Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1181
2009-12-18 18:08:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1181/01 3521808
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181808Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0747
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5817
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2996
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2006
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7213
S E C R E T GENEVA 001181 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1145 (SFO-GVA-VII-083)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001181

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 4, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1145 (SFO-GVA-VII-083)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-107.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 4, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
met at the U.S. Mission on December 4. This was the eighth
MOU Working Group meeting of this session and the fifteenth
meeting overall. Mr. Trout reiterated the U.S. position on
acceptance of the Russian deployed and non-deployed counting
rules for missiles if a limit for non-deployed launchers was
agreed. Orlov asked to hear the U.S. logic on choosing the
number 3 for heavy bomber attribution. Both sides clarified
their positions regarding the dates of data exchange.


4. (S) The U.S.side agreed to take another look at the
opening chapeau to the database in light of Russian concerns
about language and recent Conforming Group decisions. Trout
also engaged Orlov in a discussion regarding the Leninsk Test
Range in Kazakhstan.


5. (S) A statement by Orlov regarding telemetry resulted in
an animated Russian review of how telemetry worked its way
back into the treaty, with the accusation that they were
tricked into accepting a suggestion from U.S. National
Security Council Senior Director for Russia, Mike McFaul,
that the word "telemetry" had to be somewhere in the treaty.
Now, despite the Russian principled position against having
telemetry in the treaty, the United States was now proposing
to include the START telemetry provisions in the treaty. End

Summary.


6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Deployed/Non-Deployed Concept;
Heavy Bomber Counting Rules; MOU Data Exchange and Timeline -
Again; Brackets Still Held Hostage; MOU Photo Exchange;
Leninsk and Test Heavy Bombers; Telemetry is a Four Letter
Word; Duplicate Language; A Bad Idea; and Closing Comments.

--------------
DEPLOYED/NON-DEPLOYED CONCEPT
--------------


7. (S) Trout reiterated the U.S. position that until there
is agreement on a limit for non-deployed launchers, the
Russian construct of deployed and non-deployed launchers
cannot be used, but suggested that the working group continue
to review the MOU with the assumption that we will get
agreement. Regarding the nomenclature for the second central
limit regarding warheads, Trout noted that the delegations
would have to develop new language to incorporate the
attribution aspect of heavy bomber nuclear armaments, stating
that perhaps the text could be changed to "warheads on
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads


attributed to deployed heavy bombers." Orlov agreed that new
language would have to be developed and that the two sides
should think about a proposal.

--------------
HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULES
--------------


8. (S) Orlov began a discussion on how heavy bomber weapons
should be accounted for, saying that when he had left for
Moscow it was agreed that it would be one weapon per heavy
bomber and now the United States had invented three weapons
per heavy bomber. Trout responded that the one weapon per
bomber rule was a Russian invention and he had explained the
logic behind the U.S. proposal to Poznikhir at the last
meeting (Reftel). He went on to explain that the U.S.
proposal was an attempt to be more realistic. The United
States would have a few hundred ALCMs at operational bases
and that taking the total number and dividing it by the
number of heavy bombers at the base, three was the
approximate result. Orlov reminded the working group that
long ago the Russian delegation had suggested one weapon per
bomber and that concept was reported to and approved by
President Medvedev. Now the U.S. delegation, at the last
minute, was bringing up a new proposal claiming that it
better reflected reality. Care should be taken in such
claims because both one and three result in virtual counts
and have no relation to bombers that can carry many times
more. Trout rejoined saying that once MOU data is exchanged,
the Russians will see we have nowhere near enough ALCMs to
fully load all bombers, but if Russia intended to keep more
weapons at its bases we could go back to the U.S. position of
inspecting weapon storage areas and get a true count of the
number of ALCMs on the base.


9. (S) Orlov asked whether the number of ALCMs that will be
on U.S. heavy bomber bases reflected the U.S. plan to remove
ALCMs from those bases. Trout replied that it did. Orlov
opined that the U.S. proposal only addressed the U.S.
situation but was not suitable for Russia, suggesting that a
return to counting only those weapons on heavy bombers might
be better because it is consistent with how warheads are
counted on ICBMs and SLBMs. Trout stated that Russian
concerns were addressed in the U.S. offer to allow Russian
inspection of U.S. weapon storage areas. He also reminded
Orlov that in the Ad Hoc Working Group the major Russian
concern with the U.S. approach was the cost of building a
facility for the storage of additional ALCMs and the expense
of moving the ALCMs to the new facility. Trout then
explained that the United States faced the same expenses but
that the United States was willing to spend the money, that
this did not have to be achieved until 7 years after
entry-into-force (EIF) of the treaty, and that the United
States had agreed to set this idea aside to move toward the
Russian attribution proposal.


10. (S) Orlov again asked how the United States had arrived
at three weapons per bomber. Trout replied that if Russia
intended to have only one weapon per bomber at their bases
then the United States could reconsider the number, but he
also stated the belief that Russia would have more than that
at their bases. Orlov stated that the United States had more
than three weapons per bomber at each base. Trout replied


that 7 years after EIF the United States would not have those
high numbers. Orlov again stated that the new proposal was
presented in the closing days of the negotiation session and
asked how this problem could be solved in the short time
remaining. Poznikhir stated that at least the sides had
agreed to attribution despite the differing attribution
numbers. Trout stated that both sides had orders from their
Presidents and that Orlov was correct and that issue would be
difficult to solve. Orlov countered that this problem is not
up to the Presidents to solve and that it should be solved by
the delegations.

--------------
MOU DATA EXCHANGE AND TIMELINE - AGAIN
--------------


11. (S) Trout reviewed the Russian proposal for MOU data
exchange. Poznikhir restated the Russian concept that at
signature, all that will be available will be aggregate
numbers and categories of data. Then, 45 days after
signature, the Parties will exchange data for all categories
available from the July 1, 2009, START data. Finally, at
EIF, this data will be made current and include all remaining
required data. Trout reminded the working group that the
Notification Protocol had the requirement that within 30 days
after EIF, the Parties will exchange data current as of the
date of EIF. Trout then presented the U.S. position: All
data, using the July 1, 2009, START data, will be listed at
signature. Then, 45 days after signature, the Parties will
exchange data current as of the date of signature. Finally,
within 30 days after EIF the Parties would exchange data
current as of the date of EIF. Trout also reminded the
Russian side that confidential data would not be exchanged
until the EIF exchange, which includes warhead data, unique
identifier (UID) data and geographic coordinates. Orlov
agreed to take the U.S. proposal to his delegation.

--------------
BRACKETS STILL HELD HOSTAGE
--------------


12. (S) After Trout requested a return to reviewing
bracketed text, Poznikhir suggested looking at the chapeau
and reiterated the Russian proposal to delete the last
sentence: "Each Party acknowledges that it is responsible
for the accuracy of its own data," as Russian lawyers
believed it redundant with the intent of the treaty. Lobner
responded he had discussed this with U.S. lawyers and they
wanted to handle it in a lawyers' meeting. Poznikhir asked
the status of the joint proposal to replace "limitations"
with "provisions" at appropriate places within the text. Mr.
Ivanov stated that the Conforming Group had agreed to
replace: "subject to the limitations of the Treaty" with
"subject to the provisions of the Treaty" throughout the
text. Trout said he would confirm this with the U.S. members
of the Conforming Group.


13. (S) Trout then asked whether the Russians were ready to
drop the term "strategic offensive arms." Col Pischulov
stated that it had already been deleted from the Russian text
but that the U.S. delegation did not have the new text.
Orlov stated his dislike for the document as there were even
brackets in the title. After a short discussion, Trout


agreed to "Database of Strategic Offensive Arms," as long as
the other items captured in the MOU were addressed in the
chapeau. Ivanov pointed out that there was not a Russian
term that could cover all the categories of data in the MOU.
Orlov asked whether SOA was agreed for the title. Upon
Trout's affirmative reply, he suggested it could be repeated
in the chapeau and then jokingly offered to arm wrestle Trout
to settle the problem. After politely refusing the offer,
Trout agreed to bring the U.S. delegation's position to the
next meeting.


14. (S) Poznikhir then moved to the opening sentences for
both paragraphs in Section I, entering into another
discussion on the use of "provisions" and "limitations."
After some linguistic clarifications and discussions, Trout
responded that the United States would take a closer look at
these sections but that the Russian proposal to edit these
sentences was appropriate. Poznikhir returned to the issue
of the use of "version" in the MOU stating that Russia had no
versions of ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers. Lobner said that
the Definitions Subgroup and the lawyers would work the issue.

--------------
MOU PHOTO EXCHANGE
--------------


15. (S) Trout reminded Orlov that at the previous meeting
(Reftel) Poznikhir had agreed to provide photographs of fixed
structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs and, in exchange,
the United States had agreed to drop the requirement to list
measurements for fixed structures in Annex A. He
acknowledged that the photographs from the START Treaty would
be sufficient for those items being declared in the new
treaty, but we had to have provisions for additional
photographs, as necessary, and that a list of all accepted
START Treaty photographs and those needed should be added to
the MOU. Poznikhir asked whether all references to fixed
structures would be removed if photographs were provided.
Trout responded that only the measurement requirements would
be deleted; the number of fixed structures at each base would
still be required. Poznikhir reminded Trout that he had
agreed that fixed structures were not SOA and therefore they
should be deleted. Trout reminded Poznikhir that the U.S.
position was to have fixed structures reported at the bases
to which Poznikhir stated the text would remain bracketed.

--------------
LENINSK AND TEST HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


16. (S) Trout returned to the discussion on the Leninsk Test
Range. Orlov repeated that the Leninsk facility belonged to
Kazakhstan and therefore would not be declared in the MOU.
Poznikhir asked whether a space launch facility (SLF) was
inspectable, to which Trout replied an SLF was not, but a
test range was inspectable and Leninsk was a test range.
Trout further stated that if Russia only flew missiles
without re-entry vehicles at Leninsk, then the facility would
be consistent with an SLF. Poznikhir stated that Russia had
wanted to combine SLFs and test ranges so as not to hide
anything, but the United States refused because the United
States does not want inspectors at U.S. space launch
facilities and that this was a limit on transparency. Trout


restated the U.S. position that such a combination of SLFs
and test ranges was unacceptable. Poznikhir went on to
repeat the Russian position that notification of missile
movements to the facility would be provided. Trout received
an affirmative response to a question asking whether launch
notifications would be provided for launches from the
facility, as well as telemetry information, if an agreement
on telemetry was reached. Trout suggested that perhaps an
agreement could be drafted to record this information, such
as an agreed statement. Orlov agreed to review the issue
with the Russian lawyers.


17. (S) Trout addressed a concern with test heavy bombers
stating that it was a treaty Article IV issue, but one that
also affected the MOU. Trout first pointed out that test
heavy bombers are not inspectable no matter where they are
located. Therefore, unless a limit on test heavy bombers is
established, either Party could have a significant force of
non-inspectable heavy bombers. Poznikhir asked the basis for
the U.S. suspicion. Trout replied that both Parties have
test heavy bombers and should have as many as they needed.
They provide a valuable service but each Party should limit
the number. He added that the suggested limit was not meant
to force Russia to eliminate required test heavy bombers, it
was meant to assure each Party that no more heavy bombers
than necessary were included in this non-inspectable
subgroup. Orlov and Poznikhir admitted to having limited
knowledge of Russian test heavy bomber numbers and took the
issue as homework to find out more information.


18. (S) Poznikhir said that under the reasoning of
sub-limits, Russia was thinking of including a limit for
SLBMS of 200 with a sub-limit of 150 deployed SLBMs.

--------------
TELEMETRY IS A FOUR LETTER WORD
--------------


19. (S) Orlov began a philosophical oration suggesting that
to include limits on test heavy bombers opened the door to
the concept of limits on all other categories--deployed and
non-deployed launchers for example. Warming to this subject,
he claimed that when Russia offers a finger the United States
eats the whole arm. He stated that Russia felt cheated by
accepting the request from Mr. McFaul for the word
"telemetry" to appear somewhere in the treaty. He stated
that the Russian President had made a major concession and
included telemetry in the treaty. Despite the Russian
concession, the United States was now proposing to include
the START Treaty telemetry provisions in the treaty.

--------------
DUPLICATE LANGUAGE
--------------


20. (S) After a brief review of the test heavy bomber issue,
Orlov asked to return to Section II to address an Article IV
issue. He and Poznikhir pointed out three instances of the
same language from the chapeau. Lobner replied that he
understood the Russian logic concerning duplication of
categories, and that once Article IV and the central limits
were finalized, the U.S. delegation would perform a thorough
review of the text and eliminate redundancy. Poznikhir



welcomed the effort.

--------------
A BAD IDEA
--------------


21. (S) Pischulov reminded Trout that at the last meeting,
the United States had again argued its position that only
distinguishing features for heavy bombers were required and
not technical data. He asked whether it was possible to
remove all requirements for technical data for ICBMs and
SLBMs and to provide distinguishing features and/or
photographs similar to the heavy bomber proposal. Trout said
the technical data for ICBMs and SLBMs were there for two
purposes: 1) to help in identifying new types and 2) as size
criteria to assist inspectors identify which buildings could
contain SOA.

--------------
CLOSING COMMENTS
--------------


22. (S) Orlov requested clarification of a comment Trout
made about moving annexes into the protocol. Trout replied
that Annexes A, B, C, and D would become Protocol paragraphs
6, 7, 8, and 9 so that the document signed by the Presidents
would include the categories of data to be listed in the MOU.
Orlov claimed the Russian side had more questions but would
save them for a future meeting.


23. (U) Documents provided: None.


24. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES:

Mr. Trout
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Colby
Mr. Coussa
LTC LaGraffe
LT Lobner
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA:

Gen Orlov
Mr. Ivanov
Col Pischulov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Voloskov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

25.(U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS