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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) COUNTING RULES SUBGROUP MEETING,
DECEMBER 2, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-085.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 2, 2009
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) At a meeting of the Counting Rules Subgroup of the
Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group chaired by Mr.
Taylor and ADM Kuznetsov, discussion focused on locational re
strictions and sub-limits on non-deployed items in Article
IV. The Russian delegation asked questions about the
U.S.-proposed limit on non-deployed launchers and the
difference between locating and basing items. The Russian
delegation also sought to understand the U.S. position on
non-deployed heavy bombers. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Locate Versus Base for Deployed
Items; Overall Non-Deployed Limit is Key for Counting Rules;
We Have to Have 150 by When?; Moving Through the Sub-Limit
Paragraphs of Article IV; What's a Non-Deployed Heavy
Bomber?; What's an Item? What's a Movement?

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LOCATE VERSUS BASE FOR DEPLOYED ITEMS
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5. (S) Taylor began the discussion at the Treaty Text
Working Group meeting by introducing revised text for Article
IV on locational and numerical limitations on certain items
under the treaty. Taylor noted the first paragraph was
intended to capture the Russian idea for including a
paragraph in this Article about deployed strategic offensive
arms (SOA),instead of just focusing on non-deployed items.
Kuznetsov inquired about the use of "locate" for some items
versus "base" for others. Taylor explained that in English,
"locate" meant where something could be versus where it was
housed or supported. Kuznetsov asked about the legal
distinction between the terms "locate" and "base." Taylor
observed, as a way of describing the terminology, that
submarines could be "located" anywhere in the ocean but only
"based" at a submarine base. Taylor added that "base" also
worked for mobile ICBMs which had bases at which they were
housed. Kuznetsov disagreed that ballistic missile launchers
could be based, insisting that they were located at bases.


6. (S) Taylor asked Kuznetsov to explain the Russian
delegation's concept behind its use of the terms. Kuznetsov
exclaimed that it was not just a "concept" but the whole
basis of what was being discussed in the treaty: "What we
are counting is what is at bases." In the Russian view,
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would be
non-deployed, for instance. He read the following proposed
text for the first paragraph of Article IV: "Each Party
should locate deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs only at ICBM bases and submarine
bases. Deployed heavy bombers shall only be based at


airbases, unless agreed otherwise."


7. (S) Mr. Highsmith distinguished between "locating"
deployed launchers of ICBMs and "basing" deployed launchers
of SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. He pointed out that the
definitions of "airbase" and "submarine base" used basing as
a concept while the definition of "ICBM base" used location.
Kuznetsov said it sounded ridiculous to say one based SLBM
launchers anywhere, as they were an integral part of a
submarine, which was what was "based." Dr. Fraley retorted
that, if one said the launchers were located only at the
base, they would have to stay behind when the submarine went
on patrol. Kuznetsov laughed that he, too, had never seen an
SLBM launcher outside a submarine. Taylor and Kuznetsov
agreed to move on to another topic in Article IV.


8. (S) Later in the meeting the sides returned to this
subject and tried a few more formulations out loud before the
U.S. delegation committed to think about revised language for
a future meeting. (Begin comment: A revised version of
this Article, including proposed text for paragraph 1 and
showing brackets to reflect the sides' positions, was sent to
the Russian delegation that evening. End comment.)

Begin text of revised Article IV:

SFO-VII
U.S.-Proposed
Joint Draft Text
December 3, 2009

Article IV


1. Each Party shall locate:

(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;

(b) deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile
submarines.


2. Each Party shall base deployed heavy bombers only at air
bases.

((3. Each Party shall limit:

(a) the total number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers
so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter, to no more than 150.

(b) the number of non-deployed ICBMs at each ICBM base to no
more than 5.))1

((4))1 ((3.))2 Each Party shall locate:

(a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases,
production facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities,
conversion or elimination facilities, training
facilities,((and))2 test ranges((, and space launch
facilities))1. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not
be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases.

(b) non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs only at ICBM bases,
submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance


facilities of ICBM bases, repair facilities for ICBMs or
SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or
elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training
facilities, test ranges, ((space launch facilities,))1 and
production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs,
however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of
ICBM bases or at submarine bases.

((5.))1 ((4.))2 Non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs as well as
non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit.
Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between
facilities to no more than 30 days.

((6. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of
non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges to no more than
15.))1

((7.))1 ((5.))2 Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be
located only at test ranges.

((8.))1 ((6.))2 Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be
located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test
ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at
each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed
one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

((9. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers
to no more than 10.


10. Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber
flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy
bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at
training facilities for heavy bombers.))1

(( ))1 Proposed by the United States
(( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation

End text.

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OVERALL NON-DEPLOYED LIMIT
IS KEY FOR COUNTING RULES
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9. (S) Taylor turned to the next paragraph which dealt with
the two U.S.-proposed sub-limits: 150 non-deployed launchers
and five non-deployed ICBMs per ICBM base. He stated clearly
that the treaty had to have a limit on the overall number of
non-deployed limit for the United States to agree to the
Russian concept of counting deployed and non-deployed items.
(Begin comment: The Russian concept was that a missile and
launcher would become deployed when the missile was in/on the
launcher, but both would be non-deployed when separated. End
comment.) Taylor noted that the sub-limit did not single out
mobile ICBMs, but treated all SOA equally. When Kuznetsov
asked why the United States had proposed five non-deployed
ICBMs per base, Taylor explained it was to allow for
maintenance issues. Kuznetsov further asked why there was
not a limit on non-deployed SLBMs and Taylor responded that,
for submarines in overhaul, for example, there would be a
whole boatload of SLBMs.

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WE HAVE TO HAVE 150 BY WHEN?
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10. Col Kamenskiy asked about the timing of the limit of 150
non-deployed launchers. Was it a limit at entry-into-force
or after 7 years? Did the limit kick in the day after
ratification? Taylor answered that the sides would be
limited to 150 non-deployed launchers at the time of
entry-into-force (EIF) of the treaty. Kamenskiy shook his
head, saying that the Russian Federation had months earlier
proposed a limit on non-deployed launchers after 7 years, but
that proposal had been rejected by the United States.
Kuznetsov followed with a question about whether the United
States had calculated how many non-deployed launchers it
would have. The United States, he offered, had three
submarines that had been converted for SLCMs, which counted
under START as deployed launchers. Kuznetsov said he did not
know how many non-deployed SLBM launchers the Russian
Federation had, but there would be more than 150, based on
the number of items awaiting elimination.


11. (S) Taylor clarified that under the U.S. proposal, the
SSGNs would not count under the START Follow-on treaty and
that the United States had offered transparency measures to
assure the Russian Federation that those submarines could not
launch SLBMs. Kuznetsov reiterated that the Russian
Federation could not live with a limit of 150 non-deployed
launchers, as there were too many that would count until they
were eliminated. "The number is too small for us. The
number should reflect today's reality."


12. (S) The sides moved to the next paragraph on locations.
Taylor pointed out the differences between the U.S. proposal
and the previous Russian proposal for paragraph 4(a). The
United States proposed to permit the inclusion of space
launch facilities as an allowed location for non-deployed
launchers and a prohibition on prototype mobile launchers of
ICBMs at maintenance facilities and in paragraph 4(b),the
inclusion of maintenance facilities as a location permitted
for non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Kuznetsov noted the
deletion of the phrase "mobile launchers of ICBMs" as the
descriptor for the item being restricted and requested
brackets around space launch facility. Kuznetsov indicated
that the Russian delegation could agree to the prototype
sentences in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b).

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MOVING THROUGH THE SUB-LIMIT
PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE IV
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13. (S) Taylor explained that the U.S. proposal limiting
non-deployed ballistic missiles at test ranges to 15, was
previous text that had appeared as a subparagraph and now
stood on its own. Kuznetsov rebuffed the proposal by saying
that the Russian delegation did not limit non-deployed items.
Taylor used the opportunity to repeat that the overall
non-deployed limit was a key element for the United States to
drop its position on "considered to contain" for the
definition of deployed launchers. The whole approach, he
said, had been to limit ICBM and SLBM launchers in a
non-deployed status.




14. (S) On paragraph 6, regarding a limit on test launchers
at test ranges, Kuznetsov questioned the need for such a
limit. "There are no other test launchers than those at test
ranges. This is redundant." Kamenskiy added that under
START, the rail-mobile missile system had test launchers that
sometimes went to the test range; that was why this provision
had been needed. Under START, those test launchers could go
to the test range for 45 days before they had to go into
non-deployed status. Kuznetsov cut off Kamenskiy's comments.


15. (S) Taylor pointed to the definition that said a test
launcher was located at a test range. He asked what happened
if such a launcher left the range. Without the paragraph
under discussion, such a launcher could not be a test
launcher. So the treaty needed to specify that test
launchers could only be at test ranges.


16. (S) On the locational re striction for training
launchers to be only at ICBM bases and test ranges, Kuznetsov
insisted that the Russian Federation would not have mobile
training launchers, but would train with operational
launchers. Taylor reassured him that the U.S. delegation had
heard the message that Russia would not have mobile training
launchers and had, therefore, broadened the term to include
all training launchers. Kuznetsov said the Russian side
would think about it. Kuznetsov argued about the limit on
one silo training launcher per base, theorizing about having
2 or 3 such launchers at a base. Was the United States
afraid they would be converted into operational launchers?
In START, he proclaimed, "we were afraid of everything."

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WHAT'S A NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBER?
--------------


17. (S) On the U.S. proposal to limit the number and basing
location for test heavy bombers, Kuznetsov said the Russian
delegation would think about the provision. Kuznetsov noted
there was no provision on non-deployed heavy bombers, as the
Russian delegation had proposed. Where should they be based?
Kuznetsov said the Russian delegation could not understand
the U.S. position on non-deployed heavy bombers. What was a
non-deployed heavy bomber? What was a deployed heavy bomber?
He expressed frustration that the United States kept saying
that a deployed heavy bomber was a heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments. Taylor added "other than a test heavy
bomber."


18. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the Russian side wanted to
associate the bomber with its base. If a heavy bomber was
located at a flight test center or a training facility it
would be non-deployed. Lt Col Comeau asked whether the
Russian side believed a non-deployed bomber was one equipped
for non-nuclear armaments or one located at a production
facility. Kuznetsov said that, in the Russian position, both
of those would be non-deployed heavy bombers. Comeau pressed
to know how both a nuclear-equipped and a non-nuclear
equipped heavy bomber could be considered non-deployed.
Kuznetsov argued that a heavy bomber awaiting elimination for
1 to 2 years had to be considered non-deployed. Taylor noted
that the U.S. delegation had heard the Russian concerns.

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WHAT'S AN ITEM? WHAT'S A MOVEMENT?
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19. (S) On paragraph 10 of the paper, dealing with a 30-day
limit on the movement of items between declared facilities,
Kuznetsov interjected with the questions: "What's an item?
What's a movement?" Taylor reminded him that this provision
had originally been a Russian proposal in Article VIII on
notifications. When the TTDWG had discussed that Article,
the sides had agreed to move the provision to Article IV. If
the provision was not needed, it could certainly be dropped.
Kuznetsov agreed to drop it.


20. (U) Documents provided:

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Working Paper, Article IV, dated December 2,
2009, in English and unofficial Russian; and

-- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Article IV, dated December 2,
2009, in English and unofficial Russian.


21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Lt Col Comeau
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Highsmith
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

ADM Kuznetsov
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Melikbekian
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS