START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 2, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-090.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 02, 2009
Time: 16:00 P.M. - 18:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The discussion during this session of the Inspection
Protocol Working Group (IPWG) focused on Article XI of the
treaty and Section VII of the Protocol. Regarding Article
XI, Col Ilin asserted that confirmation of the elimination of
strategic offensive arms (SOA) should be conducted as a Type
2 inspection rather than as an exhibition. Additionally, he
stressed there was a need for Russia to conduct inspections
to confirm that U.S. ICBM launchers had not been converted to
perform a missile defense role. The discussion of Section
VII of the Protocol concerned the names of the types of
inspections provided for in Sections VI and VII of the
Protocol and, removing mention of any facilities associated
with mobile launchers of ICBMs from the Type 2 inspections.
End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Two Main Issues In Article XI;
Section VII of The Protocol: What to Call Inspections and
Discussion of Facilities for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs; and
Wrap-Up.

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TWO MAIN ISSUES IN ARTICLE XI
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5. (S) Col Ilin stated that the Russian delegation was
instructed to work to achieve agreement on treaty Article XI
text. He said there were two main issues in Article XI: 1)
whether the confirmation of elimination of SOA would be
conducted in the inspection of non-deployed systems or as an
exhibition, making clear the Russian side wants these
inspection activities to be Type 2 inspections and thus
counted against the annual Type 2 quota; and 2) resolution of
the issue of inspection of missiles and launchers to see
whether they had been converted to a missile defense role.
He stressed that it was important to prove that ICBMs had not
been converted to missile defense interceptors. Ilin stated
there could be no more progress on Article XI without
resolution of the missile defense issue. Dr. Warner
commented that the issue had to be discussed at the level of
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov. He
had no authorization to resolve the offense-defense issue.
He asked why the Russians felt there should be a display of
defensive interceptors in a treaty on SOA; he received no
response. Warner provided the Russians a revised joint draft
text of Article XI for their review. After the discussion,
Warner agreed that the major differences over Article XI
concerned whether eliminations should be verified in Type 2
inspections or in exhibitions and the differences of the
Parties over inspection for conversion of ICBMs to a missile
defense role.




6. (S) Ilin then offered what he called a "revolutionary
proposal," to retain only the first agreed paragraph in
Article XI as the entirety of Article XI and to move all of
the remaining text to the Inspection Activities Protocol.
Warner replied that such a move would not solve the problem,
but only "sweep it under the carpet." In any event, he would
have to discuss this with the members of the Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group. Regarding the unsolved issue of
eliminations, Warner opined that the Type 2 inspection quota
would have to be increased significantly if eliminations were
included in Type 2 inspections, even though the eliminations
could be done in batches. Ilin questioned whether the United
States was going to conduct eliminations of SOA. He said if
the United States was not going to conduct eliminations the
provisions on elimination inspections would be a one-sided
measure, unfair to the Russian Federation. Warner said the
United States may eliminate some SOA to get under the
strategic delivery vehicle limit envisioned for START
Follow-on (SFO). Warner requested that the Russian
delegation consider a more complete Article XI than their
proposed single paragraph and stated that the U.S. Senate
would demand to see the key aspects of the verification
provisions spelled out in the Protocol.


7. (S) Referring to paragraph 2 of an earlier
Russian-proposed version of Article XI, Warner pointed out
the inappropriateness of including non-nuclear armaments on
heavy bombers as items of inspection under the Type 1
inspection at heavy bomber bases. Ilin closed the discussion
of Article XI by promising o either reduce some of the text
in Article XI orto continue to propose that only the first
paragraph be retained as the entirety of Article XI.

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SECTION VII OF THE PROTOCOL: WHAT TO CALL INSPECTIONS
AND DISCUSSION OF FACILITIES MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
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8. (S) Before moving on to the discussion of Section VII,
Ilin provided a copy of paragraph 11 of Section V for the
United States to review and consider. The discussion of
Section VII began with each side expressing differing
opinions on the names to be used to refer to the type of
inspections in Section VII and, by inference, also Section
VI. The United States proposed using short references to
Type 1 and Type 2 inspections whereas Russia stated the
desire to retain the more lengthy titles in the draft
sections. Warner stressed that the U.S. TTDWG had serious
concerns regarding the descriptions of the inspection
activities and that he would have to continue to coordinate
with them. Turning to substantive issues in paragraph 1,
progress was made in deleting the Russian text calling for
Type 2 inspection of submarine bases and in removing brackets
from the listing of most types of facilities subject to the
Type 2 inspection. However, Ilin insisted in deleting
references to inspection of repair facilities, storage
facilities and conversion and elimination facilities for
mobile launchers of ICBMs claiming that a general reference
to SOA was sufficient instead of the detailed list. He also
suggested using a simple reference to "facilities as listed
in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)." Warner reminded
Ilin that there are too many items listed in the MOU to make


use of such a general reference; the facilities subject to
type 2 inspection need to be listed in Section VII. Warner
pointed out that the text listing facilities for mobile
launchers of ICBMs came from Russian text. Nevertheless,
Ilin insisted all references to mobile launchers of ICBMS be
placed in brackets, thereby winning what Warner described as
the award for "the silliest brackets placed in SFO text." In
further discussion of paragraph 1 of Section VII, it was
agreed to re-insert the reference to inspection of formerly
declared facilities.


9. (S) Turning to other paragraphs of Section VII, it was
agreed that paragraphs 3, 3a, 3b, and 4 were mutually
satisfactory as currently written. When the discussion of
paragraph 5 began, Ilin insisted that the discussion of
reading the data from unique identifiers on SOA should be
moved to the third level, that is, the Inspection Activities
Annex.

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WRAP-UP
--------------


10. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed to stop at this point in the
review. Ilin stated the working group would resume the
discussion at paragraph 5 of Section VII during the next
meeting. Warner stated that the IPWG needed to conduct two
meetings per day to make sufficient progress to meet the goal
of finishing the documents.


11. (S) (Begin comment: A few hours after completing this
session, Col Ilin informed the U.S. side that the Russian
side agreed to remove the various brackets on "mobile
launchers of ICBMs." End comment.)


12. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- Joint Draft Text of Article XI, dated December 2,

2009.

- RUSSIA:

-- Draft of paragraph 11, Section V, dated December 2,

2009.


13. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Celusnak
Maj. Johnson
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Dr. Hopkins (Int)


RUSSIA

Col. Ilin
Ms. Vodopolova
Mr. Izrazov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS