START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND
DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 29, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1127 (SFO-GVA-VII-062)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-071.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 29, 2009
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working
Group (TTDWG) was held at the U.S. Mission on November 29,

2009. to discuss Articles II, Central Limits and III,
Counting Rules. The U.S. side proposed a working paper on
Article II that contained elements of U.S.- and
Russian-proposed language for the Article. After some
discussion and additional edits to the Article II working
paper, it was agreed that after each delegation took one more
look, it could be sent to the Conforming Group with one
remaining bracketed phrase. The United States also provided
a working paper on Article III. Progress was made on
achieving agreement on certain parts of the article while
discussion continued on text pertaining to ICBM silo
launchers and the counting of heavy bombers. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article II Close to Complete;
Article III Progress Made; Heavy Bomber Counting; Counting
ICBMs and SLBMs; Newly Constructed SOA; Counting Silo
Launchers and Heavy Bombers; Limits vs. Provisions; But
Getting Back to Silo Launchers; Back to Heavy Bombers; and
When is An Item Deployed?

--------------
ARTICLE II CLOSE TO COMPLETE
--------------


5. (S) Mr.Taylor provided U.S.-proposed language for
Article II, Central Limits and noted that the language
combined elements of past U.S.- and Russian- proposed
language. Kuznetsov immediately commented that he liked the
paragraph which read: "Each Party may determine for itself
the composition and structure of its strategic offensive
arms, within the limitations set forth in this Treaty." In
particular, it corresponded completely with the Russian
proposal. Kuznetsov also said that any references to numbers
in Article II should be left blank since it is not up to the
working group to decide.

Begin text:

SFO-VII
U.S. Working Paper
November 29, 2009

Article II


1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM
launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM


warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber ((nuclear))2
armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this
Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in
accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) (((500 - 1100)))1 ((500))2 for deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(b) (((1500-1675)))1 ((1675))2, for warheads on
deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and ((nuclear
warheads on or associated with))1 deployed heavy bombers.


2. Each Party may determine for itself the composition and
structure of its strategic offensive arms, within the
limitations set forth in this Treaty.

End text.


6. (S) Kuznetsov insisted that the United States accept
"nuclear" to describe heavy bomber armaments in paragraph 1
of the Russian-proposed text. He further stated that the
word "nuclear" should be deleted from the description of
warheads on deployed heavy bombers in paragraph 1(b)
regarding the aggregate limit on the number of warheads. He
said the U.S.-proposed language would introduce counting
rules in Article II and counting rules belong in Article III.


7. (S) Taylor acknowledged the logic of Kuznetsov's argument
given its consistency with the Russian position on counting
rules as they pertain to heavy bombers. However, Taylor
pointed out, the U.S. approach to heavy bomber counting rules
includes nuclear warheads on or associated with deployed
heavy bombers and once the counting rules on heavy bombers
are resolved, this issue too would be resolved.


8. (S) Ms. Kotkova asked why the United States used the term
"aggregate numbers" in Article II but in Article III the term
"aggregate limits" was used. Taylor explained that Article
II established aggregate numbers by those categories being
counted, whereas Article III used that number as a limit.


9. (S) After conferring with Mr. Highsmith for legal
guidance, Mr. Taylor agreed that the word "nuclear" could be
used in paragraph 1 when referring to heavy bomber armaments
and that it could be deleted in paragraph 1(b) when referring
to warheads on deployed heavy bombers. The U.S. phrase "or
associated with" remained in brackets. Taylor then
recommended that Article II be sent to the Conforming Group.
Kuznetsov said he would share the revised language with his
delegation before sending it to the Conforming Group.

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ARTICLE III PROGRESS MADE
--------------


10. (S) Taylor then proposed language for Article III. He
pointed out that the United States had agreed to drop the
language "and associated launchers" in paragraph 1(a) and
1(b) and that the bracket on "aggregate" had also been
removed per the previous day's discussion. Kuznetsov had no
objections. Taylor also noted that the U.S. proposal removed
language from paragraph 2 that differentiated between nuclear
and non-nuclear given that each reentry vehicle and warhead



counted as one, should it be conventional or nuclear.
Kuznetsov had no objections. The language is provided below:

Begin text:

SFO-VII
U.S. Working Paper
November 29, 2009

Article III


1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this
Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one unit.

(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one unit.

(c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one
unit.


2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this
Treaty:

(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall
be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs
and deployed SLBMs.

(b) ((For deployed heavy bombers, the number of nuclear
warheads shall be the number of nuclear armaments loaded on
deployed heavy bombers and the number in nuclear armaments
weapons storage areas associated with air bases where
deployed heavy bombers are based.))1 ((Each long-range
nuclear ALCM and each other heavy bomber nuclear armament,
other than a long-range nuclear ALCM, on deployed heavy
bombers shall be counted as one warhead.))2


3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs
and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of
a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM
of that type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters,
an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered
to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an
assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch
canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that
type.

(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain
an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at
which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it until an ICBM or
SLBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM or SLBM has
been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister


shall not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it
contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on
static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a
particular type shall be distinguishable from launch
canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.


4. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to
be subject to the provisions of this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM when it first leaves its production
facility;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves
its production facility;

(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when ((excavation for
that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete
for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the
excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier))1 ((when the
protective device is first installed and closed))2;

(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves its production
facility;

(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that
launcher is installed is first launched;

(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when
its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or
building in which components of such a heavy bomber are
assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe
is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which
existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber
airframes.


5. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and deployed
heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to the provisions of
this Treaty in accordance with procedures provided for in
Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty, or as
recorded within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.


6. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested
solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the
surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a
ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty
apply.

(b) A new type of ballistic missile developed and
tested solely for the delivery of non-nuclear armaments shall
not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the
limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.

(c) If a new type of ballistic missile has been
flight-tested or deployed for nuclear weapon delivery, all
ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be
ballistic missiles to which the provisions of this Treaty
apply.

(d) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy


bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.


7. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types
of missiles designated by the United States of America as,
and known to the Russian Federation as Minuteman III;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the types of
missiles designated by the Russian Federation as RS-12M,
RS-18, and RS-20, which are known to the United States of
America as SS-25, SS-19, and SS-18, respectively

(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the tpes
of missiles designated by the United States o America and
known to the Russian Federation as Trident II;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the types of
missiles designated by the Russian Federation as RSM-50,
RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56, which are known to the United
States of America as SS-N-18, SS-N-20, SS-N-23, and RSM-56,
respectively.

(c) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchersof
ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, N/A;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the types of
missiles designated by the Russian Federation as (TBD).

(d) Existing types of deployed heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types
of bombers designated by the United States of America as, and
known to the Russian Federation as, B-52H, B-1B and B-2A;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the types of
bombers designated by the Russian Federation as Tu-95MS and
Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as
Bear H and Blackjack, respectively.

(e) Existing types of nuclear armaments for heavy
bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types
of nuclear armaments are nuclear bombs and the air launched
cruise missile designated by the United States of America as,
and known to the Russian Federation as, AGM-86B;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the types of
nuclear armaments designated by the Russian Federation as
(TBD).

End text.

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HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING
--------------




11. (S) Taylor said the United States had agreed to count
both nuclear and non-nuclear reentry vehicles. Therefore the
United States had developed revised language.


12. (S) On the issue of counting heavy bomber warheads,
Taylor went on to note that the United States was not
prepared to change its position. He stated that the United
States believed this treaty was about strategic offensive
arms and we should only count warheads on and associated with
deployed heavy bombers."


13. (S) Kuznetsov responded that the Russian position was
that each unit of nuclear armament located on a deployed
heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit. He further stated
that an English translation of the Russian proposed language
was: "In the case of the absence of a nuclear armament on a
deployed heavy bomber, one warhead will be counted for each
deployed heavy bomber."

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COUNTING ICBMs AND SLBMs
--------------


14. (S) Regarding Article III, the paragraph on the counting
of ICBMs and SLBMs, Taylor said the United States believed it
was important to spell out what is considered an ICBM and
SLBM so that when inspectors go to identify them, they
understand exactly what the item is. He stated that this
should be included in the treaty Article. Kuznetsov claimed
that there was a disagreement in concept and that he needed
to consult with his delegation before commenting. For now,
Kuznetsov suggested that paragraph could be kept without
brackets.

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NEWLY CONSTRUCTED SOA
--------------


15. (S) Taylor noted in Article III, the paragraph regarding
when newly constructed strategic offensive arms become
subject to the provisions of the treaty, that the United
States did not differentiate between types of production
facilities. Taylor described that an ICBM becomes subject to
the provisions of the treaty when it leaves the production
facility and the same for SLBMs.

--------------
COUNTING SILO LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


16. (S) Taylor highlighted that the situation was more
complicated when it came to silo launchers and mentioned that
the Conversion or Elimination Working Group was determining
the process for eliminating a silo launcher. Taylor stated
that the United States wanted to better define when a silo
launcher becomes subject to the provisions of the treaty. He
noted there were likely to be few opportunities for
constructing silos in the future but that there should be no
questions since the START provision has served each side well
for the last 15 years.


17. (S) With regard to the text on heavy bombers equipped


for nuclear armaments, Taylor said the United States took the
approach of combining previous U.S.- and Russian-proposed
text and said the result was a good formulation. He asked
Kuznetsov to agree to this paragraph.

--------------
LIMITS VS. PROVISIONS
--------------


18. (S) Kuznetsov took a step back and asked to look at the
situation conceptually and, in particular, at how certain
items were subject to the limitations of the treaty while
others are subject to the treaty's provisions. Kotkova added
that in her view, all items are subject to the provisions of
the treaty and that a narrower group of items are subject to
its limitations.


19. (S) Taylor clarified that limits were numerical while
provisions refer to a variety of things including
notifications, declarations, etc. For example, he said, an
ICBM automatically became subject to the provisions of the
treaty but if it was deployed, it would then become subject
to the limits of the treaty.


20. (S) Kotkova stated that she understood this but added
that she viewed the situation as having three levels. The
first and broadest level referred to those items that are
subject to the provisions of the treaty in general. The
second referred to the limits provided for by the treaty but
which could also include those limits that related to
location of items. The third level was the narrowest and
referred to the central aggregate limits, which were those
items subject to the limits of the second and third levels.
She noted that the misunderstanding concerned the second
level.


21. (S) Taylor said that the United States saw everything in
the treaty as subject to the provisions of the treaty.
Taylor acknowledged that the language used in START stating
that "newly constructed strategic arms are subject to the
limit" was different from the U.S.-proposed language which
stated that newly constructed strategic arms were "subject to
the provisions" of the treaty. He explained that this was
because the Article was about location, type, and timing and
it did not necessarily follow that these items were subject
to numerical limits.


22. (S) Kuznetsov said the wording "subject to the
provisions" was acceptable and agreed to the language in
paragraph 4 (a) and (b).

--------------
But Getting Back to Silo Launchers
--------------


23. (S) With regard to silo launchers, Kuznetsov asked for
the logic behind the U.S. proposal that a silo launcher of
ICBMs be subject to the provisions of the treaty when
"excavation for that launcher has been completed and the
pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed or 12
months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs
earlier." He asked why the 12-month period was selected. He
further questioned the need for the text on silo launchers


given that "no one would install a silo launcher outside an
ICBM base," but he also noted that this language had come
from START. Col Kamenskiy added that he viewed this text as
"discrimination against silo launchers." Taylor said he
would discuss this issue further with Mr. Elliott and said it
would be left as bracketed text.

--------------
BACK TO HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


24. (S) Kuznetsov stated that in the paragraph on heavy
bombers, any reference to "heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments" should simply be "heavy bombers." He maintained
that the working groups had created a variety of terms to
define heavy bombers that were not contained in the terms and
definitions. For example, he referred to the use of "heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments." Taylor
responded that because the treaty was about strategic
offensive arms, only heavy bombers with nuclear armaments
would be included. Lt Col Comeau further added that if a
side developed a new conventional bomber with a range in
excess of 8000 km it would be considered to be subject to the
provisions of the treaty just because of its range,
regardless of whether it was equipped for nuclear armaments.


25. (S) Kuznetsov said he saw the situation differently.
Both sides had heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments
that were subject to the treaty. Additionally, there were
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and they
would fall under the provisions of the treaty regarding
exhibitions. He proposed to drop the language "equipped for
nuclear armaments."


26. (S) Taylor said he would take this issue back to the
U.S. delegation for consideration and suggested the text be
bracketed for now. Kuznetsov said it must be bracketed but
it would be even better to delete the four words.

--------------
WHEN IS AN ITEM DEPLOYED?
--------------


27. (S) Kuznetsov suggested that a new paragraph be added
after paragraph 4 to specify when a newly constructed item
should be considered deployed since deployed items are
counted. He asked whether this type of explanation appears
elsewhere. He insisted that the United States should reflect
on how to count these items in Article III. Taylor agreed to
consider the suggestion and both sides agreed to pick up on
this point at the next meeting.


28. (S) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- U.S. Working Paper on Article II, November 29, 2009
(in English and unofficial Russian); and

-- U.S. Working Paper on Article III, November 29, 2009
(in English and unofficial Russian)


29. (U) Participants.



UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Dr. Dreicer
Ms. Kirchgasser
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Trifonov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


30. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS