Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1180
2009-12-18 18:05:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1180/01 3521805
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181805Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0743
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5813
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2992
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2002
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7209
S E C R E T GENEVA 001180 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, DECEMBER 4, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1132 (SFO-GVA-VII-092)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001180

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, DECEMBER 4, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1132 (SFO-GVA-VII-092)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-099.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 4, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 13:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired
by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Ministry of Defense Representative Col Petrov, met twice on
December 4. Discussion during both sessions focused on
Section VI, Inspections of Deployed Strategic Offensive Arms
(SOA),Warheads, and Operational Bases (Type One
inspections). Russia also provided its version of a joint
draft text for Article XI.


4. (S) Ilin continued to claim that SLBM launchers converted
to launch cruise missiles would be considered non-deployed
SLBM launchers and inspectable under the Type One quota. He
also argued that all heavy bombers located at an air base
during a Type One inspection should be inspectable, including
those equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Ilin also
questioned why the United States would not provide specific
locations for all heavy bombers located outside national
territory. Russia remained opposed to any special re
strictions on mobile missiles.


5. (S) The working group chairs agreed to expand the
temporary exemption from inspection, which was limited to
heavy bomber bases under START, to all types of bases and
also discussed counting rules and Russia's problems with a
limit on non-deployed launchers.



6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Agreement on the Title and Purpose
for Type One Inspections; Little Progress on Key Elements for
Type One Inspections; Russia Provides Insights on its
Problems with Non-deployed Limits.

--------------
AGREEMENT ON THE TITLE AND PURPOSE
FOR TYPE ONE INSPECTIONS
--------------


7. (S) During the morning session, Col Ilin passed Dr.
Warner the Russian-proposed joint draft text (JDT) for
Article XI in Russian and promised a translation later in the
afternoon. Ilin also reminded the working group that Russia
had dropped its objections to providing the reasonsQor
absent items of inspections (IOI) during the pre-inspection
briefings. Warner noted that the sides still had an issue
over the right to inspect within the boundaries of a site, a
topic that arose during previous discussions on paragraph 6,


Section VII for Type Two inspections (Reftel).


8. (S) The sides agreed on the long title to use for Section
VI, "Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs Including the Warheads on
Them, Deployed Heavy Bombers and the Nuclear Armaments on
Them, and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, Pursuant
to Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty (Type One
Inspections)," and agreed to use the short title of Type One
Inspections later in the section.


9. (S) The sides also agreed that Type One inspections would
entail inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs including the
warheads on them, deployed heavy bombers and the nuclear
armaments on them, non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. Type One
inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases, submarine bases
and air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments. The purpose of such inspections shall be to
confirm the declared data on the number and types of deployed
and non-deployed SOA located at such facilities, the number
of warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs or the
number of nuclear armaments on deployed heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments.

--------------
LITTLE PROGRESS ON KEY ELEMENTS
FOR TYPE ONE INSPECTIONS
--------------


10. (S) No movement was made on the annual quota of Type One
inspections or the number of times a facility would be
inspected each year. The sides agreed not to conduct any
other type of inspection activity at a single site
simultaneously, and agreed to broaden the right to
temporarily exempt a base from inspection to include any
airbase, ICBM base or submarine base.


11. (S) Warner explained the U.S. concept for Type One
inspections of airbases, which would permit direct inspection
of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments located at
the base as "visitors," provided they were of the same type
as those assigned to that specific base. Ilin wondered why
the United States would not allow inspections of all heavy
bombers at a base during an inspection and argued that even
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments visiting the
base being inspected should be subject to inspection. After
a long discussion about U.S. operational practices, Ilin
finally agreed that the United States did not have, and would
not have, non-deployed heavy bombers that could visit U.S.
heavy bomber bases during a Type One inspection.


12. (S) During both sessions, Ilin argued that launchers
converted to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) would be
considered as non-deployed SLBM launchers and subject to
inspection under a Type One at a U.S. submarine base. Warner
reiterated the U.S. position on SLCM launchers and asked Ilin
to take a look at the U.S. draft Agreed Statement on SSGNs.


13. (S) Ilin questioned why the United States would not
provide specific locations for all heavy bombers deployed
outside its national territory, and raised a hypothetical
"crazy" situation in which a heavy bomber took nuclear
armaments from its home base and delivered them to a location


outside national territory. Warner reminded Ilin that the
U.S. notified Russia when these heavy bombers deployed and
their general location, and that neither side carried nuclear
weapons during peacetime. As these bombers were conducting
either conventional combat operations or normal training,
there was no need to provide Russia with the specific
locations of such bombers outside U.S. national territory.

--------------
RUSSIA PROVIDES INSIGHTS ON ITS PROBLEMS
WITH NON-DEPLOYED LAUNCHER LIMITS
--------------


14. (S) Warner noted that the sides remained at odds on
counting rules with the United States continuing to embrace
the "considered to contain" rule with regard to ICBM and SLBM
launchers while the Russian approach involved specific
distinctions between "deployed" and "non-deployed" ICBM and
SLBM launchers. Warner reminded Ilin that, while the United
States understood the logic of the Russian counting rules,
acceptance of the Russian concept was predicated on
acceptance of a separate or combined limit on non-deployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers.


15. (S) Ilin explained that when Russia developed its
concept of deployed and non-deployed launchers it viewed the
concept of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
(ODSNW) as a flaw as it provided the United States with
significant upload potential using its stored SDVs and
wareads. Russia ultimately decided that it would be ore
productive to limit operationally deployed SDs (ODSDVs) as a
means to reduce upload potential. Russia viewed its approach
limiting ODSDVs as conceptually similar to limiting ODSNW.


16. (S) Ilin also highlighted the two major drawbacks Russia
saw with the U.S. draft treaty: 1) the United States had
decided not to eliminate SDVs; and the U.S. concept of
converted heavy bombers (B-1Bs) and strategic submarines
(SSGNs) would result in these options being no longer subject
to the provisions of the treaty, yet they could be
potentially reconverted back to nuclear-capable systems.


17. (S) Warner indicated that Russia's concept of deployed
and non-deployed systems had a solid basis but it also had
one glaring shortcoming, which was directly related to upload
potential, neither side would be motivated to eliminate or
convert "non-deployed" ICBM and SLBM launchers or
"non-deployed" heavy bombers. To meet the central limits on
deployed launchers, a Party simply had to separate the
ballistic missile from the launcher and place them both in
storage. The United States had proposed to limit
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers to provide a stimulus to
eliminate older, non-deployed systems.


18. (S) Ilin countered that the United States was not in the
same position as Russia with regard to empty or non-deployed
launchers. Ilin noted that Russia had a huge number of SSBN
and ICBM launchers that were queued up awaiting elimination,
which imposed a significantly unfair financial burden on
Russia. Ilin believed the United States should take on the
same financial and legal obligations to eliminate U.S.
launchers.



19. (S) Warner offered that perhaps a combined limit on
deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, along the
lines proposed in September by the Russian side, might be
workable as it would provide Russia more headroom for
non-deployed launchers while providing the United States with
more room for the deployed SDVs. Ilin commented that the
U.S.-proposed limit of 800 deployed launchers and a separate
limit of 150 non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers actually
created the significant upload potential that concerned
Russia. It allowed the United States to achieve its
objectives while avoiding any obligation to eliminate
launchers. Zaitsev added that the 150 limit was taken as
primarily focused on imposing a limit on Russian mobile ICBM
launchers and was therefore unacceptable.


20. (S) When Warner pointed out that without the 150
separate limit there would be no restrictions on the number
of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers a side could possess,
Ilin claimed that was why the Russians had proposed limiting
SDVs. Ilin said that Russia simply did not have the funds to
eliminate the large number of non-deployed launchers and
missiles it would have in the coming years. Zaitsev added
that the 7-year SFO reduction period was too short to
accomplish the elimination of all the obsolete submarines and
mobile ICBMs and their launchers, and that Russia could not
possibly return them to service as they simply did not work
anymore.


21. (U) Documents provided:

- RUSSIA:

-- Russian-Proposed Joint Draft Text for Article XI.


22. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gross (Int for AM Session)
TSgt Bennett (Int for PM Session)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Izrazov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Vodopolskaya
Ms. Komshilova (Int for PM Session)
Mr. Pogodin (Int for AM Session)


23. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS