START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, DECEMBER 3, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-092.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 3, 2009
Times: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M., and
3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG),chaired
by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Ministry of Defense Representative Col Ilin, met twice on
December 3 to discuss U.S.-proposed joint draft texts (JDTs)
for treaty Article XI and Sections V, VII, and VIII of the
treaty Protocol Part 5 on Inspection Activities. Discussion
during the morning session focused on Section VIII on
Exhibitions and Article XI, while the afternoon focused on
Section VII, U.S.-Proposed Agreed Statements, and Article XI.


4. (S) The Parties were able to come to agreement on
additional portions of Article XI of the treaty, Section VII
on Inspections of Non-Deployed Strategic Offensive Arms and
Formerly Declared Facilities (Type 2 Inspections),and
Section VIII on Exhibitions, though disagreement remained on
several key issues, such as exhibitions for elimination of
items of inspections, inspection parameters, and missile
defense.


5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VII (Type 2 Inspections);
Section VIII (Exhibitions); Summarizing Section VIII
Progress; Article XI; Afternoon: Detailed Review of Section
VII and Agreed Statements; and Afternoon: Comments on Article
XI.

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SECTION VII (TYPE 2 INSPECTIONS)
--------------


6. (S) The sides first discussed paragraph 5 of Section VII
to Part V of the Protocol. Warner stated that the right of
inspectors to read unique identifiers (UIDs) should be
retained at the Protocol level. Ilin disagreed. Warner
agreed to move this provision to Tier III in the Annex on
Inspection Activities.


7. (S) The sides then discussed at length paragraphs 6 and 7
of Section VII. Ilin argued for treating heavy bombers in
the same way as ICBMs and SLBMs, and Warner and Maj Johnson
endeavored to explain the rationale behind the distinction.
The delegations agreed to modifications of the chapeau in
paragraph 6 and based on these revisions, agreed to the
U.S.-proposed language in sub-paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b). In
paragraph 7, the sides confirmed agreement on the chapeau of
paragraph 7 and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). For
sub-paragraph (c),the Russian side made clear its consent
was predicated on a unified regime for inspections of heavy
bombers as well as ICBMs and SLBMs. The sides also agreed to
drop references to storage facilities for heavy bombers


throughout the section and confirmed agreement on paragraphs
8 and 9. Concluding discussion of this section, the
delegations agreed to defer discussion of training models of
missiles to a subsequent session.

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SECTION VIII (EXHIBITIONS)
--------------


8. (S) Working from the U.S.-proposed JDT, Warner directed
the discussion to Section VIII on Exhibitions. He described
the rationale behind the U.S. approach, noting in advance
that disagreement remained regarding exhibitions for
eliminated items in that they should not count against the
Type 2 inspection quota. After discussion, Ilin made clear
the Russian view that the language needed to emphasize that
observation of the results of elimination should be conducted
as a Type 2 inspection and count against the annual quota for
such inspections.


9. (S) The U.S. side agreed to the Russian-proposed revision
to Section VIII's title: Exhibitions to Demonstrate the
Distinguishing Features and Technical Characteristics of New
Types of Strategic Offensive Arms. The sides discussed the
inclusion of variants in paragraph 1, and agreed to delete
such references. The sides agreed to modify the language in
the paragraph to reflect that each type of ICBM, SLBM, mobile
launcher of ICBMs, and heavy bomber would be subject to an
exhibition if it had not been so exhibited under START.


10. (S) Ilin commented that the U.S. side had floated
several different approaches to exhibitions, which prompted a
discussion of the appropriate formulation for timeframes for
exhibitions. Ilin proposed language stating that exhibitions
shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions
provided for upon the invitation of the conducting Party and
within the timelines specified in notifications. Warner
pointed out that such a formulation would need to include
exhibitions for the Russian RS-24 mobile ICBM launcher. The
sides agreed to use the phrase new types of strategic
offensive arms instead of an ICBM and an SLBM in paragraph 1.
They also agreed to differentiate in the text between
exhibitions and inspections and that the sites of exhibitions
would be determined by the exhibiting Party


11. (S) Warner tabled a new JDT version of paragraph B.
Ilin noted that the wild card concept was missing and stated
that eliminations were still bracketed. A discussion of
timing ensued, and the sides agreed to a formulation
specifying that timeframes would be stated in the annexes.


12. (S) Warner turned to Part C of Section VIII, Exhibitions
to Confirm the Conversion or Elimination of Strategic
Offensive Arms, noting that the elimination element remained
in brackets. Ilin queried how the Parties would confirm that
converted heavy bombers could no longer perform nuclear
missions. Warner responded that the veryQature of
conversion was to render such systems incapable of performing
their original nuclear missions. The sides then agreed on
the Title of paragraph C, except for the reference to
conversion. Warner and Ilin then agreed to defer resolution
of the conversion and elimination issues raised in the
paragraph to the Conversion or Elimination Working Group.


Ilin also proposed inserting language stipulating that each
Party would have the right to participate in exhibitions to
confirm distinguishing features between ICBMs and SLBMs and
how they differed from missile defense interceptors, with the
time and place to be determined by the conducting Party.
Warner emphasized that this position would not be accepted by
the United States and quipped that he would place that in
triple brackets.

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SUMMARIZING SECTION VIII PROGRESS
--------------


13. (S) Warner noted that the U.S. side would update Section
VIII based upon the discussions and would propose a structure
for a third type of exhibition. Both chairs agreed to speak
with their Conversion or Elimination Working Group
counterparts. If agreement could be reached on the
conversion or elimination issues, then Part C of Section VIII
could be agreed to accordingly. In Part B, the chairs noted
that the main disagreement concerned inclusion of
eliminations as exhibitions.

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ARTICLE XI
--------------


14. (S) Warner presented the revised U.S. proposal for
Article XI of the treaty text, which Ilin stated he would
consider. The sides agreed to remove several sets of
brackets in the Article, but disagreements remained on the
scope of inspections and their purposes.

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AFTERNOON: DETAILED REVIEW OF
SECTION VII AND AGREED STATEMENTS
--------------


15. (S) Warner provided Ilin a copy of a U.S. draft of
Section VII. After discussion of the title of Section VII,
the working group agreed to delete the brackets around the
text "Type Two Inspections," but keep the text within
parentheses. A lengthy discussion was conducted on Paragraph
1 pertaining to the retention or elimination of references to
mobile launchers of ICBMs. Ilin wanted to delete the word
"mobile" but Warner stated this would make the term too
general and this would change the agreement on which types of
facilities undergo inspection. The working group suggested
conferring with each side's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Working Group to see whether it would be appropriate to
change the related references in the MOU. (Begin comment:
In a telephone call later that evening from the Russian
Delegation, Buttrick reported that the Russian side would
accept the inclusion of repair facilities and storage
facilities for mobile ICBM launchers. End comment.)


16. (S) Warner provided Ilin with copies of the two
U.S.-proposed Agreed Statements, one on B-1Bs and one on
SSGNs. The sides agreed to retain the brackets around the
numbers of permitted inspections per year at a single
facility. The current numbers stood at two for the U.S. and
one for Russia. Two issues were discussed in paragraph

4. The sides agreed to check within the Data Base on the


usage of the terms "type," "category," "variant," and
"version," and match the MOU usage with the usage in
paragraph 4. Additionally, a lengthy discussion ensued about
the use of the phrase "and the reason for the absence of each
item." Ilin did not understand the reason for keeping this
in paragraph 4 and the brackets were retained. (Begin
comment: In a telephone call later that evening from the
Russian Delegation, Buttrick reported that the Russian side
would accept the U.S. position that would include providing a
reason for absence of items of inspection from the inspection
site. End comment.)

Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on B-1Bs:

PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS

Agreed Statement: The Parties agree that in order to
provide assurances that B-1B heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments continue to satisfy the requirements
for conversion in accordance with Part III of the Protocol,
The following provisions shall apply after the completion of
the elimination or conversion, using conversion procedures
employed previously under START, of the final B-1B heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments:


1. The United States of America will notify the Russian
Federation that the Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota
and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas have been eliminated. Once
eliminated, these facilities will not be subject to
inspection.


2. B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments will
no longer be subject to the provisions of the Treaty, other
than those provisions contained herein.


3. The United States will offer an annual exhibition of B-1B
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The
Russian Federation has the right to participate in this
exhibition within the 30-day period following notification.


4. The procedures for conduct of such annual exhibitions will
be identical to those for heavy bomber conversion
confirmation exhibitions, contained in Section VIII to Part
Five of the Protocol and Part Three of the Protocol, with the
following additional procedures:

(a) The point of entry will be Travis Air Force Base,
California.

(b) The United States will indicate in the notification
the B-1B base where the exhibition will take place.

(c) Upon arrival at the B-1B base, the in-country
escort team lead shall provide an annotated site diagram to
show the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments.

(d) After pre-inspection procedures have been
completed, the inspection team leader may designate no more
than one B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments
for exhibition.

(e) A member of the in-country escort shall permit


inspectors to view the designated B-1B heavy bombers that
were converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol
and therefore are incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

(f) The conduct of such an exhibition shall be recorded
in the official report.

End text.

Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on SSGNs:

PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS

Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in order to
provide assurances that the four guided missile submarines
(SSGN) of the United States of America are incapable of
launching an SLBM, the following provisions shall apply to
such submarines:

(a) The United States of America shall conduct an initial
one-time exhibition for each of the four SSGN guided missile
submarines to confirm that its launchers are incapable of
launching an SLBM.

(b) The four SSGN guided missile submarines shall not be
subject to any requirement to provide data or photographs.
Other than the provisions contained herein, the SSGN guided
missile submarine shall not be subject to the provisions of
the Treaty.

(c) Subsequent to the initial one-time exhibition, the United
States of America shall offer a viewing of one SSGN guided
missile submarine each year until all SSGNs have been viewed
a second time during the duration of the Treaty.

1) The United States of America shall notify the
Russian Federation of an SSGN's availability for viewing. The
Russian Federation shall inform the United States of AmericaQithin 72 hours of
receipt of notification on its intent to
participate in the viewing. The Russian Federation shall have
the right to participate in this viewing within 15 days
following notification thereof. The notification shall
include the point of entry and recommended date of arrival.

2) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine
base, a member of the in-country escort shall provide a
schedule of activities.

3) The inspection team leader shall have the right to
designate for viewing one guided missile launcher located on
the SSGN guided missile submarine. If a Dry Dock Shelter
(DDS) is installed, tubes obstructed by the shelter shall not
be made available for viewing.

4) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate
to the inspectors that the guided missile launcher is
incapable of launching an SLBM.

5) The conduct of such a viewing shall be recorded in
the official inspection report.

End text.



17. (S) Ilin provided a copy in Russian of the text of
paragraph 6 in Section VII. A lengthy discussion was
conducted concerning whether structures ought to be
inspectable during a Type Two inspection and the parameters
for the inspection of the entire inspection site within the
site diagram boundary. The U.S. side suggested that a
broader term than "structures" was needed in this paragraph
to clarify that inspectors would be permitted to look for
items of inspection in the open areas between structures
within the inspection boundary. Warner proposed some text to
clarify the intent and application of this provision and Ilin
agreed to check on this proposed text to see if it was
acceptable; the brackets would remain in paragraph 6 for the
time being, however. Warner's-proposed text stated "...to
inspect the area within the boundaries of the inspection site
as shown on the site diagram to include structures which are
large enough to contain an item of inspection..."


18. (S) During the review of paragraph 8, the sides decided
to move the text concerning test ranges up to the portion of
paragraph 6 concerning test ranges. However, it was agreed
that the discussion of conversion or elimination facilities
would remain in paragraph 8.

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AFTERNOON: COMMENTS ON ARTICLE XI
--------------


19. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed to language for the first
sentence of paragraph 2 and added references to non-deployed
launchers. In paragraph 3, the sides agreed to delete
references to "mobile launchers of ICBMs" but to retain all
other brackets. Ilin promised to call Warner later that
evening to discuss this section. Ilin proposed different
language for the portion of the paragraph on formerly
declared facilities, but Warner disagreed. The sides
concurred that paragraph 4 would remain bracketed.


20. (U) Documents exchanged:

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed JDT for Article XI;

-- U.S. Proposed JDT for Section VIII and Revised JDT
for Section VIII concerning Exhibitions;

-- U.S. Proposed JDT for Part 5 of Section V;

-- U.S. Proposed JDT for Section VII;

-- Proposed Agreed Statement concerning B-1B Bombers;
and

-- Proposed Agreed Statement concerning SSGNs.


21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick


Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Colby
Maj Johnson
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Pura
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Voldopova
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS