START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001129

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING
GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-075.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 30, 2009
Time: 4:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
met with their Russian counterparts at the U.S. Mission on
November 30. This was the sixth meeting of this session and
the thirteenth meeting overall. Gen Poznikhir began the
meeting by requesting a review of positions on initial MOU
data exchange and ended by taking the subject of data
exchange and provisional application as homework to discuss
with the Russian Delegation. Poznikhir then began a review
of bracketed text in various areas of the MOU. Mr. Trout
pointed out that if we get agreement on counting rules,
unique identifiers (UIDs),and a limit on non-deployed
launchers, most of the bracketed text will be resolved.
Until then, little can be accomplished. End Summary.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: MOU Data Exchange and Timeline,
Brackets Held Hostage, and Discussion of Next Steps.

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MOU DATA EXCHANGE AND TIMELINE
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5. (S) Poznikhir started the discussions by asking for
clarification of what the U.S. delegation's proposal to
exchange MOU data 45 days after treaty signature meant and
proposed a "logical" alternative of exchanging Section I
aggregate data at signature and the remaining MOU data 45
days after entry-into-force (EIF) of the Treaty. Trout
reminded Poznikhir that under START, data was available at
signature but was a year out of date. He then suggested that
for this treaty both sides use the July 1, 2009, START MOU
data to fill appropriate categories at signing. Poznikhir
demurred, stating that Russia would not have all the UIDs
available, and errors that would be hard to rectify would be
introduced. Trout reminded Poznikhir that under START, UIDs
were not exchanged until EIF and that the United States had
proposed that warhead data not be exchanged until EIF.
Poznikhir agreed that using July 1, 2009, START data could be
done, but the Russian delegation did not have access to that
data in Geneva. Therefore Russia could not have it ready
until 45-60 days after signature. Trout again reminded him
that with START as a precedent, the U.S. Senate will expect
real data. Poznikhir reiterated his claim that exchanging
anything beyond the aggregate numbers required in Section I
would not be possible and asked what would be the effect if
we exchanged data, but never reached EIF. Trout asked how
Poznikhir's concept would support provisional application of
the treaty. Poznikhir stated that, while provisional
application had not yet been agreed to, he would discuss both
data exchange and provisional application with his delegation
as homework.



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BRACKETS HELD HOSTAGE
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6. (S) Re-engaging on bracketed text, Poznihir suggested
that the last sentence in the revised U.S.-proposed chapeau,
"Each Party acknowledges that it is responsible for the
accuracy of its own data," was redundant as the Russian
lawyers had determined that by signing and ratifying the
treaty, each Party had the implicit responsibility to provide
accurate and complete data. Trout promised to have the U.S.
lawyers take another look. Poznikhir then turned to the
bracketed text for "items subject to the provisions of the
Treaty" and the Russian-proposed text "strategic offensive
arms (SOA)." Trout said the United States was staying with
"items" because data on more than just SOA will be exchanged.
Poznikhir then pointed out that the word "herein" had been
mis-translated into Russian on the U.S.-provided Russian
language text.


7. (S) Poznihir next asked whether the bracketed text "and
their associated launchers" could now be removed. Trout
stated that if Russia agreed to a limit on non-deployed
launchers, the brackets could be removed. Poznihir reminded
Trout that in their November 28, 2009, package proposal
Russia had refused to accept a limit on non-deployed
launchers. Trout explained that without a limit on
non-deployed launchers there would be no reason to eliminate
launchers, that non-deployed missiles could be held on site
and loaded whenever needed. He suggested that this idea is
similar to the Clinton era idea of de-alerting. He went on
to opine that without a limit, the treaty will not be
decreasing forces, just de-alerting those forces. Poznikhir
explained that he had never seen additional missiles at
operational bases under START, and Russia had no plans to
have additional missiles at operational bases; moreover, we
need to forget the Cold War. Trout reminded Poznikhir that
naval forces have SSBNs and storage areas for missiles at the
same base and that this treaty will be in effect for 10
years--how each Party stores missiles can change over that
time.


8. (S) Poznikhir then asked whether deployed launchers will
be in the central limits. Trout explained that a deployed
missile implies a deployed launcher. Furthermore, if we get
agreement on a limit for non-deployed launchers, this
non-deployed limit would be placed in paragraph 1 of Section
I of the database. Poznikhir stated regardless of this
agreement, both Parties will still have non-deployed
launchers. Therefore, since we both know that these
non-deployed launchers exist, the United States should either
unbracket the Russian text in paragraph 2 or provide text as
a U.S. position in paragraph 1. Trout agreed to think about
th issue.


9. (S) Poznikhir stated that Russia wil not have variants
of ICBMs, only types, so we ould remove "or variant of a
type" from the heade in Section II. Trout then led a
discussion of hat constituted a type and variant of a type
reslting in Poznikhir conceding that, if the U.S sidefelt
it necessary, the words could remain.



10. (S) Poznikhir then brought up a number of other brackets
including the U.S. term "nuclear" warheads, the use of the
term "returned" for missiles at production facilities, MOU
requirements for reporting warheads on each missile and the
requirement for including greatest throw weight under Annex
A, Section (I),ICBMs. Trout explained that most of the
bracketed text would be resolved if we get agreement on
counting rules, UIDs, and a limit on non-deployed launchers.
A short discussion ensued on how individual submarines would
be identified with Poznikhir stating that they have names for
classes of submarines and he understood that the United
States has names for each submarine. Trout stated that the
Russians could use any convention they wished--numbers,
alphabetic designators, names, etc., and that the United
States would understand that once assigned, they would not
change. Poznikhir offered to study the idea.


11. (S) A discussion concerning heavy bombers began with
Poznikhir suggesting that the Russian proposal to have
deployed heavy bombers, non-deployed heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments, and non-deployed heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments be accepted. He further
explained that all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments would be considered non-deployed, with deployed
heavy bombers being only those equipped for nuclear armaments
located at heavy bomber bases. Trout responded that the
United States could accept the categories of deployed heavy
bombers and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments but non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments would have to be bracketed since the
U.S. proposal was to have a separate arrangement on converted
heavy bombers. Poznikhir stated that he disagreed with the
U.S. position that airbases for heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments would not be in the MOU.


12. (S) Poznikhir then suggested removing the text
concerning training models of missiles at the end of Section
(I) of Annex A. Trout agreed and suggested that under
missile stages in the same section, the length used for
confirming a new type could also be removed and asked whether
Russia had agreed to photographs of fixed structures in lieu
of measurements. Poznikhir agreed to Trout's suggested
deletion and said Moscow is still considering the fixed
structure issue.

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DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS
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13. (S) Trout suggested that the MOU Working Group still had
to address Annex J and stated that the U.S. delegation would
have something for the Russian delegation soon. Attempts to
move the Annex to another working group had failed. Col
Pischulov asked about the decision to remove heavy bomber
training facilities. LT Lobner reminded him that since
neither side has training heavy bombers, the category had
been removed completely from the treaty. Poznikhir asked
when the working group would meet next. Trout replied that
it would not be on December 1, and that it would help
negotiations if Russia would agree to a limit on non-deployed
launchers. Poznikhir responded that the U.S. concern about
non-deployed launchers was unfounded and reminded the working
group that we are running out to time to complete our


negotiations.


14. (U) Documents provided: None


15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Colby
Mr. Coussa
LT Lobner
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznihir
Mr. Shevchenko
Col Pischulov
Col Voloskov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS