START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001126

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
NOVEMBER 27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-060.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 27, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The U.S. delegation conducted a detailed discussion
of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Topics covered by
the paragraphs discussed included reporting on the location
of bombers absent from their air base during inspections, the
uses of site diagrams and coastlines and waters diagrams, the
benefits and drawbacks of inspecting two silos of launchers
during Type 1 inspections, and whether one or more fixed
structures might be inspected at a base for mobile ICBMs.
End Summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: A Daunting Challenge; Exhibition of
Heavy Bombers; Hypothetical Inspection Scenario; Detailed
Discussion of Section VI; and Wrap Up.

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A DAUNTING CHALLENGE
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5. (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting and commented that
reports from Washington, D.C., indicate a firm commitment to
finish the treaty within the next several days and that a
target had been set to get all of the work done by Friday,
December 4. He emphasized that this would be a "daunting
challenge." Warner proposed that the group re-examine
Article XI and the shortened paragraph related to
exhibitions; issues which the Parties had taken as homework
from previous sessions. Warner oQred a consolidated paper
with a revised joint draft text of Article XI and a
U.S.-proposed paragraph on exhibitions. Col Ilin commented
that the Russian side had reviewed Article XI texts and
agreed to review the latest U.S. effort.

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EXHIBITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS
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6. (S) Ilin commented that discussion of exhibitions was
important especially for heavy bombers and he wanted to move
this topic forward to discuss distinguishing features on
heavy bombers and how the different types of inspections
pertain to heavy bombers. He also provided a document in
Russian which addressed which paragraphs from Article XI
could be moved into the Protocol. Warner agreed to review it
and be prepared to discuss it during the next meeting.
Warner stated that heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments did not belong in a Type 1 inspection, whereas B-1B
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments would be subject
to the Type 1 inspection until they were converted. Once
all B-1Bs were converted, there could be periodic exhibitions
to demonstrate that the bombers had not been reconverted to



carry nuclear armaments. Ilin asked whether these
exhibitions would be non-mandatory and Warner replied that
there had to be some obligation to make such heavy bombers
available for exhibition. He suggested an Agreed Statement
could capture the specific verification activity along with
the periodicity, but there would at least be an agreement in
principle to demonstrate that converted heavy bombers had not
been re-converted. Warner proposed to take a further look at
procedures to demonstrate that the nuclear weapons will not
be on the converted heavy bombers, that the bombers will be
incapable of carrying nuclear weapons, and that there were
not nuclear warheads stored on the base.


7. (S) Warner handed over a Russian version of the Article
XI paragraph for exhibitions. Warner proposed that the more
detailed descriptions for exhibitions should be placed in the
Protocol to which Ilin agreed. Ilin pointed out that the
initial U.S. proposals for heavy bomber exhibitions called
for identification of distinguishing features. Warner
responded that the U.S. side recognized that the
distinguishability exhibition could easily be combined with
the exhibition following the conversion of the first heavy
bomber. He also pointed out that there is a potential that
the United States might wish to convert other heavy bombers
in the future and discussed a three step procedure: the
first step was a description of the conversion process as had
been discussed in the Conversion or Elimination Working
Group; the second was an exhibition of the conversion of the
first bomber; and third was the routine exhibitions to
confirm the conversion of all the remainder of the heavy
bombers undergoing conversion. Warner stated there could be
a fourth step, which would be a measure to demonstrate that
the converted heavy bombers had not been re-converted. Ilin
stated that Russia viewed this last step as a function of a
Type 2 inspection. Warner disagreed and proposed an
exhibition rather than a Type 2 inspection since there may be
many conversions which could exhaust the Type 2 inspection
quota.

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HYPOTHETICAL INSPECTION SCENARIO
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8. (S) Ilin described a scenario for an inspection of an air
base. If an inspection team arrived to inspect the heavy
bombers, the situation would provide for three possible types
of activity. In the first type, the inspection team agrees
with the declaration and counts zero deployed nuclear
armaments. In the second type, the inspection team agrees
there are no nuclear armaments on the heavy bombers, but
could agree to count one weapon for the bomber whether
nuclear or non-nuclear. In the third type of activity, the
inspection team assures the arms are non-nuclear and the
result would be zero. Ilin asked which of these three
options would be preferred by the United States. Warner
responded that there were two steps involved in each of the
three options presented: 1) what type of information would
be briefed to the inspection team; and 2) what type of
inspection activity would be performed by the inspection team.


9. (S) Warner commented that the U.S. approach accounted for
nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers as well as any
objects not declared to be nuclear armaments. He pointed out


that radiation detection equipment could be used to confirm a
sampling of objects loaded on heavy bombers that were
declared not to be nuclear armaments. Petrov asked what
would the inspectors do if they encountered a shrouded item
which could not be visually verified as being other than a
nuclear armament. Warner responded that the inspectors could
use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the
shrouded item was non-nuclear. Warner commented that the
U.S. side disagreed with the use of virtual numbers of
armaments and that the inspectors should use the actual
numbers of warheads in the weapons storage area.

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DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SECTION VI
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10. (S) Warner began by stating that paragraph 1 of Section
VI was based on the combined inspection and thought the sides
had agreed on the type of information to be declared for
ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases to which Ilin agreed.


11. (S) Warner noted that one key difference on heavy bomber
requirements was the Russian requirement to specify an exact
location for absent heavy bombers beyond national territory,
while the U.S. side proposes to provide only a general
location for those heavy bombers deployed overseas. As
discussion continued, Warner questioned Ilin whether he was
ready to have no treaty at all over the issue of precise vs.
general locations of heavy bombers since the U.S.-proposed
text is the same as the practice implemented under START and
the Parties have been operating this way for 15 years.


12. (S) Turning to paragraph 9/7, there was discussion about
the distinction between uses of site diagrams and coastlines
and waters diagrams for inspections. Petrov commented that
for each type of facility, Russia provides a site diagram; a
general site diagram for facilities with silos and a specific
site diagram for submarine bases. Warner pointed out that
the United States uses site diagrams only for ICBM and heavy
bomber facilities. For submarine bases, a site diagram is
used for the data update-type inspection and a coastlines and
waters diagram for the nuclear warhead portion of the
inspection. Specific revisions of text were discussed
including the reason for the U.S. bracketed listing calling
for two deployed ICBMs or SLBMs vice one to be inspected
during a warhead inspection. Warner stated that two ICBMs or
SLBMs were to be inspected to broaden the sample and provide
a more reliable basis on which to confirm that the inspected
side is in compliance with its obligation regarding deployed
warheads. He further stated the Russian side had frequently
expressed concern about U.S. upload potential and the United
States thought that a larger sample with each inspection
would address the Russian concern. The United States
believed that a larger sample provided greater confidence;
the tradeoff is that it takes more time. To minimize the
impact on the facility, the text provides that the second
silo or launcher must be located in the same launch group or
on the same SSBN as the first selected silo/launcher. To the
discussion of perceived Russian concerns over uploading, Ilin
responded that he thought the United States and Russia had
moved to a condition of greater transparency where we had
less concern that the other side would upload. Warner stated
that both sides had their own concerns and neither of us


completely trusts the other. Regarding warhead inspection of
two missiles, Ilin questioned whether the second missile
should be subject to the full cycle of the inspection
procedures. Warner responded "yes" since the Parties are
counting exact numbers of warheads; there is a need to follow
the full procedures to determine the exact number of reentry
vehicles on both missiles. Both sides agreed that inspecting
two missiles would require substantially greater time.

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WRAP-UP
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13. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed to stop at this point in the
review of Section VI, but Warner thought the IPWG would need
to work every day to accomplish the work. He proposed that
on Saturday both sides will have worked on analyzing each
other's draft of Article XI and can agree. Article XI should
be completed so it can be sent to the Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group (TTWG) and he asked the Russian
side's help to convince both Parties in the TTDWG that the
ideas in Article XI developed by the IPWG are valid.


14. (U) Documents exchanged:

- U.S.:

-- Joint Draft Text of Article XI and Proposed Text for
Exhibitions, dated 27 November 2009.

- Russia:

-- Draft of Article XI dated November 27, 2009.


15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Coussa
Maj Johnson
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Col Petrov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS