Annex A regarding missile technical
data.


20. (S) Regarding some mobile ICBM related issues, Trout
confirmed with Orlov that the Russians still intended to
provide boundary coordinates for an ICBM base for mobile
launchers of ICBMs. Lobner and Pischulov spoke about how to
handle information that would not be publicly released, as
coordinates was one such example.


21. (S) After an inquiry about text duplication, Lobner made
a brief statement that the United States had found some ways
to shorten the text and reduce duplication but that these
things were related to agreement on the third limit (deployed
and non-deployed launcher together),reductions in Article IV
re strictions, and agreement on counting rules.

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CLOSING COMMENTS
--------------


22. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to meet on Thursday if new
guidance was received by either side. They agreed that most
of the remaining bracketed text was related to central
limits, counting rules and additional Article IV re
strictions. Once these issues were resolved, Trout pointed
out, the brackets would fall. Orlov agreed and said,
"that'll be the day."


23. (U) Documents provided:

- U.S.

-- U.S.-Proposed Section I of Part Two of the Protocol,
dated December 7, 2009 (Russian translation provided.)


24. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES:

Mr. Trout
LT Lobner
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA:

Gen Orlov
Col Pischulov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)



25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS