Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA1173
2009-12-18 16:36:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON EGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0024
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1173/01 3521636
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181636Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE0708
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHIGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIAT
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DCIMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5784
RHMFISSDEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES ARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC MMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2963
RUEHV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1973
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7180
S E C R E T GENEVA 001173 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON EGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION MEETING,
DECEMBER 15, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01091 (SFO-GVA-VII-067)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001173

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON EGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION MEETING,
DECEMBER 15, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01091 (SFO-GVA-VII-067)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-146.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 15, 2009
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 11:30 A.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A meeting on Conversion or Elimination was held at
the U.S. Mission on December 15. Mr. Siemon opened the
meeting by requesting clarification on notifications of ICBMs
and SLBMs exiting the Votkinsk Production Facility. Col
Ryzhkov promised to consider a U.S. proposal on text for such
notifications. Mr. Elliott handed over new U.S.-proposed
joint draft text (JDT) for the Conversion or Elimination,
Part Three of the Protocol, with one edited sentence and one
paragraph added on launch canister elimination procedures.
The meeting moved into a discussion on inspection quotas and
then joint basing of nuclear-equipped heavy bombers with
non-nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. Both issues sparked
discussion and permitted Elliott to reiterate U.S. positions
on both issues. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Where is the Exit Notification?;
Some Really Small Changes; "Inspection Activities" and
Quotas; and Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers.

--------------
WHERE IS THE EXIT NOTIFICATION?
--------------


5. (S) Siemon opened the meeting by requesting clarification
regarding notifications on the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from
the Votkinsk Production Facility. He said the U.S.
understanding from the Russian counter-proposal was that
notifications were to be provided 48 hours in advance of the
exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from the facility (Reftel). That

notification, however, was not contained in the list of
notifications. Additionally, Siemon clarified that the
United States proposed that the following information be
included in the notification: type of ballistic missile
(ICBM or SLBM); unique identifier (UID) for the ballistic
missile; an indication of the intended location of the
ballistic missile; and the ballistic missile's estimated
arrival date.

Begin Text of Russian document, Proposal of the Russian
Federation on Fundamental Issues of the New START, November
28, 2009:

The Russian side shall provide, 48 hours in advance,
notification of the exit of an ICBM from the Votkinsk
production facility. The U.S. side shall provide, 48 hours
in advance, analogous notifications of the exit of ICBMs and
SLBMs from production facilities for solid fuel missiles. An
appropriate notification of the arrival of a missile at an


ICBM base, SLBM base or at a location for non-deployed
missiles shall be provided.

End text.


6. (S) Siemon highlighted that he had been instructed to put
the notification in the Notification Part of the Protocol.
He suggested that the appropriate location for the provision
in the Notification Part would be in Section II because once
the ballistic missile arrived at its destination the
possessing Party would need to transmit a Format 3
notification indicating the ballistic missile arrived.
Siemon requested the Russian side's concept for such a
notification and where to place it in the structure of the
Notification Part of the Protocol.


7. (S) Ryzhkov responded that he understood the U.S.
rationale on the matter and proposed that the U.S. side
prepare a written proposal and place it in Section II.
Meanwhile, Ryzhkov said he would report back to the Russian
delegation and study the proposal and that their response
could be discussed at the next Notification Working Group
meeting. Siemon agreed to prepare a written proposal and
provide a translated copy to the Russian side. Siemon also
maintained that there would need to be text in a treaty
article which Ryzhkov deferred comment until he read the U.S.
proposal.

--------------
SOME REALLY SMALL CHANGES
--------------


8. (S) Elliott handed over the latest JDT on Part Three to
the Protocol regarding the Conversion or Elimination
Procedures. He reviewed the Section I, paragraph 3
U.S.-proposed change. (Begin comment: Text changed to read:
"The Parties may periodically verify such a use in
accordance with Part Nine of the Protocol." End comment.)
Elliott said that the agreed statement described the
procedures to do periodic inspections and that the part of
the Protocol dealing with the agreed statement was Part Nine.


9. (S) Section V, paragraph 5 was a new paragraph added to
clarify the elimination procedures for launch canisters for
ICBMs and SLBMs. Elliott stated that once the elimination
procedures were complete, the launch canisters could be
reused for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty but
shall not be transferred to third parties outside of Russia.
Specifically, Elliott said that the concept and wording
associated with "separating" as part of the launch canister
elimination procedures would remain unchanged. Ryzhkov
responded that the Russian delegation had discussed the issue
and that he believed Russia would accept the U.S. proposal to
assume the obligation to not use the launch canisters for
purposes inconsistent with the treaty. Furthermore, Ryzhkov
believed the Russian delegation would accept the obligation
not to transfer to third parties.

--------------
"INSPECTION ACTIVITIES" AND QUOTAS
--------------


10. (S) Elliott alerted Ryzhkov to the fact that the word


"inspection" was still being discussed rather than
"exhibition" as used in the Conversion or Elimination
Protocol. To resolve the confusion the Inspection Protocol
Working Group began using the term "inspection activities"
which incorporated both inspections and exhibitions. Ryzhkov
said the term "inspection activities" was not agreed and that
the day before Amb Antonov had briefed the Russian delegation
that both heads of delegation agreed to use the word
"inspection" in Article XI. Elliott said he thought the
issue could be resolved by the Conforming Group.


11. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side had broadened
the inspection framework considerably over the course of the
negotiations. He said the Russian President agreed on the
specific number of inspections and noted that Russia had
taken incremental steps toward the U.S. position. Elliott
replied that he continued to be told that if we do not agree
to a reasonable number of inspections, the United States
would not sign a Treaty. This statement elicited a slightly
more spirited response from Ryzhkov, who said the United
States was demanding too many inspections. He went on to
provide a mathematical description of the inspection load
under START and the U.S.-proposed inspection load under START
Follow-on. According to Ryzhkov's math, the United States
was proposing a two fold increase in inspections as opposed
to START, which he deemed unacceptable. Elliott stated the
U.S. position that if an elimination inspection is captured
under an inspection quota then that would not be an "actual"
right under the treaty. That is precisely why the United
States proposed that elimination inspections be captured
under a limited number of exhibitions which would not
increase Type One or Type Two quotas nor load factor of
Russian operational bases. Elliott explained that the
opportunity always existed for both Parties to perform
eliminations in groups in order to reduce the number of total
exhibitions. Once again Elliott reiterated that should
Russia continue to insist that elimination inspections remain
subject to an inspection quota, the United States would be
incapable of ratifying the treaty.


12. (S) Ryzhkov commented that the rationale that the
exhibitions would not increase the load of Russian personnel
was unconvincing, given the travel days prior to and after
the overnight stay and the inspection time. Elliott
countered that it was based simply on whether the United
States could confirm or verify the act of elimination and
those charged with that task would testify to the treaty's
verifiability. He added that in some cases national
technical means (NTM) of verification was completely
sufficient for certain systems (for silos, submarines and
launch canisters) but for other systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and
mobile launchers) the United States believed they could not
be verified by NTM. Elliott said that this condition led to
the proposed number of opportunities to verify. Elliott
deferred further discussion to Mr. Warner and Col Ilin.

--------------
JOINT BASING OF HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


13. (S) Elliott captured the historical context of how the
United States and Russia came into the B-1B heavy bomber
basing conundrum under START. The bottom line is that B-1Bs


are based at the U.S. conversion or elimination facility,
they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments, and then placed in visit status back
at Ellsworth and Dyess Air Force Bases (AFB). Elliott
conveyed that the United States will convert a number of
B-52Hs into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments
but lacked the ramp space to separate them from B-52Hs
equipped for nuclear armaments (e.g., non-nuclear from
nuclear). He suggested that at Barksdale AFB there will be a
time when both heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
will be based along with heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. This condition makes it unacceptable
for the United States to agree on a prohibition on
co-location or joint basing of heavy bombers. Elliott stated
the United States could not agree to something that it was
incapable of doing. Ryzhkov remarked that he would report
this to the Russian delegation that morning.


14. (S) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Three:
Conversion or Elimination Procedures, December 14, 2009.


15. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Siemon
Ms. Smith (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS