START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001145

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 2, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-083.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 2, 2009
Time: 10:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
met with their Russian counterparts at the Russian Mission on
December 2, 2009. This was the seventh meeting of this
session and the fourteenth meeting overall. The sides
discussed counting rules and their affect on the MOU, their
respective positions on when data for the MOU would first be
exchanged, and clarified positions on annexes. While the
sides were able to clarify their positions on some issues,
particularly on the exchange of data, most outstanding issues
were left unresolved, pending movement at the political
level. End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Counting Rules and Numbers of
Strategic Delivery Vehicles; When MOU Data Would First Be
Exchanged; Provisional Application; Documents to Be Exchanged
at Signature; New U.S. Counting Rules; and Discussion of the
MOU; Discussion of the Annexes; Further Discussion of
Counting Rules; and Russian Facilities

--------------
COUNTING RULES AND NUMBERS
OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES
--------------


5. (S) Mr. Trout began by stating that the U.S. side had
discussed accepting the Russian-proposed counting rules, but
that such acceptance was contingent on Russia agreeing to a
limit on non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. Russia,
he noted, had resisted this limit and queried whether this
remained their position. Gen Poznikhir replied that the
sides did not have enough time to discuss this separate
limit. For instance, he raised, would heavy bombers be
included under such a ceiling? For such complex issues, the
Russian side would need to consult with Moscow.


6. (S) In any case, he continued, it would be more logical
to talk about general limits on both deployed and
non-deployed items. He said the U.S. proposal was 700
deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers, with
a limit of 150 non-deployed launchers. But, he continued, it
would be more logical to set a consolidated limit of 850 on
deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and on
heavy bombers. Under this rubric, each side could determine
the composition of its own force. He then asked whether the
Parties had enough time to discuss these issues. Trout
responded that they might indeed have time. Poznikhir then
pointed out that he had been laying out the delegation's
view, and that they were of the opinion that it was
unreasonable to introduce such a limit into the negotiations
at such a late stage. Their proposal therefore remained that


of the package proposal of November 28, 650-700 strategic
delivery vehicles. He qualified his statement by saying that
if there were more time the sides could discuss other
options, but otherwise the Russian position still held.


7. (S) Poznikhir, returning to warhead accountability for
heavy bombers, asked why the United States had determined
that three warheads per heavy bomber was the appropriate
number. Trout responded that the U.S. side had arrived at
three by assessing the number of nuclear ALCMs at each U.S.
airbase that had heavy bombers for nuclear armaments. Given
that the U.S. side had dropped its proposal to inspect
weapons storage areas (WSA),the United States believed three
was the appropriate attribution level. Poznikhir retorted
that the Russian side's proposal for an attribution of one
warhead for each heavy bomber was a hold over from START.
Why, he queried, should the attribution number not be five or
two or ten rather than three? Trout restated the U.S.
rationale regarding the number of nuclear ALCMs at air bases.
Poznikhir noted that the Russians had moved towards the U.S.
position on counting rules by counting the number of warheads
on heavy bombers, but they did not comprehend the U.S. logic
for three. Trout said the U.S. delegation needed to present
a realistic number to Congress, and, if the warhead
attribution was zero or one, Congress would not believe the
number to be serious. Poznikhir questioned how the U.S. side
had derived the attributed number for the Russian side, and
that attributing three warheads would itself be misleading to
Congress. He also asked whether the United States would be
comfortable with a warhead ceiling of 1600 given an
attribution level of three warheads for each heavy bomber,
which Trout confirmed.

--------------
WHEN MOU DATA WOULD FIRST BE EXCHANGED
--------------


8. (S) Trout asked whether the Russian position remained
that the first exchange of data for the MOU would take place
45 days after entry-into-force (EIF),which Poznikhir
confirmed. Trout explained that would not be satisfactory to
the U.S. side because Congress would demand actual data
during the ratification deliberations. Trout noted that Gen
Orlov had earlier proposed that the sides exchange data 45
days after signature. Poznikhir countered that ratification
might not occur, and suggested that the sides exchange only
aggregate data on central limits and the categories of data
at signature and populate the database only after EIF.

--------------
PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
--------------


9. (S) Trout explained that the U.S. understanding was
Russia would provisionally apply the treaty once signed.
Would provisional application include notifications and
visits? Poznikhir replied that provisional application would
not require exchange of data or notifications. With mutual
consent, he continued, the Parties could carry out
exhibitions of existing items. He stated that the Russian
side had legal obligations to conduct exhibitions under
provisional application, but there would be no obligation to
exchange data.




10. (S) Trout queried whether such exhibitions would include
new types. Poznikhir responded that only existing, not new,
types would be included, stating that the Russian side had no
new types. He offered that the U.S. side could look again at
the RS-12M or the RS-12M, Variant 2 if the Russian side could
look at the Minuteman III. Trout asked, What about the
RS-24? Poznikhir said that if they had it, the United States
could see it. But, Trout insisted, Gen Solovtsov, the
Russian Strategic Forces Commander, had stated that the RS-24
would be deployed in December after the expiration of START.
Poznikhir then jocularly noted that Solovtsov had "perhaps
said something wrong" and had been replaced by Gen
Shvaichenko. Trout then pointed out that it was probable the
RS-24 would become operational before the EIF of a new
treaty, and, in light of that, asked whether it would be
subject to exhibition. Poznikhir responded that exhibition
of the RS-24 would be carried out in accordance with the new
treaty.


11. (S) Trout queried whether there would be movement
notifications exchanged during provisional application.
Poznikhir replied that there were no such requirements in the
current draft for provisional application. Would, Trout
asked, there be any inspections under provisional
application? Poznikhir joked that the two sides should take
a break from each other for a while, and rhetorically asked
how such inspections could be conducted without established
Tier 3 procedures.


12. (S) Trout stated that the U.S. position was different.
The United States had thought using data current as of treaty
signature, but he acknowledged the difficulty of
synchronizing such data. Therefore, the U.S. proposal was to
use START data, current as of July 1, slightly modified to
match the categories in the new treaty and that would be
exchanged at signature. Forty-five days after signature the
Parties would exchange data current as of the date of
signing. He added that no warhead data would be exchanged
until after EIF. This regime would support provisional
application of notifications and inspections. Trout noted
that Amb Antonov had said that inspections and data exchanges
would be possible under provisional application. Poznikhir
asked for clarification about the U.S. proposal, and Trout
clarified. Poznikhir then stated he would report the
position to his Head of Delegation.

--------------
DOCUMENTS TO BE EXCHANGED AT SIGNATURE
--------------


13. (S) Trout then suggested that the titles of annexes
might need to be changed, since the United States wanted to
make the annex categories part of the Protocol. If this was
done, the document the Presidents would sign would include
all of the categories of data for the MOU. Poznikhir asked
for clarification, and Trout said he would return to the
issue later after having consulted with U.S. lawyers. He
re-emphasized the concern that the document signed by the
U.S. President must contain real data. A discussion
regarding the structure and format of the data ensued, after
which LT Lobner queried whether the Russians insisted on
their President signing actual data. Poznikhir repeated that


the Russian position was to provide numbers on the aggregate
central limits at the time of signature, with the remaining
information introduced after EIF.

--------------
NEW U.S. COUNTING RULES
--------------


14. (S) Turning to Section I of the MOU, Poznikhir proposed
removing the U.S. brackets around "Non-deployed Launchers of
ICBMs and SLBM"; "Non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs and
non-deployed heavy bombers"; and "Deployed Launchers of ICBMs
and SLBMs," to reflect U.S. acceptance of Russia's counting
rules as, he claimed, A/S Gottemoeller had authorized. Trout
clarified that the United States could only accept Russian
counting rules if Russia accepted a separate limit on
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. Poznikhir
commented that all other groups had dropped the brackets.
Trout responded that if other working groups had removed such
brackets then that was done in error. Poznikhir said he
would agree to retain the brackets in the MOU for the time
being.


15. (S) Poznikhir also argued for dropping the separate
limit on non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs in Section II
of the MOU. Why, he asked, should these be singled out if
there was to be a category for non-deployed launchers of
ICBMs and SLBMs. The same held, he contended, for
non-deployed ICBM launchers at test ranges. Trout responded
that the United States was still pushing for a separate limit
on non-deployed mobile launchers. A discussion then ensued
on Section II of the MOU and whether it should include
specific sub-limit information. Trout agreed to think about
the matter, and also noted that the United States had dropped
the category of mobile training launchers.


16. (S) Poznikhir asked whether the working group could
agree to the removal of "nuclear" in the context of referring
to warheads throughout the MOU. Trout agreed, but clarified
that it would apply only to warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. A
discussion ensued regarding the phrasing of the aggregate
limit on warheads, with Trout stating that the word
"attributed" might need to precede the reference to heavy
bombers therein, but that this issue was under discussion.
The sides agreed to remove references to "nuclear" warheads
on ICBMs and SLBMs throughout the MOU, but would discuss at a
later date how to address heavy bombers.

--------------
DISCUSSION OF THE MOU
--------------


17. (S) Poznikhir then turned to the MOU. He first read out
the new Russian proposal for the chapeau to the MOU, which
included some minor text changes. After some quick
discussions, Lobner pointed out that the latest Russian text
had not been translated, but when the text was available, the
United States would have a better understanding of the
proposed changes. Poznikhir questioned the inclusion of the
clause that stated "each Party was responsible for its own
data." He claimed that after consultation with the Russian
legal staff, it was determined that the clause was not
required. Lobner responded saying he would discuss the issue


with the U.S. legal staff.


18. (S) Poznikhir then proposed that the U.S. side delete
the requirement to list the number of warheads for individual
missiles in launchers. This was, he asserted, "a principled
position" of the Russian side. He assured Trout that the
Russian side would not change its position, since this was
confidential information pertaining to operational plans. He
noted that he was the person responsible for such planning in
the Ministry of Defense and, thus, if the U.S. side wanted a
treaty by December 5, the United States would drop the
demand. He further stated that this was a delegation and
General Staff level issue and therefore he could report this
position with confidence. Col Pischulov qualified this by
saying that the U.S. side would know the loadout when
inspectors arrived at bases, and clarified that this would be
provided in paper copy. Poznikhir then insisted that the
Russians were not going to hide anything, but did not want
that kind of information shared in the MOU since it might be
published at some point. The Russians "were not ready for
that openness."


19. (S) Poznikhir said that he would defer the issue of
space launch facilities because it was a contentious matter
that would complicate the negotiations at this stage.


20. (S) He then noted that there was still disagreement on
unique identifiers (UIDs),stating that the Russian position
was in their November 28 package proposal but that the U.S.
side had not accepted it. Because the U.S. side had
attempted to pick apart the package, the Russian side viewed
UIDs as off the table. If the United States accepted the
package, however, then UIDs would be a valid topic of
discussion. Trout responded that, in that case, he surmised
that there would be no treaty by December 5, 2009. He
pointed out that the sides had exchanged packages and the
United States would treat the Russian package in the same way
as the Russians had treated Washington's package. Poznikhir
then jokingly stated that their package proposal was the last
package presented.


21. (S) Poznikhir then raised whether it was necessary to
include a category for SLBMs at test ranges. Trout pointed
out that, should a Party have more than one test range, the
category would be necessary to distinguish from the aggregate
total at all test ranges. Poznikhir argued that Article III
was the appropriate place for limits, not the MOU. He then
launched into a diatribe against alleged U.S. redundancy and
excessive demands for information in the MOU.


22. (S) Poznikhir then raised the issue of listing training
facilities in the SLBM section. Following a discussion on
the matter, Trout agreed to consider further whether to
include the category.

--------------
DISCUSSION OF THE ANNEXES
--------------


23. (S) Trout then proposed dropping the Russian-proposed
Section II to Annex B on Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear
Armaments other than ALCMs in light of the attribution
agreement for heavy bombers. Pischulov pointed out that in


the most recent revision, Russia had deleted the section.
Pischulov added, however, that any additional movement
depended on U.S. acceptance of Russian counting rules. He
contended that, while the Russian side sought compromise, the
United States was not moving. Trout responded that the
United States had undertaken major shifts in its positions,
including dropping the inspection of the weapon storage areas
(WSAs),a long-time U.S. position, and had accepted an
attribution approach for heavy bombers. Poznikhir then asked
for confirmation that the United States had dropped its
proposal for inspections of WSAs, and Trout confirmed that he
was correct.


24. (S) Trout then directed attention to the section on
technical data on heavy bombers, and pointed out that, beyond
distinguishing features for aircraft, this information was no
longer necessary. Poznikhir replied that the Russian
inspection experts believed fuller information was necessary.
He suggested inviting such inspectors to the next MOU
Working Group meeting, if necessary.


25. (S) Trout then turned to Annex C, and argued that this
Annex as well was no longer necessary in light of the shift
to attribution. Poznikhir queried how the Parties would know
whether armaments were nuclear or non-nuclear. A discussion
regarding heavy bomber counting rules followed, after which
Pischulov stated that the Russian position was to remove
Annex C if the United States accepted Russian counting rules.
Trout replied that the United States had accepted the
Russian concept of attribution of heavy bomber warheads.
Pischulov countered that the attribution number was still at
issue, and the Russian side had proposed doing an actual
count of loaded nuclear armaments on heavy bombers.
Poznikhir added that it was better to return to the initial
Russian position, which actually reflected the bombers' real
load. This would also be easier to explain to the Congress,
he insisted, and would be consistent with the proposed
counting rules for ICBMs and SLBMs. The Russian move to
attribution was, he stated, an attempt at compromise. He
then once more questioned the logic behind the U.S.-proposed
attribution of three weapons for heavy bombers. It was then
agreed to leave brackets around Annex C.


26. (S) The sides then agreed to drop references to
"continuous monitoring" in Categories 1 and 2 of Annex D, but
Trout reported that the U.S. side was still deliberating
about the U.S. bracketed paragraphs 3 and 4.


27. (S) Pischulov then stated that the Russian side would
agree to provide two photos of a fixed structure but would
delete references in Annex A to fixed structures and support
equipment for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Information on
mobile launchers themselves would be retained. Trout agreed.


28. (S) Pischulov then proposed deleting "version of a type"
in Annex A. Lobner and Pischulov engaged in a lengthy
discussion about the distinction between "variant" and
"version," with the latter specially focused on mobile
launchers and associated systems. Despite Russian
persistence, the U.S. side deferred the matter to the
Definitions Subgroup. Poznikhir pushed the U.S. side to
bring to the next meeting a suggestion for what kind of item
would fall under this category.



--------------
FURTHER DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES
--------------


29. (S) Poznikhir then queried whether it was likewise
necessary to indicate deployed SLBMs under the Conversion or
Elimination Facilities heading. Trout responded that the
United States had agreed to Russia's proposed counting rules
contingent upon Russian agreement to a separate non-deployed
launcher limit. Absent such agreement, the United States
would continue to hold to its original counting rules.
Poznikhir stated he would communicate continuing fundamental
disagreement on counting rules to his Head of Delegation.
Trout said that was appropriate.


30. (S) Poznikhir, stepping back, then addressed the U.S.
counting rules and separate limit on non-deployed launchers
of ICBMs and SLBMs. He stated the United States was
inventing its suspicions regarding a potential build-up
capability from non-deployed launchers. He averred that the
United States might know the number of Russian ICBMs produced
annually and noted that it was "no more than ten." Yet, in
order to modernize, he argued, Russia needed "dozens" of
missiles. Thus, he contended, during the life of the treaty,
Russia would not be able to accumulate non-deployed missiles.
Unlike the United States, Russia actually eliminated
ballistic missiles, whereas, he accused, the United States
multiplied them. In this light, Russia had more justified
suspicions than the United States did.


31. (S) He then described that, in order to support a mobile
ICBM complex, Russia required not only the launcher and
missile but also a fixed structure and other support
equipment. If Russia began building a fixed structure the
United States would quickly notice it. Further, he
continued, it was impossible to deploy additional mobile
systems in basing areas. Nor would Russia base such systems
in the "forest." As he put it, "You can't put a launcher in
a pig farm." Such systems required special maintenance. For
instance, Russia could not put a launch canister in the
forest and then expect to use it.


32. (S) Why, then, he inquired, did the United States
"create" these fears in their minds? Why did the United
States think Russia would cheat? Russia, he argued, had not
cheated under START. Further, it would be impossible for
Russia to do so during the life of the treaty because of
economic constraints.


33. (S) Poznikhir then speculated if the sides agreed on a
limit of 700, would it be better to keep forces on alert or
in storage facilities? For him, he said it would be better
to put the forces on alert. He urged the U.S. side to be
realistic and understand that 700 was quite a high number for
Russia. Their initial proposal, he reminded Trout, was 500,
but 650 was the number "we insist on."


34. (S) Trout then queried whether the Russian position on
SDV limits remained 650 or had it shifted to 700? Poznikhir
responded that Trout should "forget about the numbers"; their
position was 500 but the President had said 650-700.



35. (S) Trout then asked why Russia objected to a separate
limit on non-deployed launchers if Ponzihir conceded that it
would be infeasible for Russia to reach it. Poznikhir
deflected the question and insisted that Trout answer his
inquiry about why the United States harbored such anxieties
about Russia. Trout explained that the United States was
concerned with an upload scenario whereby non-deployed
launchers could be deployed with spare missiles relatively
quickly, shifting the strategic picture. Further, he argued,
it was politically desirable to establish restraints both for
the international community and for Congress. Poznikhir
retorted that it would be best to set a consolidated launcher
ceiling of 650. He countered that it would take Russian
"years" to shift such a non-deployed capability to deployed
forces. For the United States, he argued, the situation was
different, since the United States possessed 50 empty
Peacekeeper and 50 empty Minuteman III silos with missiles
available that could be swiftly inserted into the launchers.
Such an upload capability would require much less time to
generate than for mobile launchers, he argued.


36. (S) Mr. Colby then returned to Poznikhir's point
regarding upload scenarios, asking if the Parties had no
reason not to trust each other why Russia proposed such stark
reductions in U.S. strategic delivery vehicles. Poznikhir
rather brusquely responded that first, the sides did not have
time for such discussions at this stage and, second, Russia
was proposing "real reductions" in strategic offensive arms
while the U.S. proposal to reduce deployed warheads was
tantamount to "deceiving the world community." (Begin
comment: The Russian interpreter used the word "cheating,"
but Mr. Shkeyrov suggested "deceiving" as a more appropriate
translation. End comment.)


37. (S) Poznikhir then shifted, asking again whether the
sides had the luxury of time for such discussions. He
emphasized again that Russia had peaceful intentions,
commenting that Russia had no desire to make war with a
country as powerful as the United States.

--------------
RUSSIAN FACILITIES
--------------


38. (S) Trout then turned the discussion to the list of
Russian facilities that had been provided during a previous
meeting. He noted that Russia had deleted from the MOU the
Nerpich'ya SSBN base (Begin comment: Historical base for
Russian Typhoon Class SSBNs. End comment.) which had been
included in the START database. Pischulov responded that
Russia fielded no strategic offensive arms at that facility,
so it did not need to be included in the MOU. Trout then
asked for the status of space launch facilities, and
Pischulov reported that there was still no agreement on the
matter since Russia still proposed merging space launch
facilities and test ranges so as to make the former
inspectable for the purposes of transparency.


39. (S) Trout thanked the Russian side for including actual
facilities in its proposed MOU for the United States, despite
the persistence of disagreements on categories. He asked why
the Leninsk Test Range for ICBMs was absent. He noted that
although the facility was in Kazakhstan, it was controlled by



Russia and boasted several SS-19s and test silos. Poznikhir
responded that Kazakhstan was a third country not party to
the new treaty. The silos, he argued, belonged to Kazakhstan
and Russia could not include them in the treaty discussions.
Russia would, however, provide notifications of movements to
and from the facility. Trout insisted nonetheless that given
the Russian presence, Leninsk should be included in the MOU.


40. (U) Documents provided: None.


41. (U) Participants:

U.S.:

Mr. Trout
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Colby
Mr. Coussa
LT Lobner
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA:

Gen Poznikhir
Col Pischulov
Ms. Voldopova
Col Voloskov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


42. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS