START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001138

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION BRUNCH FOR DUMA
MEMBER KOSACHEV, NOVEMBER 30, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-074.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009
Time: 11:30 a.m. - 1:15 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov
Ms. Purcell (notetaker) Mr. Kosachev
Mr. Leontiev (notetaker)

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) A/S Gottemoeller hosted Duma International Affairs
Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev to a brunch on November
30, 2009. Kosachev warned that ratification of the treaty
would not be easy in Russia. He emphasized that the treaty
would need to be balanced and equivalent in order to defuse
the opposition's arguments. He noted that concerns about
U.S. missile defense and ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration would be serious ratification issues in Russia.
Kosachev was very interested in pursuing consultations with
the U.S. Congress on treaty ratification. End Summary.


4. (S) Subject Summary: Duma Predictions for Treaty
Ratification Process; Probing into Treaty Issues; Missile
Defense Concerns and Prospects; Telemetry; More on Treaty
Ratification.

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DUMA PREDICTIONS FOR TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS
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5. (S) On November 30, 2009, Gottemoeller hosted a brunch
for visiting State Duma Member and Chair of the Duma
International Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev.
Kosachev's first comment was that he had just spoken by phone
with Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Prikhodko.
Prikhodko had said he felt inspired by his visit to
Washington the previous week. He had seen movement forward
on the treaty. In Prikhodko's view, however, one or two
serious issues still divided the Parties and there had been a
hardening of the U.S. position on telemetry in the last few
days.


6. (S) Kosachev asserted that interest in the new treaty was
high and growing daily among the Russian public and the Duma.
Very little information was available since the negotiations
were going on behind closed doors, so there was much
speculation. Ten days earlier the Duma had convened a closed
hearing on the treaty negotiations. Deputy Foreign Minister
Ryabkov had briefed, along with experts from the Ministry of
Defense and other agencies.


7. (S) Asked about his contacts with the Senate, Kosachev


said he had frequent contacts with his U.S. counterpart,
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Berman, but
only rarely with Senators. He was scheduled to visit Berman
in San Francisco around the end of January or early February.
He thought he should visit Washington during the
ratification process and consult with some key Senators about
the new treaty, perhaps during the same visit.


8. (S) Kosachev predicted very harsh discussions on the
treaty in the Duma during ratification. The opposition,
especially the Communist Party, would oppose the treaty.
International Affairs Committee Deputy Chair Yuliy Kvitsinsky
was a member of the Communist Party faction and would be the
main opponent of the treaty. He and other members of the
opposition had decades of experience in military and national
security matters, were highly respected and influential. The
United Russia Party could not simply push the treaty through.
Kosachev believed treaty supporters must prepare good
arguments in support of the treaty. The treaty had to be
defendable; it was not something to be signed at any cost.
The Russian administration would have to prove to the Federal
Assembly that no unequal concessions had been made, that the
treaty was balanced and equally met the security requirements
of both countries. He believed the Presidents had very
little maneuvering room. If the treaty was not equivalent,
President Medvedev would not be able to agree to it.


9. (S) Kosachev said he had received a good impression of
the delegations' work from his discussions with the Russian
delegation. He was pleased to learn that the atmosphere was
one of partnership, not competitive or hostile. Gottemoeller
reinforced that both sides had well-qualified teams and a
good working relationship, a very different approach from the
Cold War. In addition, the U.S. side was well aware of
Russia's need for equivalency in the treaty.

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PROBING INTO TREATY ISSUES
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10. (S) Kosachev praised the agreement on a three-tiered
structure of treaty articles, a protocol, and annexes. He
had some concerns about which portions of the package could
be provisionally applied, claiming that Russian laws in this
regard were different from U.S. laws. Gottemoeller and
Antonov assured Kosachev that the delegation lawyers were
working out which portions could be provisionally applied.


11. (S) Kosachev said he would support the central limits
that the Presidents would decide, but explained Russia's view
that deeper reductions in delivery vehicles were needed
because of concerns about upload potential. Russian society
was very concerned that the Moscow Treaty had exacerbated the
inequality in upload potential.


12. (S) Kosachev said many Russian experts were expecting a
large number of U.S. delivery vehicles to be deployed in a
non-nuclear configuration, which would influence third states
and affect the balance of forces for Russia over the longer
term. It would be a serious ratification issue. A way
needed to be found to regulate this type of weapon and
prevent unforeseen consequences from such deployments.
Kosachev had not yet heard about any Russian plans to develop


non-nuclear ICBMs or SLBMs, but was certain that if the
United States deployed them, the Russian military would seek
to do so as well. This would instigate a new kind of arms
race, possibly including third countries.


13. (S) To address non-nuclear strategic offensive arms
(SOA),Gottemoeller expressed the view that it was time for
serious bilateral talks on strategic stability. The
commitment by both Presidents to the goal of nuclear
disarmament, while not near-term, created different
conditions for nuclear policy making. There was a need to
think about the role of ICBMs in the future when there would
be fewer and fewer deployed nuclear weapons. The United
States had not yet made final decisions on non-nuclear
strategic delivery vehicles, so it would be useful for the
United States and Russia to analyze the question together.
For the new treaty, however, a good solution had been found
to count non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs the same as
nuclear warheads.


14. (S) Kosachev said this approach was only an interim
solution. Antonov added that Russia had initially proposed
to ban ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration because
of worries about a new arms race, noting that Ukraine had
wanted to participate in the START Follow-on negotiations and
had hinted about its capability to possess non-nuclear SOA.
The United States could not accept a ban, however, so Russia
had to compromise and count non-nuclear warheads the same way
as under START. Antonov urged that further U.S.-Russia
discussions on stopping missile proliferation be conducted at
the expert level.


15. (S) Kosachev argued that the number of inspections
should be lower than in START because the number of
facilities was fewer and space-based monitoring systems had
improved. He recalled that the Presidents had agreed that
the verification regime would be made simpler and less costly
in comparison to START. Gottemoeller responded that the
United States had simplified its original START Follow-on
proposal in response to Russian approach. At the same time,
Russia, which had started with a greatly simplified
proposal, had had to add measures back in. Thus, the two
countries were creating a balance between their two original
proposals. She stated that the United States still called
for the same number of inspections, 20, while Kosachev noted
that Russia called for only 16 inspections per year.
Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. side had accepted Makarov's
proposal to build a verification regime based on the
principle of equivalence for both countries. The U.S. side
was now discussing measures on this basis.

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MISSILE DEFENSE CONCERNS AND PROSPECTS
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16. (S) Kosachev said missile defense was a sore topic for
Russia and would be another serious ratification issue. He
asked whether the treaty could include more than just
declarations about the offense-defense interrelationship.
Gottemoeller described the joint statement that was being
developed by the negotiators. The United States had made a
very important step in accepting it, since the initial U.S.
view had been that there should be no mention of missile


defense at all. Some U.S. Senators continued to take a very
tough position opposing any mention of missile defense in the
treaty.


17. (S) Gottemoeller raised U.S. interest in missile defense
cooperation with Russia, and stated her view that there was
now a good opportunity to begin joint missile defense
programs, despite the fact that similar joint projects had
been proposed by several previous Administrations but had not
born fruit. Russia's previous proposal for missile defense
cooperation using the Armavir and Gabala radars was very
promising. Under Secretary Tauscher would be visiting Moscow
in early December to begin talks on missile defense
cooperation.


18. (S) Kosachev asserted that the previous Administration's
plans for a third missile defense site in Europe had
destroyed Russian trust in the United States, particularly
since Poland and the Czech Republic had been involved in the
planning but not Russia. He was pleased with the changed
position of the current U.S. Administration and thought
cooperation might be possible. This was a military problem
as well as a political problem: the level of SOA was based
on the extent of missile defense. Russian conservatives
would oppose SOA reductions if the extent of U.S. missile
defense development remained unknown. For that reason, the
treaty needed to include more provisions on missile defense
than just in the preamble. If the United States were willing
to commit not to expand missile defense deployments, it would
both save the United States money and pay big political
dividends.

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TELEMETRY
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19. (S) Admitting he was not a technical specialist,
Kosachev expressed concern that telemetry measures in the
treaty would appear to destroy its balance. The Russian
press accused the U.S. of using telemetry from Russian
missile launches to calibrate and improve U.S. missile
defense systems. There would be a scandal if this concern
was not resolved. Gottemoeller noted the highly technical
nature of the subject, and the fact that some fresh new ideas
were under discussion that could result in a solution. One
option was to develop a set of agreements allowing telemetry
cooperation, strengthening of the Missile Technology Control
Regime, and enhancement of transparency regarding the
development of each side's forces. Such exchanges would not
be one-sided. The United States also would test new
conventional systems and new missiles in the future, and it
would be useful for Russia to have transparency into them.
The goal was transparency and a simpler regime than under
START, since there was no longer a need to verify
throw-weight. It would be possible to discuss and agree on
the technical details of the exchanges following treaty
signature.


20. (S) Antonov commented that accusations about using
telemetry for missile defense purposes were political, not
technical. Russia was concerned about U.S. capabilities to
circumvent the treaty, including by benefiting from United
Kingdom Trident II tests. These tests were not subject to


any treaty, but were controlled by U.S. facilities. This
created great mistrust. Gottemoeller objected that the
United States had no control over United Kingdom programs.


21. (S) Antonov continued that the mistrust could not be
removed overnight. Russia needed guarantees. U.S.
unwillingness to record missile defense commitments in the
treaty created further suspicion. Antonov proclaimed he was
not anti-American but was just passing on common Russian
views. For its part, the United States was very suspicious
regarding Russian mobile ICBMs, demanding they be monitored
from birth to death, and stating that otherwise, as soon as
the missiles exited Votkinsk they would hide in the woods.
Kosachev concurred that the two countries were just at the
beginning of restoring trust that had been seriously damaged
for a generation. He remarked that his father had been born
in Votkinsk and was buried there. Gottemoeller pointed out
the United States had made a huge step by agreeing not to
continue continuous monitoring at Votkinsk.

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MORE ON TREATY RATIFICATION
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22. (S) Gottemoeller commented that the U.S. Senate was very
interested in the negotiations; they asked her for briefings
whenever she came back to Washington. Antonov interjected
that it was important to work together on ratification and to
maintain contacts between the Russian and U.S. legislatures,
so as not to repeat the experience of START-II, which Russia
ratified while the United States did not. Kosachev estimated
that the ratification process in Russia would take 1-2 months
after the Duma received the package. The Duma wanted to
maintain the same pace as the U.S. Senate, however. He
reiterated that ratification in Russia would not be
automatic. There would be a great deal of public commentary
and criticism, but he would try to find appropriate arguments
in support of the treaty.


23. (S) Gottemoeller offered to go to Moscow to talk
informally with experts and Duma members if desired, although
she could not testify formally. Kosachev enthusiastically
supported the idea. He promised to send an invitation to
Gottemoeller as soon as the Duma received the treaty for
ratification. He also wanted to invite some key Senators to
visit Moscow and consult with the Duma. He would be willing
to send some Duma members to Washington if it would be
useful. Gottemoeller promised to report Kosachev's offers
when she consulted with U.S. Senators.


24. (S) Antonov noted that the process of preparing the
treaty package for submission to the Duma would be very
difficult for him, requiring about 1 month's review by the
Ministry of Justice, followed by the Prime Minister's office,
and then the President's legal adviser. Kosachev concluded
that ratification might then not be completed until close to
summer 2010. Gottemoeller said her goal was for Senate
advice and consent to treaty ratification by May 2010, when
the NPT Review Conference would convene. Kosachev remarked
it was a very compressed schedule, but had his support.


25. (S) Documents exchanged: none.



26. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS