START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 3, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1141 (SFO-GVA-VII-079)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-091.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 03, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The tenth meeting of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group during Session VII was held at the
Russian Mission on December 03, 2009. The two sides
discussed current text regarding general provisions,
conversion or elimination (CorE) of heavy bombers, and
elimination of facilities. Some brackets were cleared in the
general provisions section. All brackets were cleared in the
section regarding elimination of facilities, and the
remaining brackets were reviewed, but not cleared, in the
heavy bomber section.


4. (S) The sides discussed text regarding elimination of
ICBMs and SLBMs along with CorE of ICBM launchers and SLBM
launchers. Numerous brackets were cleared in the elimination
of ICBMs and SLBMs section and the elimination of ICBM
launchers section. Remaining issues for elimination of ICBM
and SLBMs included: 1) the placing of a hole in the motor
case when the solid-fuel was removed by burning; the
timeframe eliminated items are visible to national technical
means (NTM); and the elimination procedures for launch
canisters. Remaining issues for elimination of ICBM
launchers included specific elimination procedures for mobile
launchers of ICBMs, including the possible use of "wildcard"
procedures, and the allowable time period for NTM to verify
CorE activities. Russia also noted a need to move inspection
procedures to Part V of the Protocol.


5. (S) In reference to the elimination of SLBM launchers,
the sides agreed in concept to a two-step elimination
process, but significant differences in the desired wording
for this section remained. The procedures to be used for
elimination remained bracketed, and the Russian side raised
concerns about the use of "limits" in one location. The two
sides disagreed in the wording regarding conversion of SLBM
launchers for use other than launchers of SLBMs. Lastly, the
Russian side raised a concern that current text did not exist
to reflect the actual date a converted item was removed from
the limits of the treaty. End Summary.


6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: General Provisions, Facilities, and
Heavy Bombers; Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs; Conversion or
Elimination of ICBM Launchers; and Conversion or Elimination
of SLBM Launchers.

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GENERAL PROVISIONS, FACILITIES,
AND HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------




7. (S) Mr. Elliott opened the meeting with discussion on
Section VII (Procedures for Elimination of Facilities). He
stated the U.S. side was removing its proposed text "ICBM
Emplacement Equipment" and "support" in paragraph 1 of this
Section. Removal of those items cleared the remaining
brackets and resulted in agreed text ready for submission to
the Conforming Group.


8. (S) Col Ryzhkov replied that he believed Section V
(Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers) and Section VII
were now agreed. Mr. Smirnov corrected Ryzhkov by noting
Section V still had bracketed text regarding the time period
for items to remain visible to NTM after CorE. (Begin
comment: The U.S. side wants a 60-day window for NTM while
Russia wants 30 days. End comment.) Elliott concurred that
brackets remained. Ryzhkov stated that issue should be
considered to be "in-progress."


9. (S) Elliott next addressed Section I (General
Provisions). He stated the brackets existing in paragraph 3
were being addressed through agreed statements. (Begin
comment: These agreed statements had not yet been provided
to the Russian side. End comment.) These statements would
allow for viewing of B-1Bs and SSGNs through the life of the
treaty. Elliott opined that acceptance of those agreed
statements would surely clear the brackets in this paragraph.
Elliott stated the brackets in paragraph 6 regarding
confirmation of CorE would remain until procedures for
elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, in addition to elimination of
mobile launchers of ICBMs, were agreed.

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ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS
--------------


10. (S) Ryzhkov opened discussion of Section II (Procedures
for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs) by stating the Russian
side was accepting U.S. language in paragraph 1 and
subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(c). Referencing the Russian
proposal to place a large hole in the case (Reftel),Ryzhkov
asked why the U.S. side did not incorporate the Russian
concept in the joint draft text.


11. (S) Elliott replied that the U.S. side attempted to
combine the U.S. and Russian texts whenever possible.
Therefore, it utilized not less than 10 centimeters vice 1
meter. Additionally, he noted the United States preferred
holes be drilled rather than using a sledge hammer as the
Russian side had proposed; the U.S. side would not oppose
that though. He also noted that while a one meter opening
would be visible to NTM, the United States was not prepared
to forfeit a right to inspect the eliminated first stage
motor cases. He opined the procedures could easily be
modified to account for a larger opening or for use of a
sledge hammer if both sides agreed that was necessary.


12. (S) Ryzhkov asked that the two sides use a term other
than "drilled" to allow for additional flexibility in the
procedure. Lt Col Goodman recommended using the term
"placed." Ryzhkov stated the Russian side would study this
paragraph and provide a recommendation if "placed" was
unacceptable.




13. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side would remove
its subparagraph 2(d) regarding "wildcard" procedures, and
consequently, the corresponding U.S. bracketed text "2(d)" in
paragraph 3 should be removed as well. He then indicated
U.S. paragraph 5, which pertained to inspection team rights
for elimination confirmation inspections, should be located
elsewhere in the text. Elliott noted that Col Ilin and Dr.
Warner should be consulted and he asked that Ryzhkov approach
Ilin for assistance. Elliott agreed to discuss with Warner
as well.


14. (S) Ryzhkov next discussed U.S. paragraph 4 which
provided procedures for elimination of launch canisters for
ICBMs and SLBMs. He said this paragraph was "not good" as it
was not possible to use the procedures as set forth by the
U.S. side, and therefore, it would remain bracketed. Mr.
Ivanov then asked to review treaty Article VII (Conversion or
Elimination). He raised a concern with the U.S. use of
"procedures" in paragraph 1. The Russian side recommended
use of "Part" to ensure all Sections of Part Three of the
Protocol were captured on the basis that some means of
removal from accountability did not contain procedures.
Elliott replied the U.S. side would consider the Russian
text.

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CORE OF ICBM LAUNCHERS
--------------


15. (S) Ryzhkov began discussion of Section III (Procedures
for Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers) with Russian
paragraph 4 concerning elimination of mobile launchers
stating there was agreement with the first three paragraphs.
Ryzhkov noted a "fundamental" disagreement in this paragraph
as the U.S.-proposed language required all procedures be
accomplished while the Russian-proposed language allowed the
use of any of the procedures. Therefore, he stated, those
brackets should remain. He then opined that the Russian side
would accept U.S. subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) if the two were
combined as they would equate to the Russian subparagraph
4(a). U.S. subparagraph 4(c) requiring cutting of 0.78m from
the launcher chassis would remain bracketed.


16. (S) Elliott indicated that the two subparagraphs could
be combined, and he acknowledged the Russian desire to keep
subparagraph 4(c) in brackets. He then asked Ryzhkov about
the disposition of the Russian subparagraph allowing
"wildcard" procedures. Ryzhkov replied the Russian
preference was to provide the "wildcard" option in all
sections of the CorE Protocol. Elliott responded that this
text should remain in brackets since the U.S. side opposed
use of "wildcard" procedures for any item other than silo
launchers of ICBMs.


17. (S) Ryzhkov agreed to keep the brackets and he quickly
moved to the time period allowed for inspection by NTM for
mobile launchers of ICBMs. He stated both "30-day" and
"60-day" should remain bracketed here and throughout the text
as they would be addressed together. Ryzhkov then noted
paragraph 6 was similar text pertaining to inspection team
procedures and should also be located elsewhere. Referencing
paragraphs 7 and 8, Ryzhkov stated the Russian side was


removing its proposed text since it was covered in the
General Provisions. Therefore, these two paragraphs were
agreed. Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether the Russian side
intended to oppose bracketed U.S.-proposed text in paragraph
1 of this section. Ryzhkov replied that the Russian side
accepted the U.S. addition.

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CORE OF SLBM LAUNCHERS
--------------


18. (S) Ryzhkov opened discussion on Section IV (Procedures
for Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers) by stating
the United States had proposed a new paragraph 1. He then
asked whether the United States had incorporated the
equivalent Russian text in its proposed paragraph 3 and why
the Russian text was not fully accepted. He also noted that
a submarine could be moved after its hatches were removed.
He stated it could be moved to a different pier for
scrapping.


19. (S) Elliott replied that the United States had attempted
to write text to support actual Russian elimination plans.
He said he understood Russia would eliminate SSBNs at a
shipyard and that current text supported movement of the
submarine as long as it remained at that facility. Ryzhkov
replied the Russian translation stipulated the submarine must
remain at the same pier where the hatches were removed. He
also noted that the U.S.-proposed text utilized an indefinite
time period for NTM while Russian-proposed text contained a
30-day time period.


20. (S) Elliott then asked to clarify several additional
paragraphs. He stated, in paragraph 2, the United States
chose "limits" instead of "provisions" since a two-step
elimination process was to be used. With START, the SLBM
launchers came out of the central limits when the hatch,
fairings, and gas generators, when applicable, were removed.
The submarine was still under the provisions of the treaty at
that time. He then noted that the U.S.-proposed text
provided inspection by NTM until the submarine was no longer
subject to the provisions of the treaty. It would remain
visible to NTM until it was scrapped.


21. (S) Ryzhkov explained the Russian concept of limits for
deployed and non-deployed launchers. He stated non-deployed
launchers, as the launchers in question would be categorized,
would not be subject to the limitations of the treaty but
would be subject to its provisions. He explained the use of
"limitations" was broader and covered more.


22. (S) Elliott responded that he understood and
subsequently noted the U.S. side was prepared to embrace the
concept of deployed and non-deployed launchers as long as a
limit was set on non-deployed launchers. He indicated SLBM
launchers were neither deployed nor non-deployed once the
hatch was removed. These launchers would still be subject to
the provisions of the treaty even though they would not count
against the numerical limits and would remain visible to NTM
until the submarine was scrapped.


23. (S) Ryzhkov noted that a conceptual difference existed.
He stated that according to the Russian concept, a launcher


was non-deployed when a missile was removed. The missile
would be non-deployed as well. In the case of elimination,
the launcher would be removed from the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) once the hatch was removed. When the
submarine was scrapped, it would also be removed from the
MOU. Therefore, Ryzhkov concluded, the use of the term
"provisions" was preferred.


24. (S) Elliott indicated that if we used "provisions" in
this case, the submarine would no longer be subject to the
treaty in any way once the hatches were removed. Elliott
asked Ryzhkov to confirm that was what Russia intended.
Ryzhkov noted that some confusion existed on this topic as
the launchers would no longer be subject to the treaty while
the submarine would be.


25. (S) Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that Article II uses the
phrase "SLBM and associated launcher." Therefore, legal
guidance was needed before the two sides could move forward.
He proposed leaving both U.S.-proposed and Russian-proposed
texts bracketed until the lawyers could respond. Elliott
then asked whether the Russian proposed text at the end of
the paragraph could be removed. Ryzhkov agreed.


26. (S) Elliott requested clarification regarding the 30-day
period provided for in Russian paragraph 3. Ryzhkov answered
that it would allow inspection by NTM of the removed hatches,
fairings, and when applicable, gas generators and the
submarine. Upon expiration of that window the submarine and
the removed elements could be moved, as required. Elliott
asked whether notification would be appropriate at which time
Ryzhkov replied "yes."


27. (S) Elliott stated the U.S. side required the submarine
be visible to NTM until it was no longer subject to the
provisions of the treaty. Smirnov replied that was
impossible in the case of a covered dock. Elliott asked
whether it was possible to identify the submarine while in
the covered dock or if it was possible to move the covering.
Smirnov replied no to both questions.


28. (S) When asked whether the Russian Federation had any
concerns about paragraph 1, Ryzhkov replied that conforming
would address their linguistic issues. Elliott then stated
the use of "any of" in paragraph 2 of the U.S.-proposed text
was not popular to the U.S. side because it allowed for
"wildcard" procedures. Ryzhkov responded that the Russian
side reserved the right to develop other procedures. He
stated that during the life of the treaty advances in
technology would allow for new procedures. Such procedures
would have to be agreed upon in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC) though.


29. (S) Elliott noted that technology would provide changes
in "how" but not "what" procedures were completed. In that
case, the U.S. side would still expect the agreed procedure
to be accomplished at a minimum. Ryzhkov replied that the
issue was not about less scope in the existing procedures but
that the "wildcard" allowed for new procedures. He noted
again that new procedures must be agreed upon in the BCC
otherwise, they could not be used. Goodman astutely
recommended the "wildcard" option be renamed the "Elliott
Option." Ryzhkov and Smirnov gleefully agreed. Elliott


then suggested it should be called the Elliot/Ryzhkov option
to which Ryzhkov laughingly responded that he wanted to be
left out of it.


30. (S) Elliott inquired if the Russian side had any
thoughts on the U.S.-proposed paragraph 4 regarding when an
item ceased to be subject to the provisions of the treaty.
Ryzhkov stated the U.S.-proposed text was acceptable and he
noted Russia was removing their proposed text at the end of
U.S. paragraph 2. He noted "any of" should remain since the
Russian side preferred the "wildcard" option. He reiterated
that it should be applicable to elimination of all items. He
also indicated that the U.S.-proposed text in paragraph 5 was
acceptable.


31. (S) Regarding paragraph 6, which states the procedures
for conversion, Ryzhkov said the U.S.-proposed text would not
work in the Russian language. He stated the language problem
could be solved once the definition of strategic offensive
arms was finalized. Elliott noted no definition existed and
Ryzhkov replied one was being worked. Elliott then proposed
different phraseology but Ryzhkov indicated that text would
not be acceptable either. Elliott explained that the option
to convert a launch tube for other than arms must be retained
to which Ryzhkov indicated his understanding; he recommended
the discussion be tabled for the time being.


32. (S) Ryzhkov stated specific conversion procedures,
subparagraphs 6(a),6(b),and 6(c) were acceptable. He asked
why the United States chose not to incorporate
Russian-proposed paragraph 6, referencing when an item was
considered converted, in the U.S.-proposed paragraph 7.
Essentially, the U.S. text did not account for the completion
of procedures in paragraphs 5 or 6. Elliott indicated this
was simply an oversight and that the U.S. side would add the
additional text. Ryzhkov agreed to study the U.S.-proposed
paragraph 7 again and if the Russian Federation agreed to
that text Russian-proposed paragraphs 7 and 8 could be
removed.


33. (S) Ryzhkov asked when a SLBM launcher would be
considered converted. Elliott responded after inspection or
upon expiration of the 30-day inspection period. Ryzhkov
replied that additional text would be required in
U.S.-proposed paragraph 7 to stipulate the actual date of
conversion. Elliott agreed and indicated this text may need
to be added to the heavy bomber section as well. Ryzhkov
closed by asking the U.S. side to review paragraphs 1 and 3
and to search for a compromise.


34. (U) Documents exchanged: None.


35. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett


Mr. Pfister
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Voloskov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


36. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS