Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1174
2009-12-18 17:55:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #1174/01 3521755
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O 181755Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0712
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5788
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2967
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1977
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7184
S E C R E T GENEVA 001174 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
NOVEMBER 28, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001174

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
NOVEMBER 28, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-063.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 28, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:50 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired
by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met on November

28. The U.S. and Russian delegations exchanged revised
versions of the joint draft text (JDT) of treaty Article XI.
The sides conducted a line-by-line review of the JDT of
Article XI and Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. The
process moved rapidly through Article XI, but slowed
significantly when the group transitioned to Section VI.
Much text was agreed in Article XI with the exception of the
section regarding the provisions for exhibitions which
required further discussion. In contrast, much of the text
of Section VI remained as bracketed text. The United States
also offered a preliminary outline of its proposed agreed
statements on SSGNs and B-1Bs. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Treaty Article XI; More on General
Obligations; and Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol.

--------------
TREATY ARTICLE XI
--------------


5. (S) Warner began the session by stating that he intended
to review the revised JDT of treaty Article XI and to
continue the review of Section VI of Part Five to the
Protocol. Petrov agreed but noted that the Russian
delegation intended to keep Article XI as short as possible
and to move any non-essential paragraphs to the second tier.

Warner then began the line-by-line review of the proposed JDT
of Article XI.


6. (S) The sides agreed that Paragraph 1 of Article XI, on
the purpose of inspections, was agreed.


7. (S) The sides also on agreed on Paragraph 2, on
facilities where inspections of deployed strategic offensive
arms (SOA) would take place, with the exception of the
U.S.-proposed adjective "nuclear" in front of warheads and
the U.S. stipulation that non-deployed SOA at heavy bomber
bases would also be inspectable.


8. (S) For paragraph three, listing the facilities where
non-deployed inspections would take place, the sides agreed
to use a general listing of the types of facilities that
would be inspected, with the specific facilities subject to
this type of inspection listed in the tier two section for
non-deployed inspections. In addition, Warner proposed that
the formerly declared facility (FDF) inspection be listed in
paragraph three. Petrov replied that the Russian Federation


agreed with the FDF concept but that he needed to confer with
colleagues before agreeing to remove the brackets to include
the FDF reference.


9. (S) Warner then inquired what the Russian-proposed
formulation "confirm technical characteristics" during a
non-deployed inspection meant. Petrov responded that it
referred to such activities as the measurement of the 20
centimeter red dot on converted B-1B heavy bombers during
inspections. Warner asked for further clarification as the
U.S. position was that converted B-1Bs would not be subject
to non-deployed type inspections. No resolution of the issue
was reached.


10. (S) Warner then took the opportunity to reiterate the
U.S. position that the converted B-1B and SSGNs would not be
subject to non-deployed inspections. He explained, however,
that the United States would present proposed agreed
statements outlining a once-per-year inspection regime for
the B-1Bs and SSGNs in order to provide the Russians with an
opportunity to verify that these systems were not reconverted
for nuclear use.


11. (S) For paragraph four on exhibitions, although both
delegations had re-worked the text, the sides could not reach
complete agreement and so deferred further discussion to the
next meeting. The sides did agree, as with previous
inspection descriptions, to move supporting information to
the second tier of the treaty. Warner also agreed to accept
the Russian proposal for new types of exhibitions. Warner
clarified that the Russian proposal to extend the
applicability of the phrase "demonstrate distinguishing
features" to all new types of SOA would require a change from
START, under which the phrase applied only to heavy bombers.
Warner also stated that the U.S. position was to include
heavy bomber nuclear armaments among the types of exhibitions
of new SOA.


12. (S) After closing the discussion of Article XI, Warner
informed the Russian delegation that the Untied States had
agreed to drop any reference to continuous monitoring at
Votkinsk in the new treaty. The Russian delegation was
visibly impressed by this statement.

--------------
MORE ON GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
--------------


13. (S) Petrov presented Warner with additional items that
Russia proposed including in Section I of Part Five of the
Protocol on General Obligations. Warner stated that the
United States would review the proposal and would be prepared
to discuss it at the next meeting, but did note that the
General Obligations section had already been sent to
conforming and any revisions would require a re-submittal to
the Conforming Group.

--------------
SECTION VI OF PART
FIVE OF THE PROTOCOL
--------------


14. (S) Warner then turned the discussion to Section VI of


Part Five of the Protocol and asked Petrov to clarify a
statement in paragraph 9(a) concerning inspection of a fixed
structure during an inspection of deployed SOA. Petrov
stated that the Russian proposal offered to substitute for an
empty fixed structure for inspection during the nuclear
warhead inspection (NWI) portion of a combined inspection if
that empty fixed structure did not contain a deployed mobile
launcher. Warner acknowledged and stated that the paragraph
also outlined that mobile launchers at the maintenance
facility would not be subject to the NWI portion of an
inspection. Petrov stated that the provision should remain
in brackets. Warner agreed.


15. (S) Warner then pointed out that the selection of a re
stricted area (RA) for the data update portion of an
inspection was essential to the United States for
verification of data presented in the periodic notifications.
Petrov stated that inspection of a re stricted area was
inconsistent with the inspections of ICBM and SLBM bases.
Under those inspections, only the maintenance facility would
be inspected during the data update portion of the
inspection. Warner agreed to leave the paragraph on re
stricted areas in brackets.


16. (S) For paragraph 9(b),outlining launcher selection for
SLBMs, Warner explained that the U.S. text directed two
deployed launchers to be subject to the NWI portion of the
inspection, while the Russian text subjected only one
deployed launcher to selection. Warner agreed to leave the
numbers bracketed until an agreement could be reached.
Warner stated that, in regards to the selection of a
non-deployed launcher, the United States did not agree to the
Russian proposal to select an SSGN launcher since the United
States did not consider it capable of launching an SLBM.
Warner reiterated that the United States would present a
draft agreed statement which would address the SSGNs and that
these systems would not be subject to inspections of deployed
SOA. Warner stated that the agreed statement would offer the
inspection of one SSGN per year in order to ensure that the
Russians would see each of the four SSGNs within a 4-year
period. Warner noted this would be in line with the
obligations outlined by the package offered to Russia by
General Jones.


17. (U) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- U.S. version of Treaty Article XI, dated November
28, 2009.

- RUSSIA:

-- Russian version of Treaty Article XI, dated November
28, 2009; and

-- Additions to General Obligations Section, undated.


18. (S) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner


Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Couch
Maj Johnson
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Petrov
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Vodopolova
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS